- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Erasing Disks, was Re: What the NSA is patenting
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See Peter Gutmann's paper, "Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory" in The Sixth USENIX Security Symposium Proceedings. My feeling after hearing his paper was that the only thing I would trust was thermite. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | "Lone Star" - My personal | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | choice for best movie of | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | 1996 | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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ALERT: Call the Commerce committee to protect your privacy! (9/7/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

======================================================================== SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE SCHEDULED TO VOTE ON PRO-PRIVACY ENCRYPTION LEGISLATION (S.1726) ON THU SEPTEMBER 12, 1996 YOUR HELP IS NEEDED TO ENSURE PASSAGE CALL THE COMMERCE COMMITTEE (PHONE NUMBERS BELOW) September 8, 1996 Please widely redistribute this document with this banner intact until September 30, 1996 ________________________________________________________________________ CONTENTS The Latest News What You Can Do Now Background / What To Expect This Week Description of S.1726, Pro-CODE Bill Chronology of Pro-Crypto Legislation For More Information / Supporting Organizations ________________________________________________________________________ THE LATEST NEWS On Thursday September 12, the Senate Commerce Committee is set to vote on legislation designed to enhance privacy and security on the Internet. The bill, known as the "Promotion of Commerce Online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act," (S. 1726) is the best hope yet for real reform of U.S. encryption policy, and its passage by the Commerce Committee would signify a critical step forward in the struggle for privacy and security in the Information Age. The bill faces significant opposition from the Clinton Administration, who continues to cling to a cold-war era view of U.S. encryption policy. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE COMMERCE COMMITTEE HEAR FROM SUPPORTERS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY ON THE INTERNET. Please take a moment to contact the committee by following the simple instructions below. ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW It's crucial that you call the Commerce committee members below and urge them to pass S.1726 out of committee without amendments. (This is also known as a "clean" bill.) Any opportunity for amendments (even if they are good) opens us up to the possibility of hostile amendments that could restrict the use of encryption even further than today's abysmal state. It could even prohibit the use of encryption without Clipper Chip-like key 'escrow' technology, which includes built-in surveillance and monitoring functionality. 1. Call/Fax the members of the Senate Commerce committee and urge them to pass S.1726 out of committee "cleanly". Do not use email, as it is not likely to be looked at in time to make a difference for the markup on September 12th. Use the sample communique and directory listing below to make it a simple TWO MINUTE task. 2. Sign the petition to support strong encryption at http://www.crypto.com/petition/ ! Join other cyber-heroes as Phil Zimmermann, Matt Blaze, Bruce Schneier, Vince Cate, Phil Karn, and others who have also signed. 3. Between now and Wed. September 12, it is crucial that you call all these members of Congress. P ST Name and Address Phone Fax = == ======================== ============== ============== D SC Hollings, Ernest F. 1-202-224-6121 1-202-224-4293 D MA Kerry, John F. 1-202-224-2742 1-202-224-8525 D HI Inouye, Daniel K. 1-202-224-3934 1-202-224-6747 D KY Ford, Wendell H. 1-202-224-4343 1-202-224-0046 D WV Rockefeller, John D. 1-202-224-6472 na D LA Breaux, John B. 1-202-224-4623 na D NV Bryan, Richard H. 1-202-224-6244 1-202-224-1867 D ND Dorgan, Byron L. 1-202-224-2551 1-202-224-1193 D NE Exon, J. J. 1-202-224-4224 1-202-224-5213 D OR Wyden, Ron* 1-202-224-5244 1-202-228-2717 R SD Pressler, Larry* 1-202-224-5842 1-202-224-1259 R MT Burns, Conrad R.