- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Deana Holmes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 2 Oct 96 at 8:47, John C. Randolph wrote: > > Moroni says: > > >I never cease to be surprised by the interest that gentiles show > >in working mormon communities while totally neglecting their own > >failing areas. > > I don't do a lot of nit-picking on this mailing list, but: > > I am a Jew. *You* are a gentile. So are all the rest of the mormons. > Get this point straight. Uh, in Utah, Jews are Gentiles. No lie. Deana Deana M. Holmes April 1996 poster child for clueless $cientology litigiousness alt.religion.scientology archivist since 2/95 mirele(a)xmission.com

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:55 PM 10/1/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 8:32 PM -0800 10/1/96, jim bell wrote: >>At 09:39 AM 10/1/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >>>(Else what's to stop Giant Corporation from using Non-GAKked software >>>within the U.S., which is perfectly legal (under the "voluntary" system), >>>but then "happening" to have their foreign branches and customers obtain >>>"bootleg" versions at their end? All it takes is a single copy to get out, >>>and be duplicated a zillion times. Voila, interoperability, with the only >>>"crime" being the first export...which is essentially impossible to stop, >>>for so many reasons we mention so often. Conclusion: Government must make >>>this very mode illegal, perhaps by making it a conspiracy to thwart the >>>export laws....) >> >>If this solution were really practical, it would have been tried already. > >And just what would you call PGP? The "impractical" I was referring to is the impracticality of the government implementing and enforcing restrictions on communications using (non-GAK) crypto. The only place this seems to exist is in ham radio. The crypto itself is eminently practical, as the PGP example makes absolutely clear. >Long before the MIT deal, people in the U.S. were using their "OK in >America" (not counting RSADSI's issues) software to communicate with >"illegally exported" copies in foreign lands. > >This model--leaking a U.S. version and then communicating freely between >U.S. sites and the "leakee" sites--worked for PGP. I believe the USG fears >this will happen again. > >Hence my speculation that they may try to illegalize the mere communication >with an offending product. "I predict they won't be able to do it." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Richard Coleman writes: > >: I've always wondered why large companies just don't write some type of >: standards document for crypto to interoperate, and then have each >: foreign branch write (or contract out) their own version. I don't see how >: this violates export laws in any way. > >The definition of ``software'' in the ITAR includes ``algortihms'' and >``logic flow'', so I suspect that the ODTC wouuld claim that the >standards are software that cannot be ``exported'' without a licnese. No, I don't think they'd be able to stretch things that far. If designs for software merely defined a plug-in interface (not specifically referencing crypto) it would be very difficult to prevent. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

