- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: European Commission on "Illegal and harmful content on the Internet"
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >A recently released European Commission Communication on "Illegal >and harmful content on the Internet" may prefigure the nature of >coming European Union regulatory initiatives concerning the net. >This Communication was in response to a 27 September resolution >by the Telecommunication Council on "preventing the dissemination >of illegal content on the Internet, in particular child >pornography." The document reportedly reflects what will be >ongoing work to "present practical measures in time for the next >Telecommunications Council on 28 November 1996." > >The Communication describes its aims as: > >firstly to describe briefly the different types of illegal and >harmful content, > >secondly to examine the technical context in which action can be >taken to deal with illegal and harmful content, > >and finally to suggest a number of practical measures designed to >be rapidly implemented > >Among the points of interest, it states with emphasis that >"additional international cooperation is required to avoid 'safe >havens' for documents contrary to general rules of criminal law." >With respect to anonymous communications it discusses proposed >"measures to close known loopholes and improve traceability and >that anonymous remailers record details of identity." > >As is typical of these agendas, the devil will be in the evolving >details of enforcement. It looks like 1997 will be a busy year >for proponents of greater state control over internet content >both here and abroad. If they can conjure up enough sufficiently >compelling bogeymen, it could be a very successful one for them >as well. > It looks as if a functioning AP system can't be here any too soon. I can't wait to bet that these sorts of thought-crime restriction won't be seen as reasonable.

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[NOISE::SECURITY] Disabled ports in Navigator
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was thinking about how to fix a sendmail program for our server when the (most likely unoriginal) thought cam to me: why not use your web broser as a telnet tool? You could embed CRLFs into the request field and the receiving program would just throw the GET /[etc] out like I messed up or something. I could then add subsequent logins & commands to my heart's content (or the string length of that particular browser's request field). Being behind a firewall, I tend to think of these things. The only problem would be with the fact that no EOL is ever sent, but with a good browser that displays as content is streamed, you wouldn't have to worry about that. Like I said, I doubt it's original because when I tried to do it in Navigator I get a Sorry, Access to the port number given has been disabled for security reasons. error dialog. I got this for all of the obvious ports (21,25,110, etc). I only have 3.0 on my machine, so I don't know if it works with previous versions. MSIE3 doesn't disable the ports, but it doesn't start displaying anything (it suffers from the stupidity of not displaying as it streams). Has anyone else personally tried this? My original idea was to see my home email, with something like: http://mail.here.com:110/user%20me%0D%0Apass [... etc] Any comments, suggestions, etc? Rick Osborne / C++ VB Pascal HTML VRML Java / osborne(a)gateway.grumman.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The NSA is now funding research not only in cryptography, but in all areas of advanced mathematics. If you'd like a circular describing these new research opportunities, just pick up your phone, call your mother, and ask for one.

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[NOISE] I never knew that Dimitri Vulis was a net.legend
by Mark O. Aldrich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While the message blew by a little while ago (and I didn't save it), someone had posted a URL with information about Dimitri's sordid/alleged past on the Net. At roughly the same time, I ran across (by accident) a URL that lists Dimitri as a "net.legend" and offers yet another perspective. Apparently, Dimitri is far more well known that any of us (at least me) gave him credit for. The notion that the idiom "dandruff covered" is indicative of anti-semitism is one passage that I found rather amusing. Check it out for yourself at http://www.math.uiuc.edu/~tskirvin/home/legends/legends3.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |some people get by | Mark Aldrich | |with a little understanding | GRCI INFOSEC Engineering | |some people get by | maldrich(a)grci.com | |with a whole lot more | MAldrich(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil| | -- Sisters of Mercy | | |_______________________________________________________________________| |The author is PGP Empowered. Public key at: finger maldrich(a)grci.com | | The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author | | and my employer gets no credit for them whatsoever. | -------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to key-esc
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I haven't seen the technical papers behind the postings you've made to the net, but the overall approach sounds very similar to "Clipper II", the Software Key Encryption work that the TIS people (Steve Walker?) and Dorothy Denning were touting a year or so ago. It wasn't in your references, and it's clearly close enough to be worth your attention. The design was interesting - it chose a set of public and symmetric key encryption that allows the recipient to validate the sessionkey-encrypted-to-key-copy-holder*. A not-highly-technical description of the TIS CKE Commercial Key Escrow system is at http://www.tis.com/docs/products/cke/present.html, particularly present9b.html. It's worth reading for the appalling graphics alone :-) I don't seem to have a copy of the technical description anywhere. <IMG href="http://www.tis.com/docs/products/cke/pres7a.gif"> A major capability that was missing from Walker's SKE work is the ability to split the copied* key into two or more parts, all of which are need to recover the session key, while making it possible to validate that the pieces do add up to the session key. (This was also missing from the Clipper chip in hardware, which pretended to do it in the master key setting process.) Can you extend the approaches you're using to allow an outside party, or at least the recipient, to validate that the two parts of the copied key contain the complete session key? [* I'm using the terms "copied key" and "Key copy holder" to refer to the copy of the key that you're giving to some third party and the third party. The term "escrow" is generally not applicable to the applications that transmit a copy of the key to some third party, and the technologies involved don't specify, communicate, or enforce conditions for access. TIS's CKE does at least cart around a 32-bit user-defined string for specifying recovery conditions, but there's not technical enforcement. ] # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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Production of ALPHACIPHER for Windows 95 and DOS Cancelled!
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may have already been posted, but I found it interesting... from: http://www.aa.net/cyber-survival-hq/ Development of the ALPHACIPHER product line has been voluntarily cancelled due to the possibility of non-compliance of users of ALPHACIPHER with the new key escrow law. Every key created by a user that would encrypt messages for international correspondence would have to be registered with the US Government. Cyber-Survival-HQ cannot insure that the users of ALPHACIPHER would voluntarily comply with this new law, and so ALPHACIPHER is hereby withdrawn from the marketplace. ALPHACIPHER currently has no built-in key generation function, and the proposed release of an ALPHACIPHER key generator has been terminated. All purchasers of ALPHACIPHER are entitled to a complete refund, and this has already been done. The New ADFGVX cipher is still offered for sale, as it is a breakable cipher, at least in theory.

