- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: (Fwd) Re: TCM: mafia as a paradigm for cyberspace
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:37 PM 5/22/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >>>the above sentence I find absolutely abhorrent: it justifies killing, >>>not merely because of the effect (the sort of "ends-justifies-the-means" >>>argument used by most here), but that in addition it is >>>supposedly "ethical". ethical?!?!? >> >>Then you've obviously dramatically mis-read my ideas. I don't claim that >>_EVERYBODY_ who will fall victim will "deserve" it by your or my opinions, > >oh, so in other words, a lot of "innocent" people will be murdered >under AP. ah, another great "feature", not a "bug", right?? Tell ya what: name a weapon that CANNOT be used to harm an innocent person. Go ahead, I'm waiting. >>For example, if you believe in NIOFP, then anyone who violates it has >>initiated force, and the victim of such force (or, perhaps, anyone else?) >>can legitimately use a system like AP to fight back. > >what is "legitimate"? in our government, "legitimate" refers to our >judicial system. "Legal" is the word you're looking for, not legitimate. > it is what determines what is "legitimate" based >on laws. in your AP anarchy scheme, the word "legitimate" has no meaning. >"legitimate" is in the eye of the beholder. this ridiculous and >impractical definition was discarded centuries ago because of the >free-for-all bloody violence it inevitably leads to. What?!? You mean that after 100 million war deaths in this century alone, you're suggesting that we DON'T have "free-for-all bloody violence"? Or are you simply used to the kind of violence that exists today? That's a common trap people fall into: They simply accept whatever current system we have, as if it is somehow required or okay or... >be very >clear about what you are advocating: in AP, there are no laws. Right! There are no "laws" per se. But there are people, and their interests, and what they believe to be their rights. > people >do not rely on the judicial system to solve their problems. RIGHT! But as importantly, they aren't the _victims_ of that "judicial system" either. Rodney King, for instance. Donald Scott. Randy Weaver. The Branch Davidians, etc. All these people were fundamentally victims of an organization political/legal heirarchy filled with people who had (defacto) greater rights/authority than ordinary citizens, and abused the public with it. > they >take the "law" into their own hands and take out contracts on anyone >who offends them. would they feel justified in killing people who >disagree with them on cyberspace mailing lists? perhaps, who is to tell? I've explained that I believe that the post-AP world will be far less violent than today, partly because there will be no people in positions of authority who can abuse the rest of us with impunity, or force us to go to war against our will. It will also allow GOOD people to punish BAD people without depending on the "system" to do it. It will also tend to prevent the enforcement of "victimless crime" laws that currently result in 60-70% of the prison and jail population. You need to show that yes, you see the advantages, but also show that you have a plausible belief that my system will be worse than the status quo. Citing a specific potential problem without quantifying it is pointless. >>You seem to be assuming that if there are TWO "wrongs" here. But I've tried >>to make it abundantly clear that justification for the self-defense comes >>from the initial "wrong." > >but who decides what is wrong? Each individual, for himself. True, he may occasionally make mistakes, but I contend that the vast majority of these decisions will be entirely justified. The truly bad people, the REAL criminals, will not last long. > the arbitrary opinion of some single >human idiot out anywhere in the world? don't you see the tyranny >of this? it is far worse than the tyranny of a government if I were >to be killed by someone who believes that I violated his rights >by breathing air particles or whatever. via AP, you wish to give him >the mechanism to murder me without trace. If the danger you describe was of higher probability than the alternative, the status quo, you might have a point. But it isn't. Further, the prospect of AP getting rid of (or reforming, because they'll have no choice) most of the real criminals (plus de-populating government and preventing its abusiveness) results in a dramatic reduction in the violations of rights that will occur. >> Where, then, is the SECOND "wrong"? What, >>exactly, makes it wrong? If a person can't get justice any other way (not >>to be confused with merely a chance at justice) then why deny that person >>his rights? > >deny rights, legitimacy, justice, blah, blah, blah. the terms you use have no >meaning in the system you are advocating. there are no "rights" in an anarchy, >because a government is the entity created to safeguard/protect them. Just because we currently think of "the government" as "the entity created to safeguard rights" doesn't mean that this is really so, and it doesn't mean that it actually achieves a net protection of our rights. What government actually does is to monopolize (as best it can) the use of force, and then force the public to pay for a protection service. And monopolies result in classicly bad service, as