- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

thesis 'internet control and the chinese government'
by Lokman Tsui 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

hi declan, i wanted to point you to my thesis about 'internet control and the chinese government'. The final draft of my thesis is available at http://www.lokman.nu/thesis it is in pdf format and about 800kb. The abstract is below. Abstract Initially, the internet was an open medium with certain characteristics that made it hard to control. According to Western journalists and politicians, the efforts of the Chinese government to control the internet are doomed to fail. This study attempts to counter this view and discusses to what degree the Chinese government can control the internet in China and, more than that, to what degree the internet can be used as a means for control. Methodologically, the four modalities of control (the law, architecture, social norms and the market), set forth by Lessig will be used. As a result, this study will offer a legal, technical, social and economical perspective in discussing the degree of internet control in China. Lessig further argues that the architecture of the internet is undergoing changes that continue to enable control. A prime example of using architecture as a means of control is the concept of the Panopticon prison, invented by Bentham and mediated by Foucault. The concept of the Panopticon will be used to show how the internet can be used as a means for control. The conclusions are that the Chinese government are quite capable of controlling the internet in China and that China has the perfect ingredients for deploying a digital Panopticon. This digital Panopticon will continue to improve and develop, driven by the market. These conclusions show that the internet, to contrary belief, can be controlled and even be used as a means for control. Keywords internet regulation, internet control, social control, political control, censorship, privacy, surveillance, panopticon, Lessig, internet in China, Chinese Internet, media. -- "The lure of imaginary totality is momentarily frozen before the dialectic of desire hastens on within symbolic chains." http://www.lokman.nu [-silent dreams-] http://www.wongkarwai.net Because We Have Taste ********** [Adam is replying to this, and the Subject: line was mine, I admit: http://www.politechbot.com/p-02275.html --DBM]

1 0

Important Information about IETF 76 Meeting Registration
by Alexa Morris 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Registration for IETF 76 will open in the next several days and we want to alert you to some exciting changes coming your way. 1) New Meeting Registration System We have moved to a new meeting registration system. The first time you use the new system (called ARO) you will need to create an account. Your account will be password protected and only you will have access to it. Your contact information will be saved, making registration in the future much simpler, and you will be able to update your contact data, registration information, etc at any time. 2) RFID Tagging Experiment at IETF 76 The hosts for IETF 76 are organizing a RFID tag experiment for the meeting. The tag will be affixed to the underside of your meeting badge, as a sticker, and will contain only your full name and any listed affiliation. The experiment will allow us to explore the possibility of electronic blue sheets (though we are still using paper blue sheets as the official blue sheets of record). We also hope that the RFID tag will improve the experience for remote participants, since speakers will be identified through the RFID tags. While you will be given the option to "opt out" of this experiment when you register for the meeting, we sincerely hope you will participate. 3) One-day Guest Pass Experiment For IETF 76 we are also offering a one-day guest pass for $200. If you only plan to attend one day of meetings, you now have the option to select which day (Mon, Tues, Weds, Thurs or Fri) when you register. After the meeting, we will solicit your feedback on the one-day pass option and evaluate to see if it makes sense to offer at future meetings. Please contact me if you have any comments or questions. And I look forward to seeing you at IETF 76 in Japan! Regards, Alexa ----------- Alexa Morris / Executive Director / IETF 48377 Fremont Blvd., Suite 117, Fremont, CA 94538 Phone: +1.510.492.4089 / Fax: +1.510.492.4001 Email: amorris(a)amsl.com Managed by Association Management Solutions (AMS) Forum Management, Meeting and Event Planning www.amsl.com <http://www.amsl.com/> _______________________________________________ IETF-Announce mailing list IETF-Announce(a)ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce

