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Re: Anonymous banking
by rkmoore＠iol.ie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

4/24/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >>But Washington last year ranked Austria alongside Colombia, Venezuela and >>Thailand in a league table of nations that tolerate money laundering. Ha ha! The U.S. and Panama probably exceed all of the above in laundering, but of course the USA/CIA doesn't notice those, since they're "in the family". -rkm

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Re: InfoWarCon V 1996: Call For Papers
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:29 AM 3/18/96 -0500, Mark Aldrich wrote: >I personally know Winn and several of the folks from NCSA. You're stuff >would be a FANTASTIC contribution, and I'm certain that it would be a >popular session. Yes, some of these folks are a bit "establishment," but >they go to these things looking for new ideas, new perspectives, etc. Well, I've forwarded the essay as is. If they really insist, I'd cut it down to a 1-2 page summary, but I suspect that if it catches their attention they won't mind reading the extra material. >You sound like a guy who can hold his own in a debate, so I imagine >you'll have no problems dealing with this crowd. They may "challenge" >your views, but you're not going to get attacked or anything. You're probably right, but some of the more perceptive ones may shit bricks when they discover what the stakes really are. The REALLY perceptive ones will know that it doesn't make any difference, whether or not they like the idea or me, it's on the way. >Don't read too much into this. Last year, we had Eric Bloodaxe (Chris G) >there, a host of, uh, shall we say "fringe" elements, and I think Eric >Hughes was there (?Eric? Sarah and I *think* we saw you there?), as well. >As far as an "agenda" other than the published one, I think you're probably >being overly concerned. It's actually a fun con and you'd be surprised >the number of people willing to actively listen to anyone they even think >might remotely be a "hacker." > >If you show up trying to "one up" folks, however, you may not get what you >want. It's more of a cooperative, interactive forum; Not a competition. It's not that I'm trying to "one up" them; it might happen automatically. Let me give you a real-life example: I first published the essay on FIDOnet, as well as list called "Digitaliberty," run by Bill Frezza. Frezza's list paradigm was to develop a way to enable the net to stay free in an unfree world; my idea had the prospect of not only making/keeping the net free, but also dragging the rest of the world into freedom whether it liked it or not. (As well as eliminating war, governments, and a few other minor details.) A few weeks after I started publicizing AP, the list went down for a few days and when it eventually returned, I was not among the subscribers and Frezza studiously ignored my inquiries. As you can well imagine, Frezza's original idea was good, it was merely too limited and was overtaken by progress. It would have been easier for him if he had opposed the fundamental concept of net freedom, or believed my position to be impractical or technically flawed. As it was, there was nothing he could do. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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"Physical Reality IV"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bad Boys, Bad Boys Whatcha gonna do? Whatcha gonna do when they come for you? Bad Boys, Bad Boys repeat endlessly. We did 4) two weeks ago. Here are some more points. 5) The Bad Boys must know where you are. The general problem that Bad Boys face when policing cyberspace (and indeed the whole modern marketplace) is that it is a "target poor" environment. As we saw in the last piece, the basic tactical reality is the force ratio that can be applied to a territory. How many bodies can you deploy per unit of land to control it. Even before you consider the size of the enemy force, you have to consider the size of the territory. This same calculus applies equally to civilian law enforcement. Another basic tactical problem is what von Clausewitz in "On War" called the "fog of war." This is the very great problem of knowing exactly where your opponent is and what he is doing. Note how computers can expand the "space" to be controlled. Even before the Internet became big, the problem can be seen in this excerpt from Sterling's "Hacker Crackdown" (http://www.usfca.edu/crackdown/crack_6.html) "About twenty-five boards vanished into police custody in May 1990. As we have seen, there are an estimated 30,000 boards in America today. If we assume that one board in a hundred is up to no good with codes and cards (which rather flatters the honesty of the board-using community), then that would leave 2,975 outlaw boards untouched by Sundevil. Sundevil seized about one tenth of one percent of all computer bulletin boards in America. Seen objectively, this is something less than a comprehensive assault." Today, 30,000 web sites are created each month or so. Just logging them is hard much