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WNSTORM NOT on wuarchive...
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If any of you managed to get it off wuarchive, great.. if not, sorry... I've just looked and some sysadmin removed it... I haven't seen it in the msdos directories either so that's a big problem... I do however have the permission of someone to use theri ftp site, however, I cannot publically post the site name at his request. If you want it, email me and I'll tell you the site name, but please don't post it to the list.

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British and German citizens....
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If the British or German citizens on the list could drop me some e-mail. (I'm interested in discussing some recent changes to citizenship requirements) -uni- (Dark) -- 073BB885A786F666 nemo repente fuit turpissimus - potestas scientiae in usu est 6E6D4506F6EDBC17 quaere verum ad infinitum, loquitur sub rosa - wichtig!

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Re: ECASH HOLY GRAIL?
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gary Jeffers writes: > Say, isn't this the electronic privacy HOLY GRAIL? - The STATE >KILLER? - The POWER GIVER TO THE INDIVIDUAL? Here's to hoping that >its everything that Chaum was looking for & congratulations to >David Chaum & company. Either that or the power is given to DigiCash. What is their take? How do they make a profit? Yes, I like the idea of cryptocash, but all the worries that come up when the government does it come up at least as loud when a private firm does it. How *do* they make their money on this? And what happens when governments get upset that a private script has cropped up? (What are the laws on minting private money?) Fascinating stuff. -kb, the Kent who has been lurking here until now P.S. Have you people developed any special mailbox filters to help deal with high-volume lists like this?

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Privacy Rights Alert
by JWRCLUM＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts jwrclum(a)aol.com Re: Privacy Rights Alert Date: November 20, 1995 c 1995 ACLUMA We at the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts want to alert you to the fact that the right to medical privacy of all Americans is imperiled by a bill just introduced in the U.S. Congress. This bill, which is claimed to be a "Medical Records Confidentiality Act," in reality may turn out to be profoundly destructive of your right to privacy. Although Part I does contain certain aspects which could help privacy, Part II undercuts the very fabric of patient- doctor confidentiality. First, it preempts many state law and common law protections which currently exist. Second, it pushes the further computerization of medical records, and will bring about the creation of "Health Information Services" --- corporate entities which would receive, process, and serve as libraries for actual on-line medical records forwarded from hospitals, clinics, and individual doctors. It appears that this will take place without any requirement for individual patients' authorization or consent. As we all know, computerized data bases are not immune from being accessed by both unauthorized "outsiders" and unauthorized "insiders." Centralization of data storage, especially in electronic form, simplifies its being accessed. But aside from that, the bill would actually authorize access to the medical records in these data bases by a host of government and non-government entities. Each of our medical records would thus become part of a computerized "lending library" --- an internet of medical records. For example, the bill would permit release of your medical records from "Health Information Services" (the on-line data base holders) and "Health Information 'Trustees'" (providers, hospitals, health plans, employers, insurers, and health oversight agencies) to the following (among others): - Release to researchers (along with your medical history, it is possible that identifying information including your name, address, and phone number would be sent). - Nearly-automatic release, to the opposing party in a lawsuit, of your entire medical history, if your health, physical or mental, has been raised by you as an issue in that lawsuit. - Release to law-enforcement authorities under certain circumstances. - Release to Public Health Agencies under certain circumstances. - Release based on Judicial Warrant --- you would be notified by mail within 30 days after execution of the warrant (90 days or more with the government's ex parte option). - Release based on Judicial Subpoena, Grand Jury Subpoena, or Administrative Agency (e.g. Social Security) Subpoena --- you would be notified on or before the date of its execution (or within 90 days thereafter [or longer] with the government's ex parte option). -A special variant of this, where the identity of the patient is "unknown," would allow the search of records (plural) in order to identify the person being sought. [In essence, this would allow "fishing" expeditions, using a computerized net, into the private lives of Americans.] In some of these situations, you, the patient, will only be informed after the records have been released. You may, in some circumstances, have the legal right to "attempt to quash" the subpoena (etc.) by seeking a court's intervention. However, the standard by which the court is to reach a decision on this will be mandated by this bill to be a consideration of whether the government's interest in obtaining the information outweighs the privacy interest of the individual. We would encourage you to pull up a copy of the actual bill and view it yourself. This can be done through the Library of Congress internet site at http:\\thomas.loc.gov (104th Congress, Senate bill number S 1360 ). Alternatively, a hard copy by mail can be requested from the U.S. Senate Documents Room, by faxing to 202-228-2815 a note containing the bill number and your mailing address. All our voices need to be heard in order to help make certain that this bill is not passed by Congress. Possible actions include: (1) Letters to your Senators and congresspersons, and to the House and Senate leadership. (2) Letters to local newspapers and other media. (3) Forwarding the contents of this message to places where you feel it will be of interest and have impact. This document may be re-distributed freely, provided it remains in its entirety. If you value your right to privacy, the time to act is now....

