- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Clipper Key Escrow Details
by grendel＠netaxs.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Regarding the Clipper Key Escrow scheme: [1] Who has the ability to submit a warrant and request the key data from the two controlling government agencies? Do you have to be a Federal organization? Local? State? Could the Lower Merion Police Department (from Lower Merion, PA, technically where I live) attempt to obtain my escrowed key parts if they had a valid reason (and the knowledge / equipment to use it)? [2] What is to stop someone, once they have my escrowed key data, from archiving it for later use? Do the federal agencies in charge have any protocols or controls or protections against this? Thanks. -- ========================================================================== | Michael Brandt Handler | Philadelphia, PA | <grendel(a)netaxs.com> | | PGP 2.3a public key available via server / mail / finger | ==========================================================================

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Re: some animals are more equal than others
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>*EXCUSE ME!* Since when have the cops and judges cared about legality >of searches? For about thirty years now. You might recall kind of a major uproar when Ed Meese proposed throwing out the probable cause restrictions on searches several years back. >Am I confused? Well, frankly, it looks that way to me. >Oh, I forgot. He meant the searches for *US*. Not *THEM*. Get a grip. This isn't the first search that was thrown out for lack of probable cause. Call your local ACLU chapter. They can tell you all about it. Or do you feel that she should have been treated especially harshly for being the daughter of a Congressman? -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone be so kind as to shed some light on PGP v2.5? I've heard a couple of comments that it is available? If so, is this a public domain release, where is it available via anon ftp and what enhancements (if any) does it offer over the v2.3 release? Thanx.

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Re: Keyserver service outage (fwd)
by werner＠mc.ab.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Fri, 06 May 1994 07:43:03 -0400 >From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)snark.imsi.com> > >Mr. Nalbandian was only recently released from the hospital, and is >still having some small difficulty adjusting to normal society. I >suggest we help him along by restricting our expressions of >displeasure at his inappropriate public remarks in private email. As much as I hate to bring this up, are you certain that Nalbandian is not a Detweiler tentacle?

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(fwd) May 4 House Hearing on Clipper, F. Lynn McNulty testimony
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > > Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto > From: koontzd(a)io.lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz ) > Subject: May 4 House Hearing on Clipper, F. Lynn McNulty testimony > Message-ID: <1994May5.010923.17264(a)wdl.loral.com> > Originator: koontzd@io > Sender: news(a)wdl.loral.com > Organization: Loral Rolm Computer Systems > Date: Thu, 5 May 1994 01:09:23 GMT > Lines: 914 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Security on the Internet > > > > Statement of > F. Lynn McNulty > Associate Director for Computer Security > National Institute of Standards and Technology > U.S. Department of Commerce > > Before the > Subcommittee on Science > Committee on Science, Space, and Technology > U.S. House of Representatives > > March 22, 1994 > > I. INTRODUCTION > > Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: > > Thank you for inviting the National Institute of Standards and > Technology (NIST) to speak about security of the Internet and the > role NIST plays in its security. We share your belief in the > importance of security on the Internet. We also believe that > recent events affecting the security of Internet users reinforce > the need for attention and action. I want to address the > specific concerns and issues you have identified and discuss the > role that NIST plays in the security of both the Internet and the > evolving national information infrastructure. > > A. NIST's Computer Security Mission > > First, let me briefly review NIST's role in the computer security > area. Under the Brooks Act (P.L. 89-306), NIST is tasked with > developing Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for > unclassified federal computer systems. Our security activities > in this area were re-enforced by Congress in 1987 when it passed > the Computer Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235). The Act > stipulates that NIST shall "have responsibility within the > Federal Government for developing technical, management, > physical, and administrative standards and guidelines for the > cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive information in > Federal computer systems" (excepting classified systems and those > used to process "Warner Amendment" information covered by 10 > U.S.C. 2315). This role was essentially reiterated in P.L. 102- > 194, the High-performance Computing Act of 1991. > > In essence, then, NIST has the responsibility -- through > standards, guidance, and technology transfer -- for helping > agencies protect their information technology and applications. > It is important to recognize that it remains the responsibility > of agencies, service providers, and users of information > technology to develop, implement, and manage security programs > based on their specific risks and needs. > > > II. THE RECENT INTERNET SECURITY INCIDENT > > Let me now turn briefly to the recent incident that was perhaps > the primary impetus for these hearings. The testimony of the > representative from the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) > describes the technical details of the incident. I will try to > put the incident in a context and perspective. Later, I will > address more general Internet and NII security concerns. > > A. The Incident > > The recent incident involved the discovery of "password sniffer" > programs on hundreds of systems throughout the Internet. This > "incident" was really a series of incidents on host systems > around the Internet involving the exploitation of a combination > of vulnerabilities present in the Internet. First, I should note > that over the last few years there have been many security alerts > and incidents involving systems on the Internet. This incident > was different from "routine" or ongoing incidents primarily in > that it developed rapidly into a widespread pattern of similar > attacks and that it resulted in threats to many other systems. > > B. Major Vulnerabilities Exploited > > There were two major types of vulnerability that were exploited > in this incident -- neither, by the way, being actual > vulnerabilities of the Internet itself, but rather problems in > systems connected to the Internet. > > Obtaining Privileged Access - The first step in the password > sniffer attack requires the attacker to obtain privileged status > on a target host system. This can be done by exploiting any of a > wide range of known attacks. This normally can happen only when > that host system has not been properly configured and > administered to prevent unauthorized access. As such, this is > not an Internet vulnerability. Rather, it is a general problem > that all computer system administrators face and must address. > > Access to Passwords - The next steps in the attack involve the > installation of the "sniffer" program to monitor the system's > network interface port and the collection of log-in information, > including passwords. The problem was not the ability of a > properly authorized user to monitor the network port; this is > needed for effective system administration. The vulnerability > here was due to the fact that most computer systems on the > Internet (and other networks) employ re-usable passwords to > authenticate users. There was no exposure for host systems or > user accounts which employed non-reusable passwords or other > advanced methods (such as tokens or "smart cards") for user > authentication. This, again, is not an Internet vulnerability; > Internet protocols do not require host systems to use passwords > for user authentication. It should also be noted that encryption > of network layer information would not have solved this specific > problem, because the monitoring occurs at a point in the > compromised systems where messages are unencrypted anyway. > > In summary, while there were known vulnerabilities exploited in > this incident, they were vulnerabilities in the security > mechanisms of host systems, not the Internet itself. > Nevertheless, there was a serious and widespread impact of the > incident affecting many other systems on the Internet. > > C. Impact > > The serious impact of the recent incident should be recognized; > log-in information (i.e., account numbers and passwords) for > potentially thousands of host system user accounts appear to have > been compromised. It is clear that this incident had a negative > impact on the operational missions of some Government agencies. > Moreover, this should be viewed as ongoing incident, not an > incident that has happend and been dealt with. Indeed, > administrators of systems throughout the Internet were advised, > in turn, to direct their users to change their passwords. This > is, indeed, very significant, and we may be seeing its effects > for some time to come. Not only is it difficult, if not > impossible, to identify and notify every user whose log-in > information might have been compromised, it is unlikely that > everyone, even if notified, will change his or her passwords. > Therefore, we will probably continue to see unauthorized access > to user accounts resulting from the password "sniffing" activity > of this incident. Clearly, we need ways to minimize this kind of > problem in the future. > > D. Alerting and Response to the Incident > > A Success Story - Despite the serious impact of this incident, it > should be viewed as a clear and major success for organized > incident response activities. The existence and cooperation of > several operational security incident response teams was > instrumental in identifying this as more than a "routine" > incident and ensuring rapid response to it. A formal coalition > of response teams, known as FIRST (the Forum of Incident Response > and Security Teams) played an important role in the process. All > of the teams central to the incident are members of FIRST. The > Department of Energy's Computer Incident Advisory Capability > (CIAC) at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory first identified the > incident. CERT led efforts to analyize and assess the emerging > threat and issued initial alert messages to the other security > incident response teams that are members of FIRST (including > NIST). Individual teams then spread the word among their > constituencies. Also of particular note was the DoD Automated > System Security Incident Support Team (ASSIST), which has > coordinated world-wide response efforts for all of DoD. When it > was clear that the incident was particularly wide-spread, notices > were posted on several Internet "bulletin boards" and other > forums. A press release was also issued. (It is important to > note, however, that, because of the specific and inherently > technical nature of most such incidents, press releases are not > normally part of the alert process.) > > E. Lessons Learned > > This incident was the result of known vulnerabilities and > already-hypothesized attack scenarios. Rather than teach us new > lessons, it really re-emphasizes some lessons we've already > learned and simply increases a sense of urgency for advanced > authentication methods and other actions. Additional lessons > learned were: > > Effective incident response teams and alerting mechanisms > can (and, in this case, did) play an important role in > minimizing the impact of such incidents. > > Traditional user authentication by means of re-usable > passwords does not provide strong security in today's > networked environment -- with or without encryption. > > Exploitation techniques (and software which automates such > techniques) are rapidly shared across the network and can be > easily used by otherwise unskilled miscreants. In other > words, you don't have to be smart (or ambitious) enough to > build these "weapons" to be able to obtain them and use them > against others. > > Any host system, if improperly configured or managed, can > become an "unwitting" platform for an attack against other > systems in a network. Therefore, we need to mimimize the > need for reliance on the integrity of individual hosts for > the security of other hosts and users on the Internet. > > System administrators (which, because of the growing > number of workstations on the net, include an increasing > number of relatively unskilled users) need better awareness, > skills, and competence in protecting their systems; > > The importance of security to users of the Internet (and > by extension the evolving national information > infrastructure) can no longer be seen as secondary. If this > valuable national resource is to achieve its full potential, > its users must have confidence in the security of their data > and activities on