less ruling them. The fact is that cyberspace is so vast, that it is very hard to make much of a dent in it. Policing territory is hard enough when you can see most of it. Any city cop or soldier doing house-to-house fighting can tell you that crowded cities are harder to police than open territory. Cyberspace has the topography of madness. Much of it is invisible and it grows changes and deforms with the speed of the thoughts of the millions of its "residents." And it has a doubling rate much faster than the doubling rate of "policing hours" available to the would-be authorities. Aside from sheer size and crazy topography, cyberspace can be very hard to penetrate. We on this list are well aware of the tools of obfuscation: cryptography, false identities, remailers, proxies, etc. An even bigger factor are the features of our world that we as sophisticated users don't even think about. The strange nature of the place is hard for outsiders to grasp. The "locals" always have the strategic advantage of familiarity with a territory. The speed of technological change is also problem as is the speed of "movement" within the system. Even if the opposition had the troopies to patrol the vast new territories there are these frustrating "magical" qualities of cyberspace. You block one WWW site and its content in "teleported" within minutes to another site half a world away. You require your local ISPs to interpose a "Surfwatch" interface between your captive citizenry and the free world and some of those captives don the "invisible cape" of a proxy server to get at the content they want. Then there's the "force field" of crypto to block your investigations. None of these "magical" technologies are perfect they can be defeated (sometimes) but defeating them takes resources. And so far, the Bad Boys haven't been winning too many in cyberspace. <More Tomorrow> DCF

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Mac Crypto Conference
by vinnie＠webstuff.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hey all; I am interested in putting together a Macintosh crypto conference for folks who do or want to write crypto on the mac. I was thinking about a one or two day thing..real tech stuff. (not so much the users), but I am flexable. I plan to hold it here at apple, cupertino. (so as to make it real cheep) If you have any ideas on what you would like to see there, either drop me an email, at <vinnie(a)webstuff.apple.com> or if you think it is worthy of a public discussion reply at cypherpunks. ------------- Vinnie Moscaritolo Apple DTS Sniper "One Shot..One Kill" http://webstuff.apple.com/~vinnie/ Fingerprint = 4F A3 29 81 50 E4 04 F2 78 25 01 87 6E A2 14 6A --------------

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Now You CAN Accept Credit Cards - Guaranteed Approval
by MAILER-DAEMON＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Your Majordomo request results
by Majordomo＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Your request of Majordomo was: >>>> subscribe cypherpunks **** Address already subscribed to cypherpunks Your request of Majordomo was: >>>> end END OF COMMANDS

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FORTUNE666 - AOL postings blamed for Iomega stock troubles (fwd)
by Bruce Zambini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An interesting question of reputations, plus a kneejerk reaction against anonymity... "It must be true; I read it on AOL..." Jon ---------- Jon Lasser (410)494-3072 - Obscenity is a crutch for jlasser(a)rwd.goucher.edu inarticulate motherfuckers. http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/ Finger for PGP key (1024/EC001E4D) - Fuck the CDA. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 17 Mar 96 23:42:34 From: FringeWare Daily <email(a)fringeware.com> Subject: FORTUNE666 - AOL postings blamed for Iomega stock troubles Sent from: sentry(a)utxvms.cc.utexas.edu () This may be of interest to lovers and haters of chaos, alike- >From Edupage: IOMEGA STOCK VOLATILITY BLAMED ON AOL POSTINGS Iomega, maker of high-capacity removable disk drives, is the focus of controversy on America Online's Motley Fool bulletin board. Company officials have complained to the SEC that postings on Motley Fool and other BBSs have contained false information and may be contributing to the volatility of its stock. Online exposure has "raised the visibility of some stocks as well as the interest in those stocks," says an outside spokesman for Iomega. "At the same time, we're very concerned about how online services can be used to attempt to drive stock prices higher or lower through misinformation." Postings about Iomega escalated to flaming and physical threats last month, causing Motley Fool to pull some of the more offensive ones, but critics of online BBSs note Iomega's problems are a result of the practice of using "screen names" and the lack of verification of information that's posted. "You don't know if the person is a Ph.D. or in Sing Sing," says one critic. (Wall Street Journal 15 Mar 96 A5C)

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If you can't take the heat... (Was Re: Keep the pressure!)
