- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: [P2P-F] Bitcoin @ EFF
by magius 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Bitcoin and Opencoin are "sons" of David Chaum's Digicash both. Chaum is one of the most important cryptographers and freedom fighters in the world and invented in the eighties the first digital cash, that was refused, attacked and destroyed by credit card companies societies, that instead wanted to propagate a model not based on anonimity. The big difference between them is that Bitcoin is a complete currency system instead Opencoin is the system to make a currency (a digital mint). Bitcoin you need to use as-it-is, with Opencoin instead you can create your own currency system. _______________________________________________ P2P Foundation - Mailing list http://www.p2pfoundation.net https://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Secrecy News -- 05/09/12
by Steven Aftergood 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Format Note: If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2012, Issue No. 44 May 9, 2012 Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ ** PENTAGON MOVES TO COMBAT THE "INSIDER THREAT" ** WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY "PARTNERSHIP"? AND MORE FROM CRS PENTAGON MOVES TO COMBAT THE "INSIDER THREAT" The Department of Defense has issued a new Instruction defining its response to the "insider threat" from Department personnel who engage in unauthorized disclosures of information or other activities deemed harmful to national security. The new Instruction assigns responsibilities and authorities for systematically detecting "anomalous" employee behavior that may be an indication of an insider threat. An insider threat is defined as "A person with authorized access, who uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm national security interests or national security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, espionage, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in loss or degradation of resources or capabilities." A subset of the insider threat is the counterintelligence (CI) insider threat, which refers to an authorized individual who uses his access on behalf of a "foreign intelligence entity." A foreign intelligence entity (FIE) is "Any known or suspected foreign organization, person, or group (public, private, or governmental) that conducts intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, blocks or impairs U.S. intelligence collection, influences U.S. policy, or disrupts U.S. systems and programs." All heads of DoD components are now instructed to "implement CI insider threat initiatives to identify DoD-affiliated personnel suspected of or actually compromising DoD information on behalf of an FIE." All military departments are expected to "conduct anomaly-based detection activities." See "Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and the Counterintelligence (CI) Insider Threat," DoD Instruction 5240.26, May 4, 2012: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/i5240_26.pdf The new Instruction complies with a congressional mandate in the FY2012 defense authorization act that was passed last year in response to the WikiLeaks disclosures. WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY "PARTNERSHIP"? AND MORE FROM CRS New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has not made publicly available include the following. In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of "Partnership" in National Security, May 4, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42516.pdf U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress, May 7, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33016.pdf Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, May 4, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, May 3, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42513.pdf Interest Rates on Subsidized Stafford Loans to Undergraduate Students, May 4, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42515.pdf Racial Profiling: Legal and Constitutional Issues, April 16, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31130.pdf Trade Primer: Qs and As on Trade Concepts, Performance, and Policy, April 16, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33944.pdf Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings, April 6, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41156.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Secrecy News -- 05/09/12
by Steven Aftergood 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Format Note: If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2012, Issue No. 44 May 9, 2012 Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ ** PENTAGON MOVES TO COMBAT THE "INSIDER THREAT" ** WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY "PARTNERSHIP"? AND MORE FROM CRS PENTAGON MOVES TO COMBAT THE "INSIDER THREAT" The Department of Defense has issued a new Instruction defining its response to the "insider threat" from Department personnel who engage in unauthorized disclosures of information or other activities deemed harmful to national security. The new Instruction assigns responsibilities and authorities for systematically detecting "anomalous" employee behavior that may be an indication of an insider threat. An insider threat is defined as "A person with authorized access, who uses that access, wittingly or unwittingly, to harm national security interests or national security through unauthorized disclosure, data modification, espionage, terrorism, or kinetic actions resulting in loss or degradation of resources or capabilities." A subset of the insider threat is the counterintelligence (CI) insider threat, which refers to an authorized individual who uses his access on behalf of a "foreign intelligence entity." A foreign intelligence entity (FIE) is "Any known or suspected foreign organization, person, or group (public, private, or governmental) that conducts intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, blocks or impairs U.S. intelligence collection, influences U.S. policy, or disrupts U.S. systems and programs." All heads of DoD components are now instructed to "implement CI insider threat initiatives to identify DoD-affiliated personnel suspected of or actually compromising DoD information on behalf of an FIE." All military departments are expected to "conduct anomaly-based detection activities." See "Countering Espionage, International Terrorism, and the Counterintelligence (CI) Insider Threat," DoD Instruction 5240.26, May 4, 2012: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/i5240_26.pdf The new Instruction complies with a congressional mandate in the FY2012 defense authorization act that was passed last year in response to the WikiLeaks disclosures. WHAT IS NATIONAL SECURITY "PARTNERSHIP"? AND MORE FROM CRS New and updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has not made publicly available include the following. In Brief: Clarifying the Concept of "Partnership" in National Security, May 4, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42516.pdf U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress, May 7, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33016.pdf Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, May 4, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage, May 3, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42513.pdf Interest Rates on Subsidized Stafford Loans to Undergraduate Students, May 4, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42515.pdf Racial Profiling: Legal and Constitutional Issues, April 16, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31130.pdf Trade Primer: Qs and As on Trade Concepts, Performance, and Policy, April 16, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33944.pdf Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings, April 6, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41156.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Hello directly from Jimbo at Wikipedia
by Jimmy Wales 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote: > I was operating under the assumption that the problem was more along the lines > of nefarious juveniles selectively posting "Kilroy was here" graffiti. > Something along those lines. If I'm out in left field about the nature of the > attack against Wikipedia, I'd be happy to be corrected, and forced to agree > that HashCash would be unsuitable. I have no opinion about HashCash just yet. I have to think about it some more. The nefarious juveniles problem is partly what it is, yes. But that sort of random vandalism goes on all the time, and isn't particularly problematic. What is problematic is the lunatic on crack and steriods who is selectively posting "Kilroy sucked your mothers cock" graffiti, obsessively, hundreds of times. Our admins find it much more peaceful to just block open proxies and Tor servers than to deal with that for hours on end, days on end, weeks on end. I am not an expert on ideas like HashCah or anything of the sort. I am a bit of an expert on the behavior of problem users at Wikipedia. :-) And what I can say is that problem users at Wikipedia are problem users everywhere for the most part. Ordinary sane people don't go on a spree of Wikipedia vandalism. So the _degree_ of trust we need is actually quite small. It isn't "We certify this person to be a certain user, guaranteed, the same as ever". It's just "this packet is being sent to you from a source that has somehow tended generally to lead us to believe to some small extent that the person posting it has not been a jackass, by and large". Or, as has been brilliantly discussed here already, it could be "this packet has been sent to you via a mechanism that one might bother to use, were one a dissident really needing anonymity, but sufficiently bothersome that were one simply a lunatic on crack, one would more likely have simply switched to using anonymous proxies". It won't be perfect, but as an empirical matter, it's probably good enough. --Jimbo ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: Hello directly from Jimbo at Wikipedia
by Jimmy Wales 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote: > I was operating under the assumption that the problem was more along the lines > of nefarious juveniles selectively posting "Kilroy was here" graffiti. > Something along those lines. If I'm out in left field about the nature of the > attack against Wikipedia, I'd be happy to be corrected, and forced to agree > that HashCash would be unsuitable. I have no opinion about HashCash just yet. I have to think about it some more. The nefarious juveniles problem is partly what it is, yes. But that sort of random vandalism goes on all the time, and isn't particularly problematic. What is problematic is the lunatic on crack and steriods who is selectively posting "Kilroy sucked your mothers cock" graffiti, obsessively, hundreds of times. Our admins find it much more peaceful to just block open proxies and Tor servers than to deal with that for hours on end, days on end, weeks on end. I am not an expert on ideas like HashCah or anything of the sort. I am a bit of an expert on the behavior of problem users at Wikipedia. :-) And what I can say is that problem users at Wikipedia are problem users everywhere for the most part. Ordinary sane people don't go on a spree of Wikipedia vandalism. So the _degree_ of trust we need is actually quite small. It isn't "We certify this person to be a certain user, guaranteed, the same as ever". It's just "this packet is being sent to you from a source that has somehow tended generally to lead us to believe to some small extent that the person posting it has not been a jackass, by and large". Or, as has been brilliantly discussed here already, it could be "this packet has been sent to you via a mechanism that one might bother to use, were one a dissident really needing anonymity, but sufficiently bothersome that were one simply a lunatic on crack, one would more likely have simply switched to using anonymous proxies". It won't be perfect, but as an empirical matter, it's probably good enough. --Jimbo ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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NSA intercepts led to a terrorist conviction
by Steven Bellovin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