the network. > > III. IMPROVING SECURITY ON THE INTERNET > > Clearly, much can be done to improve security in the Internet. > The initial, research-oriented Internet and its protocols were > designed for a more "benign" environment than now exists. It > could, perhaps, be described as a collegial environment in which > the users and host computer systems are mutually trusting and > interested in unrestrained sharing of information. The new > environment in which the Internet (and the NII) must operate is > much less collegial and trustworthy. It contains all the > situations, people, and risks that we find in the society as a > whole. Thus, we have begun to reexamine and adjust our "design > requirments" to reflect those new realities. Security is now a > primary concern. The collegial Internet of the past cannot be > the basis for the NII of the future. > > A. A Short History of Internet Security Incidents > > Despite the previous comment, security in the Internet is not > something that has never occurred to its users and operators. It > is important to understand what has taken place and what is > currently underway. > > In recent years, a number of security problems with networks in > general and the Internet in particular have received public > attention. The media have carried stories of high-profile > malicious hacker attacks via the Internet against government, > business, and academic sites. It often seems that hackers roam > the Internet with virtual impunity, masking their tracks while > moving from system to system. > > The Recent Incident Wasn't the First - Perhaps the first and > still most significant major incident involving the Internet was > the so-called Internet Worm, caused by Robert Morris, Jr. in > November of 1988. This incident, in effect, woke up the Internet > community to at least three facts: > > Everyone out there isn't a "good guy"; > > Internet protocols and applications had many inherent or > implementation vulnerabilities that create exposures to > misuse or intrusion; and > > The network community needed better methods of cooperation > to identify and react to network incidents and emergencies. > > The first two of the above factors won't change; the last remains > true, but has been and continues to be addressed. > > And It Won't Be The Last - In the years subsequent to the > Internet Worm, there have been some significant trends: > > Use of the Internet has grown exponentially -- and > continues unabated. With this has come a corresponding > increase in the number of people with a detailed technical > understanding of Internet systems -- and the potential > vulnerabilities of those systems. > > "Security" incidents, such as attempted system access, > actual system intrusions, and other exploitations of various > weaknesses of systems on the Internet, also have grown > dramatically. It is likely that almost every host system on > the Internet already has had at least some sort of security- > related incident. > > The number of unskilled users who must (or should) be > assuming network system administrator functions will > continue to increase -- simply because the number of systems > connected to the Internet is increasing. > > There are now growing organized efforts of Internet user > organizations to identify and deal with intrusions and > unauthorized system use. > > > B. Internet Vulnerabilities vs. Host System Vulnerabilities > > It is important to recognize that the vast majority of security > problems seen "on the Internet" are not really Internet problems > at all. We need to understand a subtle but important distinction > between the Internet and its host systems. > > The Internet is, in essence, a collection of computers, usually > called host systems, which are connected to underlying data > communications networks. These host systems (which may support > one or more human users) communicate with each other by means of > internet protocols. The internet protocols may be thought of as > the standard message formats by which the host systems establish > connections to each other and exchange information -- much like > the use of standard forms and procedures in an office > environment. > > Security vulnerabilities can exist in the underlying > communications network and its nodes, in the internet protocols, > in network administration, or in host systems. To use the > highway analogy, a communications problem might be like a > pothole, a bridge failure, or a closed road. A protocol problem > might be like a mis-marked exit sign or a failure of slower > traffic to stay in the slow lane. A network administration > problem might be the lack of emergency vehicle access or > notification and response procedures for accidents. Last, a host > system problem might be likened to a store proprietor along the > highway leaving the doors open and the store unoccupied. The > problem is not the proximity of the highway, but the carelessness > of the store proprietor (and the fact that not everyone on the > highway is honest). Most "Internet" security problems to date > have been careless -- or unknowlegeable -- proprietors. > > > C. The Role of the Internet in the NII > > The national information infrastructure is not some system that > will be "switched on" at some specified date in the future. The > NII, at least in its initial form, is here now, and like many > other national infrastructures, is made up of many -- often > disjoint -- elements. The issues that we in government and > industry must address are the directions in which we want the NII > to evolve and how to make that happen. In the administration's > guiding document on the development of the NII, The National > Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, one of the nine > guiding objectives is to "Ensure Information Security and Network > Reliability". > > One of the important elements in the current NII is the Internet. > The Internet may not, however, be the ultimate model or > technology for the NII. Nevertheless, it serves important roles > in the evolution of the NII. First, it is a working example of > effective global computer networking. Second, it is a possible > model for future network technology. Last -- and perhaps most > importantly -- the Internet serves as a sort of living laboratory > in which we can develop and experiment with technologies, > applications, and concepts of information sharing that will be > useful or necessary in the next century. Again, security > mechanisms are central to the process. > > D. The National Performance Review > > The importance of information technology security in general and > Internet security in particular was recognized in the Vice > President's National Performance Review. In the area of > information technology security, the following primary objectives > were identified: > > Development of cryptographic standards > Development of a set of generally-accepted system security > practices > Establishment of a national crisis response clearinghouse > Improved security awareness > Security of the public switched telecommunications network > Internet security > Coordinated security research and development > > In addition, the NPR report cited specific objectives in the > related area of Privacy: > Establishment of a Privacy Protection Board > Development of a set of Fair Information Handling > Practices > > NIST has the lead responsibility in some of these items and a > role in all of them. Although each has some relevance to > Internet security, two items are of particular relevance. > > Internet Security - This specifically focuses on the Internet. > It involves the development of an overall Internet security plan. > The Federal Networking Council has the lead in this activity, > with the participation of several other organizations, including > NIST. > > National Crisis Response Clearinghouse - This will be, in > essence, the expansion and application of the FIRST concept to > the entire Federal Government. NIST has the lead responsibility > for this item. > > E. A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy > > One of the clear directions of the administration is for agencies > to "get connected". Initially, that means electronic mail, and > to most agencies, that means "on the Internet". This presents us > with an interesting situation. For years, the reason that many > agencies used as a reason not to connect to the Internet was > concern over security -- "We don't want to open ourselves up to > hackers." Now, agencies are likely to rush headlong "onto the > Internet" without careful planning, personnel skills, and > knowledge of the security considerations. The likely result, if > we are not careful, is that we will see significant occurrences > of those security problems that the agencies were always worried > about -- a self-fulfilling prophecy. > > This is not to suggest that we should not be moving forward > agressively on connecting to the Internet; the benefits of this > initiative are clear and compelling. However, it does require > that we undertake this effort with care and intelligence. > > NIST's Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board > (CSSPAB) will be examining this very issue at their quarterly > meeting on March 23rd and 24th. They will be examining the > several agencies' plans for putting agency mission critical > systems on the Internet. > > F. Security Incident Response Efforts > > The Need - Regardless of the security technology and other > measures we put in place on the Internet -- or any other network > -- we will always have security incidents. We will discover > exploitable vulnerabilities. We will suffer intrusions, attacks, > thefts, fraud, network failures, errors and omissions, and > uncountable other possible risks. Since we will never be able to > anticipate, much less prevent all of these problems, we must have > in place effective mechanisms for dealing with them when they do > occur. This is the role of security incident response efforts. > The recent Internet incident reinforces the need for such > activities and demonstrates their value and effectiveness. > > FIRST - Beginning with the aftermath of the 1988 Internet worm > incident, it was recognized that better methods for incident > response and information sharing were needed. It was also clear > that the establishment of a single team or "hot line" would not > work; it would simply be overwhelmed. Out of this was born the > concept of a coalition of response teams -- each serving its own > constituency, but working with the others to share information, > provide alerts, and provide mutual support in the response to > incidents and potential incidents. That concept was embodied in > FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams. FIRST > has grown from an initial group of eleven, mostly Government, > teams to over thirty teams now. These teams include Government, > industry, computer manufacturers, and academia -- both U.S. and > international. > > Sharing Sensitive Security Incident Information - In discussing > these well-publicized problems, I think it is important to stress > that we at NIST believe that it is not a good idea to just > publicly announce system security weaknesses, in the hope that > such publicity will result in immediate solutions. Some, indeed > most, security weaknesses cannot be fixed overnight -- for > example, it takes time to correct errors in operating systems, > test the new code, distribute the updated code, and install the > code. Inappropriate publicity about some kinds of weaknesses > will merely serve as a call for their exploitation by malicious > hackers. > > The FIRST concept addresses this problem by establishing a means > for developing a level of trust and cooperation among teams that > permits sharing of information. The FIRST "membership" process > involves endorsement from an existing member, thus providing an > initial level of confidence. Further interactions among teams > have build a level of trust and cooperation that probably could > never have existed otherwise. > > We believe we have demonstrated the success of this concept over > the last few years of FIRST's existence. Groups who would have > never discussed security problems outside their own confines have > been able to work together with the confidence that they can gain > from the knowledge and experience of other groups without > exposing their organizations to attack in the process. > > NIST's Role in FIRST - NIST has played a leadership role in FIRST > from the beginning. NIST led efforts to bring together existing > teams, develop an operational framework, and get the activity > underway. NIST continues to serve as the secretariat of FIRST. > In that role, we provide coordination and technical support. For > example, we established and administer the electronic mail > alerting network used by FIRST members. We are currently > developing plans for a much more aggressive expansion of FIRST > membership throughout the Government. To date, the most active > FIRST members in the Government have been teams from the > "traditional" Internet communities -- the DoD and research > agencies. We are anxious to see more active participation on the > part of the rest of the civilian agencies of Government as they > increasingly become "network players". > > Individual Response Teams - The role of the individual response > team cannot be ignored. These teams are the essence of FIRST. > They must establish procedures for managing incidents within > their defined