(*sponsor) 1-202-224-2644 1-202-224-8594 R AK Stevens, Ted 1-202-224-3004 1-202-224-2354 R AZ McCain, John 1-202-224-2235 1-202-224-2862 R WA Gorton, Slade 1-202-224-3441 1-202-224-9393 R MS Lott, Trent* 1-202-224-6253 1-202-224-2262 R TX Hutchison, Kay Bailey 1-202-224-5922 1-202-224-0776 R ME Snowe, Olympia 1-202-224-5344 1-202-224-6853 R MO Ashcroft, John* 1-202-224-6154 na R TN Frist, Bill 1-202-224-3344 1-202-224-8062 R MI Abraham, Spencer 1-202-224-4822 1-202-224-8834 * supporter or cosponsor. The bill also enjoys broad bi-partisan support from members not on the committee including Senators Leahy (D-VT) and Murray (D-WA). 4. Here is a sample conversation: SAMPLE PHONE CALL You:<ring ring> Sen:Hello, Senator Mojo's office! You: SAY I'm calling to urge the Senator to pass S.1726, the THIS-> Burns/Leahy/Pressler bill, S.1726 when the committee votes on it on Thursday. It's critical to the future of privacy, security, and electronic commerce on the internet. Sen:Ok, thanks!<click> IF THEY SAY "The Senator has concerns about the bill", please answer, "Please try to work these issues out as it moves to the Senate floor, but passage out of committee will send an important signal to the Administration." 5. To help us measure the effectiveness of the campaign, WE NEED TO HEAR FROM YOU. Please tell us who you called, and how they sounded. We'll be passing this information to folks in D.C. who can help apply pressure where needed. $ Mail vtw(a)vtw.org Subject: I called so-and-so Hey, I called Sen. Mojo. He sounded iffy, call in the reinforcements. ^D 6. Forward this to your friends and colleagues in appropriate forums until the date of expiration at the top. Forward a copy of this to your Internet Service Provider as well, and ask them to put the following text in their message of the day (motd), or on their WWW page: ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT The U.S. Senate will be voting on a proposal to encourage better security on the Internet on Thu Sep. 12th. Your help is needed to call Congress. See http://www.crypto.com/ for more details. ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ALERT ________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND / WHAT TO EXPECT THIS WEEK For the past 3 years, Cyber-Rights Activists, citizens, and industry leaders have been working hard to reform US encryption policy. Support has been building behind several legislative proposals this year because they send a clear signal to the Administration about the need for security and privacy in the Information Age. The digital revolution is currently being held hostage by the White House's Cold War restrictions on privacy-enhancing encryption technology. Now, with Congress less than a month away from adjournment, everyone who supports encryption and privacy is working to see this bill leave committee in order to send a clear message to the White House that they are on the wrong side of the encryption issue. Although this bill may not become law this year, its passage out of committee will be a landmark event that will clearly tell the White House that the Congress, the public, and the computer industry care about security and privacy, and need strong, reliable encryption technology in order to make the Internet a viable platform for commerce, education, and democracy. Success for our side is not certain, and the next week is not without risks. On September 12th, the Senate Commerce committee will hold a "markup", where the bill is examined, voted on, and if there are enough votes, passed out of committee. Two things could happen: -the committee could pass the bill as written, -the committee could pass the bill with amendments. Any amendments are not likely to be friendly, and in particular, quiet sources have told privacy activists that the Clinton Administration has been readying a legislative assault on your right to use encryption for several weeks now. A Clipper-like amendment could be attached to the bill if our side does not have enough votes to block all amendments. It is crucial that all netizens who consider privacy and security important take a moment to call members of the Commerce Committee right now and urge them to vote S.1726 out of committee without