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(fwd) Global Alert: GERMAN GOVERNMENT PUSHES BLOCKAGE OF NETHERLANDS WEB SITE
by Alex Le Heux 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: xs4all!felipe From: felipe(a)xs4all.nl () Newsgroups: xs4all.announce Subject: Global Alert: GERMAN GOVERNMENT PUSHES BLOCKAGE OF NETHERLANDS WEB SITE Date: 18 Sep 1996 17:28:31 GMT Organization: XS4ALL, networking for the masses Lines: 118 Approved: the boss Message-ID: <51pbfv$anu(a)news.xs4all.nl> NNTP-Posting-Host: xs1.xs4all.nl X-XS4ALL-Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 19:28:31 MET DST X-Newsreader: NN version 6.5.0 #4 *** GLOBAL ALERT *** FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE SEPT. 18, 1996 - Please redistribute this document widely with this banner intact - Redistribute only in appropriate places & only until 15 October 1996 GERMAN GOVERNMENT PUSHES BLOCKAGE OF NETHERLANDS WEB SITES. At the behest of, and in response to legal threats from, the German government, internet providers in Germany have blocked the Dutch Web site Access For All (www.xs4all.nl) removing German users' access to the entire xs4all system. The German government demanded this action because xs4all hosts a Web "home page" with so-called left-wing political content that, though fully legal in the Netherlands, is allegedly illegal in Germany. (see: http://www.anwalt.de/ictf/p960901e.htm) As a result of this action, *all* xs4all web sites, including several thousand that have nothing to do with the offending home page, are unavailable to readers in Germany. Please send a letter of protest to the German ambassador in your country, ask your foreign minister to protest officially to the German government, and distribute this alert as widely as possible online and to the press. Referring to article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, which Germany ratified in 1973, we, the undersigned organizations, consider this censorship an illegal act. Additionally, the value of attempting to ban content the German government finds offensive is highly questionable. The proper response to offensive expression is more and better expression, and prosecution of offending criminals, not censorship. As a result of the overly broad censorship measure which targets an entire Internet access provider instead of a specific user, all 3000 and more Web site hosted by xs4all are virtually inaccessible in Germany. The loss of clients who market in Germany has resulted in economic damage to xs4all. The immeasurable harm of censoring thousands of other users for the speech of one is even greater. Access for All, though it has expressed willingness to assist the Dutch police in identifying online criminals abusing the xs4all system, has a policy against censoring its clients. Mirroring this position, at least one German Net provider has responded to the government demands with skepticism, pointing out that their compliance with the censorship request may cause them to violate contracts with their own German users, and that the government's liability threats are tantamount to holding a phone company liable for what users say on the telephone. Instead of the futile act of censorship that has simply drawn increased attention to the offending material and resulted in its widespread availability on other sites throughout the world, the German government should have acted through legal channels and asked the authorities in the Netherlands to cooperate in determining what legal action, if any, was appropriate. We are concerned that German internet providers have cooperated so easily with government censorship efforts. Some level of cooperation was probably assured by underhanded and rather questionable police threats of system operator liability for user content, but we must urge more resistance on that part of Net access providers to such online censorship schemes. As with libraries, there are many who would censor, but there is a responsibility on the part of providers of access to information, to work to protect