constituencies, and they must be able to > communicate with the other FIRST teams. The major hurdle we have > seen for agencies to become active in incident reponse activities > (aside from the lack of Internet connectivity in many cases) is > the need to develop an incident response "mindset" to complement > the traditional policy and procedures approach of many computer > security programs. To help address this problem, we published in > 1991 a guidance document, NIST Special Publication 800-3, > Establishing a Computer Security Incident Response Capability. > > In summary, we believe that organized, coordinated, and effective > security incident response efforts throughout government (and > beyond) are critical to the security of the Internet (and the > NII) now and in the future. > > > G. Security Technology > > Security technology is important for the effective enforcement of > security policies in any computer system. Such technology is > especially important in a highly distributed, networked > environment -- such as the Internet -- in which physical and > administrative controls are limited. > > Security Services - Five major security services are identified > in International Standard 7498-2. This standard was developed to > specify the security aspects of the Open System Interconnect > (OSI) model of computer networks. The security services (and a > short explanation of each) include: > > Authentication - Verification of the claimed identity of a > computer or computer network user; > > Access Control - Verification and enforcement of the > authorized uses of a computer network by a user subsequent > to authentication; > > Data Integrity - Verification that the contents of a data > item (e.g., message, file, program) have not been > accidentally or intentionally changed in an unauthorized > manner; > > Data Confidentiality - Protection of the information > content of data from unauthorized disclosure; > > Non-repudiation - Protection against denial of sending (or > receiving) a data item by the sender (or receiver). > > These major security services should be augmented by a number of > auxiliary services (audit, availability assurance) and support > services (key management, security maintenance, network > management). An integrated security system must offer all these > services with a number of security mechanisms implemented in a > number of security products. Technology will advance and provide > for newer, cheaper, better products but the overall security > system need not be changed drastically if it is designed > properly. NIST is working with several organizations seeking an > overall security architecture for unclassified information. An > integrated security system can then be designed with > interchangeable and interoperable parts as needed. > > Advanced Authentication - Since reusable passwords are the > weakest security link in the present Internet, better, more > advanced, authentication techniques are needed. A spectrum of > solutions exist ranging from "one-time" passwords to high tech, > biometric identification systems. Token based authentication and > access control systems appear to be a reasonable compromise among > the goals of low cost, high security and system simplicity. NIST > has developed several token based security systems and continues > to evaluate several new alternatives. Most are based on > something a user carries with them, like a "smart card" or "smart > token" or "smart disk." Software modules unique to an individual > will also suffice if good software protection is provided to the > information in the module. > > Public Key Infrastructure - A public key infrastructure (PKI) is > a part of an integrated security system that is needed to support > certain user authentication, data integrity and data > confidentiality services. A PKI is a distributed system > consisting of people and computers that will verify the correct > identity of a person seeking authorization to use a computer > system or network and then associate a public key with that user > in a highly secure manner. The certificate issuer in the PKI > produces an electronic certificate which contains the identity of > a user, the user's public key, some auxiliary information for the > security system and the digital signature of the CERTIFICATE > ISSUER. The PKI should be established so that a secure "chain of > certificates" is established between any pair of users anywhere, > perhaps, in the world. This allows someone to sign a secure > message, funds transfer or electronic contract and then allows > anyone else to verify the source and authenticity of the message, > etc. NIST, along with several other organizations, are seeking > to design, implement and coordinate the requisite security > services of the PKI. > > Obstacles to Deployment and Use of Security Technology in the > Internet - There are several current impediments to widespread > adoption and use of advanced computer security technologies > within the Internet. However, these should be viewed as > obstacles, not barriers. > > Historic Community Culture - The Internet community has > historically emphasized openess in communications. Computer > security has been viewed as interfering with this goal. > > Internet Management Organization - The Internet is a > loosely coupled coalition of organizations and activities > without a central management structure. Minimal rules must > be followed in order to connect to the Internet backbone > communication system, and certain protocols must be followed > in order to communicate with others on the network. There > are few policies or practices which specify acceptable use > or adequate security (even though policies for both of these > have been developed). The National Performance Review (NPR) > has identified a need for such policies. > > Availability of Security Systems - While there are many > individual security products (seeking a small number of > narrow niche markets), there is still a lack of integrated > security systems. An example of such an integrated security > system would be a commercially supported electronic mail > security mechanism (integrating a comprehensive key > management support system, user authentication and > authorization support services, and user message security > services). > > Interoperability - The commercial security products that > solve similar security problems usually are not > interoperable. A given product may have a large number of > features and interfaces, but will not interoperate with > those of other products. Thus, communities of interest may > adopt and use one product, but those users must obtain a > second product in order to communicate with someone in > another community of interest. Lack of interoperable > products often delay a user from selecting and using any > security until either a de facto or de jure standard > emerges. > > Costs - Since there is yet no universal market for > security products fitting into a seamless security system, > the costs of individual security products built to fill > niche markets are currently high. However, costs will go > down as volume and competition increase. > IV. ORGANIZATIONS, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES > > There are several organizations in the Government and in the > private sector that have roles in the security of the Internet. > It would be difficult to identify them all here. Therefore, I > will describe briefly NIST's activities and our involvement in > other Internet-related organizations or activities. > > NIST computer security activities have both direct and indirect > relevance to security on the Internet. In general, our programs > address information technology security in all environments. > Howerver, since the Internet is such an important element in our > work and of an increasing number of Government agencies, we have > a number of activities directed specifically at the Internet. > > A. NIST's Computer Security Activities > > Overall Program - In carrying out its mission, NIST seeks to > develop cost-effective security standards and guidelines for > federal systems. These are often voluntarily adopted by those > outside the federal community. We are working in many areas to > develop both the technology and standards and technology that > will be needed in the long term, and addressing short term > requirements for better training and awareness. We have issued > guidelines or standards on many facets of computer security, > including: computer security awareness training, cryptographic > standards, password generation, smart card technology, security > of electronic commerce, viruses and other malicious code, risk > management, and PBX security. We have also issued bulletins on > many computer security issues, which may be of interest to > federal agencies and private sector organizations, including a > July 1993 bulletin on security considerations in connecting to > the Internet. NIST works directly with federal computer security > program managers through our Federal Computer Security Program > Managers' Forum. We also participate on many voluntary standards > activities, and participate in various interagency forums. > > While NIST has published guidance in a wide variety of areas, > including Internet-specific topics, NIST's computer security > program is not focused primarily on the Internet -- or any other > specific network or technology. Operational responsibility for > the Internet, and thus specific, operational responsibility for > security, rests outside NIST. Nevertheless, the Internet is > central to much of the information technology activities and > plans of Government agencies, and NIST has a responsibility to > address those needs. > > General Activities Affecting the Internet - Some of the general > research, standards, and guidance activities of NIST that affect > the Internet include the following: > > Smartcard technology development and application > Advanced authentication technology development and > application > Trusted systems criteria and evaluation > Cryptographic methods, interfaces, and applications > > > Specific Activities Affecting the Internet - In addition, NIST > has undertaken a number of activities that focuse directly on > Internet security issues. These include the following: > > CSL Bulletins - guidance on connecting to the Internet > Special Publications - guidance on Incident Response > Capability > FIRST leadership and support > > Firewalls Research - One of the most actively examined methods of > protecting systems or subnetworks connected to the Internet is > the use of "firewalls" -- specially-programmed machines to > control the interface between a subnetwork and the Internet. > NIST has established, with the assistance of the National > Communications System and others, a new Firewalls Research > Laboratory effort to extend and share knowledge in this important > area. > > In addition to these programmatic activities, NIST is involved in > a number of groups and activities that are directly involved in > Internet security. > > B. Information Infrastructure Task Force > > Security is being addressed on several fronts in the Information > Infrastructure Task Force (IITF). There are specific security > efforts in each of the three main committees of the IITF, plus > the Privacy Working Group of the Information Policy Committee. > NIST is involved all of these efforts. > > C. OMB Circular A-130 > > NIST is working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in > the revision of Appendix III of OMB Circular A-130. This > appendix specifically addresses agency information technology > security programs. Although this does not address the Internet > specifically, we expect the new appendix to include the > requirement for agency incident response capabilities. > > D. Federal Networking Council > > The Federal Networking Council (FNC) is an interagency group > which coordinates the computer networking activities of federal > agencies that serve general and specific research communities. > The FNC established a security working group to address various > security needs and seek common security services and mechanisms > meeting these needs. The security working group, under the > leadership of NIST, has initiated the following activities: > > Security Policy for Use of the National Research and Education > Network - a high level security policy which specifies the > principles and goals of security in the NREN and then assigns > responsibilities to six categories of participants in the NREN > (completed and approved by the FNC). > > Security Architecture for the NREN - a comprehensive but generic > categorization of the components of security needed to satisfy > the security requirements of the NREN. This activity has been > initiated but not completed. > > Security Action Plan for the NREN - a first draft of an action > plan for developing and fielding security prototype components > (e.g., smartcards, access control tokens) has been developed; > participants in the user acceptance testing are being solicited. > > > E. Internet Society Security Activities > > The sponsors and supporters of the Internet have conducted > several security activities over the past several years. The > CERT and FIRST activities, previously described, were major > activities to alert users of potential and on-going security > problems and to provide information on what to do about them. > The following are other activities and the roles that NIST has > played in each of them. > > Internet