amendments. ________________________________________________________________________ DESCRIPTION OF S.1726, PRO-CODE BILL Privacy-enhancing encryption technology is currently under heavy restrictions kept in place by the White House. Encryption that is currently allowed to be exported is not sufficient to protect confidential information. This policy acquires an "Alice-in-Wonderland" quality when one realizes that strong encryption products are available abroad both for sale and for free download off the Internet. The Pro-CODE Act resolves to: 1. Allow for the *unrestricted* export of "mass-market" or "public-domain" encryption programs, including such products as Pretty Good Privacy and popular World Wide Web browsers. 2. Requires the Secretary of Commerce to allow the less restricted export of other encryption technologies if products of similar strength are generally available outside the United States, roughly up to DES strength. 3. Prohibits the federal government from imposing mandatory key-escrow encryption policies on the domestic market and limiting the authority of the Secretary of Commerce to set standards for encryption products. ________________________________________________________________________ CHRONOLOGY OF PRO-CRYPTO LEGISLATION 9/12/96 (scheduled) Senate Commerce committee will hold markup of S.1726 and hopefully pass it out of committee with no amendments. 7/25/96: Full Senate Commerce committee holds positive hearings on S.1726. FBI Director Louis Freeh testifies along with many cyber-luminaries. Hearings are cybercast Internet Cyber-Rights activists with HotWired and WWW.Crypto.Com. You can see the photos, read the testimony, and listen to the audio transcript at http://www.crypto.com/events/072596/ 6/26/96: Senate subcommittee holds positive hearings on S.1726. Hearings are cybercast Internet Cyber-Rights activists with HotWired and WWW.Crypto.Com. You can see the photos, read the testimony, and listen to the audio transcript at http://www.crypto.com/events/062696/ 5/2/96: Bi-partisan group of Senators introduce Pro-CODE Act, which would free public-domain encryption software (such as PGP) for export, free much commercial encryption for export, and reduce the government's ability to push Clipper proposals down the throats of an unwilling public. Original sponsors include: Senators Burns (R-MT), Dole (R-KS), Faircloth (R-NC), Leahy (D-VT), Murray (D-WA), Pressler (R-SD), and Wyden (D-OR). 3/5/96: Sen. Leahy (D-VT) and Rep. Goodlatte (R-VA) announce encryption bills (S.1587/H.R.3011) that significantly relax export restrictions on products with encryption functionality in them, as well as free public domain software such as PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). ________________________________________________________________________ FOR MORE INFORMATION / SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS There are many excellent resources online to get up to speed on crypto including the following WWW sites: http://www.crypto.com http://www.privacy.org http://www.eff.org http://www.cdt.org http://www.epic.org http://www.vtw.org Please visit them often. The following organizations have signed onto this alert: Center for Democracy and Technology Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Privacy Information Center Voters Telecommunications Watch ________________________________________________________________________ End alert ========================================================================

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RE: IDC_ard
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jya(a)pipeline.com (John Young) forwarded: >9-8-96. NYP Mag: >"The True Terror Is In the Card." >Faced with rising crime, illegal immigration, welfare >fraud and absentee parents, many bureaucrats and members >of Congress insist that the nation would run more >smoothly if we all had counterfeit-proof plastic >identity cards. >http://jya.com/idcard.txt (11 kb) And to get all the Christian Right (no pun intended) up in arms, just suggest that the best way to prevent theft of these ID cards would be to place the information on a microchip and implant it in your body. Forehead and right wrist preferably. James

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Distributed data haven monetary supply?
