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Re: Hello from the Brotherhood
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: darkened-node(a)geocities.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Nov 11 12:20:44 1996 > Hello to everyone from the Brotherhood of Darkness > Oh, joy, just what we need..... How about if you folks go off and do your thing, and leave us to ours? Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMoapqMVrTvyYOzAZAQFDSQQAoiPhXhSOSJR7nKcCrkiVhue1tIiI2q7n GLZlR5jaWZGV3ONJikWINt09mZqyaAZjuK3hbPqVNJnICOY8LtPYn0Z39oisxacO Kq+WHSavMRHstWqUm/sbknQOW24TINqi1NQs0Rn8nMrOTCYYxcugtmiLrSpgTNJa dt9DMKtOKAk= =AUie -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Rarity: Crypto question enclosed
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: mianigand(a)outlook.net, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Nov 11 12:31:25 1996 > > My simple question is regarding key/certificate distribution: > > > > Is there any particular reason that such can't be > accomplished via > > on-line lists, and made available via a service on a port, using > standard > > (textual) commands, like mail and such are now? > > It's possible to have a key-server listen on a port and accept > requests, then it would > fork a process, process the result, and return an answer set. > > But how many CPU cycles would it take for a machine to process a > request, ie going through > 1000 of keys? I am not exactly sure, it took a long while on my > pentium. > > In my opinion, if I were to run a key server as a service, with > clients connecting and requesting a key > it shouldn't take more than a minute to get a responce. > Agreed - a proper search algorithm should yield an answer in a few seconds, at most. > > The things that come to mind are a 'client' request for a > key, a > > 'client' submission of a key, an external host requesting a key > exchange, > > and the host itself requesting a key exchange with another system > (only > > new/changed keys being swapped). > > Had the exact same idea, but came up with an interesting concept. When > a person submits a key, a PGP process is spawned yeilding the > following information 1.) The name (peponmc(a)cris.com) 2.) The real > name (Michael Peponis) 3.) The key size 4.) Creation date of the key > 5.) Key finger print > > This information, along with the acutal key would be inserted into a > SQL Database table > > With a structure similar to this ... <deletia> ... The reason I brought the idea up here was in the hope that others on the CP list could help work out the fussy details of the protocol: what info would need to be included for what types of exchanges, what port(s) would be good to work with, etc. Platform/implementation would be subject to considerable variation - but the idea would survive (hopefully :-) > > It's not that hard, it's performance that's more of an issue. The > beauty of my approch would be that initially, there would be alot of > "Add" requests, resulting in many PGP processes running on the box, > but eventually, they would tapper off. Again, implementation on any particular platform using any particular OS would be up to the afficionados of said platforms/OS's. I'm more interested in the CP list coming up with the protocol/standards. Dave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMoasIsVrTvyYOzAZAQEkTAP+JQtMdr5x+Wz4s6SXchgA4ow3+P9WLpzs JpjXRbNeHspJ2btlAe4pSgRqSp9oygqJ6Nxpa6DFOC4uB6sl3NaOw8tzcVVJm8GN +QsGP3KBoeTtRh1xE5yUsFoWmGWSqtDLLhu7bU34TaryLBU/Hvj2mOQXqwXhQlvE FhE5VETJJ2o= =LG7t -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:51 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: ... >In practice I suspect that good stego is hard. You don't have to be >right every time when you look for it, just some of the time. When >you see packets that seem kind of funny to you, the judge issues you >a warrant and you search the suspect's house and computer very carefully. >If stego is in use, the software that generated it can be found. Then >you hand out a life sentence. ... I have heard of trojan horses as being destructive little programs that are disguised as some other application. This is most certainly true. A scenario for you. The police gets that court order and they raid my house. They confiscate my files. They look over every piece of software. Alas, they find nothing, although there do seem to be some nice games. Unknown to them, when I run that little doom type game and come to the first switch, I press Ctrl, Alt 6 and I get a nice little stego routine that allows me to copy any file into any other file. They didn't find it because the program and associated files run for about 6 Kilobytes, All of the prompts are found in the game, ("Hint: enter your card key at the food processor for extra health." print characters 7 - 27), and the game isn't obviously designed for the manipulation of files, with the exception of those that come with the game. This would be a DESTRUCTIVE little trojan horse, even though it didn't destroy one file.