Security Policy - The Internet Engineering Task Force > (IETF) sponsored the development of a policy for secure operation > of the Internet. This policy specified six basic guidelines for > security: > > assure individual accountability; > employ available security mechanisms; > maintain security of host computers; > provide computers that embody security controls; > cooperate in providing security; and > seek technical improvements. > > These guidelines were expanded and clarified in the Security > Policy for Use of the National Research and Education Network. > NIST participated in the development of the Internet security > policy and was a major player in development of the NREN security > policy. > > Privacy Enhanced Mail - The IETF sponsored the development of the > Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) system. PEM provides the ability to > protect the integrity and confidentiality (i.e., privacy) of > electronic messages on a user-selected basis. PEM utilizes the > popular Simple Mail Transfer Protocol as the foundation for > private (sometimes also called, trusted or secure) mail. PEM > uses the Federal Data Encryption Standard for confidentiality > protection. Digital signatures are used to assure the integrity > of a message and to verify the source (originator) of the > message. NIST was a participant in the group that developed the > specifications for PEM. It is available both as a free, > unsupported software package and a licensed supported software > system.V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS > > In summary, then, I think that recent Internet security > experiences have taught us -- or have reinforced -- some > important lessons, and there are some obvious actions that should > follow. > > A. Lessons and Conclusions > > The Internet Is a Lightning Rod - The public already knows about > the Internet and understands that the Internet will be a part of > the national information infrastructure. Thus, any security > problems affecting the Internet reflect on the entire NII effort > and could undermine the public's confidence in and willingness to > use that developing infrastructure. > > Internet Security is Not a "Second Tier" Issue - The attention > that security incidents receive in the media and the impact that > recent incidents have had on the operations of some agencies and > other Internet users make it clear that security is now a first > level concern that must be addressed. > > Organized Incident Response Efforts Work - Despite the widespread > impact of recent incident, it is clear that organized, > cooperative incident response efforts -- which we in the Federal > Government had in-place -- were instrumental in identifying and > mitigating its effect. This incident reinforces the importance > and need for such efforts. > > Traditional, Re-Usable Passwords are Inadequate in a Network > Environment - The nature of data communications networks makes > unacceptable the continued reliance on traditional, re-usable > passwords for user authentication. > > Secure Systems Operations Require Skilled Personnel - The highly > powerful and sophisticated workstations that are increasingly > being connected to the Internet are often operated by technically > unskilled users. Further, most systems come "out of the box" > configured for the easiest-to-install-and-use options -- usually > also the most insecure configuration. To be installed, > connected, and operated securely, these systems currently require > the users to be full-fledged system adminstrators, not just > "ordinary users". This is an unreasonable and unrealistic > expectation. > > B. Recommendations for Action > > Implement the NII/NPR Action Items - The recommendations of the > National Performance Review in the area of information technology > security address specifically some of the needs for the Internet. > NIST and the other action agencies will be working to implement > those recommendations. > > Deploy Advanced Authentication Technology - We must move forward > agressively to deploy already-available technology to replace the > traditional re-usable password as the method of choice for user > authentication. Technologies developed at NIST and those > becoming available in the marketplace can make marked > improvements in the near term. In the longer term, we must begin > establishment of sectoral and national certificate > infrastructures to enable more generally available and > interoperable methods of authentication. > > Promote and Expand Incident Response Activities - The concept > works. We must now move actively to ensure that agencies > throughout Government and constituencies nation-wide establish > active and cooperating incident response capabilities. NIST > plans to continue to lead such efforts within the Government and > promote them world-wide through FIRST and similar activities. > > Educate and Train System Administrators - In the long run, we > cannot demand that users of increasingly sophisticated technology > be technical experts, i.e., system administrators. We must find > ways to deliver secure systems "out of the box". In the short > term, however, we must better train system users. If agencies > are going to connect their networks (and thereby their agencies) > to the Internet and other external networks, their technical > personnel must understand the risks involved and be trained and > equipped to manage such connections securely. NIST and others > have published technical guidance to assist in this process and > will be developing additional guidance in the future. Agencies > must take it upon themselves, however, to ensure adequate > technical training of their personnel. > > Use Available Security Technology - Computer users, system > administrators, and service providers should evaluate and, where > cost-effective, employ current security products and technologies > to reduce risks to acceptable levels. > > C. Conclusion > > There are always trade-offs involved in the use of new or complex > technology -- especially in something as potentially universal as > the Internet and the evolving national information > infrastructure. The challenge, of course, is to find the right > balance of risks and costs against the benefits. However, I must > emphasize that even with a complete restructuring and replacement > of the current Internet we would continue to have security > incidents and other problems. Historically, with the > introduction of any new technology, the miscreants and charlatans > are not far behind. Our task is to work as hard as we can to > anticipate and avoid such problems and, we hope, get and stay a > step or two ahead of the game. I would also like to assure you > that NIST -- in concert with the several other key players in the > Internet -- is both aware of the importance of Internet security > in the context of the evolving national information > infrastructure and actively undertaking efforts to meet that > need. > > Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for the opportunity to > speak to your committee. We at NIST -- and the other communities > of interest involved in the Internet and the NII -- look forward > to working with your committee and others in the Congress on this >

1 0

(fwd) May 4 House Hearing on Clipper, Raymond Kammer testimony
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > > Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto > From: koontzd(a)io.lrcs.loral.com (David Koontz ) > Subject: May 4 House Hearing on Clipper, Raymond Kammer testimony > Message-ID: <1994May5.010435.17066(a)wdl.loral.com> > Originator: koontzd@io > Sender: news(a)wdl.loral.com > Organization: Loral Rolm Computer Systems > Date: Thu, 5 May 1994 01:04:35 GMT > Lines: 667 > > Statement of > Raymond G. Kammer > Deputy Director, National Institute of Standards and > Technology > Before the > > Committee on the Judiciary > U.S. Senate > > and > > House of Representatives > Committee on Science, Space & Technology > Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation > > May 3, 1994 > > > Introduction > > Good morning. My name is Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy Director of > the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and > Technology (NIST). Thank you for inviting me here today to > testify on the Administration's key escrow encryption initiative. > The Computer Security Act of 1987 assigns NIST responsibility for > the development of standards for protecting unclassified > government computer systems, except those commonly known as > "Warner Amendment systems" (as defined in Title 10 U.S.C. 2315). > > In response to the topics in which the Committee expressed an > interest, I would like to focus my remarks on the following: > > 1) the principal encryption policy issue confronting us, > > 2) the importance of encryption technology, > > 3) how voluntary key escrow encryption technically works > and how it ensures privacy and confidentiality, > > 4) alternatives to the voluntary key escrow initiative, > > 5) critical components of the Administration's policy on > encryption technology, > > 6) recent initiative to modify Secure Hash Standard, and > > 7) the effectiveness of the Computer Security Act of 1987. > > 1. The Principal Encryption Policy Issue > > First, I would like to broadly outline an important public policy > and societal issue confronting us today regarding unclassified > government and commercial cryptography. In developing > cryptographic standards, one can not avoid two often competing > interests. On the one hand are the needs of users -- corporate, > government, and individual -- in protecting telecommunications > transmissions of sensitive information. Cryptography can be used > for excellent information protection. On the other hand are the > interests of the national security and law enforcement > communities in being able to monitor electronic communications. > In particular, I am focusing upon their need for continued > ability to keep our society safe from crime and our nation > secure. > > Rapid advances in digital telecommunications have brought this > issue to a head. Some experts have stated that, within ten > years, most digital telecommunications will be encrypted. Unless > we address this issue expeditiously, law enforcement will lose an > important tool in fighting crime--the ability to wiretap--and the > mission of our Intelligence Community will be made more > difficult. The Committee is undoubtedly aware of the benefits > such intelligence brings to the nation. This matter raises broad > societal issues of significant importance. I have personally > been involved in many meetings of a philosophical and wide- > ranging nature to discuss this dilemma. > > Four broad conceptual alternatives emerged: > > Seek a legislative mandate criminalizing the use of > unauthorized cryptography. > > Seek wide adoption of an encryption method with an > unannounced "trap door." This was never seriously > considered. > > Seek wide voluntary adoption of a technology > incorporating a secure "key escrow" scheme. > > Allow technology to evolve without government > intervention; in effect, do nothing. > > None of these options satisfies all interested parties fully. I > doubt such a solution even exists, but the Administration has > chosen the voluntary key escrow technology approach as the most > desirable alternative for protecting voice communications without > impairing the ability of law enforcement agencies to continue to > conduct wiretaps. For data communication the long-standing Data > Encryption Standard has recently been recertified for use. > > It is interesting to note that other countries have faced this > same issue and chosen different solutions. France, for example, > outlaws the use of unregistered cryptographic devices within its > borders. > > 2. The Importance of Encryption Technology > > Encryption provides one of the best ways to guarantee information > integrity and obtain cost-effective information confidentiality. > Encryption transforms intelligible information into an > unintelligible form. This is accomplished by using a > mathematical algorithm and a "key" (or keys) to manipulate the > data in a complex manner. The resulting enciphered data can then > be transmitted without fear of disclosure, provided, of course, > that the implementation is secure and the mathematical-based > algorithm is sound. The original information can then be > understood through a decryption process. As I shall discuss, > knowledge of the particular key utilized for a particular > encryption of information (or, in the case of asymmetric > cryptography, knowledge of the associated key of the key pair) > allows decryption of the information. For this reason, such keys > are highly protected. > > Uses of Cryptography > > Encryption can be used in many applications for assuring > integrity and confidentiality, or both. It can be used to > protect the integrity and/or confidentiality of phone calls, > computer files, electronic mail, electronic medical records, tax > records, corporate proprietary data, credit records, fax > transmissions and many other types of electronic information. It > is expected that cryptographic technologies will be used on a > voluntary basis in the protection of information and services > provided via the National Information Infrastructure. > > Encryption used with these and other types of information > protects the individual privacy of our citizens including, for > example, their records and