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Re: Rarity: Crypto question enclosed
by Michael Peponis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Sorry that this message doesn't include any flames, "outings", > denigrations, or other stuff...... Hey, that "stuff" comes in useful. Some of the more origional ones are posted on my office wall, so when people accuse me of being a childish, insensitive and egotistical I just show them some cypherpunk postings, "See, I'm not this bad, count yourself fortunate how would you like to work for some of these guys?" > My simple question is regarding key/certificate distribution: > > Is there any particular reason that such can't be accomplished via > on-line lists, and made available via a service on a port, using standard > (textual) commands, like mail and such are now? Conceptual, I had the same idea about a year ago, but never enough time to do it. Practically, it could be painful. It's possible to have a key-server listen on a port and accept requests, then it would fork a process, process the result, and return an answer set. But how many CPU cycles would it take for a machine to process a request, ie going through 1000 of keys? I am not exactly sure, it took a long while on my pentium. In my opinion, if I were to run a key server as a service, with clients connecting and requesting a key it shouldn't take more than a minute to get a responce. > The things that come to mind are a 'client' request for a key, a > 'client' submission of a key, an external host requesting a key exchange, > and the host itself requesting a key exchange with another system (only > new/changed keys being swapped). Had the exact same idea, but came up with an interesting concept. When a person submits a key, a PGP process is spawned yeilding the following information 1.) The name (peponmc(a)cris.com) 2.) The real name (Michael Peponis) 3.) The key size 4.) Creation date of the key 5.) Key finger print This information, along with the acutal key would be inserted into a SQL Database table With a structure similar to this Name varchar2 Real_name Varchar2 KeySize Integer CreationDate date PGPKEY Varchar(a fairly large one) Submission_date Date The idea here being that the key would be added as a field, and requests from clients and other key servers would do a simple Database query, which are very quick. > The way I see it working is similar to (but not as slow as, or > requiring the human intervention) of the key servers already existing. > Granted that the first few such servers might carry a higher load, but I'd > think that would taper off as the (presumably free) software became > available, similar to the growth of remailer software (which would seem to > be a fairly reasonable relationship....). > Hooks into existing PGP-fluent software shouldn't be difficult with > a standardized protocol, and I wouldn't think that the servers would be > that difficult to code and implement on a 'standard' (consistently used, > that is) port. It's not that hard, it's performance that's more of an issue. The beauty of my approch would be that initially, there would be alot of "Add" requests, resulting in many PGP processes running on the box, but eventually, they would tapper off. Database requests pose no real problems, on Unix boxes, especially with Oracle, the SGA is always running, it's just one more request, going up against a realatively small table. The box could return an answer in a matter of seconds, as opposed to over a two minutes. Server updates would be swift too, they would just transfer well defined SQL Datasets between themselves. > I'm willing to have a try at the first server, if the parameters > can be defined. Let me know what you think of my idea > Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMoZirkUffSIjnthhAQFBpAQAw1a48NY/IPai8FqAkqlfi2tLoreGlQlW RaWLVnSE/dl4CpRf+nLXjRRYQL6FlmKxfVkgv68yS3srFlx9KpkGqOT3k9hZGfzU 3X+ADKI2oKzSZM92vmYoM+BGtxggdgg/SjoPwyxq76FuiHt6SnDcCvXeRUDclFHi CMqPPKvaqBo= =Yudv -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: "Nightmare on Crypto Street, Part 1"
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: >I also summarize Peter's set up much as you did: > >"Suppose [A]. Suppose [B] ... [Then Z is likely]. In the middle of the Polish crisis, in the early 1980s, while there were riots over the high cost of living and the lack of food, Tversky and Kahneman [seminal cognitive science researchers] asked a number of political leaders and generals to evaluate the probability [Scenario 1] that the United States might withdraw its ambassador from the then Soviet Union (without any hypothesis as to why). They further asked the same subjects to evaluate the probability [Scenario 2] that _both_ of two other things would take place: (a) that the U.S.S.R. would invade Poland and (b) that, as a consequence of the former, the United States would withdraw its ambassador from the Soviet Union. Guess which was scenario was assumed to have a higher probability. These questionaire-experiments, just like real life, have countless times shown us that a plausible and well-told story can lead us to hold as "objectively" probable events that, just minutes before, we would have considered totally improbable. Probabilities being, by their nature, less than one, the probability of the entire chain (or the last link) being true is always and without exception lass probable than the probability of the least probable link in the chain. We fail to notice this prograssive attenuation of probability. The story takes over from reality. The trick - which is the oldest in the book - is to find the narrative path by which the last, and most implausible, link can be made imaginatively compelling. Give us a little story, a script, something born of our own imagination, and our own natural tendencies, cognitive or emotional, do the rest. This discussion applies as well to the other script: Irreversible Crypto-Anarchy, soon appearing on a street near you. Ciao, James Quoted liberally from the book _Inevitable Illusions_ by Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, Ph.D. The author is a pricipal Research Associate of the Center for Cognitive Science at MIT. I recommend the book.