by DAVID A MOLNAR 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

When writing about Eternity services or other distributed data havens, one has to cover the issue of cost. After all, it takes some expenditure of resources to store data, which can translate to actual $$ (or riyals or dinar or kroner or whatever). So far that I've seen, the problem of delivering that payment has been put down to "e-cash payment" of some kind (hopefully untraceable), or creative wire transfer. In both cases, we end up needing to implement e-cash on a wide-scale basis, or completely reforming the way banks work in most countries. After all that trouble, then, our value is still stored in terms of a real currency. What if a node in a data haven could issue its own certificates/money for goods/services? The idea seems similar to me to the "TrustBucks" discussed recently on the list. A node's operator issues credits to others in exchange for money, favors, or space on their own machines. However, if every node issues its own currency, but only to those it trusts, we have the same problem as w/PGP...there is no guarantee that data may flow freely from node to node, which invites weakness. It's also an open invitation to inflation, as each operator may mint many billions of $ w/o immediate consequences (perhaps combined w/spam in a misguided publicity attempt?) Question : would it be preferable for a group of nodes to issue e-cash? I'm thinking in terms of a system where the bank's secret key is split between the participating nodes (or a certain voting subset), with a certain threshold needed to mint new currency. If there are several such constallations (and methods of exchanging currency between them), it multiplies the number of points one must subvert in order to manipulate the system. Perhaps groupings might agree to share stored data freely between nodes in the interests of security. A user then has several different "economies" to choose from, each of which has different policies. Once a data haven begins to devrive actual _income_ or benefit from these transactions, its attitude toward economic policy may affect its ability to secure and retreive data on command. A rich haven, for instance, may be able to afford better bandwidth between nodes, or funding for research into distributed computing. In contrast, a "poor" haven may suffer from outdated equipment, hardware failures, and possibly intermittent loss of data. Of course, such effects will not be particularly pronounced so long as a data haven is largely a volunteer effort. If a haven were to evolve into a socially stronger entity, with clearly defined "rights" and "responsibilities" for nodes, then its policies would have greater effect. I do not see a guarantee that such a structure would be anarchic in nature, even though the technology itself is amenable. Y'know, a group currency could prove to be a powerful tool to assert dominance/influence over a single node, much as we may speak about "dollar zones" or "yen blocs" in the real world. Gridlock might also be a problem...what if the system is set up to demand unanimous consent, but one of the nodes just died? How does one cast out a node or add a new one without collecting the bank's key in one place? What's to stop me from adding myself as a node under 15 assumed names? My concern is that these fears might engender the kind of 3l33t mindset sometimes seen on really lame wAR3z BBSs : a small power group, intense distrust of outsiders, almost cultish fac,ade of devotion to said small power group, et. al. None of which is helpful. Comments? Is it a good idea, or will it lead to ever-more confusion? Sorry if this is a bit long, repetitive of other things previously discussed to death elsewhere, or rambling. :-) -David Molnar

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TWA 800 - hit by an unarmed US missile?
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A collision with an unarmed missile would explain why they are not finding much evidence of high explosives (the pitting, ruptured metal, and residue). If a missile going at supersonic speed hit a 747 in the underbelly, near a fuel tank, I sure believe that it could take out the 747. If it was coming toward the 747, not catching up to it from behind, the collision speed would be the addition of the two speeds. In this case a soft civilian airplane would not stand a chance. Civilian airplanes are designed to survive collisions with birds, but not supersonic missiles. If the Navy was firing missiles in this area, it really does seem like the press should be checking out this angle. -- Vince

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Re: Los Angeles Times article on Helsingius and anon.penet.fi
by Jon Lebkowsky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:04 PM 9/9/96 +0800, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: >On Mon, 9 Sep 1996, Gary Howland wrote: > >> Enzo Michelangeli wrote: >> >> > Perhaps, but defamation is an issue that can't be ignored either, >> > especially if one tries to build systems based on reputation. >> >> It _is_ an issue that can be ignored - if the "defamer" backs up his >> claims, then fine, the claims can be shown to be valid, otherwise ignore >> those claims. Simple. > >I and you may well choose to do so, but the vast majority of the human >beings believe just anything that is repeated loud and long enough. >Otherwise, nobody would hire PR and pay for advertisement, politicians >wouln't be fedwith taxpayer's money, Bosnians would trade goods instead >of gunshots, etc. I'm personally not interested in conjuring up the latest >utopia for a minoritarian sect of illuminati: I need to live in the real >world, and push for viable solutions that change it for better, now. > >Enzo One viable solution you can push for: educate the 'vast majority' to understand that these wordstreams have no mojo, that skepticism is a surivival skill in the 'Information Age.' -- Jon Lebkowsky <jonl(a)hotwired.com> FAX (512)444-2693 http://www.well.com/~jonl Electronic Frontiers Forum, 6PM PDT Thursdays <http://www.hotwired.com/eff> "No politician can sit on a hot issue if you make it hot enough."--Saul Alinsky

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash ksub latent cut ek mix reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 9 Sep 96 6:45:23 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca +**+******** 18:19 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++++++++++++ 1:04:20 99.98% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com +*******#**# 1:51 99.98% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de --.++++-+++ 1:54:34 99.97% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*** *+***** 5:02 99.83% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com +---------- 3:22:14 99.78% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com +*********** 5:08 99.75% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +*+*+*+* *** 27:34 99.47% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++ -++ 1:00:20 99.36% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com -+* 2:46:09 98.70% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com --+++++ -- 1:08:18 98.27% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +### #*#### 3:19 95.26% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---------- 4:55:16 94.74% winsock winsock(a)c2.org -+-------- 3:14:43 91.19% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com +******* 24:33 57.62% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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China joins Singapore, Germany, ....
