- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: support for "crack DES"
by Omegaman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> NetScape might not hawg the glory, but Bully Billy will trumpet > to the world that HE devised the means, HE directed the breakers, > and MicroSlop is the "benevolent" [read greedy, vicious, corrupt, > threatening predator] organization which "pulled freedom loving > Americans clear from the *very* mouth the the beast." Considering the situation -- considering that RSA has even signed on to this scheme -- I'd have to say that I don't give a rat's ass what Bill Gates claims. If Micro$oft bucks the system, I'll gladly applaud their stand. The situation is not good at all. Cracking DES (whether distributed or through a hardware crack, or both!) seems critical at this point. me -------------------------------------------------------------- Omegaman <mailto:omega@bigeasy.com> PGP Key fingerprint = 6D 31 C3 00 77 8C D1 C2 59 0A 01 E3 AF 81 94 63 Send a message with the text "get key" in the "Subject:" field to get a copy of my public key. --------------------------------------------------------------

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How to Compete under Clipper-3
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> * Even if some industry participants fall for it, the majority will not. > The "deal" is simply not any good for anyone but the Administration. > Expect the same opposition to Clipper III as we saw with Clipper I and II. The difference is that some weak companies will decide to fall for it. These companies may think that two years of 56-bit un-escrowed products (with promises of key escrow in future releases) will be competitive against 40-bit un-escrowed products. They're right, but that's not the competition they will be facing. The right competitive strategy is to build strong crypto using 168-bit Triple-DES, in a country that has a sane government and a respect for privacy. Such products would sell well against 56-bit products or key-escrowed products produced by the weak companies that tried to lean on the government for a competitive edge. If the US government ends up ever imposing import restrictions on crypto, it will be completely clear to everyone that their goal all along has been to restrict the availability of privacy to AMERICANS. The export laws, their continual announcements that "Americans are free to use any crypto they want", and all their preaching about impacts on foreign intelligence would be known as an obvious sham all along. Import restrictions would not be any more Constitutional than export restrictions. The Constitutional right to receive information (in the form of source code) from outside the US will enable companies to bypass any import restrictions that survive Constitutional scrutiny. They can do their crypto development in a free country, ship binaries to most of the world from there, ship source code to the United States, and compile that source code to binaries for local US distribution. None of these actions will violate any US export or import controls that can be Constitutionally imposed. Such development can be done in dozens of countries. Some countries who aren't afraid of their citizens having privacy will find it economically advantageous to remain free, despite US pressure to suppress privacy. A small industry of good cryptographers will grow into a large industry there, as the US pressures the rest of the world to become less free. John

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The New GAK-Clipper Thing will Fail
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Comparing the latest GAK/Clipper III (or is it Clipper IV?) thing to the original Clipper announcement in April 1993, I sense a lot more confusion, a lot more thorny issues, and a lot more vagueness. They just seem more disorganized and less committed than the last time around. Each iteration of Clipper gets less focussed and seems to last a shorter time before the next version is being talked about. A good thing, of course. Some random points: * Unlike with Clipper, where a specification existed and was available within a few weeks for analysis, and where hardware existed (the Mykotronx chips, the AT&T phone), what has been publically presented so far is just a vague commitment to participate. * There seem to be many ways around the new GAK: --superencryption is essentially impossible to stop (e.g., use PGP on text messages, then use the officially-approved GAK--how could this be outlawed?) --the large pool of _existing_ crypto products means people will be using these products for years to come (possibly within GAK wrappers, as just noted)...unless the New World Order (tm) somehow locates, seizes, or otherwise makes criminals out of those who use a once-legal product, how could this be stopped? --the "degrees of freedom" for messages have sharply increased in the last several years: messages inside Web accesses, messages "sent" by posting to message pools (*), direct phone calls, the Net, etc. (* Will posting encrypted messages to the Usenet or world-readable Web sites become a crime? Or will attempts be made to limit distribution of Usenet and access to Web sites? Neither of these seems feasible, but how else could the stated goals of the Administration ("stopping terrorists, etc. from conspiring") be stopped?) (On this point above, yes, I know that there has been no talk of illegalizing the sending of mere encrypted data, only the export of non-GAKked programs. But I think it likely that the LEAs will realize that "criminals" are