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Re: criminalizing crypto use
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:18 AM 11/8/96 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: >At 04:43 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Tim May wrote: > >>* Intent. It's hard to imagine someone being imprisoned for using >>cryptography, except perhaps in wartime conditions. I may be wrong. Also, >>there are deep Constitutional issues we haven't been much discussing. > >One change I suspect we'll see sooner or later on the Federal side is an >amendment of the Sentencing Guidelines to include an upward adjustment for >the use of encryption to frustrate law enforcement efforts. This wouldn't >be a conviction for using crypto, but would result in harsher penalties for >people convicted of other crimes where they happened to use crypto in a way >connected with the crime. (Keeping child porn or records of a forbidden >business on an encrypted disk volume, using PGPfone to conspire across long >distances, etc.) > >As an example, less than a year ago, Congress directed the Sentencing >Commission (a sub-branch of the federal Judiciary) to amend the guidelines >to enhance the penalties by at least two levels for using a computer to >advertise or "ship" a visual depiction of child porn. Pub. L. 104-71, Sec. >2 (12/23/95). > ... I myself have heard of people getting tougher sentences for monitoring police bands during the commission of a crime. It seems that using a scanner while committing a crime is itself a crime, at least around here.

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:02 AM 11/8/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: ... >You know, I've always wondered, how did the genie get in the bottle in the >first place. Someone must have coaxed him in there. ... Yes, they told him that it was for his own protection and that if he didn't do it, no one else would either. They told him that it wasn't nice, but it was far better than what he would be enduring if he stayed outside. Upon being released, however, he had the insight of the confinement. You can fool a being once easy enough, everyone has to learn somwhow. Its much harder to fool that being a second time, they know better. Like someone said, the government has to act now before the people know better.

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FW: Validating a program
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> My question is as >> >follows: If PGP and DES are as secure as thought to be, then why is it >> >not ruled illegal software, just as they do with silencers, narcotics, >> >certain type weapons, etc..... > >[snippo] > >> Why does it follow that these must be crackable, or the government would >> have outlawed them? Despite recent moves to limit encryption, there are >> currently NO domestic (U.S.) restrictions on crypto. Nothing prohibits >> you from using a true One Time Pad, which is mathematically proven to be >> unbreakable, now and forever, even against infinite resources. If this >> is not prohibited (and it isn't), doesn't that refute your argument? > >Dale Thorn replies: >This is a misleading challenge. There's a helluva difference between the OTP >and a >Public Key system. If, for example, it can be proven that I can crank up PGP >to its >most cryptic level, and send the OTP overseas with "absolute security", so >that I >can now send messages with the OTP which was crunched with PGP's highest >security, >then that would mean something. > >My point here is that Ed was asserting that PGP, DES, etc., must be >crackable, otherwise the U.S. government would have ruled them illegal >(domestically). I pointed out that one can legally own and use a true OTP >with impunity in the U.S., despite its unquestioned unbreakability. >Therefore, his argument falls. If it made sense, the USG would have AT LEAST >outlawed OTP's (which they most assuredly cannot break). > >Just so there's no misunderstanding: > >1. The OTP is absolutely unbreakable. (if done correctly) >2. The OTP encryption cannot be decoded on the other end unless you can >deliver the > OTP to the person on the other end by a secure means. >3. PGP, which is not usually used at its highest level of security (for all >bits in > a message), *will* be used at its highest level of security to send the >OTP to the > person on the other end. >4. The OTP arrives on the other end, completely safe from snooping. > >Now you see the problem. #4 above can't be assured, and that is why Ed says >that PGP >is not shut off "right now", because it's probably not "really secure". > >I'm not sure what you're claiming here, or what point it is intended to >demonstrate. No matter the strength of PGP, delivering a OTP in this fashion >would render it no longer a OTP. Besides, this scenario makes no sense. In >any case, there is no restriction I know of in sending encrypted data (or >even One Time Pads) to whomever you choose, by whatever means. (Granted, if >you send encrypted traffic to khadafi(a)libya.gov, or dispatch couriers with >briefcases handcuffed to their wrists, you might invite suspicion...) > >Could you clarify the point you're making above? > >I'm amused to think that, in a nation armed with 20,000 or so nukes, the >paranoid of >paranoid nation-states as it were, some of the erstwhile intelligent citizens >think >that the U.S. military are just sitting around wringing their hands over the >"fact" >that the citizens have "unbreakable" crypto. > >Bear in mind the Scientific American articles on Public Key crypto back in >the 1970's. >The military knew the score back then, and if you think they just sat back >and allowed >all this to happen, well, sorry, I don't believe in Santa Claus or the Easter >Bunny. > >Well, while the feds are no doubt powerful, they ARE subject to the same laws >of mathematics as the rest of us. While it is _possible_ they know much more >about factoring than the rest of the world, I find it unlikely that they are >advanced enough to factor 2000-bit numbers. (I can't prove it, just as I >can't prove they don't know how to make their agents invisible.) > >And they didn't just sit back and allow this information out -- witness >Bernstein, et. al., and all the continuing ITAR/GAK fallout. Of course, I >expect that some will claim this is just for appearance's sake, so as not to >make it obvious that they can actually read all our thoughts directly, using >technology they got from the Greys from Zeta Reticulon... > >Tunny >====================================================================== > James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny > Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 > tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C >====================================================================== > >