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Re: A Disservice to Mr. Bell
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:16 AM 11/10/96 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >jim bell wrote: > >> Interestingly enough, the one thing the Commonlaw court system needs is an >> effective enforcement system. One likely method is the commercial lien >> process, but even that tends to be resisted by people who are far more used >> to dealing with equity court personnel. It turns out that my AP system >> seems to mesh almost perfectly with their needs, although obviously in >> practice it would only be used as a "last resort." > >Speaking of Common Law courts and their Liens, the feds have expanded their crackdown >begun with the Freemen of Montana. They arrested Elizabeth Broderick and several of >her associates or whatever, and I know at least one person personally who is hiding >or keeping a very low profile at least. [these are people in the common law/lien >business] This is, generically, a dispute that the Federal government will eventually lose, I think within 10 years or so. Commonlaw courts were quite real (in fact they pre-dated equity courts by at least 2-3 centuries), and they can rapidly reconstitute themselves along their original lines. There are, I think, two reasons that the equity court system (and their sleazy lawyers, both on and off the bench) are worried. First, what they have now is, effectively, a monopoly on "justice." The re-emergence of commonlaw courts would provide competition that has been long gone. Think of it like any monopoly that suddenly has to accept competition. The second reason is that with the return of commonlaw courts will be eliminated the tradition (and that's all it was, effectively a tradition) of judicial immunity. Imagine how easy it could be to bring criminal charges against judges, lawyers, cops, and others who are either "impossible" to sue or at least very difficult. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: ideal secure personal computer system
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:55 AM 11/10/1996, tom bryce wrote: >Here's a question: if one were designing for oneself a secure personal >computer system, for use in, say, word processing, spreadsheet, >communications, the usuals - what system would one purchase and how would >one set it up? > >For example, on the Mac I would envision this as the ideal system: > >(1) Get a power mac >(2) Partition the hard drive into two partitions: > install the system folder on one and a copy of CryptDisk > make this the startup partition and make it READ ONLY with aliases to > folders you want to be modiyfable (such as Eudora Folder in the sys folder) > place these folders on the encrypted partition >(3) Completely fill the other partition with a CryptDisk file so there is no > room for other stuff to be written. Adjust the partition size if needed. >(4) Install a screen saver (such as shareware Eclipse) that will password lock > the screen after a few minutes of inactivity, and set CryptDisk to dismount > the external partition after a few minutes of inactivity (or longer) Watch out for the clipboard which appears to be stored as a file in the system folder. Unfortunately, it has to be a real file - aliases not allowed. This makes it harder to have a read only system folder and, of course, every time you cut and paste something you leave a ghost on the disk for an undefined length of time. It's hard to work on the Mac without using the clipboard. I would love to know a workaround for this. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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No Subject
by Igor Chudov ＠ home 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

manifold::~==>premail -t cypherpunks(a)toad.com Chain: haystack;jam Subject: I urgently need a lot of money. Please share your money-making secrets, I am in a desperate need for cash.