transactions with government agencies > and financial institutions. Private sector organizations can > also benefit from encryption by securing their product > development and marketing plans, for example. It also can > protect against industrial espionage by making computers more > secure against unauthorized break-ins and, if data is encrypted, > making it useless for those without the necessary key. > > The government has long used cryptography for the protection of > its information -- from that involving highly classified defense > and foreign relations activities to unclassified records, such as > those protected under the Privacy Act. My point here is not to > list all potential applications and benefits but to give you a > feel for the innumerable applications and benefits which > encryption, when securely implemented, can provide. > > Hazards of Cryptography > > Counterbalanced against its benefits, encryption also can present > many substantial drawbacks -- to both the government and other > users. First and foremost, encryption can frustrate legally > authorized criminal investigations by the federal, state, and > local law enforcement agencies. As their representatives can > better explain, lawful electronic surveillance has proven to be > of the utmost benefit in both investigating and prosecuting > serious criminal activity, including violent crime. > Cryptographic technologies can also seriously harm our national > security and intelligence capabilities. As I shall discuss, the > Administration recognizes that the consequences of wide-spread, > high quality encryption upon law enforcement and national > security are considerable. > > Encryption may also prove a potential hazard to other users, such > as private sector firms, particularly as we move into the > Information Age. Private firms, too, are concerned about the > misuses of cryptography by their employees. For example, a rogue > employee may encrypt files and offer the "key" for ransom. This > is often referred to as the "data hostage" issue. Keys can also > be lost or forgotten, resulting in the unavailability of data. > Additionally, users of encryption may gain a false sense of > security by using poorly designed or implemented encryption. To > protect against such hazards, some corporations have expressed > interest in a "corporate" key escrowing capability to minimize > harm to their organizations from internal misuse of cryptography. > As security experts point out, such a false sense of security > can be worse than if no security measures were taken at all. > Encryption is not a "cure-all" to all security problems. > > Let me now turn to the details of the Administration's key escrow > encryption initiative. > > 3. Voluntary Key Escrow Encryption Initiative > > Goals of the Voluntary Key Escrow Encryption Initiative > > I will begin my remarks about the government-developed key escrow > encryption chips (referred to as "chips" herein) by discussing > the goals that we were trying to achieve in developing this > technology for application to voice-grade communication. > > At the outset, we sought to develop a technology which provides > very strong protection for government information requiring > confidentiality protection. Much of the sensitive information > which the government holds, processes, and transmits is personal > and requires strong protection. Tax records and census data are > two such examples. We sought nothing less than excellent > protection for government communications. In order to allow > agencies to easily take advantage of this technology, its > voluntary use (in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) > 185) to protect telephone communications has been approved by the > Secretary of Commerce. > > The chips implementing FIPS 185 efficiently support applications > within the its scope. They far exceed the speed requirements of > commercial modems existing today or envisioned for the near > future. > > In addition to the need for strong information protection, the > increasingly digitized nature of advanced telecommunications is > expected to significantly hamper the ability of domestic law > enforcement to carry out lawfully authorized wiretapping. Their > problem has two dimensions. > > First, the design and complexity of the nation's > telecommunications networks makes locating those communications > which can be lawfully tapped very difficult. This is the digital > telephony issue, which my law enforcement colleague will discuss > today. > > Second, the proliferation of encryption is expected to make law > enforcement's tasks more difficult. If a telephone conversation > is encrypted, resources must be expended for decryption, where > feasible. Such expenditures and technical capabilities are > normally far outside the ability of local law enforcement > organizations and could be quite significant at the federal > level. In seeking to make available a strong encryption > technology, we have sought to take in to account the needs of the > law enforcement community. For example, one of the reasons that > the SKIPJACK algorithm, the formula on which the key escrow chip > is based, is being kept classified is that its release would make > their job much harder were it to be used to hide criminal > activity. > > Misconceptions Concerning the Purpose of the Voluntary Key Escrow > Encryption Initiative > > A number of those opposed to this Administration initiative have > expressed doubt about whether the key escrow encryption > initiative can do anything to solve this nation's crime problem. > Of course, this initiative cannot by itself do so. The basic > intent of the program is the provision of sound security, without > adversely affecting other government interests, including, when > necessary, the protection of society through lawfully authorized > electronic surveillance. > > The voluntary key escrow encryption initiative, first and > foremost, was devised to provide solid, first-rate cryptographic > security for the protection of information held by the government > when government agencies decide such protection is needed for > unclassified government communications -- for example, tax, > social security and proprietary information. (The Escrowed > Encryption Standard (FIPS 185) allows federal agencies to use > this technology for protection of telephone communications.) > This was done, in part, with the realization that the current > government cryptographic technique, the Data Encryption Standard > (which was recently re-approved) is over fifteen years old; while > DES is still sound, its usefulness will not continue > indefinitely. We also recognized that were we to disclose an > even stronger algorithm (with the government's "seal of > approval"), it could be misused to hamper lawful investigations, > particularly electronic surveillance. > > In approving this initiative, we felt it important that > protective measures be taken to prevent its misuse -- a safety > catch, if you will. This will help assure that this powerful > technology is not misused if adopted and used voluntarily by > others. Our method of providing this safety mechanism relies > upon escrowing cryptographic key components so that, if the > technology is misused, lawful investigations will not be > thwarted. Additionally, the algorithm (SKIPJACK) will remain > classified so that its only uses will be consistent with our > safety mechanism, key escrowing. I think it is fair to say that > use of this powerful algorithm without key escrowing could pose a > serious threat to our public safety and our national security. > > Key Escrow Encryption Technology > > The National Security Agency, in consultation with NIST and the > federal law enforcement community, undertook to apply voluntary > key escrow encryption technology to voice-grade communications. > The product of this effort was announced in the April 16, 1993 > White House release concerning the key escrow encryption chip. I > note that we have chosen to discontinue use of the term "Clipper > Chip" to avoid potential confusion with products and services > with similar names. > > The state-of-the-art microcircuit, the key escrow encryption > chip, can be used in new, relatively inexpensive encryption > devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone. It > scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm > more powerful than many in commercial use today. The SKIPJACK > algorithm, with an 80-bit long cryptographic key,is approximately > 16 million times stronger than DES. For the record, I will > restate my earlier public statements that there is no trapdoor in > the algorithm. > > Each key escrow encryption chip has two basic functions. The > first is an encryption function, which is accomplished by the > SKIPJACK algorithm, developed and rigorously tested by NSA. The > second function is a law enforcement access method. I will > discuss each briefly. > > The SKIPJACK algorithm is a symmetric algorithm (as opposed to > "public-key" algorithms). Basically, this means that the same > cryptographic key (the session key) is used for both encryption > and decryption. The algorithm is so strong that the Department > of Defense will evaluate it for use in protecting selected > classified applications. > > The second basic function of the chip is the provision for law > enforcement access under lawful authorization. To do so, each > chip is programmed with three values: a cryptographic family > key, a device unique key, and a serial number. (The device > unique key is split into two key components which are then > encrypted and are provided to the two current escrow agents, NIST > and the Automated Systems Division of the Department of the > Treasury, for secure storage.) These three values are used in > conjunction with the session key (which itself encrypts the > message) in the creation of the law enforcement access field. > When law enforcement has obtained lawful authorization for > electronic surveillance, the serial number can be obtained > electronically. Law enforcement can then take the serial number > and a certification of their legal authorization to the two > escrow agents. (Detailed procedures for the release of these key > components were issued by the Department of Justice in early > February.) After these certifications are received, the > encrypted components will be transmitted by escrow agent > officials for combination in the decrypt-processor. > > After decryption of the key components within the decrypt > processor, the two key components are then mathematically > combined, yielding the device unique key. This key is used to > obtain another key, the session key, which is used to decrypt and > understand the message. This device unique key may be used by > law enforcement only for the decryption of communications > obtained during the applicable period of time of the lawful > electronic surveillance authorization. It can also only be used > to decrypt communications transmitted or received by the device > in question. > > Security and Privacy Using Key Escrow Encryption > > When the Administration announced the voluntary key escrow > encryption initiative, we anticipated that questions would be > raised about the strength and integrity of the SKIPJACK > algorithm, which is at the heart of the system. We assured the > public that we knew of no weakness in the algorithm and that > there was not an undisclosed point of entry, commonly referred to > as a trapdoor. The algorithm was designed by cryptographic > experts at the National Security Agency and withstood a rigorous > testing and analysis process. > > As a further way to indicate the fundamental strength of > SKIPJACK, we invited a group of independent experts in > cryptography to review the algorithm, under appropriate security > conditions, and make their results publicly known, again, > consistent with the classified nature of the algorithm. This > group consisted of Ernest Brickell (Sandia National > Laboratories), Dorothy Denning (Georgetown University), Stephen > Kent (BBN Communications Corp.), David Maher (AT&T) and Walter > Tuchman (Amperif Corp.). These experts reported that: > > Under an assumption that the cost of processing power > is halved every eighteen months, it will be 36 years > before the cost of breaking SKIPJACK by exhaustive > search will be equal to the cost of breaking DES today; > > > and > > There is no significant risk that SKIPJACK can be > broken through a shortcut method of attack. > > Let me also repeat the reasons why the algorithm must remain > classified. First, we believe it would be irresponsible to > publish the technical details. This would be tantamount to > handing over this strong algorithm to those who may use it to > hide criminal activity. Publishing the algorithm may also reveal > some of the classified design techniques that NSA uses to design > military-strength technology. It would also allow devices to be > built without the key escrowing feature, again allowing criminals > to take advantage of the strength of this very powerful > technology without any safeguard for society. > > With regard to privacy, key escrow encryption can, of course, be > used to protect personal information contained in telephone > communications. Moreover, the voluntary key escrow encryption > initiative does not expand the government's authority for the > conduct of electronic surveillance, as my colleague from the > Federal Bureau of Investigation will discuss. It is important to > understand that the escrow