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:05 PM 3/20/96, Perry E. Metzger is rumored to have typed: > anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com writes: > > Some people have wondered why I am anonymous and attack me. > > I am not ashamed of my views. > > Well, then you should be. > > > I write this thread anonymous as a form of protest. > > Why is it a form of protest? If you aren't ashamed, post it under your > name. What amuses me most about this series of rantings by whomever, other than the paranoid and baseless claims made by the anonymous poster, is the number of people who have been complaining about the author doing so anonymously through a remailer. The irony of such a situation is too rich to pass up. It seems that cypherpunks can dish it out when other newsgroups and mailing lists suffer such problems ("well, the remailers do nothing that telneting to port 25 cannot do..." or "internet identity is such a fiction anyway, get used to it" seem to be common responses), but when the cypherpunks lists is the victim of unpleasant anonymous messages we fall back to the tired refrain of "if you have nothing to hide why are you posting anonymously." How sad. So, why the hypocrisy here? If you don't want to be bothered by these messages there is a simple solution, use a mail agent that can filter out remailer postings and trash them. Of course this would also kill interesting messages from others who use remailers, but that's the price we pay for having remailers that do not support anonymous identity upon which reputation can be built. Oh yeah, I forgot...cypherpunks write code (snicker). So why not stop bitching and write a bit of code that provides for useful anonymous reputations and/or fix the glaringly obvious problems with current remailers. jim, who is sorry that he is not the one posting such trolls to the list just to make the puppets dance...

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Crypto in New Zealand - an update
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a continuation of the article I posted here a few weeks ago. You can find the whole thing at http://jya.com/nsazeal.htm. Peter. -- Snip -- On the 17th January significant parts of this story appeared on the front page of the National Business Review (NBR), a fairly influential paper read by (apparently) half the NZ business world. The GCSB declined to comment on anything except to acknowledge that there had been a meeting between a GCSB person and the manager of Orion Systems. The story also confirms (from talking to some of the people involved) the GCSB - MFAT and GCSB - DSD connections. The following week Andrew Mayo wrote a letter to the editor of the NBR containing an eloquent defense of the use of encryption to protect personal privacy. MFAT replied to say that they were only following orders, and were required by the Wassenaar agreement to restrict crypto exports: "Export permits normally were required only if the encryption was 40-bit or stronger, so most commercial encryption would not be affected". I wonder where the 40-bit limit suddenly came from? Note also the phrasing "40-bit or stronger". This means that anything including 40 bits is restricted. If they're going to try to blindly parrot US policy then they should at least get their facts straight. A few days later I found someone who knew what to ask for in order to get a copy of the NZ export regulations. I called MFAT and talked to a gentleman by the name of John Borrie, who had recently taken over responsibility for this affair from someone else who, to put it mildly, had been annoying to deal with. I suggested to him that the GCSB were feeding him just the information they wanted him to know and no more, and that perhaps he should avail himself of alternate sources of advice. He didn't see it quite that way. The export regulations are identical to the Australian regulations, even down to the layout style. A few of the fonts differ, but that may be due to different systems/printers/whatever. There are several obvious holes in these regulations, but I won't mention them now because they'll probably be used in court fairly soon. The following week the story was again on the front page of the NBR. This time the story covered the financial difficulties that Cyphercom had been plunged into. Because MFAT had stopped them from having any access to their product for nine months, the company was considering filing for bankruptcy. MFAT spokesperson Caroline Forsyth commented: "US controls on the export of strategic goods are at least as strict as those of New Zealand... an export permit would normally only be required for encryption if it was 40-bit or stronger. Most commercial encryption is well below 40-bit strength. Almost all New Zealand exporters of software are unaffected". The confused and nonsensical nature of these statements presents a scary picture. MFAT are a government department who (in this area) have no idea what they're doing, but don't know that they have no idea. Combined with the sterling advice they seem to be getting from the GCSB, this could make them a tough nut to crack. In anticipation of what MFAT would say, I wrote a letter to the NBR editor (which won the "Letter of the Week" award :-) which refuted their claims. The letter ended with: It appears that MFAT's position is based on an antiquated outlook which regards software to secure electronic commerce as some form of special military technology, a position which might have been reasonable a few decades ago but is totally out of touch with the modern use of computers and electronic communications. In their October 1996 "Business File", MFAT claim that "New Zealand... is helping to limit the spread of increasingly sophisticated military technology and weapons of mass destruction". Whether mass-market commercial software which protects financial transactions and medical records counts as "sophisticated military technology" or "weapons of mass destruction" is unclear (I suppose it's possible to beat someone to death with a floppy disk if you were very determined, but that hardly qualifies as "mass destruction"). Finally, one of the goals of the Wassenaar agreement was to "not impede bona fide civil transactions", which MFAT have certainly done, and are continuing to do. In the meantime anyone with a credit card and phone, or the ability to walk into a software store, can buy the same software overseas. Stopping New Zealand companies from exporting widely available mass-market computer software of this kind "because terrorists might use it" makes about as much sense as stopping farmers from exporting beef and lamb "because terrorists might eat it". The issue of Management Technology Briefing included with last weeks NBR reports on page 22 that there will be "a US$186 billion market in global transactions by the year 2000", along with a comment that securing these transactions - one of the goals cryptlib was designed for - remains a problem area. Within the next few years the push towards electronic commerce will become a veritable steamroller. By needlessly blocking the export of the technology required to secure this market, MFAT is helping ensure that New Zealand becomes part of the roadkill. MFAT's parting shot was: "People trying to export encryption without clearance can be prosecuted under the Customs and Excise Act". I should certainly hope so! It's going to be difficult creating a test case to get this nonsense thrown out if they refuse to prosecute me. Stay tuned, this is going to get entertaining...