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infowar Digest for 10 Nov 1996
by list 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

infowar Digest for 10 Nov 1996 Topics covered in this issue include: 1: RE: Chemical Warfare Agents by alm(a)io-online.com 2: Propaganda and TWA/CIA-Cocaine by winn(a)infowar.com -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Message:0001 1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- To: infowar(a)infowar.com From: "Betty G. O'Hearn" <betty(a)infowar.com> Subject: Infowar Digest Vol. 1 # 1 infowar(a)infowar.com Sunday, November 10 1996 Volume 01: Number 01 We thank our sponsors: National Computer Security Association OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Inc. New Dimensions International - Security Training Secure Computing Corporation HOMECOM Communications Internet Security Solutions ___________________________________________________________ Infowar(a)infowar.com is brought to you in the the interest of an open, unclassified exchange of information and ideas as a means for advancement of Information Warfare related issues. Topics of discussion for this list include: Infowar, Electronic Civil Defense, Hacking, Defensive Techniques, Policy, Non-Lethals, Psyops, Chemical Warfare Agents and WMD. As the list expands we will adapt to the needs and desires of our subscribers. This is a DIGEST format. ________________________________________________________________ Contents of this Digest: Volume 01: Number 01 Infowar(a)infowar.com Chemical Warfare Agents Infowar(a)infowar.com Iraq WMD Infowar(a)infowar.com RE: Chemical Warfare Agents ---------------------------------------------- To: Wilson, Gary, COL, OSD/RA GWilson(a)osd.pentagon.mil Cc: betty(a)infowar.com Subject: Re: Chemical Warfare Agents Chemical Warfare Agents An overview of chemicals defined as chemical weapons >> Main Groups >> >> Nerve Agents >> Mustard Agents >> Hydrogen Cyanide >> Tear Gases >> Arsines >> Psychotomimetic Agents >> Toxins >> Potential CW Agents >> What is a Chemical Warfare Agent? A United Nations report from 1969 defines chemical warfare agents as " ... chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants ... ". The Chemical Weapons Convention defines chemical weapons as including not only toxic chemicals but also ammunition and equipment for their dispersal. Toxic chemicals are stated to be " ... any chemical which, through its chemical effect on living processes, may cause death, temporary loss of performance, or permanent injury to people and animals". Plants are not mentioned in this context. Toxins, i.e., poisons produced by living organisms and their synthetic equivalents, are classed as chemical warfare agents if they are used for military purposes. However, they have a special position since they are covered by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. This convention bans the development,production and stockpiling of such substances not required for peaceful purposes. Today, thousands of poisonous substances are known but only a few are considered suitable for chemical warfare. About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as CW agents during the 20th century. Today, only a few of these are considered of interest owing to a number of demands that must be placed on a substance if it is to be of use as a CW agent. A presumptive agent must not only be highly toxic but also "suitably highly toxic" so that it is not too difficult to handle. The substance must be capable of being stored for long periods in containers without degradation and without corroding the packaging material. It must be relatively resistant to atmospheric water and oxygen so that it does not lose effect when dispersed. It must also withstand the heat developed when dispersed. >> "War Gases" are Seldom Gases >> CW agents are frequently called war gases and a war where CW agents are used is usually called a gas war. These incorrect terms are a result of history. During the First World War use was made of chlorine and phosgene which are gases at room temperature and normal atmospheric pressure. The CWagents used today are only exceptionally gases. Normally they are liquids or solids. However, a certain amount of the substance is always in volatile form (the amount depending on how rapidly the substance evaporates) and the gas concentration may become poisonous. Both solid substances and liquids can also be dispersed in the air in atomized form, so-called aerosols. An aerosol can penetrate the body through the respiratory organs in the same way as a gas. Some CW agents can also penetrate the skin. This mainly concerns liquids but in some cases also gases and aerosols. Solid substances penetrate the skin slowly unless they happen to be mixed with a suitable solvent. Effects on Vegetation Flowers and leaves of some plants may change colour if they are exposed to droplets of a CW agent in an attack. Light or matt spots may occur as well as brown discoloration, particularly on leaves. Entire trees, or parts of them, may also get brown discoloration in situations of strong exposure. The discoloration often arises within a few minutes but may also occur after some days. Classification CW agents can be classified in many different ways. There are, for example, volatile substances, which mainly contaminate the air, or persistent substances, which are involatile and therefore mainly cover surfaces. CW agents mainly used against people may also be divided into lethal and incapacitating cathegories. A substance is classified as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through nausea or visual problems. The limit between lethal and incapacitating substances is not absolute but refers to a statistical average. In comparison, it may be mentioned that the ratio for the nerve agents between the incapacitating and lethal dose is approximately 1/10. Chemical