that access, else libraries, and Internet service providers, lose the reason for their existence. We ask that the German government refrain from further restrictive measures and intimidation of internet providers and recognize the free, democratic, world wide communications represented by the Internet. All governments should recognize that the Internet is not a local, or even national, medium, but a global medium in which regional laws have little useful effect. "Top-down" censorship efforts not only fail to prevent the distribution of material to users in the local jurisdiction (material attacked in this manner can simply be relocated to any other country), but constitutes a direct assault on the rights and other interests of Internet users and service providers in other jurisdictions, not subject to the censorship law in question. For press contacts, and for more information about the Internet, see the homepages for the signatories to this message: DB-NL (Digital Citizens Foundation in the Netherlands) * http://www.xs4all.nl/~db.nl ALCEI - Electronic Frontiers Italy * http://www.nexus.it/alcei CITADEL-E F France *http://www.imaginet.fr/~mose/citadel CommUnity (UK) * http://www.community.org.uk Electronic Frontier Canada * http://www.efc.ca/ Electronic Frontier Foundation (USA) * http://www.eff.org Electronic Frontiers Australia * http://www.efa.org.au/ Other signatures: NLIP, Dutch Foundation for Internet Providers * http://www.nlip.nl Internet Providers Rotterdam * http://www.ipr.nl Digitaal Werknet Nederland * http://www.dwn.nl Foebud e.V, foundation to promote free datatraffic, * http://www.zerberus.de National Writers Union (UAW LOCAL 1981 AFL-CIO) * http://www.nwu.org/nwu/ Nizkor Project * http://www.nizkor.org/ Internet Access Foundation (NL) * http://www.iaf.nl/ Digitale Stad Venlo * http://www.dsvenlo.nl CSO * http://www.canucksoup.net/ -- Felipe Rodriquez - XS4ALL Internet - finger felipe(a)xs4all.nl for http://xs4all.nl/~felipe/ - Managing Director - pub pgp-key 1024/A07C02F9 pgp Key fingerprint = 32 36 C3 D9 02 42 79 C6 D1 9F 63 EB A7 30 8B 1A -- /// I dabble in techno-house and sometimes, /// I do that badass hip-hop thang... /// But the F U N K gets me every time!

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FCC Licensed Cypherpunks
by Thumbnail 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- As someone pointed out recently, there's a lot of similarity between the as-yet-unregulated Internet and the pre-FCC airwaves. There were even cypherpunk-analogs back then, who called themselves amateur radio operators. Where are they now? Corralled into tiny slices of FCC-approved bandwidth. Granted titles of nobility by the government in recognition of their Morse code prowess. Eager to report pirate operators who don't play by the rules, at least back when the FCC still investigated such complaints. There lies the future: all those newbies wandering in with their "Unbrakable Random Number Generator Encription Systemz" are going to come back as Master Class Amateur Cryptography Operators, and by God you'd better not laugh at their Internet Key Recovery Authority certificates, if you know what's good for you. Have a nice day. - --Thumbnail ~~~ The PGP signature on this message is to certify that it was sent by thumbnail(a)nym.alias.net on or before Wed Sep 18 18:00:48 1996 GMT. The administrators of nym.alias.net and the nym.alias.net PGP key in no way endorse, approve of, or claim authorship of this message. Report any abuse of this pseudonym service to admin(a)nym.alias.net. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMkA40U5NDhYLYPHNAQGKZAf+ImZZXEAXdWdv1v30GFfguJ+1KWJRMsDD uhDjuwyHfFVvKpJSyYr5nmBJLm41vvSXOIJnCtjzS7Ai+Y9tEnMUsY5Mg0Qp76LB qvxDIgSB+S87xjSzWAx9Kur0SqRkyu3UZPqBniSKzUWIf9/dzu2ttnC0d+eCoBHZ Vk8z8h6JsSU3G35djG7jrvVv4+Jg7VSIjFHvvfaJ528vcM+iUxiLWidIz1PPKmN4 r3dnjCsJql9akc2U013pFXzQV890bc2VEha5NQwxCPYS9L1oCZJfc5as5c6t0Xb7 AwoaZEhCt352TBQdeoLSE+5t+l3YvDSnmPr/HUWI+/bk27/XGhugTA== =hmdh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The GAK Momentum is Building...