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN is presenting coverage of China's decision to pull the plug on more than 100 sites, and issuing a list of sites which are illegal to connect to. (Net censorship is getting to be a big story....when the list of countries reaches 15, it will of course no longer be news. And when the United States block access, this will all be transmogrified into an "Anti-Terrorist Action.") --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Job for netescrow ? (was Secure anonymouse server protocol...
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam and Matt put my casual remark under the grill: Peter Allan <peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk> writes on cpunks: > [Matt Blaze's Oblivious Key Escrow paper] ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.ps > > This all hinges on a policy to be followed by archive holders defining > the conditions under which they release their shares. > This could be receipt of a signed request from the owner (remailer). > > Maybe the table relating nyms to reply addresses could be stored in > netescrow style so that captured remailers reveal nothing. The problem > of operator coercion is not addressed by this. Adam: > Just to clarify, if I understand correctly you are proposing a penet > style system with the database held in `netescrow'. Yes. What I had in mind resembled the split list scheme used at a church I used to go to. UK tax law has concessions for regular giving (Covenants, in the jargon) and the church needed to know that comittments were being met. At the same time it was preferred not to know who was giving what. This was done by having 2 lists eg Namelist: Mr J Smith = member 999 Cashlist: member 999 gives 1000 / month If member 999 didn't give as planned, cashlist-holder could say to namelist-holder "have a word with 999". These were held by 2 people, trusted not to collude. Also I suppose committee reshuffles shouldn't put one person straight into the other post. My idea was to replicate this split list so that addrlist: leukos.gleukos(a)c2.org = index97b6150200000564 nymlist: index97b6150200000564 = an0001002304000101(a)this.remailer This would be altered for the remailer table as: addlist: leukos.gleukos(a)c2.org = index97b6150200000564 addlist: an0001002304000101(a)this.remailer = index97b6150200400281 and these 2 mappings would be escrowed: index97b6150200000564 -> index97b6150200400281 index97b6150200400281 -> index97b6150200000564 (Or just escrow the _keys_ for the latter, as Matt first thought.) > However the aim is not to prevent others > censoring your publically available writings, but to allow a second > avenue of access only in the case of `mob cryptography'. The aim is to prevent a seized remailer having its data read. The "angry mob cryptanalysis" is a side issue. > If the police are unsucessful (seems likely) does this offer the > operator much solice in his jail time for contempt of court, to > know that he has a vote of confidence in the moral correctness of > his decision from a population of the net? > Does it offer him any legal benefit? Are the share holders guilty > of contempt also, does this lessen his guilt, and harshness of > prosecution? (Remember that the share holders' identity and > location are unknown to the operator... > I'm not sure how useful this part is, unless the possibility of > `mob cryptography' is the desired feature. I'd have thought an > individual remailer operator would be more likely to fold than a > group of anonymous crypto-anarchists. I did say this didn't address operator coercion. The widespread cross-jurisdiction aspects of netescrow will be important here. Capture of hardware without scope for operator coercion would be protected against - but is an easy problem anyway. > 2. You could add the twist of an alternative duress key, that would > stand a real chance of successfully nuking the database. More > satisfying. I was thinking of calling this the "shredder ticket" and giving it to the sender (who can then distribute it to all remaining remailers without needing to use the seized one). This would depend on him realising that the remailer was (about to be) seized, and would have to be done before the