"Threat Level Privacy, Crime and Security Online NSA-Intercepted E-Mails Helped Convict Would-Be Bombers The three men convicted in the United Kingdom on Monday of a plot to bomb several transcontinental flights were prosecuted in part using crucial e-mail correspondences intercepted by the U.S. National Security Agency, according to Britainbs Channel 4. The e-mails, several of which have been reprinted by the BBC and other publications, contained coded messages, according to prosecutors. They were intercepted by the NSA in 2006 but were not included in evidence introduced in a first trial against the three last year. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/nsa-email/ has more. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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NSA intercepts led to a terrorist conviction
by Steven Bellovin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

"Threat Level Privacy, Crime and Security Online NSA-Intercepted E-Mails Helped Convict Would-Be Bombers The three men convicted in the United Kingdom on Monday of a plot to bomb several transcontinental flights were prosecuted in part using crucial e-mail correspondences intercepted by the U.S. National Security Agency, according to Britainbs Channel 4. The e-mails, several of which have been reprinted by the BBC and other publications, contained coded messages, according to prosecutors. They were intercepted by the NSA in 2006 but were not included in evidence introduced in a first trial against the three last year. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/nsa-email/ has more. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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None
by mmotyka＠lsil.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> Riddles ought to be tough for a machine to solve. Language and shades of > meaning seem less easily rendered as mathematical problems than > graphics. Yeah, but they're open to a "database attack" - collect all of them with their replies. I don't think you can randomly generate riddles from a theoretically huge space (comparable to generating one random number from a 128-bit space). Mark

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None
by mmotyka＠lsil.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> Riddles ought to be tough for a machine to solve. Language and shades of > meaning seem less easily rendered as mathematical problems than > graphics. Yeah, but they're open to a "database attack" - collect all of them with their replies. I don't think you can randomly generate riddles from a theoretically huge space (comparable to generating one random number from a 128-bit space). Mark

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None
by mmotyka＠lsil.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> Riddles ought to be tough for a machine to solve. Language and shades of > meaning seem less easily rendered as mathematical problems than > graphics. Yeah, but they're open to a "database attack" - collect all of them with their replies. I don't think you can randomly generate riddles from a theoretically huge space (comparable to generating one random number from a 128-bit space). Mark

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