1 0

[p2p-hackers] CfP ..:::SESOC 2010:::.. (Security and Social Networking)
by Thorsten Strufe 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[ a gentle reminder ] [ apologies for cross-posting ] $%#'&*'$#%&*$%#'&*$%'&*$%#'&*'$#%&*$%#'&*$%'&*$%#'&*'$#%&*$% ( ( ) SESOC 2010 ) ( ( ) International Workshop on ) ( SECurity and SOCial Networking ( ) ) ( March 29 / April 2 2010 ( ) Mannheim, Germany ) ( (as part of IEEE PerCom 2010) ( ) ) ( http://www.sesoc.org ( ) ) %&*$%#'&*$%'&*$%#'&*'$#%&*$%#'&*$%'&*$%#'&*'$#%&*$%#'&*$%'&* Future pervasive communication systems aim at supporting social and collaborative communications: the evolving topologies are expected to resemble the actual social networks of the communicating users and information on their characteristics can be a powerful aid for any network operation. New emerging technologies that use information on the social characteristics of their participants raise entirely new privacy concerns and require new reflections on security problems such as trust establishment, cooperation enforcement or key management. The aim of this workshop is to encompass research advances in all areas of security, trust and privacy in pervasive communication systems, integrating the social structure of the network as well. ============================= Topics of Interest ============================= - new aspects of trust - privacy concerns - availability and resilience - community based secure communication - data confidentiality, data integrity - anonymity, pseudonymity - key management - secure bootstrapping - security issues in forwarding, routing - security aspects regarding cooperation - new reputation systems - new attack paradigms - new requirements for software security - malware ============================= Important Dates ============================= Submission deadline: October 18, 2009 Notification date: December 21, 2010 Camera ready submission: January 29, 2010 ============================= Submission instructions ============================= Submitted papers must be unpublished and not considered elsewhere for publication. Camera-ready versions of accepted papers will be limited to 6 pages in IEEE 8.5x11 conference format, and formatted in accordance with the IEEE Computer Society author guidelines. The link for the templates and further guidelines for preparing and submitting the manuscript are available on the workshop website. All papers are managed electronically through easychair, the submission website is: http://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=sesoc2010 Submitted papers will undergo a rigorous and double-blind review process handled by the Technical Program Committee. Authors' names must not appear in the paper. All accepted papers need to have a full registration to the PerCom 2010 Conference (There is no workshop only registration). Moreover, no-shows of accepted papers at the workshop will result in those papers not being included in the IEEE Digital Library. ============================= Committee ============================= General Chairs: Refik Molva EURECOM, France Gene Tsudik University of California Irvine, USA Organizing Chairs: Melek Vnen EURECOM, France Thorsten Strufe Technische Universitdt Darmstadt, Germany Web Chair: Antonio Cutillo EURECOM, France Technical Program Committee: Imad Aad Nokia, Switzerland Davide Balzarotti EURECOM, France Erik-Oliver Blass EURECOM, France Jens-Matthias Bohli NEC Europe, Germany Michael Brinkmeier TU Ilmenau, Germany Sonja Buchegger Deutsche Telekom Laboratories, Germany Levente Buttyan BUTE, Hungary Claude Castelluccia INRIA, France Lorenzo Cavallaro UCSB, USA Ahmet Gamtepe TU Berlin, Germany Mauro Conti Vrije Universiteit, The Netherlands Jon Crowcroft Computer Lab Cambridge University, UK Marc Dacier Symantec Europe, France Anwitaman Datta NTU, Singapore Roberto Di Pietro Universit` di Roma, La Sapenzia, Italy Alexander Eichhorn Simula, Norway Stephen Farrell NewBay Software, Ireland Artur Hecker Telecom ParisTech, France Sotiris Ioannidis FORTH, Greece Stefan Katzenbeisser CASED, Germany Albert Levi Sabanci University, Turkey Mark Manulis CASED, Germany Jvrn M|ller-Quade Uni Karlsruhe, Germany Guevara Noubir North Eastern University, USA Christian Rohner Uppsala Universitet, Sweden G|nter Schdfer TU Ilmenau, Germany Dirk Westhoff NEC Europe, Germany -- Thorsten Strufe Peer-to-Peer Networks Technische Universitdt Darmstadt http://www.p2p.tu-darmstadt.de/ _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

