- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

My impending death
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since Vulis decided to drag in a disagreement from elsewhere, I have a brief invitation. He says I'm going to die in the next few months. My birthday is in October. So on my birthday in 1997, I'm going to have a party. All present will be invited to petition Vulis for more oracular pronouncements about the fate of past and present posters to Cypherpunks. In the meantime, I give thanks to the God of Killfiling, and fire mine up. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Encrypted file systems
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some more thoughts on encrypted file system design criteria. A wish list: - Choice of secret key encryption algorithms (IDEA, 3DES, MDC, Blowfish) - Multiple architectures (MSDOS, Win31, Win95, WinNT, Unix, Mac) - High performance (hand optimised assembler for each architecture) - Compression - Ability to chain algorithms (IDEA and then 3DES for example) - Possible to have encrypted file systems on separate partitions, or - Encrypted file system located in a file in another file system (much like DOS stacker drives) this is an ease of use criteria -- I suspect re-partitioning drives would put off many potential users. - Ease of use. Graphical user interface for setup and administration functions, with a very simple set of configurations options displayed by default, with more advanced configuration options available in "expert" mode. - All directory and FAT information should be encrypted, so that it is not possible to discover even number of files, or percentage of disk used without the key - Facility for duress key, with the real data hidden in the unused space of the first encrypted drive. To increase the plausible deniability all unused blocks within a file system should be filled with garbage, so that it is not possible to tell if there is more data there. - File system steganographically hidden in files on another file system (encrypted or not). Support for a wide selection of file formats (Aiff, Wave, Midi, JPEG, GIF, RGB, MPEG). - Ability to use stegoed file system in files on an unencrypted file system, and boot from a floppy to access stegoed file system, with no other traces left on hard disk. Thought for the day: the main barrier for a Chinese dissident to using such software is that being caught with a boot floppy with the software for a stegoed drive would be dangerous. What would solve this would be if Microsoft, Apple, UNIX vendors, Slackware linux included this functionality (or this software itself as useful freeware included with the CD distribution) in their respective O/Ses as non-optional modules -- that is you get the software installed whether you want it or not. If everyone has the software, mere possesion of the software no longer is a problem. Throw in a few useful utilities, like a steganographic interface to anonymous remailers, the address of a few ftp/www by email services, and you have a system with interesting possibilities. To improve the national security of the US, the NSA should be dropping CDs with such software (much like war-time propoganda leaflets air dropped) on undemocratic countries with poor human rights records. Instead they expend their efforts on ITAR... Adam -- #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:06 PM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >At 2:37 PM -0700 7/14/96, jim bell wrote: >>At 10:17 AM 7/14/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >>>Your best shot would be to make sure the part about the system being >>>voluntary was hard-wired into any legislation or rule-making. >> >>Wrong. Our "best shot" is to ensure that no "key escrow" legislation is >>adopted, and moreover export restrictions on crypto are eliminated. > >Nope. That's some people's preferred shot, but may not be the best one Okay, "best" by which definition? And don't avoid the question: Am I not free to reject YOUR opinion of what the "best" solution is FOR ME? >or even a realistic one. "Realistic"? Who's definition? >It's certainly a partisan political advocacy (in the >sense that people are partisan about this issue, not in the sense of a >particular political party). Meaningless tripe. All you're saying is that people disagree. People disagree about a lot of things; that doesn't legitimize opposing opinions. > Yet that attitude didn't get any legislation to stop Clipper I. We didn't NEED "any legislation to stop Clipper I." Quite the opposite, anyone promoting Clipper NEEDS legislation to force it on unwilling citizens. >My point was very simple--if the government is going to say a system is >voluntary, make them put it in writing in the rules or legislation. Why have the "system" in the first place? No legislation, no system. Simple. > We >failed to do that with Clipper I (when they said in non-rulesmaking >statements that they had no intention of making escrow mandatory--but >nobody said "OK. Put it in writing as a formal policy.") No, you're misrepresenting the issue: You're trying to subtly suggest that we should have agreed with