we all know. >all actions are legitimate in an anarchy, because there is no civilized >system that rejects any ones in particular. If the probability of an improper action is dramatically reduced, without being eliminated, that is an improvement, right? Tell me, as a citizen don't we deserve changing to a system that reduces violations of rights? >>>It should be obvious to anyone around here that if AP "works," it will work >>regardless of whether it meets with your approval or any other subset of >>humankind. That makes it worthy of discussion even if you don't like it. > >it will "work" exactly as anonymous murdering now works. AP already exists, >that's what you don't understand. No, it doesn't, certainly not quantitatively, and in practice not qualitatively, either. Take a 5-foot wave, and notice that it doesn't overflow a 50-foot seawall. Twenty of them, separately, likewise don't get past it. But combine them in one large wave, and the 100-foot wave does get by. The fundamental advantage of AP is that the desires of thousands of people can be combined in order to accomplish what no individual would be able to induce on his own. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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[SCARE]: "If you only knew what we know..."
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:53 PM 5/23/96, jim bell wrote: >Well, he must have learned it all in the last few months, because his bill >was the closest thing to DOA that we've seen in a long time, exceeded only >by GAK 3. I'd like to hear from him what the source of the text of the >Leahy bill on encryption really was: Who pressured him to make it so bad? "If you only knew what we know..." ("...you wouldn't support encryption, you wouldn't push for privacy legislation, you would order all citizen-units to have tatooed ID numbers on their arms...") Though I normally avoid "Wired," I did pick up the latest issue to skim through. A couple of good things, actually, including a nice summary of the state of crypto laws, etc. (I don't recall the author, as I didn't buy the issue.) A great discussion of the Deepest and Darket Secret in Washington, the special "If you only knew what we know..." briefing given to legislators, staffers, etc. to convince them of the Evils of Cryptography. Paraphrasing the "Wired" item, "No person who has ever received "The Briefing" has ever again argued forcefully for the rights of citizens to use strong cryptography." I surmise that either Sen. Burns has not yet been given The Briefing, or he is for some reason more resistant than most other burrowcrats to the scare tactics used in The Briefing. I sure would like to know what's in this briefing. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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VIRUS ALERT: Java virus that affects Netscape 2.0 & 2.01.
by gcg＠pb.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >WHO IS AFFECTED BY THIS ALERT? >------------------------------ > >Users of Netscape Navigator 2.0 or 2.01. To determine what version of >Netscape you are running, do the following: > > 1. Open Netscape Navigator. > 2. Pull down the Help menu. > 3. Click on About Netscape. > 4. Check to see if you have version 2.0 or 2.01. If so, read on. > If not, then you can not be affected by this alert. > >WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? >-------------------- > >There have been reports lately of a hostile Java applet (a Black Widow >Java applet called JAVA) that is downloaded and executed automatically >when certain sites are visited with Netscape versions 2.0 or 2.01. Java >applets are small applications that are automatically started when you >access certain web pages. This particular Java applet is a malicious >program that can destroy data, interfere with your network, and possibly >even upload sensitive material to a third party. > >WHAT SHOULD YOU DO? >------------------- > >Upgrade to Netscape Navigator 2.02. > > >WHAT SHOULD YOU DO IF YOU CAN'T DOWNLOAD VERSION 2.02 RIGHT NOW? >---------------------------------------------------------------- > >You can temporarily protect your PC or Macintosh by disabling the Java >functionality. However, this should only be a short-term fix as many >legitimate web sites make use of Java applets. To disable the use of >Java applets, do the following: > > 1. Open Netscape Navigator. > 2. Pull down the Options menu. > 3. Click on Security Preferences. > 4. Under General, place a "X" in the Disable Java and the > Disable Java Script boxes in the Java window. Click on OK. > >After upgrading to the latest version of Netscape Navigator (version >2.02), re-enable the Java applets by doing the following: > > 1. Open Netscape Navigator. > 2. Pull down the Options menu. > 3. Click on Security Preferences. > 4. Under General, remove the "X" in the Disable Java and the > Disable Java Script boxes in the Java window. Click on OK. > >

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Re: (Fwd) Re: TCM: mafia as a paradigm for cyberspace
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ At 12:11 PM 5/23/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: >Tell ya what: name a weapon that CANNOT be used to harm an >innocent person. Go ahead, I'm waiting. The Truth? S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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MD5 completely broken!