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Re: FW: FYI-WARNING (fwd) Zip300 Trojan Horse?
by Otto Matic 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is this for real? If not, forgive me for posting this to your list. >From:Matthew Hayton <mhayton(a)vt.edu> >Subject: FW: FYI-WARNING (fwd) >Sender: owner-sfraves(a)hyperreal.com >Precedence: bulk >>From: "Bayless, Marilyn J. Capt" <BAYLESMJ(a)CISF.AF.MIL> >>To: "hayton, todd" <mhayton> >>Subject: FW: FYI-WARNING (fwd) >>Date: Wed, 02 Oct 96 11:40:00 MDT >>Encoding: 63 TEXT >> >> >> >> ---------- >>From: Bailey, Craig E. Mr. >>To: Bosse, Roger H., Civ; Ferribee, George, Civ; Caracillo, Mike R. Mr.; >>Fleming, Kirk Mr.; Guthrie, Michael P. Mr.; Kounter, Mike J. Mr.; Allen, >>Scott C., Capt\DET1; Thomas, Christopher 2Lt; 'Kelch, William Mr.'; Einmo, >>Kent Maj; Myers, Gale Maj; 'Gribble, TSgt (SEIT)'; 'Manas, Capt (SEIT)'; >>SSSGp (All CISF Bldg Pers) >>Subject: FW: FYI-WARNING (fwd) >>Date: Wednesday, October 02, 1996 11:33AM >> >> >> >> ---------- >>From: Sanders, Timothy SrA >>Sent: Wednesday, October 02, 1996 9:00 AM >>To: Gebhardt, Dean MSgt; Potter, Rodney MSgt; Bailey, Craig E. Mr.; >>Guthrie, Michael P. Mr.; Armstrong, Harry SSgt; Drent, Shirley Ms DoD; >>McFadden-Garnier, Jacquelin MS; Slomski, John MSgt; Burgtorf, Christina >> SSgt; Brown, James TSgt; Malloy, Archie Mr DoD; Nelson, Andrew A1C; >>Lewis Benjamin SSgt; Scheer, Brian TSgt; Bundrick, Christopher SSgt; >>Mullens, Carolyn Ms. DoD; Wohr, Charles TSgt; Hohle, Duane Sgt; Mizell, >>David SrA; Morgan, Dwayne SSgt; Holland, Gregory SSgt; Deeney, James >> TSgt; Garn, John MSgt; Hilyard, John SrA; Sumner, Jennifer Amn; Dean, >>Laura TSgt.; Dozier, Larry SSgt; Estensen, Michael SSgt; Heckle, Megan >> Ms.; Imel, Michael SrA; Michniewicz, Mark MSgt; Schueckler, Michael J. >>A1C; Mantell, Patrick SrA; Beckwith, Ralph Mr DoD; Daniel, Shirley SSgt; >>Lopez, Steven MSgt; Dinsmore, Tina SrA; Sanders, Timothy SrA; Thompson, >>William TSgt; Burkett, Brian SrA; Richardson, Jackie MSgt; Shelton, Jay >> MSgt; Martinez, Jessie SrA; Ooley, Matt TSgt; Godfroy, Rainette Ms DoD; >>Herndon, Richard Mr. DoD; Timm, Roseangeli TSgt; Abernathy, Samuel MSgt; >>Greenwood, James SSgt; Young, Malcolm MSgt; Bookout, Bruce Capt; Stith, >>Carolyn SSgt; Feller, Dean SMSgt; Lemoine, David TSgt; Johnson, Fred >> SrA; Wilkinson, Heather Capt; Dias, John SSgt; Hewitt, James SrA; >>Bianchi, Kevin SrA; McDowell, Michael TSgt; Wilson, Steven Capt; >>Armstrong, Connie Ms DoD; Akin, Henry TSgt.; Murray, Mark SMSgt; Parsons, >>Vicki Capt; Brown, Johnnie TSgt; Floyd Gregory SSgt >>Subject: FW: FYI-WARNING (fwd) >> >>Received this on a courtesy copy this morning, once again some of you may >>get duplicates, but this needs to go far and wide. >> >>SrA Sanders >>21 Unit Security >> ---------- >>> DO NOT DOWNLOAD ANY FILE NAMED PKZIP300 REGARDLESS OF EXTENSION. >>> >>> A NEW Trojan Horse Virus has emerged on the internet with the name >>> PKZIP300.ZIP, so named as to give the impression that this file is >>a >>> new version of the PKZIP software used to "zip" compressed files. >>> >>> DO NOT DOWNLOAD THIS FILE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES!! >>> if you install or expand the file, the virus will wipe your hard >>disk >>> >>> clean and affect modems at 14.4 and higher. This is an extremely >>> destructive virus and there is NOT yet a way of cleaning this one >>> up. >>> >>> PLEASE PASS THIS ON TO ANYONE YOU KNOW. >> >> > > otto =-=-=-=-=- Otto Matic "Fuckin' A, Miller!" Bud, Repo Man --------------------------------------------------------- Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com ---------------------------------------------------------

