- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

verilog decryptor
by an53004＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A few months ago someone posted a verilog decryptor perl script to comp.lang.verilog. Does anyone have a copy? If so, would you send it to me. Thanks in advance ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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AI code speed up !!!!
by Scott Bence 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >> Recently I received the code for a neural network. It is written in > >> standard ANSI-C. However, running it on the Mac gives me a lot of coffee > >> breaks ( it takes 10 min on a IIci, 3 hrs on an LC ). I was wondering if > >> anybody out there has experience with this and knows of ways to make the > >> code faster ( replacing ANSI routines with Mac-based routines. > >You might want to get a match coprocessor for the LC. The ci has one, > >and that's probably your problem. (I'm not sure if the LC can take one, > >though!) If my memory still works after the two pints I just had, the LC > >has a 68020 without any FPU. You might want to upgrade to an LC III and > >find out if it has an FPU. I believe neural nets use floats, no? If so > >you will most certainly need and FPU if you want decent speed. > The LC does lack a FPU, but you can get one on a card. I'm not sure if > this would help though, because it would depend if your compilier would > generate FPU code. I know you can with Think. You also might need to take > into account which compiler you are using for this kind of program, there > seems to be a vairation in efficency between Mac Compilers. I have done a lot of optimization work on Mac and PC - Fractal generations & ray tracing both in C. 1.) Don't use SANE unless accuracy becomes a major issue. 2.) CHANGE ALL FLOATS TO DOUBLE!!!! Better speed & better accuracy!!!!! (MOST IMPORTANT due to Motorola design!) 3.) Think & MPW both can create FPU code as well '030 code. Use em. 4.) Fall back from system 7.x to newest 6.x with no multitasking. Then try to structure your object code size to fit in the cache of 680x0. 5.) Use register variables where needed. 6.) Don't re-code in assembler - the gain usually isn't worth it. 7.) If there is alot of screen updating - stop it until the final/desired result is achieved. 8.) Don't make System Task calls inside critical loops like Apple says to do, it slows down completion time, it will invalidate your code in the cache (see #4). There is alot more stuff but this should speed you up by a significant factor. 9.) Mac's are wonderfull but for number crunching '486/66 can smoke the mac due to 256k cache(secondary) and 8K cache (internal -Primary). Don't know your budget but the POWER PC looks sweet. I don't know when the compilers will opimize for this chip but look for mega mega mega increase in performance. > > As for using toolbox calls, using Apple's SANE library might help. I > > haven't had much experience with it, but it would probably take advatage of > > the FPU. Yup, but it's s...l...o....w....... Hope this helps. Write back and let me know. BENCE :-) #include <std_disclaimer.h> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ Scott Bence * Texas State Technical College @ Waco, Texas ----- --- Computer Networking & Systems Administration * sbence(a)tstc.edu --- ----------------------------------------------------------------------