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks -- Atfer much scientific research, I have finally found a way to restore any message given only its MD5 checksum. The method is based on the so called "enthropy restoration" algorithm. I have also written a libMD5hack library for restoring messages given their MD5 checksums. I plan to license the library for commercial use. The price of the library is to be determined. - Igor.

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Re: CLI_pr3
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On May 23, 1996 10:41:13, 'tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May)' wrote: >Of course, this appears to be implying that _domestic_ data will be subject >to Clipper 3 restrictions, else this statement is meaningless. > >So, will my stored-value cards that I "charge up" in California and carry >in my wallet to Zurich be GAKked? If not, Morris's statement is >meaningless. If so, domestic data is intended to be GAKked. > >(But we knew this, didn't we?) Several news reports in the last few days seem to be aiming at raising the alarm about crypto, perhaps in response to the various crypto bills, administration reformulations, and studies such as that headed by Herb Lin. The recycling of the news of DoD break-ins supposedly due to heavy military reliance on the Internet; the drumbeat of conferences, press releases and planted stories on international money laundering, the hazards of E-money to the stability of the banking system, spreading "Russian" criminality, and the role of high-technology in each; global Chinese arms dealers and copyright pirates; thousands of Japanese spies needed to combat "Asian" threats. These scares might well be orchestrated in support of Clipper 3 -- to the mutual benefit of international governments and commerce as stated by the IWGCP report. The Clipper 3 report, as John Gilmore and others have noted, aims at an international clampdown on non-GAKed crypto. For this to work, all the major crypto players must agree to act at the same time so that no one gets an advantage by offering non-GAKed products. But is it not probable that there will be a holdout nation(s), like the Swiss in war and bank secrecy, to offer crypto that is non-GAKed? Or will a holdout be starved? Or is it more likely that the genuine alternative to multilateral governmental regulation is going to be small- scale, non-corporate, private parties, insusceptible to large-sacle governmental-market coercion, willing to offer risky, covert services, perhaps as lucrative as prohibited armaments? In such a case, for example, would not a highly skilled cryptographer, let us call her Mathilda Blaze, be able to sell covert crypto (on the side, encrypted transactions, anonymity assured) for far greater reward than a not-very- secure pittance and pension at a downsizing ATT, or NSA, or Russia, China, Israel, France, UK, NL, JP ... ? To be sure, if we knew what they knew, we would understand why the House has just increased the intelligence budget to $30bn, $2bn more than 1996 (WaPo 5-23-96). Maybe all the major crypto nations (gov-and-com), are minting E-money to pay their best techies to protect their secrets. If so, may the best algorithmist take 'em all to the cleaners -- just remember to share with the hackers spooking the spooks-and-crooks of gov-com intel-insec, and causing "Yo, man's" of recognition and admiration of those peering for pennies at ELINT and NetSec screens.

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Re: [SCARE]: "If you only knew what we know..."