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: shamrock(a)netcom.com, liberty(a)gate.net, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed Sep 18 11:57:32 1996 Lucky wrote: > On Wed, 18 Sep 1996, Jim Ray wrote: [my stuff about a small "victory" elided.] > Nope. It is a Cypherpunk loss. The use of the term "key recovery" for GAK > now fully obfuscates the distinction between accessing a > backup copy by the legitimate owner (or his estate, employer, etc.) and > GAK. Many PKIs will support the former type of key recovery. And for good > reasons. Thanks to the brainwashers using the same term for GAK, it will > now become impossible to tell from a basic description of a PKI if it > supports GAK or not. Furthermore, those who oppose the latter type of key > recovery (us!), will be pushed further into the fringe by the media > now being able to mix up our arguments against GAK with arguing against > true key recovery. [Do you notice the weird constructs I have to use to > distinguish the two meanings? One of them being new...] Upon further reflection, I agree with Lucky. I will say that the _really_ bad news is that our opponents seem to be getting smarter. <sigh> Or else I'm just getting dumber. :( Also: If any more of you have comments for Judge Kozinski, please send them to me soon. Comments from stable nyms (such as you, Lucky) are especially appreciated, and with your permission I will include this message. Please tell me if you want me to include your e-mail address in the message to Judge Kozinski. TIA. JMR Regards, Jim Ray -- DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy "As govt.s grow arithmetically, corruption grows exponentially." -- Ray's Law of official corruption. Defeat the Duopoly! Stop the Browne out. Harry Browne for President. Jo Jorgensen for Vice-president. http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ http://www.twr.com/stbo ___________________________________________________________________ PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 I will generate a new (and bigger) PGP key-pair on election night. <mailto:liberty@gate.net> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMkAb8m1lp8bpvW01AQGwDQP/Wz8Bw27oXVzNt4gusljym5ardHFgCNDR A3N8kXcL7rGRs2SFDBNYlodcTSh60d1FJTvLQ77oolMPWp3oQygZ+HLFEhwHK/GG tt1VPavPhvpdPiXoDOcZKUm/vRobAJrvkfUEaeqI8hmzCVBq5YS/4m4KaD3XquWO w0IyCViMVmw= =ntqD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: 56 kbps modems
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 15 Sep 1996 23:35:38 -0700 (PDT), Lucky Green wrote: >Seriously, how may of the 28.8 modem users get connections at 28.8? >Twenty percent? Fifty percent? Today's modems are already faster than >most analog lines can support. More likely than not, a 56k modem won't >link up at 56k. If you want speed, use the clean solution. Get ISDN. >[And don't buy the Motorola BitSurfer PRO. It won't work with two line >phones. The sound is so bad, you can't use the POTS you pull out for >business. Motorola: "We are aware of the problem". Well, they have been >aware of it since at least February.] Interesting. . . Oh well, I bet their competition doesn't mind. >But for data, home ISDN is the way to go. Of course, we'll be getting the cable modems around here by early next year, so I might just wait for that 15MB/s. . . # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # cadams(a)acucobol.com | V.M. (619)515-4894 "I have never been able to figure out why anyone would want to play games on a computer in any case when the whole system is a game. Word processing, spreadsheets, telecoms -- it's all a game. And they pay you to play it." -- Duncan Frissell

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Re: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 16 Sep 1996 07:37:17 +0200 (MET DST), Anonymous wrote: >> The thing about _traditional_ charity, of the religious or community sort, >> was that it was not treated as an "entitlement," as something the resentful >> masses could "demand" as part of their "human rights." > There's no substantial difference between their resentful whining about >their rights and your resentful whining about your rights - except maybe >that you whine more. Last time I checked, tcmay has never insisted that it is his right to have something I worked for. . . # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # cadams(a)acucobol.com | V.M. (619)515-4894 "I have never been able to figure out why anyone would want to play games on a computer in any case when the whole system is a game. Word processing, spreadsheets, telecoms -- it's all a game. And they pay you to play it." -- Duncan Frissell

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Re: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 15 Sep 96 23:43:33 +0000, attila wrote: > forget the idea that it will build a community --unless > you wish to consider the Bitch's "It Takes a Global > Village" a community. Statist from the cradle; welcome She's right about that, to some extent. It often does take a village to raise a child. What she doesn't mention is that the governmental policies she lobbies for are doing their best to destroy that village. Name one example where wealth-transfers have made people more willing to spread their now vastly reduced resources to the needy? As a sidenote, does anyone know how much of the money taken out in taxes actually goes toward useful things? i.e. maintaining infrastructure like roads, providing for the public defense, paying police (most of whom I've found are great people. It's the higherups who seem to have ODed something), forest service, etc? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # cadams(a)acucobol.com | V.M. (619)515-4894 "I have never been able to figure out why anyone would want to play games on a computer in any case when the whole system is a game. Word processing, spreadsheets, telecoms -- it's all a game. And they pay you to play it." -- Duncan Frissell