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One way to handle the problem mentioned below is this: Using your GAK-approved encryption, send a note that contains a PGP encrypted body (or insert your crypto of choice here.) What this does is makes it look like you're sending a proper GAK only note to folks who are checking headers and such. If they actually decrypt it (with the proper court order), they will see that you've got more encryption inside, and drag your butt off to court and try to make you give up your key etc... If they decrypt it (and they have no proper court order) they either go away because they can't call you on it, or they throw you on the bad-guy list, or drag you off to area 51 and beat you with rubber hoses and some such. Point being, You wouldn't look like you were doing anything wrong unless they got as far as decrypting your messages. If you're legally busted, your messages are secure. If they illegally decrypt your messages, your messages are secure, and you may have some recourse for suing the feds. Ryan ---------- Previous Message ---------- To: tcmay cc: smith, cypherpunks From: smith @ SCTC.COM (Rick Smith) @ smtp Date: 10/01/96 04:03:10 PM Subject: Re: How might new GAK be enforced? Tim May asks: : Any other ideas on how the government plans to enforce GAK, to make GAK the : overwhelmingly-preferred solution? The problem seems somewhat analogous to the software copy protection problem and maybe the enfocement will be similar: make "examples" of a few high profile offenders who are exchanging blatantly un-GAKed traffic with foreigners. This assumes they fine tune the law to make such behavior illegal without having to prove you yourself exported the stuff to them. Wonder what the Supremes will say to that. But that's not the end of the story. If there is lots of GAK encrypted traffic flowing about, then encrypted traffic in general is no longer noteworthy. So as long as your traffic looks like GAK, you won't be hassled until they try to read your traffic. So it's possible that products will appear that use pseudo-GAK protocols -- they look just like their GAKed cousins but the GAK fields contain plausiable garbage instead of keys. It could even turn out to be a vendor "quality control" thing -- oops, the GAK was supposed to work but... You couldn't do that with Clipper (except via Matt Blaze's brute forcing of the LEAF checksum) because the crypto wouldn't decrypt a packet with an invalid LEAF checksum. Since it was a sealed hardware module, implementers had no choice but to play by those rules. There's no such enforcable limitation on commercial software implementations. Rick.

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Re: ITAR satellite provision
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:40 AM 10/2/96 -0700, Greg Broiles wrote: >At 09:31 PM 10/1/96 -0700, Steve Schear wrote: > >>Does anyone on the list have the exact ITAR reg. text relating to the >>exemption for space-launched crypto? > >I think you're talking about the definition of "export", located at 22 CFR >120.10: > > "Export means, for purposes of this subchapter: [snip] >* A launch vehicle or payload shall not, by reason of the launching >* of such vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of this >* subchapter. Most of the requirements of this subchapter relate > only to exports, as defined above. However, for certain limited > purposes, the controls of this subchapter apply to sales and other > transfers of defense articles and defense services (see, e.g., Sec. > 126.1) of this subchapter." Okay, everybody, call Estes! We've got some crypto to export...er...launch! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Tim May asks: > >: Any other ideas on how the government plans to enforce GAK, to make GAK the >: overwhelmingly-preferred solution? > >The problem seems somewhat analogous to the software copy protection >problem and maybe the enfocement will be similar: make "examples" of a >few high profile offenders who are exchanging blatantly un-GAKed >traffic with foreigners. This assumes they fine tune the law to make >such behavior illegal without having to prove you yourself exported >the stuff to them. Wonder what the Supremes will say to that. Another possible monkey wrench is to send non-GAK messages containg random data. Since the entropy of encrypted and RNG data should be identical you can always maintain the messages contain nothing at all and cannot produce a decrypt key since none exists. > >But that's not the end of the story. If there is lots of GAK encrypted >traffic flowing about, then encrypted traffic in general is no longer >noteworthy. So as long as your traffic looks like GAK, you won't be >hassled until they try to read your traffic. See above comment. > >So it's possible that products will appear that use pseudo-GAK >protocols -- they look just like their GAKed cousins but the GAK >fields contain plausiable garbage instead of keys. It could even >turn out to be a vendor "quality control" thing -- oops, the GAK >was supposed to work but... > >You couldn't do that with Clipper (except via Matt Blaze's brute >forcing of the LEAF checksum) because the crypto wouldn't decrypt a >packet with an invalid LEAF checksum. Since it was a sealed hardware >module, implementers had no choice but to play by those rules. There's >no such enforcable limitation on commercial software implementations. Another casuality could be anonymity. Once GAK is in place, look for a requirement for Clipper cards in order to access ISPs. -- Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

