- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

ID Chips...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I understand it there was a proposal to install such chips in children to prevent kidnapping and such last year in Congress (don't remember if it was House or Senate). I question the validity of the chips use, seems to me that tatooing the ear of the pet and placing this in a database would be much more efficient and a LOT less expensive. It would not require the vet to buy any special equipment or buy access to special databases. Also, what about small towns and rural communities w/ insufficient tax base to purchase the equipment for general use by the community? I can see it now, a black van w/ tinted windows rolls slowly down your street interrogating all the pet transponders determining who lives where and then comparing this w/ the official records of residence... When you take this in concert w/ real-time (or even small delay) financial record searches, the loss of freedom of speech, limitations on assembly, criminalization of crypto, etc. you are building a realy spooky scenario... I think I would prefer to have my cat or dog tatood instead of transpondered.

1 0

Re: Locating Color Copiers
by stevenJ 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John C. Brice muttered something about... :: ::The Secret Service is a division of the Treasury Department. One of their ::main duties is tracking down counterfeiters. If someone has stolen a color ::copy machine, there's a very good chance that it was stolen for the end ::purpose of counterfeiting. So I would imagine that that would be why the ::SS would be looking for this particular stolen property. Make sense? That's ridiculous. I hate to start a flame-war, but if I decided that I desperately needed a color copier but didn't want to spend that money and figured I'd just steal one, why would there be a good chance that I'd be doing this to start a counterfeiting process? Maybe I just want to make color copies. If you truly believe that this would be the main impetus for anyone stealing on of these devices you're thinking in the same ballpark as those who we fight against with cryptography. Additionally, it's only possible to photocopy $1, $5 and $10 because anything larger than that has that funny little strip of plastic in the bill. e x t r a p o l a t e steve j. white _____________________________________________________________________________ Gort, klatu barada nicto. aragorn(a)alpha1.csd.uwm.edu

3 2

CLIPPER COMPROMIZED?
by mech＠io.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to a fax I received: _____ begin fwd ___________ CLIPPER COMPROMISED? "Security Insider Report," a monthly newsletter published in Seminole, Fla., has reported that government officials are seeking to determine whether former CIA employee and alleged traitor Aldrich Ames may have sold information to the Russians about the government's secret key-escrow technology used in Clipper Chip chipsets and Capstone Tessera cards. The secret key-escrow technology, dubbed Skipjack, can be used to encrypt network voice and data. _____ end _________________ This was faxed march 17, and consisted of part of a xeroxed page from a publication; unfortunately I cannot tell what the publication is. Some other headlines on it are "ARDIS aims to simplify radio-based messaging", "Vendors curb wireless hype", "AnyLAN, anytime, anywhere", and "Cheyenne prepares fix for ARCserv users woes". Next to the Cheyenne article is a round logo that says R.A.F. in large letters, and with the following cirling the logo: Network World's Reader A[missing] Force. "[missing]" means text that is cut off. Anyone know what publication this is, and which issue? The page number is 2. My best guess is it's Network World. Any corroborating stories?

3 2

Re: spyproofing your house/work building
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I suppose they could bounce four or five lasers on the same window in >hopes of being able to use two beams for the substraction, but if the >speaker is placed in a good location, or several of them are placed >on the same window, they'll have a bitch of a time getting anything. If you're seriously worried about los Federales expending this degree of effort on you, you must lead a radically more exciting life than _I_ do. In the relatively isolated area where I live, anyone parked close enough to my house to do this sort of thing (and given the ambient foliage, that'd be _mighty_ close) would stick out like a sore thumb. This is not a scenario over which I plan to lose much sleep. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

1 0

Re: CLIPPER COMPROMIZED?
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just got word from the RISKS folks that the upcoming issue has a denouncement of the Network World article, from Denning. She says she checked up on it, and it's BS. This is pretty much obvious, but it still leaves open the question of who originally came up with this rumor to monger, and why? It looks almost like an act of desperation. That's my interest in this. If it was something that could be taken seriously, it would be a good bit of propaganda work, truth or falsehood aside. But the entire short article smacks of conspiracy theorist ranting. I hope this sort of stuff isn't going to become more frequent, or it may make anti-Clipper people look, from the outside, like kooks. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

3 2

Re: CLIPPER COMPROMIZED?
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is the story that Ames sent the secret of the Clipper Chips to Moscow unlikely? Well, yes. There are no escrow agents because there aren't any keys yet. Plus, it is unlikely that the specific design got to him. But Dorothy characterizes the entire rumor as absurd and I don't think that this is the case. It seems entirely plausible to me that someone in Ames position could severely compromise the Clipper system. Why? Someone in Ames position would presumably need access to Clipper encrypted calls to conduct counter-intelligence operations. Remember some of the first customers will be the DOJ, a good place to put a mole. So if someone in Ames wanted a Clipper key, he could probably ask the escrow agents for it and get it, no questions asked. Dorothy uses arguments like Ames wouldn't have a "Need to Know." This really isn't a strong point. Ames is accused of being a spy. Spies, by definition, circumvent "need to know" requirements. I believe that they found some documents in Ames possession that he was not authorized to hold. The specific rumor is probably false, but I think that the Ames case is a perfect proof of what will almost certainly go wrong with the Clipper system. Someone will rat. History has shown time and time again that three can keep a secret if two are dead. Me and the two Clipper Agencies make three.