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Re: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 15 Sep 1996 17:13:53 -0700, Dale Thorn wrote: >> And that's good. The world population really should go back to around >> 1 billion for achieving a stabile ecology (with singing birds for >> the peace of minds). The former (?) US system of encouraging young >> standalone women to make babies to get benefits was very bad. The >> Chinese system - less benefits the more children you have - is the >> way to go. >Just a comment: "The world population really should go back to around >one billion", etc. And how could we achieve that without severe govt. >oppression, one wonders? Now, I've heard of "education" being used to >help the masses learn to be responsible citizens ad nauseam, but since >education is pretty much just propaganda in the massively-capitalist >system now taking over even the P.R. of China, how the heck is education >going to work? Well, they're much better at telling kids how to use condoms than they are at, say, explaining an integral. (or even an equation for that matter) As a side note, how about some real welfare reform: mandatory birth control (and pay for that; it's *much* cheaper) and benefits go DOWN for additional births. # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # cadams(a)acucobol.com | V.M. (619)515-4894 "I have never been able to figure out why anyone would want to play games on a computer in any case when the whole system is a game. Word processing, spreadsheets, telecoms -- it's all a game. And they pay you to play it." -- Duncan Frissell

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Re: cypherpunk listserve usefulness
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:33 PM 9/18/96, Chip Mefford wrote: >As much as it shames me, I have recently discovered that by filtering >messages from only 2 participants and setting body filters on 3 keywords >have remarkably improved the usefulness of this listserve. > >As much as I do enjoy some of the filtered subject matter, I really feel it >is very off subject and makes this listserver useless for the intended task. > >I guess that makes me a censor and it has me reexamining some things. No, it certainly does not make you a "censor." It makes you more _discriminating_, but this is often a good thing. A _censor_, by all standard definitions one can find, is one who restricts what _others_ may read. The form that concerns many of us the most is when a government uses its monopoly on force to censor. (But the term can also apply to when churches or corporations act as censors of what worshipper-units or employee-units may read or view.) I hope by "has me reexamining things" you do not mean that your experience with filters means support for government telling us all which filters we must use. Certainly the CP list is undergoing one of its periodic "sunspot cycles," where spambots and loonies are attempting to trash it, and where the discussions of meaty issues are being affected. We've survived half a dozen or so such periods, and will survive this. The best way to increase the S/N ratio is to post more signal. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Snakeoil FAQ edits/comments
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matt: Thanks, and good work. My comments are indicated by [your text] in brackets, my comments >>> set off by >>>'s. To help separate, look for "-----------------------------" --------------------------- snake-oil-faq ---------------------------- Snake-Oil Warning Signs Encryption Software to Avoid $Id: snake-oil-faq.html,v 0.4 1996/09/16 13:52:26 cmcurtin Exp $ Distribution Please do not distribute this beyond the circles of cryptographic competence yet. This is an incomplete work-in-progress. Feedback is greatly appreciated. The Snake Oil FAQ is (to be) posted monthly to cypherpunks, sci.crypt, alt.security, comp.security, and comp.infosystems. We're targeting those who have influence over or direct involvement in the purchasing decisions of computer security software and equipment in the corporate and academic worlds, as well as individual users who wish to assert their privacy through the use of good cryptography. ----------------------------- >>> I wonder what a good assumption is about level-of-expertise. I should think rather low, since a more experienced person will not be in as much need of the doc in the first place. Think moderately-informed user: like the readers of InfoWorld, eh? Given that, there are several places where knowledge of the subject is assumed that the real consumer of the FAQ doesn't have. ----------------------------- Disclaimer All contributors' employers will no doubt disown any statements herein. We're not speaking