MOST of the Clipper proposal AS LONG AS it was explicitly made voluntary. (Yet nothing prevents Congress from writing and passing a law which prohibits the executive branch of government from making escrow mandatory; they haven't done this.) Quite the contrary: I don't trust the government to implement any such proposal EVEN IF it is, ostensibly, "voluntary." The voluntary/involuntary aspect is an excellent reason to oppose Clipper, but is by no means the only one. Also, I don't trust the government's definition (and dynamically changeable interpretation) of the word, "voluntary." Since Clipper was funded with tax dollars stolen from the public its very existence is already a violation of the "voluntary" requirement. The fact that Clipper was developed without substantial public (and I mean PUBLIC, not some selected committee of bootlickers) input and debate proves that the government knew it could get no support for the idea. One of the recently revealing aspects of the government's dishonesty concerning Clipper was a clarification which stated that Clipper telephones could not communicate with any crypto telephone that didn't implement key escrow. But as anyone who followed the Beta vs. VHS competition saw, the market generally abhors two mutually incompatible standards, particularly if a certain level of compatibility is required or is at least desirable, and particularly if there is no good reason to maintain BOTH those standads. The main disadvantages to maintaining two tape formats was the inconvenience of sharing tapes with people who had the opposite format, the requirement that retail stores maintain two stocks, and the requirement that rental people support both formats. There were no powerful incentives to maintain two standards, and thus one had to die. Crypto telephones, by definition, need to be far more compatible with each other than VCR machines. They must actually talk to each other. Imagine a world in which there were two different crypto formats, and for stupid political reasons they were entirely incompatible: System "A" couldn't talk to system "B." What would happen? It's obvious: One format would kill the other. People wouldn't tolerate the compatibility. The US Government wanted the surviving system to be Clipper, and to accomplish this they used stolen tax dollars to secretly develop a system that they hoped would nip the potential competing systems in the bud. It didn't work, of course, but it is clear what they tried to do. If, on the other hand, there was no impediment to system "A" talking to system "B", both systems could easily co-exist. A few suckers would buy Clipper phones; the rest of us would insist on good encryption. Clipper would eventually die, just as Beta VCR's eventually did. The government understands this, that's why they inserted the requirement for incompatibility. >. As a result, many >in government even at the higher policy-making levels are still calling for >mandatory escrow. Had it been in the rules, it's less likely they could >have overtly gone against a rules-making covenant/compromise. Hmmmm... I thought Congress made arming the Contras in Nicaragua explicitly illegal. Yet Ollie North got away with it, effectively. What is it that makes you so certain that Government has gotten any more honest in the past 10 years? >It's simple pragmatic regulatory politics. And that's exactly the problem! That's because it's also wrong. We don't need to be "pragmatic" by YOUR definition. >It's how the system works, Actually, in the past the system has "worked" by suckering in the public, in exactly the way you're attempting to do. Tricking them into supporting things that were bad for them. Remember the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution"? > and >using the system itself to achieve one's goals is one of the more powerful >techniques around. You don't have to like it, but you do have to decide >whether you'd rather be "right" or get the result. In a sense, we ALREADY have "the result," or at least a substantial fraction of it. Development of domestic crypto is ostensibly free. The only thing desired further in the elimination of any residual restrictions, WITHOUT letting the government set up any sort of key-escrow system, voluntary OR involuntary. As far as I can see, cooperation at this point with the pro-GAK forces can only hurt the cause. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Markoff on Clipper III