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IP: VP GORE'S CHINA SCANDAL
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Date: Tue, 15 Sep 1998 05:33:46 -0400 (EDT) To: ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com From: softwar(a)us.net (CharlesSmith) Subject: IP: VP GORE'S CHINA SCANDAL Sender: owner-ignition-point(a)majordomo.pobox.com Precedence: list Reply-To: softwar(a)us.net (CharlesSmith) http://www.worldnetdaily.com According to Chinese General Sun Tzu "All war is based on deception." Tzu wrote those words over 2,000 years ago and his first rule of war still applies today. For example, a hidden November 1994 letter written by DNC donor Sanford Robertson to President Clinton that clearly details the sale of Commerce trade trips for campaign donations. Robertson was so bold as to include a telling "P.S." where he notes for Clinton that "Bob Rubin" turned out the "Silicon Valley" at a Robertson sponsored fundraiser that took in "$100,000" for California Senator Feinstein. Of course, neither Robertson nor current Treasury Secretary Rubin expected that letter to be revealed. In November 1995, Vice President Gore called Sanford Robertson from the White House and asked for a $100,000 donation. In January 1996 Robertson obliged and kicked in $80,000 soft and $20,000 in so-called "hard" donations to the Clinton/Gore campaign. The fact that Gore made the call from inside the White House is the least of his legal problems. In 1993 Clinton named Gore to head U.S. export policy for encryption technology in a TOP SECRET order written by National Security advisor Anthony Lake. A 1996 secret memo on a secret meeting of DCIA Deutch, FBI Director Freeh and Attorney General Janet Reno states "The Vice President chairs the senior group that set the Administration's encryption policy; since Februarcy 1994 it has been supported by a working group co-chaired by NSC, and OMB, composed of NSA, CIA, FBI, State, Commerce (BXA, NIST), and Justice." In 1995 Sanford Robertson also had a big financial interest in the U.S. computer security industry. Robertson's investment firm had hundreds of millions of dollars tied up in a Massachusetts based computer company named Security Dynamics Inc. (SDI). Thus, in 1995 Gore had direct control of policy that also affected Robertson financially. Security Dynamics was able to import computer security hardware manufactured in China. SDI secured Hong Kong electronics maker RJP Industries to produce electronic computer security cards for sale in America. The Chinese manufactured cards are sold to major defense contractors, medical institutions and the U.S. government. Hong Kong millionaire Raymond Hung also owns RJP. Hung manufactured the security cards in two factories leased directly from the China National Electronics Import/Export Company (CNEIEC), a business owned by the People's Liberation Army. Thus, the computer security cards imported and sold here in the U.S. were built on a Chinese Army assembly line. Hung also owned a U.S. based company called Quorum International that went bankrupt in 1996. The company left millions in bad debt in Arizona and California. Yet, Hung was able to donate over a million dollars to the Special Olympics, donate a temple to communist China, and have his photo taken with Arnold Schwarzenegger all only days before declaring bankruptcy. Hung is also reported to have set up dozens of shell "front companies" offshore. These companies allegedly sell cheap Chinese products imported by Hung who declares bankruptcy, citing Chinese taxes on the imports. Hung, of course, splits the "taxes" with the Chinese government, and returns to America to purchase hard assets such as real estate. Despite all this Hung remains un-investigated by the Clinton administration. Hung's close working relationship with China and the Clinton administration raises another question... Could there be a "secret" back door embedded in imported hardware or software, waiting like a TROJAN HORSE, brought safely inside the secure walls by a paying customer? Could a hidden SNIFFER be hunting down passwords, code keys and sensitive data? "Absolutely," stated Info-warfare expert Winn Schwartau. "I call it 'pro-active' defense - you'll find it referenced in my original book (Information Warfare)." "Chips are made of silicon," explained Schwartau. "If you buy hardware the only way to tell exactly how it works is with a destructive test. You tear the chip apart, layer by layer. This is not only difficult but expensive. Can it happen? Just look at the multitude of hardware and software products maintained outside of the United States. How many of them are 'proprietary' designs that have never been viewed inside the