warfare agents are generally also classified according to their effect on the organism. In order to achieve good ground coverage when dispersed from a high altitude with persistent CW agents the dispersed droplets must be sufficiently large to ensure that they fall within the target area and do not get transported elsewhere by the wind. This can be achieved by dissolving polymers (e.g., polystyrene or rubber products) in the CW agent to make the product highly-viscous or thickened. The result will be that the persistence time and adhesive ability increase which thus complicates decontamination. Although it may appear that a CW agent can be "custom-made" for a certain purpose, this is not the case. Instead, there is always some uncertainty about the persistence time, the dispersal and the effect. These Military Chemicals are Not Considered to be Chemical Weapons Incendiary agents such as napalm and phosphorus are not considered to be CW agents since they achieve their effect mainly through thermal energy. Certain types of smoke screen may be poisonous in extremely high concentrations but, nonetheless, smoke ammunition is not classed as a chemical weapon since the poisonous effect is not the reason for their use. Plants, microorganisms, algae, etc. which produce toxins are not classed as chemical weapons even if the produced toxins belong to that class. Pathogenic microorganisms, mainly viruses and bacteria, are classed as biological weapons. -------------------------------------- From: "Wilson, Gary, COL, OSD/RA" <GWilson(a)osd.pentagon.mil> Subject: Iraq: WMD Date: Fri, 1 Nov 1996 08:24:37 -0500 WASHINGTON (AP) -- Before and during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, truck convoys carried Iraqi chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear material to safe haven in Iran, according to U.S. intelligence documents. > "The trucks were camouflaged with mud during their travel through Iraqi >territory," said the report placed Thursday on the Internet. "The convoy moved >only at night. The mud was washed off after re-entry into Iranian territory." > The report said "at least 14 trucks were identified as having nuclear, >biological and chemical cargo. Boxes labeled 'tularemia,' 'anthrax,' 'botulinum' and 'plague' were loaded into containers." > The trucks were driven by Iranian civilians who turned them over to Iranian >Revolutionary Guards. > That account was among more than 200 documents placed on the Internet over >the objections of the CIA. They were put on the worldwide computer network by >publisher Bruce W. Kletz, who plans to put out a book by a former CIA analyst, >Patrick Eddington. > Eddington asserts that the agency has hidden evidence that American troops >were exposed to Iraqi chemical weapons. > "These documents are still under review," CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield said. >"We consider portions of them to be classified." > The Pentagon originally put the material on the Internet and then withdrew it in February when the CIA objected to making it public. > While numerous studies have found no conclusive evidence that Iraqi forces >used chemical or biological weapons against U.S. troops during the 1991 war, it >is feared U.S. forces could have been exposed to nerve gas as they destroyed an >Iraqi munitions dump after the war's end. > Iraq's transfer of material to Iran was a new example of cooperation between >two countries that fought an eight-year war but became covert allies when a >U.S.-led coalition demanded that Iraq withdraw forces that occupied Kuwait in >August 1990. > During the ensuing Persian Gulf War, Iran allowed Iraqi planes to land on its territory to escape destruction by coalition forces. The planes were not allowed to rejoin the Iraqi military during the conflict. > The documents did not shed new light on whether U.S. forces came into contact with Iraqi chemical weapons. But they did show the concern about Iraq's ability to manufacture and deploy such weapons. > One document cited a defector's account that "at least one chemical company >is attached to each (Iraqi) division." > Russia may have supplied biological warfare technology to Iraq and North >Korea, according to a report written in 1994. "It was believed that the >technology transfer commenced several years prior to April 1992 and was still in progress during April 1992," the report said. > The material also indicated the government had evidence that Iraq had moved >chemical weapons into Kuwait. > One report in January 1991, from an Iraqi national, said that chemical land >mines had been loaded for shipment to Kuwait. The report said the information >"cannot be confirmed." > In September 1990, less than two months after Iraq occupied Kuwait, evidence >was seen that "Iraqi forces may be conducting chemical decontamination >exercises. They could be preparing for a chemical attack." > During the same period, when the United States and its allies were massing >forces in the Persian Gulf region, U.S. officials were concerned that terrorists >allied with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would stage attacks on allied forces. > > Among the records returned to the Internet is a Nov. 3, 1995, memo written by Paul Wallner, a Pentagon official heading an oversight panel dealing with Gulf War veterans' illnesses. > Noting that various military officials and departments had "expressed concern about potential sensitive reports or documents on GulflINK," the Persian Gulf War web site, Wallner recommended certain steps to "allow the investigation team time to begin preparation of a response on particular 'bombshell' reports." > According to the memo, a host of material would be subject to further review, including "documents containing releasable information which could embarrass the government or DoD," the Department of Defense. > It also warned that additional scrutiny would be needed on documents "that >could generate unusual public/media attention" or those "which seem to confirm >the use or detection of nuclear, chemical or biological agents." ------------------------------------------------------- Notes from Moderator: 1. GulfLINK documents can now be downloaded from infowar.com 2. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN TERRORISM The Emerging Threat Posed by Non-State Proliferation, James K. Campbell is an interesting read. The article is posted on infowar.com under the What's New section. -------------------------------------------------------- ate: Tue, 29 Oct 1996 12:22:27 -0700 To: winn(a)Infowar.Com From: alm(a)io-online.com Subject: RE: Chemical Warfare Agents Cc: "Wilson, Gary, COL, OSD/RA" <GWilson(a)osd.pentagon.mil>, betty(a)infowar.com, 'Ron Lewis' <INTELLIGYST(a)worldnet.att.net> I think we have an excellent example of the psychological impact of chemical weapons in the case of Israel right now. The news statements about land for peace in the Golan came shortly after new gas masks were issued in Israel and I got curious. I went back and checked the news database and found that speeches recomending not serving in the IDF, that students should leave Israel, and a wide variety of other self defeating actions peaked at about one week after news of chemical weapons threats, issueing of gas masks, and other news of this type appeared in the papers there. This comes after a long period of stress and being on high alert. Early reactions seem to be panic, after a period of such stress it seems make people (at least in this situation) turn in on themselves, willing to abandon strongly held beliefs, etc. without knowingly tieing it to the threats. The attacks seemed aimed not at the threats but at the government of Israel; yet, they are tied time-wise to increased pressure. This was traced over a two year period which gives some validity rather than a one-time relationship. I hate to say it, but this is an excellent laboratory for a variety of such studies as it isn't artificial and its one of the few places where open information is available on on-going threats of various types. Sociologists have already done studies on behavior in society and such using this lab. Alijandra ------------------------------------------------------ END Infowar Sunday, November 10 1996 Volume 01: Number 01 DIRECT REQUESTS to: list(a)infowar.com with one-line in the BODY, NOT in the subject line. Subscribe infowar TO JOIN GROUP Unsubscribe infowar TO LEAVE GROUP Help infowar TO RECEIVE HELP TO POST A MESSAGE: E-Mail to infowar(a)infowar.com _____________________________________________________ Infowar.Com Interpact, Inc. Winn Schwartau winn(a)infowar.com http://www.infowar.com 813-393-6600 Voice 813-393-6361 FAX Sponsor Opportunities/Comments/Help Betty G. O'Hearn Assistant to Winn Schwartau http://www.infowar.com betty(a)infowar.com 813-367-7277 Voice 813-363-7277 FAX -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Message:0002 2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- To: infowar(a)infowar.com From: "Betty G. O'Hearn" <betty(a)infowar.com> Subject: Infowar Digest Vol. 1 #2 infowar(a)infowar.com=20 Sunday, November 10 1996 Volume 01: Number 02 We thank our sponsors: National Computer Security Association OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS New Dimensions International - Security Training Secure Computing Corporation HOMECOM Communications Internet Security Solutions __________________________________________________ Infowar(a)infowar.com is brought to you in the the interest of an open,= unclassified exchange of information and ideas as a means for advancement= of Information Warfare related issues. Topics of discussion for this list= include: Infowar, Electronic Civil Defense, Hacking, Defensive Techniques,= Policy, Non-Lethals, Psyops, Chemical Warfare Agents and WMD.=20 As the list expands we will adapt to the needs and desires of our= subscribers.=20 This is a DIGEST format. __________________________________________________________ Contents Vol. #1 No.2 infowar Original Allegations - Flt 800 Disaster infowar Propaganda and TWA/CIA-Cocaine infowar Electronic Civil Defense ------------------------------------------- To: winn(a)Infowar.Com Date: 8 Nov 1996 14:33:38 CST Subject: Original Allegations - Flt. 800 Disaster ENN Special Report 11/08/96 - 13:45CST Original Allegations of Friendly Fire Came From Alleged Iranian Propagandist (ENN) In light of yesterday's statements by former JFK Press Secretary Pierre Sallinger, the Emergency Response & Research Institute conducted an internal literature review of documents regarding the TWA Flight 800 disaster. This internal probe included e-mail, newsgroup postings,press= reports, and consultations with experts, received from numerous sources. = It revealed that the original allegations of a U.S. Naval "friendly fire= incident" came from an alleged Iranian/Extremist Moslem propagandist named= Parveez Syad, aka Parveez Hussein, who was operating from a base in= Birmingham, England at the time. Interestingly, Mr.Hussein/Syad= distributed these allegations widely on the Internet within 48 hours of the= incident and made what appeared to be premature accusations that the United= States was already engaged in a "cover-up." Mr. Hussein/Syad's current whereabouts are unknown, and it is believed that he may have been the subject of a government investigation in England. Concerns were raised, at the time, by ERRI analysts that Mr. Syad/Hussein may have been engaged in an "disinformation" campaign in an= effort to deflect attention from possible moslem extremist involvement in the bombing of Flt. 800. Subsequent inquiries and examinations by ERRI seem to verify that there was a concerted "foreign" effort to obscure= and confuse a number of issues involved in the Flt. 800 investigation. Speculation continues