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"Dear Newt" Letter...
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My, *this* looks interesting... Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: 20 Nov 1995 11:21:01 -0800 Subject: please fwd to cpunks if you To: "Bob Hettinga" <RAH(a)shipwright.com> The Ad Hoc Taxpayer Coalition for Computer Privacy November 8, 1995 The Honorable Newt Gingrich Speaker of the House of Representatives H-232 The Capitol Washington, DC 20515-6502 Dear Mr. Speaker: We are writing to express serious concerns about the Administration's efforts to continue to restrict the ability of computer users at home and abroad to protect their personal and private information over electronic networks through the use of encryption technology. The Administration seems determined to ensure government surveillance of all electronic information and communications. It began with President Clinton's "Clipper Chip," but has not stopped. Consumers aren't happy with these proposals, and neither is the business community nor civil libertarians. In fact, it's hard to find anyone supportive outside the Administration except for the few that would benefit from the Administration's "proposed relaxation" of the nation's export policy. The Administration refuses to let American computer hardware and software companies sell products with good encryption worldwide unless the U.S. Government is guaranteed access to a key that unlocks that information. The Administration is trying to leverage these companies' need to export -- they derive more than half their earnings from sales abroad -- and desire to develop a single product worldwide, to force them to include a feature in products they sell in the U.S. and abroad that will allow government access. Administration officials also have said that if American companies do not "voluntarily" include such a feature, then they will seek legislation making such a feature mandatory. The Administration's approach is the wrong policy for today's marketplace. It's anti-consumer. Computer users will not entrust their sensitive information to computer networks unless its security and privacy are assured. Without good privacy protection, there simply will not be a Global Information Infrastructure -- and America won't be in the lead. It's anti-marketplace. There is no consumer demand for encryption products that give the government easy access. The Administration has come forward with a typical big-government approach -- a government designed solution for a government problem. This completely overlooks the realities of a free-market. It is anti-American business. The Administration's current policies are seriously harming the continued competitiveness of one of our fastest growing and most successful industries -- the computer hardware and software industry. Computer users are demanding good encryption but American companies are not allowed to supply it. Yet there are hundreds of foreign encryption products manufactured and encryption programs are widely available on the Internet. Finally, it is anti-progress. Wishing that there was no encryption available will not make it so. The technology is widely understood and available -- you can't put this genie basic in the bottle. Government policies should not encumber the American computing industry as it leads the world technology revolution. We strongly urge you to oppose attempts to limit the ability of Americans to use whatever encryption they wish and to support the immediate relaxation of harmful export controls on American products and programs with encryption features. The Ad Hoc Taxpayer Coalition for Computer Privacy Americans for Tax Reform Association of Concerned Taxpayers Competitive Enterprise Institute Citizens for a Sound Economy The Business Leadership Council The Small Business Survival Committee Citizens Against a National Sales Tax/VAT Virginia Postrel, Editor, Reason magazine Sheldon Richman, Senior Editor, The Cato Institute Tanya Metaksa, Executive Director, Institute for Legislative Action, National Rifle Association Kellyanne Fitzpatrick, The Polling Company Donna Matias, Institute for Justice =+=+=+=+ This information is provided as a service of the National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action, Fairfax, VA. This and other information on the Second Amendment and the NRA is available at any of the following URL's: http://WWW.NRA.Org, gopher://GOPHER.NRA.Org, wais://WAIS.NRA.Org, ftp://FTP.NRA.Org, mailto:LISTPROC@NRA.Org (Send the word help as the body of a message) Information may also be obtained by connecting directly to the NRA-ILA GUN-TALK Bulletin Board System at (703) 934-2121. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 958-3971 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://www.webstuff.apple.com/~vinnie/Rah >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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(None)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pcw(a)access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) writes: > "Fewer" enemies? I am of the opinion that most of the Post SU countries will amount to no serious threat. Remember, most of our problem was with Moscow. Most of the SU didn't especially care about us -- they were more concerned with eating dinner that night. As a result, yes, there are a few emerging hot spots, but they aren't _our_ enemies. The Bosnia deal is a local political problem. It is _not_ a threat to US security, much as Clinton would like us to think it is... ;-) > Croatia etc... We didn't need to monitor the different governments in the > different regions. True, but, most of that died. Yugoslavia, for example, is hardly a threat to us. Our problems in the past were mostly with Moscow. Most of the rest of the SU was not an issue. So yes, we have more governments to watch, but fewer enemies. > The ex-SU is now split into too many pieces for me to count. Some of them > have nuclear weapons that they don't want to turn over. Others have military > ships. Yes, they have Nukes. If I did, in their shoes, you're damn right I wouldn't want to give them up! Yes, they bear watching. Hell, even Israel, our military ally, bears watching. That doesn't mean they require the same level of surveillance. > North Korea, the Mid East and Cuba are the only places that still need the > same amount of attention that they needed during the Cold War. This is > because they're already maxed out. NK is a hot spot at the moment. Even if the C/W was still in effect and the SU still in force, NK would probably still be a problem now. The Middle Eastern area still requires a mind-boggling amount of watching. That situation is just too volatile not to watch it. However, I find it hard to buy into the fact that we're going to give 100% to Middle East, and the same 100% to Russia, who not only still can't feed it's people, but has SERIOUS financial problems. --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+ -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: Anonymity and Intellectual Capital