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alternative to Fair Cryptosystems
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm slow reading my cp mail and saw a reference to Micali's Fair Cryptosystems (what a name!). There is a simple alternative -- also to Clipper. You can have your surveillance agency (or agencies which need to cooperate) publish their own RSA keys (big ones, presumably), and all the good little boys and girls who want to prove how obedient and conformist they are can include those keys as recipients when they encrypt messages. If there are to be multiple agencies which have to cooperate, the PGP or RIPEM software would have to change to split the message key by XOR with ranno pieces, but in the meantime, you could just include the FBI in your list of recipients and save everybody the hassle of having to get pieces to put together. Simple -- direct -- speaks right to the gov't desire. What could be wrong with this? - Carl -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCzAgUBLT6w6njfNbIrNWRxAQH7gQTvS3ZzwSMfzbE6XjWaHmNxVqPt7QPPGlqi pkMwF1IX/AyZ6VSOsETPGANwgMjk9NBDQNutNvpmZHnCm90smz+Z1q70/Pg5wY9F mY19U68G38qrYvv6YIAYTcW38O3vDpDnpqeltnrZ2yf7WR9ujfiEJZdPOdgkMJ7r KEqWTkvP36yxOBaZ0ozORDgZrnDJmHuRCWLYlWSiZsr5laI4NSo= =63Vw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RSA: questions
by an56238＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Karl Lui Barrus writes: > >I believe if p and q are well chosen (p-1 and q-1 have large prime >factors, for example p = 2p'+1 and q=2q'+1 with p' and q' prime) then >only two values of d will work as the decryption exponent. This makes >guessing d as "easy" as guessing either p or q in the first place. > That was the answer I was lookin for. Any more maths available ? (formulas!, formulas!) My paranoia hates the ``I believe'' part. >For example: p = 11 (p' = 5), q = 23 (q' = 11), n = 253, phi(n) = 220 >I picked e = 7, gcd(e,n) = 1, solve for d = 63 >The message 20 encrypts to 20^7 mod 253 = 136 >I make a brute force search for d by raising C to all possible values >of d, from 1 to 253, looking for what decrypts to the original message. I did a brute force search too in my first example. However, this is the story of the snake biting its tail:if you choose p and q with the ``nice'' properties you describe, you then restrict yourself to a subset of all possible values of p and q, thus shrinking the key space search for the possible attacker. So, to completely answer the question, you need to figure out the distribution of prime number couples (p,q) that verify: p=2p'+1, p' prime q=2q'+1 q' prime, p'!=q' This way you'll be able to know how much you're shrinking key space. - -zap -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCUAgUBLT5QWCk+9PttYUp1AQFwHwP3T+DoLsQQf9C/LBWKv62AhGBxFIk/h1Zl HnCtDwuJvbAG10RJ1Hg4uetdvtqyo+T3vfeFzExsdEBnPljGTNptpnJF5CXqVjB/ lbPAmxrFPUjOnSU0NbJcxfU73QTwq5Ep2Nj3uQu1RAdi0JptZ2wjIGnngrlXqCwT RlLXRAMVAw== =XuUd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Barriers to offshore banking
by m＠BlueRose.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

szabo(a)netcom.netcom.com (Nick Szabo) writes: >The middle class avoids current offshore banking because it >is user-hostile and puts their life savings at high risk. They may be user hostile, but they are not necessarily risky. And the middle class uses offshore banks a great deal. Offshore means any bank outside the US. Swiss banks are quite reliable, though they occasionally provide information to the US government and they withhold taxes on interest earned. Austrian banks are just as reliable and offer not just numbered accounts, but password protected, numbered accounts, and do not tax interest earned. There are many other places with reliable banks that will protect one's privacy. The Channel Islands have a system of government that dates to 1066, numbered bank accounts, and the largest bank on the Islands is the tenth largest bank in the world. >An offshore bank often takes a week or more to service requests for >statements sent by snail-mail. That's why most people use faxes to communicate with offshore banks. I would be surprised if email didn't follow soon. >Offshore banks are notorious for obsconding with customers' money. In a few jurisdictions, this is true. For example all that is required to set up a bank in Grenada is to form a corporation with the word "Bank" in the name. That's it! No regulations at all. Most jurisdictions in which offshore banking take place regulate several different types of banks. Class A banks are the type one finds in the US, with tellers, etc. Class B banks are typically run by a company which sets up the bank and are almost always prohibited from doing any business with the local residents. Class B banks are usually divided into restricted and unrestricted. An unrestricted bank can do business with anyone not a resident of the country in which the bank exists, while a restricted bank can do business only with parties named at the time the bank is formed. Reserve and capitalization requirement vary from country to country but unrestricted banks must nearly always meet tougher requirements than restricted banks, and Class A banks must meet tougher requirements than Class B banks. For example, in the Bahamas, a restricted Class B bank must have a minimum capitalization of $100,000 and pay an annual license fee of $5000. For an unrestricted Class B bank, it is $1,000,000 and $25,000 respectively. I don't have figures available for a Class A bank but they are much higher and the Class A bank would be subject to regulation. >Reputation information on these banks is hard to find to >nonexistant. It's not that hard to find. Many offshore banks are more than 100 years old. >The typical offshore bank customer spends $1,000's on legal fees to >obtain information on reputable banks, the legality of what they are >doing in both the local and offshore jurisdictions, and to set up >obscure, sophisticated legal entities. True but misleading. The typical offshore bank customer spends about $1000 to $2000 to set up a corporation, so that the bank acount is not in his own name. This obviates the requirement to tell the IRS when an American opens a bank account in a foreign country. >There aren't any good statistics, but I'd guess that most of the >money saved by going offshore is lost to legal fees and fraud. If that were true, there wouldn't be offshore banks. The tax savings probably outweigh the legal fees by 10 to 1 or more in most cases, and fraud exists, but is not so rapant that people stay away. M Carling