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:33 PM 7/14/96 -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote: >On the Friday "Clipper III" rehash by the Admin: > >Balancing Privacy and Official Eavesdropping > > By JOHN MARKOFF > > "The president and vice president took an oath to protect our >national security," Simon said. "They feel they have to err on the side of >protecting national security." > > The government also said that it did not see an immediate >technical solution to the problems that would result from the global >proliferation of "strong cryptography." > >************** > >Last time I looked, the oath they took was to protect the Constitution -- >not the nation or national security. It's called "mission creep." And they didn't quite tell the truth: Their main loyalty is to "government security" or even "job security." >I don't see an "immediate technical solution" to strong crypto either. Or, >indeed, a long-term solution. Thank heavens for that! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by clark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: david(a)sternlight.com, jimbell(a)pacifier.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sun Jul 14 23:08:09 1996 > At 4:48 PM -0700 7/14/96, jim bell wrote a typically argumentative > message. > I've gotten wiser over time and don't plan to respond. I think both our > positions are quite clear and readers may make up their own minds. > > This post is a courtesy to others who may have been expecting more. It's > a > one-time statement to this list, which I've just joined, of my current > practice: Silence does not constitute assent. > > David More time required, apparently. Professional liars will put anything in writing. Judas' Sheep, too. Compromise is surrender. ec -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMenELqr9Bm6Zdjx5AQE4XQf+Je9KZ+3sVL+tACTfTxjqmnuzaq4XNvAN oH92/O5f4ilWYomeacqXYuEmc7Owk2bAVIA3IO2ZxbbBBKkb8Gy4xILEVyzVC825 +FDccpwwNETkVWGaLcoo8h7FHuWnNTfVmQ23IyTo7lIYy7g3Fkr4KJPBac4BInv4 GRy5qazCrLMEXHT0VHOrNsi+cCejlGBQAkrwqWNFonNVr3+FpZY9+Yo8AZGWTiPY d7yTWlFbAIANXLshSHatsVAb9uKTIzJeosGM9Hhq6hK9rYBXJhcfHat+7SkOKzJI we6Hgg4D/TVzLmJAo3X8yUPDDDm9YyA2RbdF1FLZg6qzYr+vvSjuTg== =2/4c -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.27 - No New News on Crypto: Gore Restates
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:05 PM 7/13/96 +0000, Deranged Mutant wrote: >On 12 Jul 96 at 18:23, Bob Palacios posted: > >[Banner Snipped!]] >> CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 27 July 12, 1996 >[..] > >> Today's statement is essentially a re-statement of the Clipper III proposal >> released in May. Among other things, the Vice President: >> >> * Called for the liberalization of export controls provided computer >> users participate in a "global key management infrastructure" >> designed to make personal encryption keys accessible to law >> enforcement. > >This is particularly problematic... if the mainland Chinese gov't >requested a key from a N.Amercian or European (or even UN controlled) >escrow agency, who is to say it isn't really for political reasons >(even though they may claim the persons are drug smugglers)? > >Or what if the 'crime' was, say, discussing Mormon beliefs, which is >illegal in Singapore (and I think Russia as well)? > >Or what if some terrorist was using keys escrowed in a country that >sponsered terrorist acts? Deranged Mutant is absolutely right. There are about 150 (or so) governments in the world. When people talk about making keys available to government (or law enforcement), always ask, "Which governments can access these keys?" If I were a non-French corporation, I would feel distinctly nervous if the answer included France. (There are a number of other countries where the security services have also been suspected of engaging in industrial espionage.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Defend Mail Bomb
by Jerome Tan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is it possible to defend mail bomb? If not, detect who they are?

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Clueless "Attachment converted" uses
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:48 AM 7/15/96, Gregory A Empey wrote: >On Thu, 20 Jun 1996 10:55:29 -0800 jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> >writes: >>At 10:59 AM 6/20/96 -0400, Intense wrote: >>> >>>does not matter - it will be renewed in the interest of the >>government >>>The goverment want's there backdoor... would you expect less? >> >>As far as I know, patents can't be "renewed." I've heard they can be >>"re-issued," amended, but to my knowledge that doesn't extend their >>term. >> >>Jim Bell >>jimbell(a)pacifier.com >> > > >Attachment converted: Macintosh HD:UUE.DOC (WDBN/MSWD) (0000FAD8) OK, I _usually_ delete these "Attachment converted" messages, which (fortunately) deletes the attachment in my "Attachments" folder, but for some reason this time I fired up my word processor and opened the attachment. All I found was this crap: "Hey, im ready to seriously f*ck-up MCI for no apparent reason, and im also giving credit card (and calling card) #'s away for no apparent reason, just reply to skitzo(a)juno.com." I urge people to NOT use attachments when ordinary plain text will obviously work. There's a time and a place for richly formatted messages, a la MIME, but not on a mailing list with heterogeneous platforms, mailers, and varying graphics capabilities. Think of our mailing list as being like Usenet, where graphics messages and oddball formats are frowned upon (except in the binaries groups, and a few of the non-English language groups). And especially not clueless nonsense like this call for "fucking up MCI." --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Word lists for passphrases