among experts in regard to the authenticity of the alleged U.S. government documents that are reportedly in the possession of Mr. Sallinger. Without examination of these documents, ERRI analysts say that further confirmation of Mr. Sallinger's statement is difficult at best. One purposefully unidentified consultant told ENN that it is even possible that Mr. Sallinger and French intelligence agents may have been "duped" by a "foreign effort." U.S. Navy and FBI officials have both "catagorically denied" any viable evidence of a "friendly fire" incident or of any sort of "cover-up" on the part of the U.S. government. James Kallstrom announced today that he would welcome any additional information or evidence that Mr. Sallinger or others might have in regard to the Flight #800 tragedy. EmergencyNet News Service (ENN) Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI) 6348 N. Milwaukee Ave., #312 Chicago, IL. 60646 (773) 631-3774 - Voice (773) 631-4703 - Fax (773) 631-3467 - Modem/Emergency BBS On-Line ------------------------------------- Date: Fri, 8 Nov 96 16:26 EST From: Michael Wilson <0005514706(a)mcimail.com> To: G-TWO List Members <g-two(a)majordomo.netcom.com> Subject: Propaganda and TWA/CIA-Cocaine Many of you may be dealing with questions regarding the two matters, so I thought I would make this available to you. --- Two recent events in the media are prompting my writing a very brief= commentary: allegations of a cover-up in the TWA Flight 800 disaster and the alleged=20 CIA-Cocaine connection into the L.A. urban environment. My comments will be= directed at the propaganda value of these media events, as I'm currently= engaged in writing a primer on propaganda, and these make interesting case= studies. Modern propaganda comes in many forms, but of primary concern in these two= cases are: - 'Mobile truth,' or the reinterpretation of events (revisionist history), a= =20 common feature on the Internet, which is increasingly becoming an entry= point into the more conventional media; - Psyops in support of operations, including spin control, after action= reports,or informative accounts when the media is controlled by= intelligence and law enforcement; - The digital nature of media--text, photographs, video, audio--has= undermined the ability to establish the reality of what they represent as= observational proxies. This has recently been termed the 'fictive= environment' by the military, and I'll use the term for lack a better one. Let me discuss the two cases in terms of these points: TWA 800 Ever since Flt. 800 went down, the conspiracy theorists have been out on the= Internet, alleging everything from a Syrian missile to a 'friendly fire'=20 accident. Part of these allegations have been blind assertions, but some= have=20 been backed up with 'proof' that entails supposed photographs and internal= =20 government documents. Mobile truth: in the absence of public facts or knowledge, speculation has= run wild. As usual, everyone's favorite pet suspect emerges--terrorists,= the U.S. Navy, government cover-ups, etc. This 'playing to the audience'= has received wide audience and coverage, because it is media hot--it= attracts a lot attention simply because it receives attention in the= viewers, readers, etc. in a self-fulfilling way. It plays on public and= hidden fears; provides simple=20 solutions; gives an enemy to hate, react against; it justifies the beliefs= and=20 agenda of many. The only solution is to provide facts, hopefully answers; of= =20 course, this is antithetical to the investigatory (scientific and criminal)= =20 process. This vacuum of data is being capitalized on by individuals or=20 organizations who know that the official channels are going to be closed to= the public--their motive is something I have no desire to quantify. PsyOps: this game is lose-lose for everyone; the public is confused and= angered, the investigation is hampered or discredited, the sources of the= false information will eventually be shown to be wrong (although they will= launch secondary operations to manage this as well, alleging further= cover-up, conspiracy, and so forth). What happens though is a continual= lessening of the resistance in the information environment to future psyops= operations, and this is the long term benefit sought by the perpetrators.= Confidence in the government is at an all time low--post Viet Nam,= Watergate, Iran-Contra, Whitewater, etc. The readiness to believe the worst= becomes greater and greater, and public mental health suffers. Fictive environment: while ground truth comes from direct observation, we're= becoming more dependent upon observational proxies than ever= before--photos, audio, video, documents, etc. The memories of observers is= a questionable thing at best (the madness of crowds), but digital trickery= are removing the trust values that we, only a few years ago, were able to= place in 'more reliable' materials. In the case of TWA, just as in most any= case, the creation or faking of evidence requires only modest skills and a= personal computer. Photos can be digital from their origin, and once= transferred into a computer with the right software, they can be merged or= altered in ways that are=20difficult to refute, even when false. Documents= are trivial to manufacture; elements used for provenance, showing a truth= and history of origin, can be falsified in a variety of ways (optically= scanning letterhead or signature, creation from scratch by matching= typeset, etc.), and the textual body can be anything imagined (and textual= analysis or comparison is commonly beyond the capabilities of the= audience). Video and audio are slightly more complex (in levels of effort);= video modification, loosely based on the same technology used to alter= photographs, requires greater skill and more powerful equipment, but is= gradually coming into the range of the average