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DOUBLE the Reward for Errors in _Digital Cash_
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last week, I offered $10 for the first person to report any technical errors in the first edition of my book, _Digital Cash_. I got many good suggestions for additional topics to add to the book, but not one mention of any errors. So I'm doubling the reward. $20 for the first person to report a technical error to me. The details and restrictions follow this message. I would also like to encourage people to continue to send suggestions. If you thought some topics were covered too lightly, let me know. This isn't a technical error, but I reserve the right to reward you anyways. Also, I hope that any company with new or improved products will write. One of the biggest problems I've found in researching the book is finding the right person to contact in a company. So I encourage you to volunteer. --Peter Wayner (pcw(a)access.digex.net) 1) The offer may withdrawn at any time. Check my web page for any changes. 2) The offer could be increased at any time, but it probably won't be. So don't push your luck waiting for more money. 3) My decision on the "first" person to send me a technical error is final. I may choose to reward both people if it is clear that they found the error independently. The limitation is necessary to keep people from telling their friend, "You want $20? Just send this email message to this guy." 4) My decision on what constitutes a technical error is also final. Errors in grammar or word choice are not rewarded. But you're free to write about them. It's not that I don't want to hear about them. I just think that the concept of "grammatical error" is so ill-defined that I don't want to get in arguments in that domain.

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Re: Secrecy: My life as a nym. (Was: nym blown?)
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn makes a lot of good points regarding privacy. One thing I wanted to follow up on: > Unfortunately, in the United States most citizens only become interested > in privacy in their 20s or so. By this time it is difficult to overcome > the mass of information which has been stored up. (Pseudocide can be an > attractive option for some perhaps). I have two kids entering their teens, and I'm sure other list members are parents as well. What can we do for our children to help them enter their adult lives with better chances to retain privacy? Unicorn mentions keeping them absent from school on picture day, although I'm not sure how much this helps. I suppose it makes it harder for an investigator to find out what they look(ed) like. Then when they get old enough to drive you have a new problem avoiding the photo (and thumbprint) on the license. Are there other measures which parents could take while their children are young to get them off to a good start, privacy-wise? Hal