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The analogy between corporations protecting physical capital and anonymity protecting intellectual capital is interesting, and I will write a bit about it here. I don't think it quite works in all ways but it does suggest some ideas. Capital, as I use the word, means stuff which helps you be productive. Money can be physical capital, as can machines, computers, and so on, but generally not consumer goods. Traditionally, intellectual capital by the same definition refers to training, knowledge, experience, education - those mental skills and characteristics which help you produce. We have sometimes extended this notion here to reputation capital, which we often use just to mean your reputation itself, your good name. But if we are going to call it "capital" it should really be those aspects of your reputation which lead to productivity. To the extent that your good reputation helps you accomplish your productive goals, it can be considered capital. Particularly if you are a manager or performer in some other position where people's opinions of you make a big difference in how much you get done, you have a lot of reputation capital. Business reputations have many of the characteristics of capital, too. For some uses of anonymity it does make sense to think of them as protecting reputation capital. If you are going to send a message which carries a risk of harming your reputation, perhaps because it is terribly stupid or harsh, then anonymity can protect you in that way. I think some people do communicate anonymously for this reason. However there is another motivation, too, and that is fear of physical consequences. Some anonymous messages might lead to lawsuits or retribution in other forms, such as firing or blackballing. There is more involved in these cases than just loss of reputation capital. Physical capital is involved as well. So this is one way in which I think the analogy does not work. Another difference relates to the number of people involved. As I understand it, the motivation for the corporate veil of immunity from liability is so that people can safely band together in business. If there were no veil, and one harmful act by a member of the corporation could result in any stockholder being held liable, then few people would be willing to commit their assets to such an activity. The risk would be too great. The point is that this protection is oriented towards protecting large numbers of people. It does not make much sense for a single person to incorporate in order to try to protect himself from his own harmful acts, and in fact I understand that the veil can often be easily pierced in such situations. On the other hand, with anonymity we are generally dealing with single individuals. There is no apparent need for people to pool reputation capital in an endeavor, and have it be protected by the use of anonymity. The closest I can think of would be for a bunch of highly regarded individuals to announce that they were going to join together and create commentaries which would demonstrate all the insight, wit, and other traits which gave these people such a high reputation in the first place, but that the resulting missives would be released anonymously, so that if one of them ended up reflecting badly on the writers, there would be no way to know who had actually created it (it could be a fake created by an imitator). While I can't rule this out, it doesn't seem like a likely scenario, and it doesn't seem to offer the opportunities that corporations do for increasing productivity. Another issue is the different forms of anonymity, which don't have clear analogies with physical capital. Using a pseudonym you can build up reputation capital (or at least reputation) in the nym, but then you no longer have immunity from harm if it commits some gaffe. (Actually I suppose this is not too different from the corporation whose assets can be attacked but not those of the shareholders.) Then there are the limited pseudonyms discussed by David Chaum, where there are limits in how many pseudonyms of a particular type a person can create. You could have one "committed" pseudonym, unlinkable to your True Name, which you post under; but you'd only get that one. (You could post under other pseudonyms but they wouldn't be able to get that "committed" stamp.) You'd have to be pretty careful what you say via that nym, much as you are today with your True Name (which BTW a lot of people don't realize yet). Then people could filter so they only received messages from committed nyms, figuring that senders would be more likely to put meaningful content into these kinds of messages. Chaum's system of credentials also could allow you to transfer endorsements from one pseudonym to another. We have discussed the idea that such endorsements could be considered an embodiment of reputation capital. You could post a wide range of messages under different pseudonyms, collect the positive endorsements (and discard the negative ones), and attach them to your True Name or committed nym. This might encourage people to abandon their natural caution in making postings which will come back to haunt them years hence (again, this will be more an issue once people realize that this will happen). Hal