for anyone but ourselves, based on our own experiences, etc., etc., etc. This is a general guideline, and as such, cannot be the sole metric by which a security product is rated, since there can be exceptions to any of these rules. ----------------------------- >>> Actually, I think there are some rules in here that there are no exceptions to. Check; nothing comes immediately to mind tho. ----------------------------- ----------------------------- [(But if you're looking at something that sounds familiar on several of the 'things to watch out for,' you're probably dealing with snake oil. ] >>> But if many of the items on the "Things to look out for" list seem to apply to a product, the product is very likely weak. ----------------------------- ----------------------------- >From time to time, a reputable and decent vendor will produce something that is actually quite good, but will use some [braindead] marketing technique, so be aware of exceptions. >>> "Braindead", eh, hmmmmm. Too dignified ;) ----------------------------- Every effort has been made to produce an accurate and useful document, but the information contained herein is completely without warranty. If you find any errors, or wish to otherwise contribute, please contact the document keeper, C Matthew Curtin <cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com> Introduction Good cryptography is an excellent and necessary tool for almost anyone. However, there is a multitude of products around. Many good cryptographic products are available, both commercial (including shareware) and free. However, there are also some extremely bad cryptographic products (known in the field as "Snake Oil"), which not only fail do their job of providing security, but are based on, and add to, the many misconceptions and misunderstandings surrounding cryptography and security. ----------------------------- >>> They also prey on the inexperience of the consumer, rely on the mystery and mystique of mathmatical-sounding jargon, to make poorly engineered products seem to be something they are not. ----------------------------- Superficially, it is difficult for someone to distinguish the output of a secure encryption utility from snake oil: both look garbled. The purpose of this document is >>> to <<< present some obvious "red flags" [so that] >>> which <<< people unfamiliar with the nuts and bolts of cryptography can use as a guideline for determining whether they're dealing with snake oil or the Real Thing. For a variety of reasons, this document is general in scope and does not mention specific products or algorithms as being "good" or "Snake Oil". When evaluating any product, be sure to understand what your needs are. For data security products, what do you need protected? Do you want an archiver that [supports strong encryption? ] ----------------------------- >>> Problem: what is "Strong Encryption" ??? From a user's point of view this term is too fuzzy. Try: "that will keep data secure from your kid sister? A rogue government? For 5 minutes? Etc. etc. " ----------------------------- ----------------------------- [An E-mail client? Something that will encrypt on-line communications? Do you want to encrypt an entire disk or partition, or selectively some files? Do you need on-the-fly (automatic) encryption and decryption, or are you willing to select when and which files you want encrypted? ] >>> I'd leave that out: not pertinent to snake-oil vs. Good Stuff, but is about the kind of application user requires. How secure is "secure enough?" Does the data need to be unreadable by third parties for 5 minutes? One year? 50 years? 100 years? >>> see above. ----------------------------- ----------------------------- [Different products will serve different needs, and it's rare that a product will serve every need. (Sometimes a product won't be needed: it may be better to use a utility to encrypt files, transmit them over a network using standard file transfer tools, and decrypt them at the other end than to use a separate encrypted utility in some cases.)] >>> I don't understand: "sometimes a product won't be needed?" I think this paragraph could be left out. After all, OS utility or Snoop-Dooper-Doggy-Doo-Ware product, ya still gotta know what you're doing, right? So you everthing in the FAQ still applies; or maybe I'm missing the point here. ----------------------------- Some basics The cryptography-faq (found at ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/cryptography-faq/) is a more general tutorial of cryptography, and should also be consulted. In an effort to make this FAQ more complete, some very basic topics are included below. Conventional vs. Public Key Cryptography ----------------------------- There are two basic types of cryptosystems: symmetric (also known as "conventional," [sometimes also called] >>> or <<< "private key") and asymmetric (public key). Symmetric ciphers require both the sender and the recipient to have the same key. That key is [applied] >>> used by the cryptographic algorithm <<< to encrypt the data >>> originated <<< by the sender, and again by the recipient to decrypt the data. Asymmetric ciphers are much more flexible, from a key management perspective. Each user has a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. The public key is shared widely, given to everyone, while