still conspiring with crypto. One thing they may try is to require that any communication with a non-U.S. site involve GAK. This then raises the Usenet/message pool directly. Since such sites have world-distribution, currently, posting encrypted messages to alt.anonymous.messages or to a mailing list like this necessarily involves export of the messages. It gets complicated to enforce, naturally.) * The Cabal itself seems confused as to what's involved. They seem to be counting on IBM and/or TIS to deliver the solution, and may be just signed on for what they think are reasons of political expediency. * As the IBM scheme gets attacked (in the way Matt Blaze attacked Tessera), as questions are raised about the Key Authorities and their cooperation, and as the _costs_ are revealed....well, I expect further crumbling. (On the "costs" issue, running these Key Authorities, staffing them, complying with subpoenas (and who will _fight_ the subpoenas?), etc., will not be cheap. For software products like Navigator and Explorer, that are either free or very cheap, just who will pay for this infrastructure? Someone at the EPIC Pro-CODE conference in Palo Alto a few months ago--I forget whom--presented calculations of just how expensive a "key recovery" infrastructure could be. Will it cost $50 to send a message to a foreign site? Better to use message pools! :-}) I apologize for the random nature of my comments here. I just see so many points of attack, so many ways to skirt the intentions of GAK, and so much ambivalent commentary from the companies involved, that I am convinced this whole thing will crumble. Unless a "major terrorist incident" galvanizes the effort, it looks to start falling apart almost immediately under the onslaught of Cypherpunks, hackers, other governments (think France wants the USG having access to their traffic?), and the "crypto anarchy" of nations whose borders are not even speed bumps. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: The New GAK-Clipper Thing will Fail
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:11 AM 10/3/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >Comparing the latest GAK/Clipper III (or is it Clipper IV?) thing to the >original Clipper announcement in April 1993, I sense a lot more confusion, >a lot more thorny issues, and a lot more vagueness. They just seem more >disorganized and less committed than the last time around. Each iteration >of Clipper gets less focussed and seems to last a shorter time before the >next version is being talked about. A good thing, of course. Sort of like a "political" version of Zeno's paradox? B^) > >Some random points: >--the large pool of _existing_ crypto products means people will be using >these products for years to come (possibly within GAK wrappers, as just >noted)...unless the New World Order (tm) somehow locates, seizes, or >otherwise makes criminals out of those who use a once-legal product, how >could this be stopped? And I suspect that there will be large numbers of people using non-GAK simply as a protest. Trying to convict even one of them will be difficult; the government has to admit that they're not doing anything illegal, etc. Yet, if the gov't FAILS to prosecute them, that'll destroy an law requiring GAK. [snip] >(On the "costs" issue, running these Key Authorities, staffing them, >complying with subpoenas (and who will _fight_ the subpoenas?), I think it would be appropriate to contact each of the companies which have publicly signed on to this most recent propsal (Clipper 3.XX? Clipper IV?) and point out that (if they still won't revoke their approval) they should publicly and irrevocably commit to challenge each and every key subpoena with a full legal challenge (to the SC if necessary), INCLUDING informing and participation of the key owner/user, with all of his attorney fees paid for by an insurance policy issued specifically for the purpose. This process would probably take at least months, if not years. (This is important, because I believe that wiretaps have set a false precedent: AT+T (before breakup) and local telcos afterwards, being monopolies, had no motivation to challenge wiretap orders, and the practice was to not inform those tapped, perhaps not even after the tap was removed. There is no reason to assume, however, that key-escrow systems should follow that precedent, because the relationship between AT+T and government was not an "arm's length" one. Presumably, key-escrow companies should be entitled, no REQUIRED to verify the legitimacy of any key-release. "It's only fair!" ) The resulting legal atmosphere would become so distasteful to the Dept. of Injustice that it would make key escrow useless as a practical tool, even though it would exist as a technicality. If the DOI objected, companies need merely say the magic words "Richard Jewell" and all ordinary citizens would recognize the problem. The point, of course, is NOT to encourage these companies to support Clipper IV. Rather, goal is to suggest to them a "poison pill" which would make their cooperation meaningless in the end, while at the same time giving them a 2-year free 56-bit export. Think of it as a monkey-wrench they can throw into the works. We can use such a proposal as a sort-of "loyalty to freedom and their fellow citizens oath" because any company which refused such a REASONABLE protection to ordinary citizens would be, in effect, giving their middle finger to the public. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: The Right to Keep and Bear Crypto