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:33 AM 7/15/96 -0700, David Sternlight wrote: >At 12:45 AM -0700 7/15/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >>At 09:43 PM 7/8/96 -0700, ??? wrote: >>>If the purpose is for use with "Crack" or some similar program, it might be >>>better than you would think. You won't get the "unusual" words, but you >>>will also get the words in common usage that do not appear in dictionaries. >>>(Such as fnord, jedi, killfile, and the like...) >> >>"fnord" is in _my_ dictionary - can't you find it in yours? :-) >> >>>Another thing to look for when choosing dictionaries/wordlists for crack is >>>not sticking to english. If you have a userbase that is known to have a >>>certain percentage of people of a non-english background, you will want to >>>find lists of words from that background. (I had a sysadmin asking me about >>>Yiddish and Hebrew wordlists for just that reason.) These can be a bit >>>harder. (Especially for unusual languages.) >> >>Grady Ward has his Moby Words databases with some of this kind of information. >>In addition to the usual sets of languages, it's useful to include any >>available lexicons of Elvish, Klingon, Unix, and other popular >>hacker-languages, > >It is pretty easy to defend against dictionary attacks by using an expanded >character set--mixed caps and lower case; numbers substituted for some >letters according to easily-remembered personal rules. Then I caution you to review the program 'Crack'. Crack comes with two sets of rules with which it mutates the words from two separate dictionaries. Things like: replace 'i' with 'y', 's' with '$', 'e' with '3', change capitalization to pattern AbCdE, etc. Typically, there is an extensive set of rules (I remember 47) that perform more "morphing" of a shorter "hot" dictionary list, followed by a common subset of the rules applied to the entire dictionary. The shorter dictionary list I remember seeing contained an extensive list of female first names, common computer "words" such as foo, bar, etc., and even some Klingon and Elvish words. These words were subjected to extensive letter shifting, case changing, and substitutions. The balance of the dictionary was subjected to the simpler subset of rules (22, I believe) regarding substitution, reversal of letters, capitalizing the first and/or last letters, suffixing a single non-alpha character, etc. I know a rather paranoid sa who used to think he had secure passwords because he'd look around for some "word" of some random object nearby, then transmogrify some letter (typically substituting 'y' for 'i'). Crack found him out in very short order. The reason I post this is that these word lists are invaluable to the Crack operator. *ANY* knowledge that reduces the search space can render the security useless. For example, if a Crack operator learns that you once had a password of "any0ne", he or she will make sure to include a rule substituting zero for 'o' in both dictionaries, they will probably make an effort to emphasize letter-to-number substitutions of the words in their dictionary, and maybe even focus less (or at least test last) on other attacks, such as case-changing or number-suffixing. Those "easily-remembered personal rules" to which you refer can catch you pretty quickly. >"Da5id" in "Snow Crash" by Neal Stephenson is an obvious example, since the >"v" is a roman numeral 5. Another is the "Compuserve method" of inserting >punctuation characters between words making up a password or key. Since the >length of the words used is unknown to the cracker, this makes his job >harder. Harder is not NP-hard. It's a very very long way away from NP-hard. >That is--a dictionary which accomodates such things as the above will be >pretty large. With the number rule, there would have to be 10 additional >versions of the one-letter word, 10 versions of each leading character >making up a two letter word, and then it starts increasing combinatorially. >Might as well use brute force. A "pretty large" dictionary is still much! smaller than brute force. And even if it is the precursor to brute-force, it's still a better starting point than 0x00000000000000, if you have reason to believe that it's based on an ASCII password. Just remember the old joke: entropy ain't what it used to be. And every generation of faster processor that arrives makes this statement more relevant to cryptanalysis. John -- J. Deters "Captain's log, stardate 25970-point-5. I am nailed to the hull." +-------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad(a)dsddhc.com (work) jad(a)pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'33"N by 93^16'42"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +-------------------------------------------------------+

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Errors-To: for cypherpunks
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Whoever is in charge of maintaining this mailnig list, PLEASE add header Errors-To: cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com I am flooded by stupid "Mailbox is full" messages from Banyan and CC-mail gateways. - Igor.

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