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Re: DES cracker.
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 16:30 10/17/96 +0100, Adam Back wrote: > >[added cc cypherpunks also] > >Sameer Parekh <sameer(a)c2.org> writes: >> Peter Trei <trei(a)process.com> writes: >> > Ideally, this should be a DEMO case of a real world encrypted >> > application, in which we have a cryptotext, and a known plaintext, >> > each at least one 8-byte block long. >> >> I'd like to get in touch with a bank who can provide us some >> sample ciphertext for an ATM transaction or something like that. I >> initially thought we should hit SWIFT, but that would be very >> illegal. =) > >If someone can dig up a selection of banking protocols (some of these >things must be standardised), perhaps we can simulate the same thing >without the legal implications. > >Of course you'd need the person constructing the challenge to be >trustworthy to the tune of $10k, or whatever the prize fund pans out >to be. For that matter the NSA, or anyone else with a hardware >breaker would be able to cheat, but then they help our cause, which is >to demonstrate how weak DES is :-) > Tell me what you need. A large part of my job is providing hardware security modules to banks to secure (among other things) their ATM networks (Automated Teller MAchines, not Async Transfer Mode). Do you need PIN encryption formats, transmission message protocols, or what? Just LMK. G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP 2.6.2 public key available at http://www.pb.net/~wizard | | and on a plethora of key servers around the world. | | Key ID = 0E818EC1 | | Fingerprint = A6 7B 67 D7 E9 96 37 7D E7 16 BD 5E F4 5A B2 E4 | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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[NOISE] About piracy & key recovery / hacked pages & Clinton-Gore
by scrappo.reverb＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmmm... let's see... At about the same time I see people talking about major software/hardware companies going into the key recovery biz and piracy sites _not_ getting taken off of servers (SPA). Piracy. Software companies. Don't they have a common bond somewhere? Wouldn't it be ironic if a rash of piracy occurred with said companies products being pirated? I also noticed two other parallels: Hacked web pages and (although not here) the Clinton/Gore re-election. Hmm... Didn't somebody say something about the real Dole page getting a lot of hits? Maybe the Clinton page gets a lot of hits too. Wouldn't that be a hoot if somebody hacked their page and changed it to something more meaningful, say, how they are pushing the terribly dangerous key-recovery project. Even a subtle hack, such as putting a link to national and international sites carrying PGP, would have an effect. In the true spirit of the subject, I am not responsible. err... I am not responsible if this happens. Food for thought/no need to reply.

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Re: Production of ALPHACIPHER Snake Oil Cancelled!
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> : At 9:11 PM -0700 10/17/96, ! Drive wrote: : >This may have already been posted, but I found it interesting... : > : >from: http://www.aa.net/cyber-survival-hq/ : > : > Development of the ALPHACIPHER product line has been voluntarily : >cancelled : >due to the possibility of : > non-compliance of users of ALPHACIPHER with the new key : >escrow : >law. : : : And just which _law_ might that be? Care to name an Act? Or even a Bill? I don't know, I'm only affiliated by the ISP, goto the page and find a mailto link and ask the owner. : : Come to think of it, just what the hell is "Alphacipher," and why should we : care? : : : > ALPHACIPHER currently has no built-in key generation function, and the : >proposed release of an : > ALPHACIPHER key generator has been terminated. All purchasers of ALPHACIPHER : >are entitled to a complete : > refund, and this has already been done. : : Were there any actual purchasers? : : > The New ADFGVX cipher is still offered for sale, as it is a breakable : >cipher, at least in theory. Why would one want to purchase something advertised as breakable? 'course advertising that its not breakable would would keep me away also. : : Ah, yes, now I understand. Sounds like just a new marketing ploy for the : same old snake oil. : : --Tim May

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Writing A Remailer
by William Davidheiser 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all. I want to try to write a re-mailer that will run on my ISP's UNIX shell account. I am familiar with Windows socket programming (C/C++) but have never done anything in the UNIX environment. Any pointers on where I should start? Thx a bunch --- billd

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Re: More threats from FOTM (Friends of Timmy May)
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 15 Oct 1996 21:54:20 -0700 (PDT), Sandy Sandfort wrote: >Does anyone remember the Russian word for "uncultured"? It was >in one or two of Tom Clancy's books. nekulturny? # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" "That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can change them." --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review editorial)

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