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:39 AM 10/3/96 -0400, Mullen Patrick wrote: >This may (will?) limit the products which are produced by large corporations, >as their need for a single, globally distributable product is respected. >However, smaller companies who have neither the desire nor finances to >distribute their product on a global scale will be unaffected. Shareware/ >freeware products will also be unaffected (unless someone from another >country pulls it off a website, or similar means). > >However, all of this is irrelevant, because I must say, Tim May has the >proper idea -- We may have the right to bear crypto, but the government >has the right to limit the types/amounts of crypto we bear. > >** Success in this matter is classifying crypto as speech ** >Patrick While I agree we shouldn't push the crypto/arms connection, on the other hand I think we can push BACK: If the government tries to equate crypto with arms,take the position that while we disagree with this equation, to the extent the government is using it, it must take the good with the bad and accept the "keep and bear arms" interpretation literally. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RSA's position on espionage-enabled crypto.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RSA has put up a 'position statement' on clipper 4 at their home page at www.rsa.com. They're not rejecting it, but are clearly not wildly pro-GAK either. It's clearly early days yet. Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Re: Clipper III on the table
by dustman＠athensnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ernest Hua <hua(a)chromatic.com> wrote: > I predict, therefore, Netscape and RSA would NOT capitulate to this > latest bitter carrot. Huh? RSA has already gone over to the dark side. According to http://www.rsa.com/PRESSBOX/releases/keyrecov.htm: "The recently announced Key Recovery Alliance, of which RSA is a part, ..."

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Margaret Milner Richardson loses her breakfast...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the Wall Street Journal Wednesday October 2, Page 1: Use of the internet to attract tax-dodgers rings alarm bells at the IRS. The rapidly expanding new worlds of the internet and electronic money are stirring deep concern at the IRS. "We know that some foriegn banks are now using the internet to solicit new customers with promises of complete anonymity and a haven from all taxes," IRS commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson said. She said this issue is being "carefully monitored" by tax administrators around the world. Ms. Richardson, in a recent speech, cited a world-wide-web advertisement offering a "one-of-a-kind book" covering topics such as, "Banking in Silence" and offering information on setting up an offshore trust that "could include protection from a large IRS assessment." Ms. Richardson's reaction: "I almost take that personally." Another ad touts "excellent interest rates, offered in a stable, tax-free environment...Clients communicate with the bank any time from anywhere via the internet." Ms. Richardson said: "How would you like to be responsible for administering tax laws and have to read these ads over breakfast?" Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "'Bart Bucks' are not legal tender." -- Punishment, 100 times on a chalkboard, for Bart Simpson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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The John Doe rebellion
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have some direct insight as to how airlines interpret the new travel provisions and what they are reasonably able to accomplish in improving safety via identity and luggage checks. I was wondering if with gov't trying to compile dossiers on travellers it might be possible for a large enough percentage of frequent air travellers to assume the same identity (e.g., John or Jane Doe). If so, a service could be established to book airline reservations under a single credit card for Does so as to confound automated tracking systems. Eventually, Does could arrange to exchange IDs (if their ages and descriptions matched) and even credit cards (again assuming equivalence) to really monkey wrench things. -- Steve

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Re: Public Schools
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:40 PM 9/25/96, Jay Gairson wrote: >> A minor point: An 800 SAT or Achievement score does _not_ mean "no problems >> missed." There is some threshold for the percentage of right answers, which >> varies from year to year and from test to test, above which the score is >> marked "800." Don't ask me why they do this. (*) > >They did it because, the American students, where scoring worse than the >Japanese students. And the with the 1600 they got a copy of the >questiosn and answers, and the questions they missed, they didn't miss any. >So... Nonsense. Japanese students were not taking the CEEB and SAT tests in the 1950s, when the test methodologies were established. (As a point of fact, the Japanese have their own grueling exams, which bear no resemblance to the CEEB and SAT tests.) Nor were the number of Japanese-American students taking the test sufficiently plentiful in the 1950s and 60s to affect the methodology. So, this is your chance to present your evidence that the scoring methodology was changed in response to Japanese students doing better than American students. >ok >buh bye > >Erp On second thought.... --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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