Re: Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper
by Satoshi Nakamoto 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

>> As long as honest nodes control the most CPU power on the network, >> they can generate the longest chain and outpace any attackers. > >But they don't. Bad guys routinely control zombie farms of 100,000 >machines or more. People I know who run a blacklist of spam sending >zombies tell me they often see a million new zombies a day. > >This is the same reason that hashcash can't work on today's Internet >-- the good guys have vastly less computational firepower than the bad >guys. Thanks for bringing up that point. I didn't really make that statement as strong as I could have. The requirement is that the good guys collectively have more CPU power than any single attacker. There would be many smaller zombie farms that are not big enough to overpower the network, and they could still make money by generating bitcoins. The smaller farms are then the "honest nodes". (I need a better term than "honest") The more smaller farms resort to generating bitcoins, the higher the bar gets to overpower the network, making larger farms also too small to overpower it so that they may as well generate bitcoins too. According to the "long tail" theory, the small, medium and merely large farms put together should add up to a lot more than the biggest zombie farm. Even if a bad guy does overpower the network, it's not like he's instantly rich. All he can accomplish is to take back money he himself spent, like bouncing a check. To exploit it, he would have to buy something from a merchant, wait till it ships, then overpower the network and try to take his money back. I don't think he could make as much money trying to pull a carding scheme like that as he could by generating bitcoins. With a zombie farm that big, he could generate more bitcoins than everyone else combined. The Bitcoin network might actually reduce spam by diverting zombie farms to generating bitcoins instead. Satoshi Nakamoto --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

Important Information about IETF 76 Meeting Registration
by Alexa Morris 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Registration for IETF 76 will open in the next several days and we want to alert you to some exciting changes coming your way. 1) New Meeting Registration System We have moved to a new meeting registration system. The first time you use the new system (called ARO) you will need to create an account. Your account will be password protected and only you will have access to it. Your contact information will be saved, making registration in the future much simpler, and you will be able to update your contact data, registration information, etc at any time. 2) RFID Tagging Experiment at IETF 76 The hosts for IETF 76 are organizing a RFID tag experiment for the meeting. The tag will be affixed to the underside of your meeting badge, as a sticker, and will contain only your full name and any listed affiliation. The experiment will allow us to explore the possibility of electronic blue sheets (though we are still using paper blue sheets as the official blue sheets of record). We also hope that the RFID tag will improve the experience for remote participants, since speakers will be identified through the RFID tags. While you will be given the option to "opt out" of this experiment when you register for the meeting, we sincerely hope you will participate. 3) One-day Guest Pass Experiment For IETF 76 we are also offering a one-day guest pass for $200. If you only plan to attend one day of meetings, you now have the option to select which day (Mon, Tues, Weds, Thurs or Fri) when you register. After the meeting, we will solicit your feedback on the one-day pass option and evaluate to see if it makes sense to offer at future meetings. Please contact me if you have any comments or questions. And I look forward to seeing you at IETF 76 in Japan! Regards, Alexa ----------- Alexa Morris / Executive Director / IETF 48377 Fremont Blvd., Suite 117, Fremont, CA 94538 Phone: +1.510.492.4089 / Fax: +1.510.492.4001 Email: amorris(a)amsl.com Managed by Association Management Solutions (AMS) Forum Management, Meeting and Event Planning www.amsl.com <http://www.amsl.com/> _______________________________________________ IETF-Announce mailing list IETF-Announce(a)ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce

1 0

[p2p-hackers] CfP ..:::SESOC 2010:::.. (Security and Social Networking)
by Thorsten Strufe 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[ a gentle reminder ] [ apologies for cross-posting ] $%#'&*'$#%&*$%#'&*$%'&*$%#'&*'$#%&*$%#'&*$%'&*$%#'&*'$#%&*$% ( ( ) SESOC 2010 ) ( ( ) International Workshop on ) ( SECurity and SOCial Networking ( ) ) ( March 29 / April 2 2010 ( ) Mannheim, Germany ) ( (as part of IEEE PerCom 2010) ( ) ) ( http://www.sesoc.org ( ) ) %&*$%#'&*$%'&*$%#'&*'$#%&*$%#'&*$%'&*$%#'&*'$#%&*$%#'&*$%'&* Future pervasive communication systems aim at supporting social and collaborative communications: the evolving topologies are expected to resemble the actual social networks of the communicating users and information on their characteristics can be a powerful aid for any network operation. New emerging technologies that use information on the social characteristics of their participants raise entirely new privacy concerns and require new reflections on security problems such as trust establishment, cooperation enforcement or key management. The aim of this workshop is to encompass research advances in all areas of security, trust and privacy in pervasive communication systems, integrating the social structure of the network as well. ============================= Topics of Interest ============================= - new aspects of trust - privacy concerns - availability and resilience - community based secure communication - data confidentiality, data integrity - anonymity, pseudonymity - key management - secure bootstrapping - security issues in forwarding, routing - security aspects regarding cooperation - new reputation systems - new attack paradigms - new requirements for software security - malware ============================= Important Dates ============================= Submission deadline: October 18, 2009 Notification date: December 21, 2010 Camera ready submission: January 29, 2010 ============================= Submission instructions ============================= Submitted papers must be unpublished and not considered elsewhere for publication. Camera-ready versions of accepted papers will be limited to 6 pages in IEEE 8.5x11 conference format, and formatted in accordance with the IEEE Computer Society author guidelines. The link for the templates and further guidelines for preparing and submitting the manuscript are available on the workshop website. All papers are managed electronically through easychair, the submission website is: http://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=sesoc2010 Submitted papers will undergo a rigorous and double-blind review process handled by the Technical Program Committee. Authors' names must not appear in the paper. All accepted papers need to have a full registration to the PerCom 2010 Conference (There is no workshop only registration). Moreover, no-shows of accepted papers at the workshop will result in those papers not being included in the IEEE Digital Library. ============================= Committee ============================= General Chairs: Refik Molva EURECOM, France Gene Tsudik University of California Irvine, USA Organizing Chairs: Melek Vnen EURECOM, France Thorsten Strufe Technische Universitdt Darmstadt, Germany Web Chair: Antonio Cutillo EURECOM, France Technical Program Committee: Imad Aad Nokia, Switzerland Davide Balzarotti EURECOM, France Erik-Oliver Blass EURECOM, France Jens-Matthias Bohli NEC Europe, Germany Michael Brinkmeier TU Ilmenau, Germany Sonja Buchegger Deutsche Telekom Laboratories, Germany Levente Buttyan BUTE, Hungary Claude Castelluccia INRIA, France Lorenzo Cavallaro UCSB, USA Ahmet Gamtepe TU Berlin, Germany Mauro Conti Vrije Universiteit, The Netherlands Jon Crowcroft Computer Lab Cambridge University, UK Marc Dacier Symantec Europe, France Anwitaman Datta NTU, Singapore Roberto Di Pietro Universit` di Roma, La Sapenzia, Italy Alexander Eichhorn Simula, Norway Stephen Farrell NewBay Software, Ireland Artur Hecker Telecom ParisTech, France Sotiris Ioannidis FORTH, Greece Stefan Katzenbeisser CASED, Germany Albert Levi Sabanci University, Turkey Mark Manulis CASED, Germany Jvrn M|ller-Quade Uni Karlsruhe, Germany Guevara Noubir North Eastern University, USA Christian Rohner Uppsala Universitet, Sweden G|nter Schdfer TU Ilmenau, Germany Dirk Westhoff NEC Europe, Germany -- Thorsten Strufe Peer-to-Peer Networks Technische Universitdt Darmstadt http://www.p2p.tu-darmstadt.de/ _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