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Re: Rarity: Crypto question enclosed
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 10 Nov 1996, David K. Merriman wrote: > > My simple question is regarding key/certificate distribution: > > Is there any particular reason that such can't be accomplished via > on-line lists, and made available via a service on a port, using standard > (textual) commands, like mail and such are now? There are a few things available or in the works right now. Most of the PGP key servers respond to WWW requests already. You connect to them on a port, the HTTP port, send some standard textual commands following the HTTP protocol, and get the requested PGP keys back in text form. How does this differ from what you were thinking of? Other proposals, including Ron Rivest's SDSI, envision an environment where most people make their own keys available via a URL. Certificates would have this URL in them and you could check it to make sure the key has not expired or been revoked. Then the only problem is distributing the URL... John Gilmore's SWAN project is working to put keys into Domain Name System (DNS) databases. He has sample code which will get keys dynamically via DNS calls, and DNS servers are now available which will support the new data types necessary. You can actually get his own key right now from toad.com via this method. This is a binary protocol rather than a textual one but could be a good way to do it. So I think you are right that on-the-fly key grabbing is the direction in which things are moving, replacing large local databases of keys. Hal

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So how does the crypto crackdown go?
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've enjoyed Peter Hendrickson's provocative postings and the many good responses. However I don't think we should forget that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies almost certainly do hope to ban strong encryption in the U.S. and in other countries as well. So it is worth discussing how the ban is likely to happen and what impact, if any, it would have. I could see such a measure going into effect after the next terrorist attack as part of a comprehensive bill that also includes taggants in explosives, more permission for wiretaps and surveillance of terrorists, and similar items on the LEA laundry list. Keep in mind the effects of the current ban on U.S. exports of crypto technology. Obviously this have not stopped crypto from moving overseas. But it has definitely had significant effects. It is _not_ widely ignored, at least in public. That is why we work so hard to overturn it; if it had no effect, we wouldn't care. Companies are much more careful about how and whether they will distribute crypto on the net; for many months Netscape's free software didn't have strong crypto; Americans even on this list are afraid to publish algorithms and envy Adam Back's freedom to do so. My guess about how a crypto ban would go is that it would be an extension of the export ban, and be based on interstate commerce regulation. It would ban distribution of crypto software, commercial, freeware, and shareware, which had the ability to hide the content of messages. Exceptions would exist along the lines of the recent export proposals, where the software would be OK to use if it had a small key size with an approved cipher, or other means to ensure law enforcement access. The ban might also cover stego and stealth type software, at least if that were the primary purpose of such programs. The U.S. would also work to convince foreign countries to implement similar bans. One question is whether they would also try to make it illegal to use (rather than to distribute) crypto software. On the one hand, if they don't do that, they have a problem with all the installed base of code. But the legalities of stopping people from encrypting code on their own computers, or writing crypto programs for personal use, seem a lot more questionable to me, and I don't know how much precedent there would be for that kind of restriction. So as I see it the main target of the ban would be distributors of software rather than end users. This would be in line with the often stated goal of the law enforcement people that their main concern is with crypto that is built in, transparent, and trivial to use, rather than hacker's crypto. So what are the impacts of this kind of ban? They might not be all that bad. Already on the net Americans have to be careful about what they say. We can't describe crypto algorithms because they might leak overseas. With a ban on domestic distribution we would still be prevented from talking about crypto. So this is not very different. Commercial companies building in crypto would have to go back to escrowed or weak encryption. All those export controlled sites would treat Americans the same as foreigners and prevent them from getting the strong crypto. The few commercial products sold in the stores which do crypto would have to be changed. Strong crypto might be distributed via an underground network, but this would be about as risky as running Internet sites that export strong crypto is today. There are very few such sites, although granted there is little call for them because overseas crypto sites are widely available. The end result is that almost nobody in the U.S. would have access to strong crypto, except for the motivated few who write their own, keep old strong versions around, or obtain new strong software illegally. This sounds bad, but as far as actual _users_ of strong encryption it is not so different from the way things are today. Weak/escrowed crypto would still be widely used and built in to communication software. The big question in my mind is whether they could get away with banning the use of strong crypto rather than its distribution. This would be much more effective from the law enforcement perspective. But they have not tried this so far even for international messages, presumably due to the serious Constitutional questions it would raise. Hal

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