the private key is kept secret. If Alice wishes to mail Bob some secrets, she simply gets Bob's public key, encrypts her message with it, and sends it off to Bob. When Bob gets the message, he uses is private key to decrypt the message. Asymmetric [cryptosystems] >>>algorithms<<< are much slower than [their symmetric counterparts.] >>> symmetric algorithms, and are almost exclusively used to encrypt short "session keys," which are then used to encrypt a message using the speedier symmetric algorithms. This use of public key cryptography is called "key exchange." ----------------------------- ----------------------------- [Also, key sizes must be much larger.] >>>I agree with one comment that discouraged comparing the 2 algo types. ----------------------------- See the cryptography FAQ for a more detailed discussion of [the topic.] >>>these topics.<<< Key Sizes ----------------------------- Some ciphers, while currently secure against most attacks, are not considered viable in the next few years because of relatively small keysizes and increasing processor speeds [(making a brute-force attacks feasible).] >>> Again, I maintain that the audience for this stuff can't be relied upon to even know what that means. Try: "which makes the cipher vulnerable to breaking by trying every possible key combination (called a brute-force attack)." --- or something like that. ----------------------------- The tables below should give some general guidelines for making intelligent decisions about the key length you need. If the key is too short, the system will be easily broken, even if the cipher is a good one. In [1] and [2], we're presented with some guidelines for deciding appropriate key length. (It is important to note that this is based on the ability to predict computing power 40, 65, and 100 years from now. Major breakthroughs in computing power 30 years from now might render everything on this chart kiddieplay.) Security Requirements for Different Information Type of Traffic Lifetime Minimum [Symmetric] Key Length Tactical military information minutes/hours 56-64 bits Product announcements, mergers, interest rates days/weeks 64 bits Long-term business plans years 64 bits Trade secrets (e.g., recipe for Coca-Cola) decades 112 bits H-bomb secrets >40 years 128 bits Identities of spies >50 years 128 bits Personal affairs >50 years 128 bits Diplomatic embarrassments >65 years at least 128 bits U.S. Census data 100 years at least 128 bits ----------------------------- >>> Where is the attribution for the table? ----------------------------- As mentioned earlier, asymmetric ciphers require significantly longer keys to provide the same level of security as their symmetric cipher counterparts. Here is a comparison table, again, from Applied Cryptography, second edition. Symmetric and Public-Key Lengths With Similar Resistance to Brute-Force Attacks Symmetric Key Length Public-key Key Length 56 bits 384 bits 64 bits 512 bits 80 bits 768 bits 112 bits 1792 bits 128 bits 2304 bits ----------------------------- >>> BEWARE, Danger: comparing public/private key cryptosystems again. I think if you really want to do so, then the comparison should really be explained. ----------------------------- Some Common Snake-Oil Warning Signs The following are some of the "red flags" one should watch for when examining an encryption product * Technobabble The vendor's description of the product may contain a lot of hard-to-follow use of technical terms to describe how the product works. If this appears to be confusing nonsense, it may very well be (even to someone familiar with the terminology). Technobabble is a good means of confusing a potential user and masking the fact that the vendor doesn't understand anything either. A sign of technobabble is a descrption which drops a lot of technical terms for how the system works without actually explaining how it works. Often specifically coined terms are used to describe the scheme which are not found in the literature. * New Type of Cryptography? Beware of any vendor who claims to have invented a "new type of cryptography" or a "revolutionary breakthrough". Truly "new break-throughs" are likely to show up in the >>> scientific <<< literature, and [many in the field] >>> professionals won't <<< [are unlikely to] trust them until after years of analysis, by which time they are not so new anymore. Avoid software which claims to use 'new paradigms' of computing such as cellular automata, neural nets, genetic algorithms, chaos theory, etc. Just because software uses to different method of computation doesn't make it more secure. ----------------------------- >>> As a matter of fact, these techniques are the subject of ongoing cryptographic research and nobody has published successful results based on their use yet. ----------------------------- Anything that claims to have invented a new [public key] cryptosystem without publishing the details or underlying mathematical principles is highly suspect. Modern cryptography, especially public key systems, is grounded in mathematical theory. The security is based on problems that are believed, if not known to be hard to solve. ----------------------------- >>> There are some other comments in cpunks on this last bit. I defer. ----------------------------- The strength of any encryption scheme is only proven by the test