RE: Internet helps brutal governments retain control, paper says
by Adam Powell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The subject line of this message is not supported by the paper. The full paper, posted at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/21KalathilBoas.pdf, says the Internet is not necessarily "an insurmountable threat to authoritarian rule." That is different from saying the Internet "helps brutal governments retain control." The paper begins by noting recent scholarship that has found a positive correlation between Net penetration and democratization -- and correctly noting that does not imply causality, any more than the crowing of a rooster causes the sun to rise. But by relying on official government data on computer *ownership* and on *registered* email accounts, the authors may have encountered a methodological problem that has skewed data for many countries around the world -- including the US. Throughout Asia and Africa and especially in China (I don't have first-hand knowledge of Cuba), relying on such data means you miss the vast majority of the online community that uses hotmail accounts, proxy servers and cybercafes or other non-owned machines for Net access. For every registered user we met in China, we met several who were not registered. So instead of the official Beijing number of 26.5 million people on line (that's the *official* number from China Internet Network Information Center reported today, up 56.8% from last year - details at http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=14423) most experts we contacted said the ratio of unregistered to registered users is 4:1, yielding a total of well over 100 million. That's still a small percentage in a country of billions, but it is different from the paper's 17 million. Why lower than the official numbers? The citation in a footnote takes you to www.chinaoline.com, a Web site in Chicago. The page cited notes one "definition of Internet users rules out Web surfers in Internet cafis" - which would seem to be a problem in a country full of hotmail and yahoo email accounts. So instead they use another method to reach these new, lower numbers: they "conducted online and written surveys of each group to determine the proportion of Web users within each group. The total number of Chinese Internet users was then obtained by calculating the proportion of these groups in relation to the total Chinese population." These are people who go to great pains *not* to be counted or found by the government, but somehow they are expected to respond to an official survey. And if they do not complete the survey, these people do not exist. We also are receiving email from people in countries where, according to this paper, all such traffic is monitored and all users are registered. Not so. Students all seem to know how to use proxy servers and anonymizers and avoid official scrutiny -- and are not reported by those relying on official numbers. But more broadly, the problem is with the "one machine, one user" model of the Internet that most in North America and Europe assume is the standard worldwide. Not so: in Africa, Asia and South America, the standard is "one machine, many users." One example is at www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=11876 based on our first-hand observations and research on the ground, and there are many others on our site. This is not to say the Internet must inevitably topple undemocratic governments. That is the straw man addressed in this report's introduction. But this is to say that it is an important influence in totalitarian countries, enabling a still small but rapidly growing minority to access information directly from outside of their countries -- and to relay that information and their personal views via email to others. Otherwise, what are we to make of the reports by the BBC and the NY Times that China has been forced to change "official" versions of news stories because Chinese can send email to each other (and to those outside of China) with first-hand accounts of what actually happened? Cheers Adam ********** ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ -------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

thesis 'internet control and the chinese government'
by Lokman Tsui 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

hi declan, i wanted to point you to my thesis about 'internet control and the chinese government'. The final draft of my thesis is available at http://www.lokman.nu/thesis it is in pdf format and about 800kb. The abstract is below. Abstract Initially, the internet was an open medium with certain characteristics that made it hard to control. According to Western journalists and politicians, the efforts of the Chinese government to control the internet are doomed to fail. This study attempts to counter this view and discusses to what degree the Chinese government can control the internet in China and, more than that, to what degree the internet can be used as a means for control. Methodologically, the four modalities of control (the law, architecture, social norms and the market), set forth by Lessig will be used. As a result, this study will offer a legal, technical, social and economical perspective in discussing the degree of internet control in China. Lessig further argues that the architecture of the internet is undergoing changes that continue to enable control. A prime example of using architecture as a means of control is the concept of the Panopticon prison, invented by Bentham and mediated by Foucault. The concept of the Panopticon will be used to show how the internet can be used as a means for control. The conclusions are that the Chinese government are quite capable of controlling the internet in China and that China has the perfect ingredients for deploying a digital Panopticon. This digital Panopticon will continue to improve and develop, driven by the market. These conclusions show that the internet, to contrary belief, can be controlled and even be used as a means for control. Keywords internet regulation, internet control, social control, political control, censorship, privacy, surveillance, panopticon, Lessig, internet in China, Chinese Internet, media. -- "The lure of imaginary totality is momentarily frozen before the dialectic of desire hastens on within symbolic chains." http://www.lokman.nu [-silent dreams-] http://www.wongkarwai.net Because We Have Taste ********** [Adam is replying to this, and the Subject: line was mine, I admit: http://www.politechbot.com/p-02275.html --DBM]