agents will not track the devices by > individual owners; they will simply maintain a database of chip > ID numbers and associated chip unique key components (which > themselves are encrypted). > > > 4. Alternatives to the Voluntary Key Escrow Initiative > > In reaction to industry's concerns about our hardware-only > implementation of key escrow encryption, we announced an > opportunity for industry to work with us on developing secure > software-based key escrow encryption. Unfortunately, initial > industry interest was minimal; our offer, however, remains open. > We are also willing to work on hardware alternatives to key > escrowing as we emphasized in our recent announcements. > > The Administration has been seeking to meet with members of the > computer, software, and telecommunications industries to discuss > the importance of this matter. We are open to other approaches. > > > 5. Key Government Policies on Unclassified/Commercial Encryption > > Encryption is an important tool to protect privacy and > confidentiality. > > As I discussed earlier, encryption is powerful technology that > can protect the confidentiality of data and the privacy of > individuals. The government will continue to rely on this > technology to protect its secrets as well as the personal and > proprietary data it maintains. Use of encryption by federal > agencies is encouraged when it cost-effectively meets their > security requirements. > > No legislation restricting domestic use of cryptography. > > Early in the policy review process, we stated that the > Administration would not be seeking legislation to restrict the > use, manufacture, or sale of encryption products in the U.S. > This was a fear that was expressed in the public comments we > received, and one that continues, despite our repeated assertions > to the contrary. Let me be clear - this Administration does not > seek legislation to prohibit or in any way restrict the domestic > use of cryptography. > > Export Controls on encryption are necessary but administrative > procedures can be streamlined. > > Encryption use worldwide affects our national security. While > this matter cannot be discussed in detail publicly without harm > to this nation's intelligence sources and methods, I can point to > the Vice President's public statement that encryption has "huge > strategic value." The Vice President's description of the > critical importance of encryption is important to bear in mind as > we discuss these issues today. > > In recent months, the Administration has dramatically relaxed > export controls on computer and telecommunications equipment. > However, we have retained export controls on encryption > technology, in both hardware and software. These controls > strongly promote our national security. These export controls > include mass market software implementing the Data Encryption > Standard. The Administration determined, however, that there are > a number of reforms the government can implement to reduce the > burden of these controls on U.S. industry. > > These reforms are part of the Administration's goal to eliminate > unnecessary controls and ensure efficient implementation of those > controls that must remain. For example, fewer licenses will be > required by exporters since manufacturers will be able to ship > their approved products from the U.S. directly to customers > within approved regions without obtaining individual licenses for > each end user. Additionally, the State Department has set a > license review turnaround goal of two working days for most > applications. Moreover, the State Department will no longer > require that U.S. citizens obtain an export license prior to > taking encryption products out of the U.S. temporarily for their > own personal use. Lastly, after a one-time initial technical > review, key escrow encryption products may now be exported to > most end users. These reforms should help to minimize the effect > of export controls on U.S. industry. > > The Government requires a mechanism to deal with continuing > encryption policy issues. > > In recognition of this, the Interagency Working Group on > Encryption and Telecommunications was formed in recognition of > the possibility that the economic significance of our current > encryption policy could change. The Working Group has been > assigned to monitor changes in the balance that the President has > struck with these policy decisions and to recommend changes in > policy as circumstances warrant. The Working Group will work > with industry on technologies like the key escrow encryption chip > and in the development and evaluation of possible alternatives to > the chip. > > The group is co-chaired by the White House Office of Science and > Technology Policy and the National Security Council. It includes > representatives from all departments and agencies which > participated in the policy review and others as appropriate, and > keeps the Information Policy Committee of the Information > Infrastructure Task Force apprised of its activities. > > Flexibility on Encryption Approaches. > > >From the time of the initial White House announcement of this > technology, we have stated that this key escrow encryption > technology provides 1) exceptionally strong protection and 2) a > feature to protect society against those that would seek to > misuse it. I have personally expressed our flexibility in > seeking solutions to these difficult issues. We have offered to > work with industry in developing alternative software and > hardware approaches to key escrowing. We actively seek > additional solutions to these difficult problems. > > We also stand willing to assist the Congressionally-directed > study of these issues by the National Research Council. > > Use of EES is voluntary and limited to telephone systems. > > The Escrowed Encryption Standard, which was approved on February > 3, 1994, is a voluntary standard for use both within and outside > of the federal government. It is applicable for protecting > telephone communications, including voice, fax and modem. No > decisions have been made about applying key escrow encryption > technology to computer-to-computer communications (e.g., e-mail) > for the federal government. > > Government standards should not harm law enforcement/national > security > > This is fairly straightforward, but can be difficult to achieve. > In setting standards, the interests of all the components of the > government should be taken into account. In the case of > encryption, this means not only the user community, but also the > law enforcement and national security communities, particularly > since standards setting activities can have long-term impacts > (which, unfortunately, can sometimes be hard to forecast). > > 6. Secure Hash Standard > > As the Committee may be aware, NIST has recently initiated the > process to issue a technical modification to Federal Information > Processing Standard 180, the Secure Hash Standard. The Secure > Hash Standard uses a cryptographic-type algorithm to produce a > short hash value (also known as a "representation" or "message > digest") of a longer message or file. This hash value is > calculated such that any change to the file or message being > hashed, will, to a very high degree of probability, change the > hash value. This standard can be used alone to protect the > integrity of data files against inadvertent modification. When > used in conjunction with a digital signature, it can be used to > detect any unauthorized modification to data. > > Our intent to modify the standard was announced by NIST after the > National Security Agency informed me that their mathematicians > had discovered a previously unknown weakness in the algorithm. > This meant that the standard, while still very strong, was not as > robust as we had originally intended. This correction will > return the standard to its intended level of strength. > > I think this announcement illustrates two useful issues with > regard to cryptographic-based standards. First, developing sound > cryptographic technology is very difficult. This is also seen > with commercial algorithms, including those used for hashing and > encryption. Secondly, this incident demonstrates the commitment > of NIST, with NSA's technical assistance, to promulgating sound > security standards. In this case, a weakness was found, and is > being quickly corrected. > > > > 7. Effectiveness of the Computer Security Act of 1987 > > Lastly, as requested in your invitation to appear here today, let > me briefly address the effectiveness of the Computer Security Act > of 1987 (P.L. 100-235). I will first briefly comment on what we > learned about the state of computer security in the federal > government during our agency visit process and then turn to > cryptographic-specific issues. > As part of our efforts to increase awareness of the need for > computer security, during 1991-1992, officials from OMB, NIST and > NSA visited 28 federal departments and agencies. Each visit was > designed to increase senior managers' awareness of security > issues and to motivate them to improve security. I believe that > what we learned during those visits remains valid -- and > indicates that we still need to focus on basic computer security > issues in the government. > > Specifically, OMB, NIST and NSA proposed the following steps to > improve security: > > Focus management attention on computer security. > Improve planning for security. > Update security awareness and training programs. > Improve contingency planning and incident response > capabilities. > Improve communication of useful security techniques. > Assess security vulnerabilities in emerging information > technologies. > > Actions are being taken by NIST and other agencies to address > each of these areas. The background and discussion of the need > for these measures is discussed in the summary report prepared by > OMB on "Observations of Agency Computer Security Practices and > Implementation of OMB Bulletin No. 90-08" (February 1993). In > short, the Computer Security Act provides an appropriate > framework for agencies to continue improving the security of > their automated systems -- but much work remains to be done, by > NIST and individual federal agencies. > > One of the questions that the Committee was interested in was > whether there is a need to modify this legislation in response to > the same advancements in technology that led to the key escrow > initiative and digital telephony proposal. First, I would > observe that the Act, as a broad framework, is not tied to a > specific technology. I think it would be unworkable if the Act > were to address specific computer technologies, since this is a > rapidly evolving field. Also, I would note that the Act does not > address digital telephony concerns -- the Administration is > proposing separate legislation in that area. In short, no > modifications to the Act are necessary because of technology > advances. > > Before leaving the subject of the Computer Security Act, however, > let me briefly comment on the Escrowed Encryption Standard. I > strongly believe that NIST and NSA have complied with the spirit > and intent of the Act. At the same time, this issue underscores > the complex issues which arise in the course of developing > computer security standards, particularly cryptographic-based > standards for unclassified systems. > > The Act, as you are aware, authorizes NIST to draw upon computer > security guidelines developed by NSA to the extent that NIST > determines they are consistent with the requirements for > protecting sensitive information in federal computer systems. In > the area of cryptography, we believe that federal agencies have > valid requirements for access to strong encryption (and other > cryptographic-related standards) for the protection of their > information. We were also aware of other requirements of the law > enforcement and national security community. Since NSA is > considered to have the world's foremost cryptographic > capabilities, it only makes sense (from both a technological and > economic point of view) to draw upon their guidelines and skills > as useful inputs to the development of standards. The use of > NSA-designed and -tested algorithms is fully consistent with the > Act. We also work jointly with NSA in many other areas, > including the development of criteria for the security evaluation > of computer systems. They have had more experience than anyone > else in such evaluations. As in the case of cryptography, this > is an area in which NIST can benefit from NSA's expertise. > > Summary > > Key escrow encryption can help protect proprietary information, > protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent > unauthorized release of data transmitted telephonically. Key > escrow encryption is available as a valuable tool for protecting > federal agencies' critical information communicated by telephone. > At the same time, this technology preserves the ability of > federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept > lawfully the phone conversations of criminals. > > Encryption technology will play an increasingly important > security role in future computer applications. Its use for > security must be balanced with the need to protect all Americans > from those who break the law. > > Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer your > questions. > >

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Re: Linear Congruential Random Number Crackers..