of time, >>> involving exhaustive analysis by cryptographers<<<. New crypto is like new pharmaceuticals, not new cars. * Proprietary Algorithms Avoid software which uses "proprietary" or "secret" algorithms. Security through obscurity is not considered a safe means of protecting your data. If the vendor does not feel confident that the method used can withstand years of scrutiny by the [academic] >>> professional and academic cryptographic <<< community, then you should be wary of trusting it. (Note that a vendor who specializes in the cryptography may have a proprietary algorithm which they'll show to others if they sign a non-disclosure agreement. If the vendor is well-reputed in the field, this can be an exception.) ----------------------------- >>> How can you tell a well-reputed vendor? I am thinging of one co. that promises to release their algo. details upon NDA, but at least in my case the details never showed up! This is slippery here! ----------------------------- Beware of specially modified versions of well-known algorithms. This may intentionally or unintentionally weaken the cipher. The use of a trusted algorithm, >>> availability of <<< [if not with] technical notes explaining the implementation ([if not availability of] >>> and preferably <<< the source code for the product) are a sign of good faith on the part of the vendor that you can take apart and test the implementation yourself. A common excuse for not disclosing how a program works is that "hackers might try to crack the program's security." While this may be a valid concern, it should be noted that such 'hackers' can reverse engineer the program to see how it works anyway. If the program is implemented properly and the algorithm is secure, this is not a problem. (If a hypothetical 'hacker' was able to get access you your system, access to encrypted data might be the least of your problems.) ----------------------------- >>> Add: The strength of a cryptosystem should depend ONLY on the security of the keys involved, and not the security of the algorithm. ----------------------------- * Experienced Security Experts and Rave Reviews Beware of any product claiming that "experienced security experts" have analyzed it, but it won't say who (especially if the scheme has not been published in a reputable journal). Don't rely on reviews in newspapers, magazines or television shows, since they generally don't have cryptologists (celebrity hackers who know about telephone systems don't count) take the software apart for them. Just because the vendor is a well known company or the algorithm is patented doesn't make it secure either. * Unbreakability Some vendors will claim their software is "unbreakable". This is marketing hype, and a common sign of snake-oil. Avoid any vendor that makes unrealistic claims. ----------------------------- >>> The reader is not qualified to evaluate realistic/unrealistic. ----------------------------- No algorithm is unbreakable. Even the best algorithms are breakable using "brute force" (trying every possible key), but if the key size is large enough, this is impractical even with vast amounts of computing power. One-time pads are unbreakable, but they must be implemented perfectly, which is, at best, very difficult. See the next section for a more detailed discussion. ----------------------------- >>> Add: Avoid products that use huge numbers to impress you that it would take massive amounts of time to break them. This is ONLY true under the assumption that the only way to break the system is by exhaustively trying every possible key, and this assumption hass to be proved before the claim is valid. A cryptosystem using a keylength of 50,000 bits theoretically would take 2 raised to the 50,000th power to break (a ridiculously large number) if, AND ONLY IF the algorithm had no weaknesses. The hard part of cryptosystem design is making an algorithm with no weaknesses, such that exhaustive brute-force search is the only method of breaking it, not using long keys. ----------------------------- * One-Time-Pads A vendor might claim the system uses a one-time-pad (OTP), which is theoretically unbreakable. That is, snake-oil sellers will try to capitalize on the known strength of a OTP. It is important to understand that any variation in the implementation means that it is not an OTP, and has nowhere near the security of an OTP. A OTP system is not an algorithm. It works by having a "pad" of random bits in the possession of both the sender and recipient. ----------------------------- >>> Explain what you mean by a "pad" --- using a term which to the newbie may not usually be associated with crypto. Origin being the pads of paper that they used to use etc.etc. ??? ----------------------------- ----------------------------- The message is encrypted using [the next n bits in the pad as they key, where n is the number of bits in the message] >>> as many bits from the key as there are bits in the message. That is, for each bit in the message, there is a random bit from the one-time-pad.