consumer, just as audio= sampling and modification technology has reached the 'garage' level. All= this calls into question any materials of physical evidence, but those= distributed over the Internet are particularly ntrustworthy--even the lower= resolution of net-distribution works to the advantage of the creation of= such materials. I expect this problem to have increasing impact as time= goes on, including in criminal and civil cases (for instance, in the Yousef= case in New York, where he claimed his computer files were faked, or the= potential falsification of photographic evidence in the Simpson civil= trial). In short, the discussion and materials on/using the Internet have done= little to advance the search for the truth of the matter in TWA 800, and= have done much harm (diverting critical manpower from the investigation,= damaging the credibility of the investigation, etc.). CIA-Cocaine connection TWA and this accusation actually have much in common from a propaganda= standpoint. The allegation (made by the San Jose Mercury News) was that= assets associated with the CIA-backed effort in support of the Contras were= trafficking in cocaine, which helped to finance the (c)overt war. In= particular, the cocaine smuggled into the U.S.A. was supposed to have been= converted into the 'crack' or rock (smokable) form, and introduced into the= African-American urban setting in Los Angeles, with the undertones being= that it was a conspiracy to undermine the solidarity of the A-A community. Mobile truth: the basic assertion never actually connected the CIA with any= =20 involvement or trafficking, yet the implication (made indirectly or= directly,=20 depending on the source) was that it was a tacit CIA operation. Far be it= for me to write the apologia for the Agency, but not only is the supposed= action=20 illegal and immoral, it is also highly unlikely. Creative interpretation of= the=20 events allowed a rather clever ontological judo--the all-powerful,= all-knowing CIA either had to admit they had no idea what their assets were= involved in (thus damaging the all-knowing aspect of their reputation);= they could admit to knowledge but inaction (thus criminal facilitation, or= having to say that sometimes they need the help of 'bad' people, not a= politically correct position); or they could deny any involvement, and= foster the continual suspicion of cover-up, conspiracy, and hidden agendas.= Any way they move, they lose. This is again a position where history has= created an impression that the Agency would perform the worst action in= support of their own agenda,=20and then actively protect themselves from= investigation; no amount of reform or whitewashing can reverse the trend.= The strength of this attack on the credibility of the Agency is that it= plays so well with public impressions of the Agency, appears to fit the= profile of previous Agency violations of public trust, but can't be= defended against because of the secrecy requirements of the Agency, and the= improbable success of proving a negative assertion (that the Agency wasn't= responsible). PsyOps: a factor to consider is that the accusations were made during an=20 election period in a key state where the issue solidified a constituency= into a=20 solid position against their 'traditional' opposition. The issue is very= much a=20 political one, and directed at rekindling public animosity about past deeds= (and misdeeds) to shape current public impressions. Again, the long term= casualties of all this are the public trust and credibility of a key but= troubled Agency; politically expedient attacks which undermine the= political process; and the continued progression of the perversion of the= information environment. Fictive environment: no proof was actually offered (mostly proof by= assertion, as well as collateral association), but the very absence of= proof feeds in to the mobile truth and psyops elements of the operation.= Clearly no public documentation and argument could be offered from an= Agency that must maintain its security and integrity, and no proof could be= offered to prove the Agency wasn't involved, a negative assertion (a common= element in this sort of propaganda operation). The CIA, Congress, and Justice Department are now engaged in investigations= of the allegations; as such, they will be on-going events to continue the= propaganda campaign, with a predictable end--the Agency finds no proof in= their records and interviews, which is then interpreted as continuing= evidence of a cover-up and conspiracy. Conclusion-- Media manipulation, particularly using the Internet as a method= of propagation of the propaganda message or as an entry point into the= conventional media cycle, is becoming more of a problem. Clearly everyone= suffers, and the general atmosphere of distrust and disbelief, not to= mention disgust, prevail. Michael Wilson 5514706(a)mcimail.com ------------------------------------------ To: infowar(a)infowar.com From: winn(a)infowar.com Date: November 8, 1996 Subj: Electronic Civil Defense Becomes a National Issue In June of 1991, I testified before Congress that unless we moved forward as= a nation, we faced the possible specter of an "Electronic Pearl Harbor."= Five years to the day later, that same phrase was used by John Deutch and= others to wake up Congress and America that indeed a new concept of= national security has evolved as the Cold War wound down. I recently ran into a Libertarian friend and lawyer who was somewhat upset= with me. "You are single handedly responsible for the backlash and efforts= of law enforcement to take away our personal freedoms." He was referring to= the comments made by FBI Director Louis Freeh, that additional electronic= eavesdropping capabilities were needed to thwart the threats of domestic= terrorism. He also referred to various law enforcement concerns that unless= US citizens voluntarily complied with a Key Escrow scheme of some variety,= it might be necessary to legislate a common cryptographic system which= would not interfere with government investigations into crime and= terrorism. "So, it's all my fault?" I asked him in the presence of others. He paused, and with only a twinge of humor said, "yes." Well, I do not believe or accept for a moment that the work we have done in= the last several years is solely responsible for the extreme measures being= discussed, but my friend's concerns are legitimate and must be addressed.