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any references on cracking LC random number generators? -Peter Wayner ``Cracking a Random Number Generator'', Jim Reeds, Cryptologia 1,1, Jan '77. It's also in ``Cryptology: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow'', edited by Deavours, Kahn, Kruh, Mellen, and Winkel.

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Linear Congruential Random Number Crackers..
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any references on cracking LC random number generators? -Peter Wayner

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re: Re: Bunch of Clueless Idiots
by SGT=DARREN=S.=HARLOW%ISB%MCTSSA＠nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been fighting for the 2nd ammendment for many years. Last night my wife, who used to be for gun-control, went off on a several neighbors who felt that it was good that it passed. She has become a huge advocate against gun-control. But this list is for cryptography, talk to the RKBA list if you want to talk about guns. Let's keep it on that subject. Sgt Darren Harlow - Computer Security MCTSSA, Camp Pendleton, USMC Internet: harlowd(a)nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil or another less reliable & slower: harlow(a)mqg1.usmc.mil Voice: Comm: (619) 725-2970 DSN (Autovon): 365-2970 Fax: Comm: (619) 725-9512 DSN (Autovon): 365-9512 PGP 2.3a Public key available upon request ^^^^ "The views expressed are my own, and always will be..."

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EFF's Jerry Berman testimony - House Clipper/DigTel hearing 5/3/94
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Executive Director Electronic Frontier Foundation before the Committee on Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation U.S. House of Representatives Hearing on Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security May 3, 1994 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on communications and computer surveillance, privacy, and security policy. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a public interest membership organization dedicated to achieving the democratic potential of new communications and computer technology and works to protect civil liberties in new digital environments. EFF also coordinates the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group (DPSWG), a coalition of more than 50 computer, communications, and public interest organizations and associations working on communications privacy issues. The Working Group has strongly opposed the Administration's clipper chip and digital telephony proposals. EFF is especially pleased that this subcommittee has taken an interest in these issues. It is our belief that Administration policy developed in this area threatens individual privacy rights, will thwart the development of the information infrastructure, and does not even meet the stated needs of law enforcement and national security agencies. A fresh and comprehensive look at these issues is needed. I. Background on digital privacy and security policy ------------------------------------------------------- From the beginning of the 1992 Presidential campaign, President Clinton and Vice President Gore committed themselves to support the development of the National Information Infrastructure. They recognize that the "development of the NII can unleash an information revolution that will change forever the way people live, work, and interact with each other." They also know that the information infrastructure can only realize its potential if users feel confident about security measures available. If allowed to reach its potential, this information infrastructure will carry vital personal information, such as health care records, private communications among friends and families, and personal financial transactions. The business community will transmit valuable information such as plans for new products, proprietary financial data, and other strategic communications. If communications in the new infrastructure are vulnerable, all of our lives and businesses would be subject to both damaging and costly invasion. In launching its Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) the Clinton Administration recognized this when it declared that: The trustworthiness and security of communications channels and networks are essential to the success of the NII.... Electronic information systems can create new vulnerabilities. For example, electronic files can be broken into and copied from remote locations, and cellular phone conversations can be monitored easily. Yet these same systems, if properly designed, can offer greater security than less advanced communications channels. [_Agenda_for_Action_, 9] Cryptography -- technology which allows encoding and decoding of messages -- is an absolutely essential part of the solution to information security and privacy needs in the Information Age. Without strong cryptography, no one will have the confidence to use networks to conduct business, to engage in commercial transactions electronically, or to transmit sensitive personal information. As the Administration foresees, we need network standards and transmission codes that facilitate interconnection and interoperation between networks, and ensure the privacy of persons and the security of information carried.... [_Agenda_for_Action_, 6] While articulating these security and privacy needs, the Administration has also emphasized that the availability of strong encryption poses challenges to law enforcement and national security efforts. Though the vast majority of those who benefit from encryption will be law abiding citizens, some criminals will find ways to hide behind new technologies. II. Current cryptography policy fails to meet the needs of ------------------------------------------------------------ the growing information infrastructure ---------------------------------------------- As a solution to the conflict between the need for user privacy and the desire to ensure law enforcement access, the Administration has proposed that individuals and organizations who use encryption deposit a copy of their private key -- the means to decode any communications they send -- with the federal government. In our view, this is not a balanced solution but one that undermines the need for security and privacy without resolving important law enforcement concerns. It is up to the Congress to send the Administration back to the drawing board. A. Current Export Controls and New Clipper Proposal Stifle Innovation ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Two factors are currently keeping strong encryption out of the reach of United States citizens and corporations. First, general uncertainty about what forms of cryptography will and will not be legal to produce in the future. Second, export controls make it economically impossible for US manufacturers that build products for the global marketplace to incorporate strong encryption for either the domestic or foreign markets. Despite this negative impact on the US market, export controls are decreasingly successful at limiting the foreign availability of strong encryption. A recent survey shows that of the more than 260 foreign encryption products now available globally, over 80 offer encryption which is stronger than what US companies are allowed to export. Export controls do constrain the US market, but the international market appears to be meeting its security needs without help from US industry. The introduction of Clipper fails to address the general uncertainty in the cryptography market. Announcement of a key escrow policy alone is not sufficient to get the stalled US cryptography market back on track. B. The secrecy of the Clipper/Skipjack algorithm reduces public trust ------------------------------------------------------------------------ and casts doubt on the voluntariness of the whole system -------------------------------------------------------------- Many parties have already questioned the need for a secret algorithm, especially given the existence of robust, public-domain encryption techniques. The most common explanation given for use of a secret algorithm is the need to prevent users from bypassing the key escrow system proposed along with the Clipper Chip. Clipper has always been presented by the Administration as a voluntary option. But if the system is truly voluntary, why go to such lengths to ensure compliance with the escrow procedure? C. Current plans for escrow system offer inadequate technical ---------------------------------------------------------------- security and insufficient legal protections for users ----------------------------------------------------------- The implementation of a nationwide key escrow system is clearly a complex task. But preliminary plans available already indicate several areas of serious concern: 1. _No_legal_rights_for_escrow_users_: As currently written, the escrow procedures insulate the government escrow agents from any legal liability for unauthorized or negligent release of an individual's key. This is contrary to the very notion of an escrow system, which ordinarily would provide a legal remedy for the depositor whose deposit is released without authorization. If anything, escrow agents should be subject to strict liability for unauthorized disclosure of keys. 2. _No_stability_in_escrow_rules_: The Administration has specifically declared that it will not seek to have the escrow procedures incorporated into legislation or official regulations. Without formalization of rules, users have no guaranty that subsequent administrations will follow the same rules or offer the users the same degree of protection. This will greatly reduce the trust in the system. 3. _Fixed_Key_: A cardinal rule of computer security is that encryption keys must be changed often. Since the Clipper keys are locked permanently into the chips, the keys can never be changed. This is a major technical weakness of the current proposal. 4. _Less_intrusive,_more_secure_escrow_alternatives_are_available_: The Clipper proposal represents only one of many possible kinds of key escrow systems. More security could be provided by having more than two escrow agents. And, in order to increase public trust, some or all of these agents could be non-governmental agencies, with the traditional fiduciary duties of an escrow agent. D. Escrow Systems Threaten Fundamental Constitutional Values --------------------------------------------------------------- The Administration, Congress, and the public ought to have the opportunity to consider the implications of limitations on cryptography from a constitutional perspective. A delicate balance between constitutional privacy rights and the needs of law enforcement has been crafted over the history of this country. We must act carefully as we face the constitutional challenges posed by new communication technologies. Unraveling the current encryption policy tangle must begin with one threshold question: will there come a day when the federal government controls the domestic use of encryption through mandated key escrow schemes or outright prohibitions against the use of particular encryption technologies? Is Clipper the first step in this direction? A mandatory encryption regime raises profound constitutional questions. In the era where people work for "virtual corporations" and conduct personal and political lives in "cyberspace," the distinction between _communication_ of information and _storage_ of information is increasingly vague. The organization in which one works may constitute a single virtual space, but be physically dispersed. So, the papers and files of the organization or individual may be moved within the organization by means of telecommunications technology. Instantaneous access to encryption keys, without prior notice to the communicating parties, may well constitute a secret search, if the target is a virtual corporation or an individual whose "papers" are physically dispersed. Wiretapping and other electronic surveillance has always been recognized as an exception to the fundamental Fourth Amendment prohibition against secret searches. Even with a valid search warrant, law enforcement agents must "knock and announce" their intent to search a premises before proceeding. Failure to do so violates the Fourth Amendment. Until now, the law of search and seizure has made a sharp distinction between, on the one hand, _seizures_of_papers_ and other items in a person's physical possession, and on the other hand, _wiretapping_of_communications_. Seizure of papers or personal effects must be conducted with the owner's knowledge, upon presentation of a search warrant. Only in the exceptional case of wiretapping, may a person's privacy be invaded by law enforcement without simultaneously informing that person. Proposals to regulate the use of cryptography for the sake of law enforcement efficiency should be viewed carefully in the centuries old tradition of privacy protection. E. Voluntary escrow system will not meet law enforcement needs ----------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, despite all of the troubling aspects of the Clipper proposal, it is by no means clear that it will even solve the problems that law enforcement has identified. The major stated rationale for government intervention in