1 0

Re: [tor-talk] hidden services and stream isolation (file transfer over Tor HS speedup?)
by grarpamp 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I think you aren't considering how much cpu load is added by > opening a new circuit ... > This latency you will experience is exactly the sort of thing > that will get worse if people start overloading the network with > extra circuits. As with the current count of onions, it's not intentional harm, just people wanting to do things. Bitcoin is bringing a big growth in onion sites (litle impact itself). But the new bitcoin version can interop with clearnet and onions natively. If I remember from my last test, bitcoin rotates its traffic through a sizable address pool. Multiply that by the userbase and it could be similar to torrenting. There might be utility in allowing different circuit expiry parameter settings for different socksports... perhaps keeping a large state table for some would reduce load. Related at a distance is that I think the Phantom project mentioned they will not hesitate to use disk to support the network protocol. > While I'm at it, there *are* several steps that would lead to > significantly improving hidden service performance: > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1944 > plus the various performance and security fixes in the 'Tor hidden > service' category. I want to get around to make some nice HS metrics along that ticket, but I don't want to give early hopes. > I know it can be tempting to treat the Tor design and code as a > black box and try to hack around it, but I think in this case the > clear right thing to do is to make the code not suck so much. Yes this is nicer. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

Re: [tor-talk] Tor and P2P
by grarpamp 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> While we don't need a very complex p2p design (in short, we are mostly > just talking about simple HTTP servers running on each device, behind > a hidden service .onion), I am concerned in the long run about > scalability and reliability of this. Is, or can Tor be, useful or optimal? On which platforms? With what P2P apps or traffic patterns? Assuming these are the only cores available at this time... http://www.i2p2.de/ https://code.google.com/p/phantom/ https://www.torproject.org/ Running a P2P app will require running one of the above cores. Which means all peers already have access to each core's internal addressing scheme, respectively: i2p, private IPv6, onion. And thus they have access to each other. So though Tor is unique in having exit facilities by design, those facilities are not needed for a global P2P mesh to work. Tor's uniqueness and its perhaps as yet uncharacterized ability to handle certain P2P loads should lead to a comparative review of the utility of other cores. If you can speak IPv6, you can speak Phantom, which makes app development incredibly simple. Written in C. Probably the lightest weight core so far. Needs some review. Presents a native, node specific, source address. I2P has the most network experience so far with lots of P2P connections going on, ala bittorrent. More work is needed to interface apps with it. Written in Java. Does not present a native, node specific, source address? If you need to use exit for other things, you may not have room to run multiple cores, provide some resources back, etc. So Tor would make sense in that case. Does not present a native, node specific, source address. There are certainly more comparisons to be made. > OnionCat can be seen as implementing P2P-over-HS. I never read a > similarily strong statement about it before. It does provide an IPv6 interface/layer, that is definitely a win since you can use all the usual network programming methods and apps. It is not a P2P app, only a shim for Tor and I2P. And it needs further work to provide IPv6 to HS/I2P PKI authentication. I might be inclined to sign all the traffic ala IPSEC before attempting some ping pong scheme. On a big scale, it might make sense for all the anonymous networks to use interfaces and IPv6 node addresses for interop purposes. Though there are some current problems there... Tor's 80 bits may be too small, I2P's 256 is wider than can be packed under an IPv6/48. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0