enemy rounded up the shares. [Incidentally I'm not that keen on regarding the police as the enemy. My mention of "angry mob cryptanalysis" in the event of a crime was to show that it was not the ideal vehicle for crime. But then maybe I'm a statist pig.] In any case it would be necessary to > 3. Negative comment on the system: TLAs have a vested interest in > themselves being most of the share holders. True of the ownership > of the current remailers also of course. > The widespread cross-jurisdiction aspects of netescrow will be important here. (Perhaps including compulsory cross-border secret reassembly. ) I was envisaging this being combined with Mixmaster. (I see from your Eternity post that you'd run a netescrow scheme that way.) This gives us "vertical integration" a sort of "of the remailers, by the remailers and for the remailers". Careful design of message formats could make it hard to tell the escrow mechanics from the traffic. To mount this collusion attack the TLAs would have to be part of the scheme - helping to pass most anonymous messages in order to trace some random ones, not necessarily those they want to trace. (If there was nothing in it for them they wouldn't join.) (Compare that to the current state quoted as near as I can remember from AC2 "It seems reasonable to assume that the NSA can break any message that it intercepts, but not all messages") It takes time to collect the shares and determine the next destination, during this time the message is sat in a pool. (Is there scope for traffic analysis in the fact that the average speed of messages will be lower than that of shares ?) With that in mind I was looking at the scope for cheating. Cheating seems possible by: 1) Collusion (as mentioned) 2) Not releasing (valid) shares when requested This can be caught by traps. The list of where the shares went is usually destroyed, but need not be. The shareholders are none the wiser, and when they get known for not releasing shares the remailer excludes them from future share issues. 3) Flooding attacks - storing rubbish in escrow servers who are eventually forced to accept no more shares, or ditch some existing ones. So far as I can see Matt's Netescrow scheme has exactly this problem. Ecash payments might help. If existing shares are ditched the reply-ability will not last long. You might get a message you can reply to for 2 weeks, but no later. Sender might resend periodically - a bit like following up an unanswered snail mail. > At the same time it would provide an argument against GAK, all > legitimate (in the publics eyes, what other opinions count, this is a > democracy isn't it) law enforcement needs met. As in the last sentence or so of the OKE paper. Matt: > My original idea for OKE was as a way to backup long-term, > slow-changing sensitive data without also introducing a single point > of failure for either security or availability. The remailer model is > a bit different, and I'm not sure it's a good fit, in particular > because I haven't thought about the various new failure modes in this > application. But let me think ``out loud.'' > > So can this scheme be improved upon? Is there a better way to run a > persistent-reply-address remailer? These are interesting, and I think > largely open, questions. -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

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Test...sorry about this - Reply
by Barbara Gamble 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got it too. And since I am a new subscriber, I thought it might be the normal traffic. The Welcome msg *did* say the list is high-traffic. Still, I was aghast--300 all at once, another 100 just in the last hour. Is that typical? (Please forgive such a question from a newcomer to the list.) >>> Z.B. <zachb(a)netcom.com> 09/06 10:38 am >>> I'm just posting this to see if there's something wrong with my mail filter - it dumped a ton of messages from this list over the night, and I'm trying to figure out why the !@%$# it did that. Sorry for the interruption. --- Zach Babayco zachb(a)netcom.com <----- finger for PGP public key http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Park/4127

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