the domestic encryption arena is to ensure that law enforcement has access to criminal communications, even if they are encrypted. Yet, a voluntary scheme seems inadequate to meet this goal. Criminals who seek to avoid interception and decryption of their communications would simply use another system, free from escrow provisions. Unless a government-proposed encryption scheme is mandatory, it would fail to achieve its primary law enforcement purpose. In a voluntary regime, only the law-abiding would use the escrow system. III. Recent policy developments indicate that Administration policy is ----------------------------------------------------------------------- bad for the NII, contrary to the Computer Security Act, and ----------------------------------------------------------------- requires Congressional oversight -------------------------------------- Along with the Clipper Chip proposal, the Administration announced a comprehensive review of cryptography and privacy policy. Almost immediately after the Clipper announcement, the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group began discussions with the Administration on issues raised by the Clipper proposal and by cryptography in general. Unfortunately, this dialogue has been largely one-sided. EFF and many other groups have provided extensive input to the Administration, yet the Administration has not reciprocated -- the promised policy report has not been forthcoming. Moreover, the National Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are proceeding unilaterally to implement their own goals in this critical policy area. Allowing these agencies to proceed unilaterally would be a grave mistake. As this subcommittee is well aware, the Computer Security Act of 1987 clearly established that neither military nor law enforcement agencies are the proper protectors of personal privacy. When considering the law, Congress asked, "whether it is proper for a super- secret agency [the NSA] that operates without public scrutiny to involve itself in domestic activities...?" The answer was a clear "no." Recent Administration announcements regarding the Clipper Chip suggest that the principle established in the 1987 Act has been circumvented. As important as the principle of civilian control was in 1987, it is even more critical today. The more individuals around the country come to depend on secure communications to protect their privacy, the more important it is to conduct privacy and security policy dialogues in public, civilian forums. The NII can grow into the kind of critical, national resource which this Administration seeks to promote only if major changes in current cryptography and privacy policy. In the absence of such changes, digital technology will continue to rapidly render our commercial activities and communications -- and, indeed, much of our personal lives -- open to scrutiny by strangers. The Electronic Frontier Foundation believes that Americans must be allowed access to the cryptographic tools necessary to protect their own privacy. We had hoped that the Administration was committed to making these changes, but several recent developments lead us to fear that the effort has been abandoned, leaving individual agencies to pursue their own policy agendas instead of being guided by a comprehensive policy. The following issues concern us: * Delayed Cryptography Policy Report ---------------------------------------- The policy analysis called for along with the April 16, 1993 Presidential Decision Directive has not been released, though it was promised to have been completed by early fall of 1993. We had hoped that this report would be the basis for public dialogue on the important privacy, competitiveness, and law enforcement issues raised by cryptography policy. To date, none of the Administration's policy rationale has been revealed to the public, despite the fact that agencies in the Executive Branch are proceeding with their own plan * Escrowed Encryption Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ approved against overwhelming weight of public comments ------------------------------------------------------------- The Presidential Decision Directive also called for consideration of a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for key-escrow encryption systems. This process was to have been one of several forums whereby those concerned about the proposed key-escrow system could voice opinions. EFF, as well as over 225 of our individual members, raised a number of serious concerns about the draft FIPS in September of this 1993. EFF expressed its opposition to government implementation of key-escrow systems as proposed. We continue to oppose the deployment of Skipjack family escrow encryption systems both because they violate fundamental First, Fourth, and Fifth amendment principles, and because they fail to offer users adequate security and flexibility. Despite overwhelming opposition from over 300 commenters, the Department of Commerce recently approved FIPS 185. * Large-Scale Skipjack Deployment Announced ----------------------------------------------- At the December 9, 1993 meeting of the Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board, an NSA official announced plans to deploy from 10,000 to 70,000 Skipjack devices in the Defense Messaging System in the near future. The exact size of the order was said to be dependent only on budget constraints. The Administration is on record in the national press promising that no large-scale Skipjack deployment would occur until a final report of the Administration Task Force was complete. Ten thousand units was set as the upper limit of initial deployment. Skipjack deployment at the level planned in the Defense Messaging System circumvents both the FIPS notice and comments process which has been left in a state of limbo, as well as the Administration's promise of a comprehensive policy framework. * New FBI Digital Telephony Legislation Proposed ---------------------------------------------------- The FBI recently proposed a new "Digital Telephony" bill. After initial analysis, we strongly oppose the bill, which would require all common carriers to construct their networks to deliver to law enforcement agencies, in real time, both the contents of all communications on their networks and the "signaling" or transactional information. In short, the bill lays the groundwork for turning the National Information Infrastructure into a nation-wide surveillance system, to be used by law enforcement with few technical or legal safeguards. This image is not hyperbole, but a real assessment of the power of the technology and inadequacy of current legal and technical privacy protections for users of communications networks. Although the FBI suggests that the bill is primarily designed to maintain status quo wiretap capability in the face of technological changes, in fact, it seeks vast new surveillance and monitoring tools. Lengthy delays on the promised policy report, along with these unilateral steps toward Clipper/Skipjack deployment, lead us to believe that Administration policy is stalled by the Cold War-era national security concerns that have characterized cryptography policy for the last several decades. EFF believes that it would be a disastrous error to allow national information policy -- now a critical component of domestic policy -- to be dictated solely by backward-looking national-security priorities and unsubstantiated law-enforcement claims. The directions set by this Administration will have a major impact on privacy, information security, and the fundamental relationship between the government and individual autonomy. This is why the Administration must take action-- and do so before the aforementioned agencies proceed further--to ensure that cryptography policy is restructured to serve the interests of privacy and security in the National Information Infrastructure. We still believe the Administration can play the leadership role it was meant to play in shaping this policy. If it does not, the potential of the NII, and of fundamental civil liberties in the information age, will be threatened. IV. Congressional oversight of cryptography & privacy policy is ----------------------------------------------------------------- urgently needed to right the balance between privacy, ----------------------------------------------------------- competitiveness & law enforcement needs --------------------------------------------- All participants in this debate recognize that the need for privacy and security is real, and that new technologies pose real challenges for law enforcement and national security operations. However, the solutions now on the table cripple the NII, pose grave threats to privacy, and fail to even meet law enforcement objectives. In our judgment, the Administration has failed, thus far, to articulate a comprehensive set of policies which will advance the goals upon which we all agree. Congress must act now to ensure that cryptography policy is developed in the context of the broader goal of promoting the development of an advanced, interoperable, secure, information infrastructure. In order to meet the privacy and security needs of the growing infrastructure, Congress should seek a set of public policies which promote the widespread availability of cryptographic systems according to the following criteria: * Use Voluntary Standards to Promote Innovation and Meet ------------------------------------------------------------ Diverse Needs: -------------------- The National Information Infrastructure stretches to encompass devices as diverse as super computers, handheld personal digital assistants and other wireless communications devices, and plain old telephones. Communication will be carried over copper wires, fiber optic cables, and satellite links. The users of the infrastructure will range from elementary school children to federal agencies. Encryption standards must be allowed to develop flexibly to meet the wide-ranging needs all components of the NII. In its IITF Report, the Administration finds that standards also must be compatible with the large installed base of communications technologies, and flexible and adaptable enough to meet user needs at affordable costs. [_AA_, 9] The diverse uses of the NII require that any standard which the government seeks to promote as a broadly deployed solution should be implementable in software as well as hardware and based on widely available algorithms. * Develop Trusted Algorithms and End-to-End Security: --------------------------------------------------------- Assuring current and future users of the NII that their communications are secure and their privacy is protected is a critical task. This means that the underlying algorithms adopted must have a high level of public trust and the overall systems put in place must be secure. * Encourage National and International Interoperability: ------------------------------------------------------------ The promise of the NII is seamless national and international communications of all types. Any cryptographic standard offered for widespread use must allow US corporations and individuals to function as part of the global economy and global communications infrastructure. * Seek Reasonable Cooperation with Law Enforcement and National ------------------------------------------------------------------- Security Needs: --------------------- New technologies pose new challenges to law enforcement and national security surveillance activities. American industry is committed to working with law enforcement to help meet its legitimate surveillance needs, but the development of the NII should not be stalled on this account. * Promote Constitutional Rights of Privacy and Adhere to Traditional ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Rules: ------------------------------------------ New technology can either be a threat or an aid to protection of fundamental privacy rights. Government policy should promote technologies which enable individuals to protect their privacy and be sure that those technologies are governed by laws which respect the long history of constitutional search and seizure restraints. * Maintain Civilian Control over Public Computer and -------------------------------------------------------- Communications Security: ------------------------------ In accordance with the Computer Security Act of 1987, development of security and privacy standards should be directed by the civilian V. Conclusion ---------------- Among the most important roles that the federal government has in NII deployment are setting standards and guaranteeing privacy and security. Without adequate security and privacy, the NII will never realize it economic or social potential. Cryptography policy must, of course, take into account the needs of law enforcement and national security agencies, but cannot be driven by these concerns alone. The Working Group, along with other industry and public interest organizations, is committed to working with the Administration to solving the privacy and security questions raised by the growing NII. This must be done based on the principles of voluntary standards, promotion of innovation, concern for law enforcement needs, and protection of constitutional rights of privacy. ***************

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