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INTERNET BANKING
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Michael C. Berch raised several issues about digital banking which I would like to address. Though his post was very thoughtful, it had some imbedded common misconceptions. He listed four concerns he had with digital banking--Security, Convenience, Privacy and Credit. He then wrote: No. 1, security, is a problem with anonymized, offshore, network banking. Today we rely on a combination of reputation and regulation . . . But in a *nonregulated* environment, there will have to be private deposit insurance which could easily have some bootstrap problems in building the initial market. [Emphasis added.] For the foreseeable future, all digital banking will be conducted from some national jurisdiction--just as with current offshore banks. Every world jurisdiction has some degree of regulation which is specifically aimed toward client protection. . . . I envision transactions ending up in two big buckets: card services and "cheque" services. . . . The card system, insecure at it is, is fast becoming universal; . . . I find it difficult to imagine large-scale displacement of institutions like VISA, MasterCard, and Amex, simply because they do what they do (provide instant POS credit authorization, guarantee merchants quick payment, etc.) very well. There is no need to displace current institutions. When a credit (or debit) card is issued by a bank in a privacy jurisdiction, all financial information about the card user must, by law, be kept secret. . . . Because of the degree to which strong financial privacy threatens government power (especially taxing power. . .) I can easily imagine that (1) banks doing business in or "touching" the US and most politically similar sovereignties will not be able to prevent themselves from disclosing identity and transaction information about their customers, and (2) people will probably be prohibited from dealing with these banks if they are in fact beyond the reach of legal process. Currently, there exist thousands of banks that offer strong financial privacy. They have little difficulty in preventing disclosure of customer information. Why should a digital bank be any different? No Western countries now prohibit their nationals from dealing with offshore banks. With the advent of strong encryption-mediated communications, anonymous remailers and, of course, digital banking, any such future prohibitions would be nearly impossible to enforce. The last issue Michael raised was credit. He wants a digital bank that will loan him money without knowing who he is. Don't hold your breath on this one. Those who wish to borrow money can probably expect that digital banks will want exactly the same personal and financial information that traditional banks require today. Such is the nature of business. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLT7J7E5ULTXct1IzAQG7fgP7Bzuu+wF4ESBy5WIS70BhMllxKDJiwG/e VvJyCyRQH/F590WPnyewUf3sw6GucMjH862iHOaTdlSipB5Iw1RiNYnsj85YYMe6 7UhPw1ajE+vlAyxMD38D+t6zLdHb3wdrn/26TfEnit8PbkLWD6qhCN0f+3WeKZE6 HbixxfTb93M= =2T+9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: alternative to Fair Cryptosystems
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone wrote: >What about us who won't obey? :-) No problem. The Clipper and the Fair Cryptosystem proposal work on voluntary compliance as it is -- so the same people will volunteer for this. It saves all sorts of time and money and hassle doing engineering of chips. It's pure software. As far as I can tell, it's a pure winner! Carl