U.S.?" "It is possible," agreed Forrest Mimms, a leader in the U.S. electronics engineering and well-known author. Mimms is best known to electronics hobbyists worldwide for his series of books that populate Radio Shack. "I would not be surprised to find a back door put in by the Chinese government," stated Mimms. "Go to Wal-Mart and you'll find hundreds of commercial electronics products made by Chinese government factories. In fact, I would not be surprised to find a back door put in by an independent [rouge or criminal] operation." "Yes. It is always possible to slip a Trojan horse into cryptography products, both hardware and software," stated Bruce Schneier, President of Counterpane Systems and author of the best selling book on computer security APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY. "Unless the user takes the time to reverse-engineer the product - - much easier to do in software than in hardware - - he is essentially trusting that the manufacturer is behaving honestly," stated Schneier. "The NSA has been rumored to have convinced several cryptography hardware companies world-wide to install Trojan horses that effectively 'leak' secrets as the hardware is used." The Chinese Army, Sanford Robertson, Al Gore and Ron Brown shared an interest in computer security technology. California based RSA Inc. is the only U.S. company that has ever been able to secure any export deal on encryption with China. Documentation held by the Commerce Department and taken by former DNC fundraiser Ira Sockowitz shows that RSA was able to obtain a trade deal with the Chinese government through a Commerce sponsored trade conference to Beijing in October 1995. In fact, both the Chairman of RSA, Jim Bidzos, and Ron Brown met in October of 1995 with Madam Wu Yi, head of China's MOFTEC (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation). Al Gore also had previous legal contact with RSA Inc. in 1994. According RSA CEO James Bidzos, in March 1994 Gore sent government lawyers to RSA in a failed effort to purchase patents on encryption technology held by his company. Curiously, the envoy Gore selected to send was John Huang's boss, Commerce Counsel Ginger Lew. Even more curious is the fact that Lew claimed to know nothing about encryption in her deposition for Judicial Watch. Her lack of computer security knowledge is puzzling because Lew also possessed a 1994 document detailing penetrations of U.S. government computers using "back-door" and "SNIFFER" programs installed by unknown hackers. The document was returned in response to a Freedom of Information Request. Ms. Lew currently works at the Small Business Administration and has refused my request for an interview. In February 1996, only days after Robertson had kicked in his $100,000 to the Clinton/Gore campaign, RSA announced the China encryption export deal. In April 1996, Robertson's Security Dynamics Inc. bought RSA for $296 million above the stock value. Robertson's investment firm was paid $2 million just to write the merger document. Thus, Robertson financially benefited from the same company that Gore had previously engaged in secret government negotiations. Robertson gained $2 million for a $100,000 investment in less than 90 days. How deeply involved was Robertson with party officials? Perhaps, the real question is which party? Democrat or Communist? In an April 1994 letter Robertson reminded Brown of scheduled money-raising events for the DNC and of his efforts for DNC candidates. "P.S." Robertson wrote to Brown. "It has been fund raising season out here for the Senate and we've had events at our home for Feinstein, Lieberman, and Cooper. I wish you were still head of the DNC for the December elections, but you are obviously doing a great job at Commerce." In the same letter Robertson also noted his influence in the Chinese communist party. In April 1994 Robertson informed Brown of his successful effort to hire the son of a major Chinese Communist leader. "We have recently hired Bo Feng the son of Feng Zhijun the vice chairman of the China Democratic League and a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress." On August 18, 1998 this author filed suit in Federal Court against the Clinton administration for illegally withholding documents. The documents in question were discovered at the Commerce Department in response to a Freedom of Information Request on Loral CEO Bernard Schwartz and DNC donor Sanford Robertson. At first, the Commerce Department refused to release the "22" documents because they were being withheld by unspecified "other agencies" for "consultation". On May 18, 1998 the Commerce Department released one of the 22 documents. The single document returned