<<< ----------------------------- After the bits are used from the pad, they're destroyed, and can never again be used. The bits in the pad must be truly random, generated using a real random source, such as specialized hardware, radioactive decay timings, etc., and not from an algorithm or cipher. Anything else is not a one-time-pad. The vendor may confuse random session keys or initialization vectors with OTPs. * Algorithm or product XXX is insecure Be wary of anything that makes claims that particular algorithms or other products are insecure without backing up those claims (or at least citing references to them). Sometimes attacks are theoretical or impractical (requiring special circumstances or massive computing power running for many years), and it's easy to confuse a layman by mentioning these. * Keys and Passwords The "key" and the "password" are often not the same thing. The "key" generally refers to the actual data used by the cipher, while the "password" refers to the word or phrase the user types in, which the software converts into the key (usually through a process called "hashing" or "key initialization"). >>> Other comments addressed this paragraph. I defer. The reason this is done is because the characters a user is likely to type in do not cover the full range of possible characters. (Such keys would be more redundant and easier for an attacker to guess.) By hashing a key can be made from an arbitrary password that covers the full range of possible keys. It also allows one to use longer words, or phrases and whole sentences as a "passphrase", which is more secure. Anything that restricts users' passwords to something like 10 or 16 or even 32 characters is foolish. If the actual "password" is the cipher's key (rather than hashing it into a key, as explained above), avoid it. If the vendor confuses the distinctions between bits, bytes and characters when discussing the key, avoid this product. Convenience is nice, but be wary of anything that sounds too easy to use. ----------------------------- >>> Instead, try: be wary of any product that overly emphasizes ease-of-use without due attention to its cryptographic strength. ----------------------------- Avoid anything that lets anyone with your copy of the software to access files, data, etc. without having to use some sort of key or passphrase. Avoid anything that doesn't let you generate your own keys (ie, the vendor sends you a key in the mail, or it's embedded in the copy of the software you buy). Avoid anything by a vendor who does not seem to understand the difference between public-key (asymmetric) cryptography and private-key (symmetric) cryptography. * Lost keys and passwords If there's a third-party utility that can crack the software, avoid it. >>> Which - the utility or the crypto? If the vendor claims it can recover lost passwords (without using a key-backup or escrow feature), avoid it. If there is a key-backup or escrow feature, are you in control of the backup, or does the vendor or someone else hold a copy of the key? * Exportable from the USA If the software is made in North America, can it be exported? If the answer is yes, chances are it's not very strong. Strong cryptography is considered munitions in terms of export from the United States, and requires approval from the State Department. Chances are if the software is exportable, the algorithm is weak or it is crackable (hence it was approved for export). If the vendor is unaware of export restrictions, avoid the software: the vendor is not familiar with the state of the art. Because of export restrictions, some legitimate (not-Snake Oil) products may have a freely exportable version for outside of the USA, which is different from a separate US/Canada-only distribution. Also note that just because software has made it outside of North America does not mean that it is exportable: sometimes a utility will be illegally exported and posted on an overseas site. Other Considerations Interface isn't everything: user-friendliness is an important factor, but if the product isn't secure then you're better off with something that is secure (if not as easy to use). No product is secure if it's not used properly. You can be the weakest link in the chain if you use a product carelessly. Do not trust any product to be foolproof, and be wary any product that claims it is. Contributors The following folks have contributed to this FAQ. Jeremey Barrett <jeremey(a)forequest.com> <geeman(a)best.com> Jim Ray <liberty(a)gate.net> Robert Rothenburg Walking-Owl <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> References 1. B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, second edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1996 2. M. Blaze, W. Diffie, R. L. Rivest, B. Schneier, T. Shimomura, E. Thompson, M. Wiener, "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate Commercial Security," available via ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.ps ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---- C Matthew Curtin Last modified: Mon Sep 16 09:51:41 EDT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- -- C Matthew Curtin MEGASOFT, INC Chief Scientist I speak only for myself. Don't whine to anyone but me about anything I say. Hacker Security Firewall Crypto PGP Privacy Unix Perl Java Internet Intranet cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com http://research.megasoft.com/people/cmcurtin/

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Interactive Edition free access ends this week
by The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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