1 0

Re: CLIPPER COMPROMIZED!!!! :-)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's been a report going around linking Aldrich Ames to Clipper. Back when I read alt.folklore.urban a lot, I'd see stories like that. My guess about the origin of this report is that it evolved like this: - Somebody on talk.politics.crypto posts a comment like "Oh, come on - if the CIA can't prevent trusted spies like Aldrich Ames from leaking the names of other spies, how will the NSA keep its people from giving away the CLipper secrets, either for bribes or for "patriotic" reasons like loyalty to the "Office of the President". - Somebody else reads that and says "What if a *spy* like Aldrich Ames gave away Clipper?" - Somebody else reads that and says "Does anybody know if Aldrich Ames had anything to do with Clipper?" which somebody in the press hears somebody say to somebody else, and it turns into a report like: > <<CLIPPER COMPROMISED? "Security Insider Report," a monthly newsletter > published in Seminole, Fla., has reported that government officials are > seeking to determine whether former CIA employee and alleged traitor > Aldrich Ames may have sold information to the Russians about the > government's secret key-escrow technology used in Clipper Chip chipsets > and Capstone Tessera cards. The secret key-escrow technology, dubbed > Skipjack, can be used to encrypt network voice and data. which must *obviously* be true because it came off the *wire services*... Probably Aldrich Ames didn't have any contact with the people in the NSA doing Clipper or the FBI people doing Digital Telephony Prevention. Bill

1 0

Re: CLIPPER COMPROMIZED!!!! :-)
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204) >>> <<CLIPPER COMPROMISED? "Security Insider Report," a monthly newsletter >> published in Seminole, Fla., has reported that government officials are >> seeking to determine whether former CIA employee and alleged traitor >> Aldrich Ames may have sold information to the Russians about the >> government's secret key-escrow technology used in Clipper Chip chipsets >> and Capstone Tessera cards. The secret key-escrow technology, dubbed >> Skipjack, can be used to encrypt network voice and data. > >which must *obviously* be true because it came off the *wire services*... >Probably Aldrich Ames didn't have any contact with the people in the >NSA doing Clipper or the FBI people doing Digital Telephony Prevention. Ames may have had access to the rationale Dot and an un-named white house source were quoted to effect ' ..if you knew what I know, you would understand the need' (in effect tying Clipper to national security). Were he to compromise how good the interception is IN THIS COUNTRY to a foreign powers intelligence service, for instance, it might severly change their way of doing communications in the U.S. (the target country). Thus, nullifying some of the effect of say, a hypothetical successor to SHAMROCK, (Allen Steeles Big Ear).

2 1

Re: Counterfieting $$$$
by Jeremiah A Blatz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 18-Mar-94 Re: Locating Color Copiers by stevenJ(a)alpha1.csd.uwm.e > Additionally, it's only possible to photocopy $1, $5 and $10 because anything > larger than that has that funny little strip of plastic in the bill. Actually, they have strips on the tens, too. Re: passing bills Okay, so the 10's and 20's have little mylar strips on them. You can't copy old bills, because they get wrinkles, and, anyway, if someone handed me a crisp, new 1983 $20 I'd get a bit suspicious. There are ways to age bills, but they look a lot less convincing. However.... What night manager at Denny's knows about the strips. How many times have you seen someone at your local convience store check for the strip when you hand them a $20. If you travel a lot, and never use counterfiet bills for transactions where your name is recorded, you can do lots with counterfiet money. True, though, if you wanted to sell suitcases of it for $3 per twenty dollar bill (I just guessed at the price), you may have a problem. Not a crook, Jer darklord(a)cmu.edu | "it's not a matter of rights / it's just a matter of war finger me for my | don't have a reason to fight / they never had one before" Geek Code and | -Ministry, "Hero" PGP public key | http://www.cs.cmu.edu:8001/afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr25/jbde/

1 0

Re: EFF gun-shy of legally employing PGP
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous is alleged to have said: > : > Yes, but the point of the reply, is that PGP signatures SHOULD > : > be used by sysops. > : Hmmm... why PGP, as opposed to the FIPS Digital Signature Standard? > Yes, you can use the DSS (unless it is given away to PK partners, that is). No, you can't use the DSS. The reason NIST was getting into confusion about whether they have to give it to PKP is that PKP says that it infringes on Schnorr's patent, which they recently bought up; assuming that's true technically (I haven't looked in a while), this means you need a license from PKP to use DSS. Unlike RSA, which the government has some rights to use because it partially funded their work, even the government doesn't have rights over Schnorr's work, since they didn't fund it, so the NIST is in deeper yogurt with DSS than with RSa signatures. You can still use DSS for research and the usual things you can use patents for without a license, but you can do the same with PGP. RIPEM can be used free non-commercially in the US+Canada under the RSAREF license terms, and RIPEM-SIG can even be exported. (Now all we need to do is find a way to get RIPEM-SIG to do key exchange and message encryption as well as signatures and patch it into PGP :-) (presumed not possible...) Bill

1 0