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:07 PM 5/23/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: > >"If you only knew what we know..." > >("...you wouldn't support encryption, you wouldn't push for privacy >legislation, you would order all citizen-units to have tatooed ID numbers >on their arms...") > >Though I normally avoid "Wired," I did pick up the latest issue to skim >through. A couple of good things, actually, including a nice summary of the >state of crypto laws, etc. (I don't recall the author, as I didn't buy the >issue.) > >A great discussion of the Deepest and Darket Secret in Washington, the >special "If you only knew what we know..." briefing given to legislators, >staffers, etc. to convince them of the Evils of Cryptography. There is a clue here. If that briefing is so effective, why don't they give it to the entire country? We "all" know (at least around CP) of a number of sorta-bad things that might occur as a consequence of allowing good cryptography. (none of which, on balance, even come close to justifying banning or restricting good crypto, or justify GAK, etc.) However, very few of them require more than a little imagination to invent on our own, and given communication most of them will be thought of and disseminated without being revealed by the government. So it's a bit difficult to imagine why they'd avoid discussing those issues in public. The clue, I think, is that this briefing is given to "legislators, staffers, etc". Presumably, whatever arguments they use in this briefing are quite selective and tailored to appeal to government types. They're telling these people of a argument against good encryption that works for government-types but NOT ordinary civilians. It isn't that they don't want the average civilian to know of these arguments, they simply don't want the populace to know what subset of these consequences the government is really concerned about. Okay, what kind of thing would terrify government-types but not most civilians? >Paraphrasing the "Wired" item, "No person who has ever received "The >Briefing" has ever again argued forcefully for the rights of citizens to >use strong cryptography." >I surmise that either Sen. Burns has not yet been given The Briefing, or he >is for some reason more resistant than most other burrowcrats to the scare >tactics used in The Briefing. >I sure would like to know what's in this briefing. >--Tim May It probably starts like this: "See, there's this guy named Jim Bell...." B^) Seriously, though, I can't see how it could be anything other than the typical Crypto-Anarchy-type scenarios, but presented as if they are a Bad Thing as opposed to being a Good Thing. This would fit all the criteria: They appear to be extremely bad from the standpoint of the government-types, are not particularly convincing to the citizens, and the government wouldn't want the public to know what they're most concerned with. It might start'em thinking. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Trust In A Cryptographic Economy And Digital Security Deposits: Protocols And Policies
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My thesis "Trust In A Cryptographic Economy And Digital Security Deposits: Protocols And Policies" is now available in digital form for those that might be interested. You can find it on my ecommerce page at: http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/commerce/commerce.html An intro, table of contents, conclusion, and the refs are in html format. You may download the whole thing as compressed postscript. _______________________ Regards, When we ask advice, we are usually looking for an accomplice. -Marquis de la Grange Joseph Reagle http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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Attacks on remailers
by herodotus＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The current discussion on the future of remailers seems to have been ignited by two events: the closure of the Hacktic remailer and the FBI's contacting an operator about a threatening message sent through his remailer. We have, however, almost no actual information about the two incidents, especially the type of threats, if any, made against the operators of the two remailers. This lack of information makes it difficult for others interested in remailers to make informed decisions about their future. We need more specific information about these two incidents. -- Herodotus <herodotus(a)alpha.c2.org>

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Re: Children's Privacy Act
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lauren Amy Gelman said: >The text of the Children's Privacy Protection and Parental Empowerment >Act is available at the Epic "Children's Privacy" web site: > >http://epic.org/privacy/kids/ > >Read it before you trash it! We at LolitaWatch GMBH are amused that legislators in the United States are attempting to legislate that which can be so easily bypassed with the world-wide Internet. In fact, anticipating such restrictions on the collection of some data, we moved our operations to Aalborg, Danmark earlier this year. (Forslag og ideer vedr. indhold modtages gerne af: www(a)lolita.nordjyllands .dk ) Danish laws are not so repressive as American laws, and our American friends can so easily access our data bases of information derived from the mandatory age-labeling tags you Americans so conveniently (for us) insist upon. --Klaus Jellingestenen

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