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WANTED: roommate for defcon
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wanted: a roommate for the weekend at defcon. Just let me sleep on the floor and I'll pay part of the bill. Also, I am not an axe-murderer! (what a deal!) -nate -- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons <nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu> <nate(a)yuma.ANCS.ColoState.Edu> | | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | | Data Visualization/Interrogation, Modeling, Animation, Rendering | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

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radio program - Los Angeles area only
by Robert Lau 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

today's topic on Which Way LA (KCRW 89.9FM, Los Angeles) was on phone, computer, etc. privacy, and how the government is doing everything it can to take it away from us. at least that's what the spots have said. presumably about clipper, FBI wiretap laws, etc. first broadcast was at 13:00 but i missed it, being rebroadcast at 19:00. i don't have a tape deck in my office, but i guess i could digitize it. sorry for all of you outside LA, which is probably 99.3598% of you... :) Robert Lau - Systems Programmer, Unix Systems 213-740-2866 -- University Computing Services Internet: rslau(a)usc.edu -- University of Southern California Bitnet: rslau@uscvm -- 1020 W Jefferson, LA, CA USA, 90089-0251 UUCP: ...!uunet!usc!rslau

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Markoff/NSA/RSA
by KillBarny＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's something to put in your FYI files... 6/28:PROFIT AND EGO IN DATA SECRECY By JOHN MARKOFF c.1994 N.Y. Times News Service REDWOOD CITY, Calif. - If the web of thousands of computer networks around the world can be thought of as an information superhighway, then Jim Bidzos is one of its best-placed toll takers. Bidzos expects to become very rich - unless the government has its way. As president of a Silicon Valley company called RSA Data Security Inc., Bidzos, 39, controls the patents for software crucial to scrambling and unscrambling computer messages so they can be sent confidentially. Just about anyone using a computer network - whether for sending personal messages, filing taxes electronically, or shopping from home with a credit card - would want such confidentiality. On the strength of its coding technology, RSA has sold more than four million copies of its software, and it has won wide support from industry giants like Apple Computer, AT&T, IBM, Lotus Development, Microsoft, Motorola, Northern Telecom, Novell and Sun Microsystems. Until recently cryptography, the science of sending secret messages, was a province generally populated by the armed forces, governments and their spies. But with the rise of commercial computer networks, cryptography has become an essential ingredient in information-age services. RSA's software is based on an innovation in cryptography that permits people to exchange private messages without actually getting together beforehand and arranging a secret password. In the past, cryptography required that the two parties to a communication first meet to exchange a large number that enabled them to encode and decode messages. RSA's system employs two keys, one for encoding a message, known as a public key, and another for decoding it, called a private key. People who wish to receive secret messages can freely distribute their public key, which enables senders to encode a message. Only with the private key can the message be decoded. A company selling products on-line, for instance, might make its public key widely available, which would enable customers to send in a coded message containing their credit card numbers that could not be intercepted and read by others. The company could decode those messages with its private key, which has a mathematical relationship to the public one. The government fears that should the RSA system become available abroad, it would lose its ability to eavesdrop and wiretap in cases involving risks to national security. It would much prefer that the global standard be based on its own Clipper encryption standard, which has a "backdoor" that law enforcement officials can peek through. Precisely because the RSA method has no backdoor, it is the choice of industry. But to some government officials, Bidzos is nothing short of a scheming businessman. "The government would like him not to exist," said Jeffrey Schiller, a computer manager at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has negotiated a licensing deal with Bidzos. And Stuart Baker, who until several weeks ago was chief counsel of the National Security Agency, observed, "My sense is that his motivation is no more than trying to convince people to buy