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Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[But how does one undo the dangerous criminals without violating the privacy rights of everyone else? --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 10:30:43 -0700 (PDT) From: Joe Shea <joeshea(a)netcom.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late If you become a dangerous criminal, Declan, I think law enforcement does have the right to use key escrow to undo you. That has nothing to do with spying. You need to be a little more selective about your language, and to make distinctions a little more rationally than you do. Best, Joe Shea Editor-in-Chief The American Reporter joeshea(a)netcom.com http://www.newshare.com:9999 On Wed, 2 Oct 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote: > BTW, Joe, I'm still waiting for your response to my comments on why > your endorsement of key escrow (GAK) is braindead. Or do you still > think that the Feds should have the right to spy on my conversations, > just like you thought that "porn isn't speech?" > > -Declan > > > On Wed, 2 Oct 1996, Joe Shea wrote: > > > Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 09:47:59 -0700 (PDT) > > From: Joe Shea <joeshea(a)netcom.com> > > To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > > Subject: Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late > > > > > > > > Declan, how does your list work? Do you only publish comments > > that agree with you? I didn't see my first two, and this one only came > > with your response. Is this your version of freedom of the press, or what? > > > > Joe Shea > > Editor-in-Chief > > The American Reporter > > joeshea(a)netcom.com > > http://www.newshare.com:9999 > > > > > > On Wed, 2 Oct 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > > Date: Tue, 1 Oct 1996 20:19:16 -0700 (PDT) > > > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > > > To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu > > > Cc: joeshea(a)netcom.com > > > Subject: Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late > > > > > > [Joe, this may be yet another area where we disagree. It represents a > > > power grab by law enforcement; the infrastructure is prone to failure > > > and can be compromised; it's more government meddling and coercion and > > > more restrictions on free speech; the Fed bureaucrats controlling this > > > are vulnerable to special-interest lobbying; the Constitution gives > > > the Federal government no right to impose such restrictions; the FBI > > > has demonstrated that we can't trust the Feds with our most personal > > > information; it violates an absolute right to privacy; and it's > > > technically impractical for a good number of applications. --Declan] > > > > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > > Date: Tue, 1 Oct 1996 15:57:51 -0700 (PDT) > > > From: Joe Shea <joeshea(a)netcom.com> > > > To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > > > Cc: fight-censorship > > > Subject: Re: FC: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late > > > > > > > > > Declan's most recent piece makes much more sense than the earlier > > > one. He is quite correct in emphasizing the future vulnerability of the > > > encryption logarithms rather than centering on whether or not terrorists > > > might use them. By making them impossible to crack without the key, and > > > permitting the key to be available to appropriate law enforcement > > > authorities when absolutely necessary, everyone's real needs are > > > satisfied, I think. I enjoyed this report a lot. > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Joe Shea > > > Editor-in-Chief > > > The American Reporter > > > joeshea(a)netcom.com > > > http://www.newshare.com:9999 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

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Re: ITAR satellite provision
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:40 AM 10/2/96 -0700, I wrote: >I think you're talking about the definition of "export", located at 22 CFR >120.10: ^^^^^^ but upon closer inspection it looks like the House of Representatives' WWW-accessible version that I looked it up in is out of date. (geez.) The more current version is located at 22 CFR 120.17; there are some wording changes in the definition of export but the exemption for launch vehicles and payloads is unchanged. ("(6) A launch vehicle or payload shall not, by reason of the launching of such vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of this subchapter.") -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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[SPAM] More "fuckhead" e-mail from Timmy May and his young friends
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy May posts inane rants with no crypto-relevance to this mailing list and attributes nonsense to people who never said it. Therefore he fully deserves every virtual fart being emitted in his general direction. >Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 12:16:17 -0700 (PDT) >From: "Z.B." <zachb(a)netcom.com> >Sender: "Z.B." <zachb(a)netcom.com> >Reply-To: "Z.B." <zachb(a)netcom.com> >Subject: Fuckhead ranting >To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> >In-Reply-To: <B1k6uD3w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> >Message-Id: <Pine.3.89.9610021109.A23982-0100000@netcom> >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII > >On Wed, 2 Oct 1996, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > >> Timmy May lies, rants, posts off-topic, and pollutes the cypherpunks >> list... >etc, etc, ad nauseum, ad infinitum. > > >Boy, you just don't know when to shut the fuck up! You are *THE* single >problem with this list today. Probably the reason why "most of the good >people left the list" (so you claim) is because of *YOUR* stupid ranting >about Tim May, which is largely undeserved. Do the list a favor and get >the hell off it. > >All further messages from you will be killfiled. > > >Zach Babayco > >zachb(a)netcom.com <-------finger for PGP public key >http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Park/4127 >----- >If you need to know how to set up a mail filter or defend against >emailbombs, send me a message with the phrase "get helpfile" in the >SUBJECT header. I have several useful FAQ's and documents available. > >

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