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postmaster@lance.colostate.edu speaks
by Steve Dempsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So far I have replied individually to complaints about the noise coming from L. Detweiler. My response has been, and continues to be, that he has the right to post in public any opinion he may construct. Some of you have begun to conclude that these postings constitute real threats and libel. I have been reluctant to get involved, but these claims of illegal activity force me to respond. Most of the complaints refer to a document recently posted to many public mailing lists via remailer services. This document apparently describes a fictitious contest or game called SQUISH. Individuals named in this document have written to me claiming that L. Detweiler <ld231782(a)lance.colostate.edu> is the author and is responsible for posting it. They also claim it is libelous and threatening. These folks are understandably offended at the references to themselves and to the invasive method of distribution. But the connection to Mr. Detweiler and to the systems I administer is indirect and assumed. I have spoken with Mr. Detwiler and he claims he did not post it. I have seen no evidence that he posted it. His name was not attached to the document in any copy I've seen. It was distributed by remailers that remove the source of the message. If you're going to claim libel, you better be able to prove the source. I've seen no proof; I have seen only finger-pointing. As to the substance of the document, it appears to be a joke. The reference to entry deadline of April 1 should tell you to check your sense of humor before taking it verbatim. As for the other references cited, including Usenet postings from anonymous addresses and mailing list articles delivered by anonymous remailers, I find it difficult to accept these at face value. It's possible that Mr. Detweiler composed these. It's equally possible that someone else did so. There are plenty of copycats on the net and they're not easy to separate or identify. I won't even try to sort out the anonymously posted or remailed data. And here's what you've all been waiting for: Regarding Mr. Detweiler's other activities on the usenet and other public lists, he concedes that his crusade of the past 2+ months has been less than productive. He has agreed to cease the postings that have yielded so few results other than inflammatory debate. I expect the noise to quiet. I expect to receive from users at large no further complaints of disruptive data coming from his account here. Finally, I will announce to everyone who wants to file additional complaints that I do not enjoy playing the part of net.policeman, nor net.complaint-dept; that really is not my job. Unless you can show some direct evidence that one of my users is harassing you or otherwise violating your rights, or breaking some law, I don't want to hear about it. Complaints about anonymous posts and remailed data should go to persons administering those services. ================================================================== Steve Dempsey Engineering Network Services steved(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu Colorado State University root(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu Fort Collins, CO 80523 postmaster(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu +1 303 491 0630 ==================================================================

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Re: AI code speed up !!!!
by Scott Bence 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't know what (if) I read this in any books or mags. I would recommend MacTutor(name may have changed) I had read it all through college and worshiped it. You can find it at *the Book Stop* if you know where on is. You can benchmark you routines fairly easy. Before you call your function get the ticks off the clock then again afterwards, then get the difference. ie ... start=GetTicks(); /* I think this was call, check the toolbox */ foobar(); total_time=GetTicks()-start; ... One more thing, I left out another optimization kludge. Try to reduce the number of calls outside your function by moving the code it is calling to inside the function. This reduces the associated overhead of jumping (jsr $xxxx). Also, if you have to go through the "toolbox" check into the function GetTrapAddress(). Do this for Moveto(x,y) and then you can bypass the entry point of the toolbox and go directly to the routine in ROM. This should shave off 5%-15% on the execution of toolbox calls. DO NOT HARD CODE THE ADDRESS IN YOUR PROGRAM! YOUR PROGRAM WILL DIE A HORRIBLE DEATH ON ANY OTHER MODEL! Use GetTrapAddress(). Hope all this helps. Let me know how things work for you. > Bence, > > I saw your list of recommendations for code speed-up on the mac. I'm > currently learning how to program the mac, make tool-box calls, etc. and > I found the list interesting. Is there book of information like that, or > is this just stuff picked up in the trade? Let me know when you get a chance. > > -john. > jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu > #include <std_disclaimer.h> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ Scott Bence * Texas State Technical College @ Waco, Texas ----- --- Computer Networking & Systems Administration * sbence(a)tstc.edu --- ----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: alternative to Fair Cryptosystems
by fb＠cyberg.win.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>You can have your surveillance agency (or agencies which need to cooperate) >publish their own RSA keys (big ones, presumably), and all the good little >boys and girls who want to prove how obedient and conformist they are can >include those keys as recipients when they encrypt messages. If there are >to be multiple agencies which have to cooperate, the PGP or RIPEM software >would have to change to split the message key by XOR with ranno pieces, >but in the meantime, you could just include the FBI in your list of recipients >and save everybody the hassle of having to get pieces to put together. > >Simple -- direct -- speaks right to the gov't desire. What could be wrong >with this? And anyone who didn't include a surveillance agency in the list of message recipients would of course be demonstrating that they were up to no good and should be investigated. How diabolically clever. Next let's "voluntarily" switch to postcards for all snail mail. :) --------------------------------------------------------------- Francis Barrett, F.R.C. | Thou canst not travel on the path | The Cybernetics Guild | before thou hast become the Path | fb(a)cyberg.win.net | itself. | ---------------------------------------------------------------

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