was the bio of W. Bowman Cutter, Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, written by the White House. "Bo" Cutter, "Bob" Rubin, Al Gore and Ron Brown were all tasked to encryption export policy in the 1993 Top Secret order from Bill Clinton written by Tony Lake. Bo, Bob, Al and Ron were part of the encryption task force detailed in the 1996 CIA/FBI/DOJ meeting. "Bo" Cutter's boss, now Treasury Secretary "Bob" Rubin, raised the 1994 $100,000 from Sanford Robertson while working inside the White House - just like Al Gore in 1995. All of these fine gentlemen were also making secret export policy... including Sanford Robertson. In addition, according to the Commerce Department FOIA officer, the remaining 21 documents were being withheld by the White House. However, the White House is NOT an agency. My source on this legal "Catch-22" is the White House legal counsel for Vice President Al Gore. In response to a 1997 FOIA request Vice President Gore's Deputy Counsel Elizabeth Brown wrote "Please be advised that FOIA applies to only records maintained by 'agencies' with in the Executive Branch. The Office of the President and the Vice President ... are not 'agencies' for the purposes of this law. Therefore, your request must be denied." The Clinton administration caved instead of facing embarrassment in court. The remaining documents withheld by the White House have been released. Both Bernard Schwartz and Sanford Robertson were given the detailed dossiers of the Chinese leadership from President Jiang Zemin, and MOFTEC's Madam Wu Yi - down to the local communist mayor of Shanghi. The new documents include information on such communist officials as Hu Qili - Minister of Electronics Industry - a former radical Red Guard member of the Chinese Youth movement. According to the hidden documents, Qili argues "that military electronics are a key technology necessary for winning modern warfare." According to Sun Tzu, all war is based on deception. War, according to Von Clausewitz, is also merely an extension of politics. The war of Clinton deception continues to this day. The administration and its agencies are continuing to withhold documents from this author, the House National Security Committee, and the House Government Oversight Committee. The White House is engaged in a cover-up of illegal activities. Evidence hidden in a deliberate and planned scheme to conceal crimes by officials currently in power. ============================================================== source documents * = new - Robertson letters to Brown & Clinton http://www.softwar.net/rscot.html <--- text version http://www.softwar.net/rsco.html <--- jpeg version - SECRET 1993 order on encryption by Anthony Lake http://www.softwar.net/not4u2c.html - Secret 1996 DCIA Deutch/FBI Freeh /AG Reno meeting http://www.softwar.net/docciat.html <--- text version http://www.softwar.net/doccia.html <--- jpeg version - * Snips from the SEC - official RSA/SDI merger document RJP, China, MFN treaty & $2,000,000 payment to Robertson & Stephens for writing merger document. http://www.softwar.net/sdi.html - * Raymond Hung with Arnie, wife with $1,000,000 check, wife with Shriver, temple donated to PRC and article ref. http://www.softwar.net/quorum.html - Interview of RSA CEO James Bidzos http://www.softwar.net/bidzos.html - * Documents held by Ginger Lew on back-doors and sniffers http://www.softwar.net/lew.html - * Documents on encryption written by Al Gore & 1997 FOIA rejection by Gore's legal counsel http://www.softwar.net/al2000.html http://www.softwar.net/gore.html http://www.softwar.net/vp.html - * Ron at CHINA WORLD - Oct. 1995 JCCT meeting with Wu Yi http://www.softwar.net/ron.html - * White House Bio of "Bo" Cutter http://www.softwar.net/boknows.html - * snips from White House documents & SOFTWAR action, bios of Jiang Zemin, Wu Yi, Hu Qili, and Huang Ju (mayor of Shanghi) http://www.softwar.net/white.html ================================================================ 1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775 Charles R. Smith SOFTWAR http://www.softwar.net softwar(a)softwar.net Pcyphered SIGNATURE: 5A7061066259AAE7F805238B655FF97BB1EAE42FB1C6F167AFD9964D21E2BD4A BABA05AC8A30EFA7B576D199F6F01DEA3460074026CD09F27A36919487341214 57401400416BC39E ================================================================ SOFTWAR EMAIL NEWSLETTER 09/15/1998 *** to unsubscribe reply with "unsubscribe" as subject *** ================================================================ ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ********************************************** --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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