his products." Officials at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, another federal agency, say they want to create a standard that is not beholden to the patents of one small company. And the National Security Agency and the Justice Department want a standard that will allow law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop on suspected criminals or violators of national security. >From Bidzos' perspective, Washington remains bound up in a cold war mentality, and should simply get out of the way and let RSA Data go about its business. What is more, he complains, any number of foreign companies are developing encryption techniques just as hard to crack as his, so the government's efforts to keep him from exporting his software are useless, and perhaps counterproductive. Notwithstanding the official concerns, RSA has developed a loyal following among a wide range of computer, communications and software companies. "They have the strongest technology and the best reputation in the cryptography business," said William Ferguson, vice president of Semaphore Inc., a maker of data-scrambling systems that licenses RSA's software. Adding spice to this dispute is Bidzos' ability to outmaneuver the government, most recently by snatching a crucial patent from under the noses of officials who were planning to use it in an official standard they are trying to establish. Several years ago, two top computer scientists from the National Institute of Standards and Technology traveled to Europe to meet with a German mathematician, Claus Schnorr, who holds a key patent that the government's coding system may violate. When they returned to the United States, the scientists told their superiors that the United States should license Schnorr's patent. But Washington was slow to act. So in March 1993, while Bidzos was on a trip to France, he met with Schnorr for a four-hour lunch. By the end of the meal, Bidzos had a deal to use Schnorr's patent. Despite Bidzos' high profile in the world of encryption, RSA's revenue is small - somewhere between $5 million and $10 million annually. But analysts say that the company has the ability to grow substantially. "They have a huge opportunity in the Internet," said Lisa Thorell, a researcher at Dataquest in San Jose, Calif., referring to the global web of computer networks that is regarded as a working but primitive model of a global data highway. RSA is also playing an increasing role in the $500 million secure-communications business for equipment that permits safe financial transactions and voice and data communications. The issue clouding the future of the company is how severely it will suffer from export controls and competing standards backed by the National Security Agency. Last month the government made its own competing standard for signing electronic documents mandatory for all federal agencies, and declared that the digital signature standard, as it is known, did not violate RSA's technology. Bidzos thinks that Washington is infringing his patents, and, eventually, the strength of his patent claims will be tested in court. Rather then sue the government, Bidzos is likely to start with one of the small companies, like Group Technologies Corporation in Tampa, that is making components under a government contract, industry executives say. Bidzos, who is a Greek citizen and a permanent resident of the United States, was working at a small international marketing firm in 1985 when he decided to move from Florida to the Silicon Valley to help a friend save a failing business. "I wanted to do deals and stay in luxury hotels," he said recently at his office here. "I had no idea I'd be in the center of a political whirlwind." When Bidzos joined the company in 1986, RSA was a shoestring operation about to go into bankruptcy. With his help, RSA struck a deal with Lotus Development in 1987, in which the software giant agreed to advance money for the right to include RSA software in Lotus Notes, a program designed for work groups of office employees. A year later RSA was presented with an offer to be acquired by Rupert Murdoch in a multimillion-dollar deal. A Murdoch subsidiary, the News Data Communications Corp., was developing technology for Murdoch's Sky TV. So in 1988 Bidzos flew twice to Britain to attempt to negotiate a deal, but the sides were far apart on price. He says the offers to buy RSA still roll in. "I've received no less than five firm, written offers in the last two years," he said. He also says he doesn't think that the government can regain the upper hand in the cryptography wars. "They've fired every weapon they have at us now, and we're stronger than ever," Bidzos said. "All they can do is try and get RSA legislated out of business, and that will never happen, in my opinion."

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