= He is keenly concerned, as many of us are, that recent headline grabbing= events may trigger law enforcement to overreact and with the emotional= support of many Americans, permit laws to be passed that a few short years= ago we never would have tolerated. Civil Libertarians are quick to point out that if we permit law enforcement= to regain unbridled powers of electronic eavesdropping, we provide them= with the capability of abuse. "Today's government may be fine. But we don't know about tomorrow's= government." They openly refer to the abuses of the Hoover FBI where, most= of will admit, things did get out of hand. I've met with CIA case officers= who feel hamstrung by their inability "to get the job done" in an effective= way, because they are paying for the sins of their predecessors. Most of= the FBI agents I know understand the legitimate fears of the civil= liberties groups, but also know that they must have increased access to= technology to defeat criminal activities. The issue comes down to one of balance. Pure and simple. "Whom do you trust"= is a high profile collateral issue.=20 But let's understand what has catalyzed much of these moves on the part of= law enforcement: - The Oklahoma City bombing - The World Trade Center bombing - The Lockerbie Tragedy - The US Military Bombing in Saudi Arabia - TWA Flight 800 - The Olympic Bombing These events trigger deep emotional responses on the part of most Americans= and a call for action. "What can we do?" "Do something." "This shouldn't= happen in America." "Protect us." And the predictable response from law= enforcement is to ask for additional powers. Balance. It's all about= balance. The critics say that Law Enforcement can push electronic taps past friendly= judges with little inquiry on their part. The FBI says it takes a mass of= paper work and evidence to convince a judge. There were less than 2,000= phone taps issued last year - and I guess I feel that's not a whole lot.= 260,000,000 people, less than 2,000 taps. You add it up.=20 Resources on the part of law enforcement are pretty scant. They do not have= the budget or manpower to indiscriminately tap phones everywhere and= analyze their contents. It's manpower intensive. They have to be selective.= In many ways I wish they listened in on more of the bad guys. On one phone= tap, an FBI agent told me, their target said in a taped conversation, "hey,= the feds are tapping the phone. Let's whisper." Bad guys are not all rocket= scientists. But on a national scale, we do indeed face a new risk, a new vulnerability,= for which my friend blames me. It's all my fault. Right. In "Information= Warfare" and other works, I maintained that the civilian infrastructure was= the unacknowledged target of future adversaries. I don't believe we will see Submarines sailing up the Potomac, or that enemy= planes will come into San Francisco Bay. Just won't happen. But I fear we= will see attacks against the econo-technical infrastructure, affecting not= only we citizens, but the ability of law enforcement and the military to= function as we wish them to. On July 15 of this year, President Clinton issued an Executive Order calling= for the Establishment of President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure= Protection. I applaud much of it, but I also think we have to maintain caution on how it= is effected. His order says: Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or= destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic= security of the United States. These critical infrastructures include: telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government. Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into two categories: 1. physical threats to tangible property ("physical threats"), 2. and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on= the information or communications components that control critical= infrastructures ("cyber threats"). Because many of these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the= private sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work= together to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring their= continued operation. This part of President Clinton's statement is right on the mark. These are= all critical structures of the macro-sized econo-technical infrastructure,= of which the NII and other bits are sub-infrastructures. However, when it= comes to forming a committee, the people and groups he wishes to handle the= problem are quite government-centric. - Department of the Treasury; - Department of Justice; - Department of Defense; - Department of Commerce; - Department of Transportation; - Department of Energy; - Central Intelligence Agency; - Federal Emergency Management Agency; - Federal Bureau of Investigation; - National Security Agency. The committee members are to include: - Secretary of the Treasury; - Secretary of Defense; - Attorney General; - Secretary of Commerce; - Secretary of Transportation; - Secretary of Energy; - Director of Central Intelligence; - Director of the Office of Management and Budget; - Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; - Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; - Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. The immediate concern I see is that the government wants to take charge on= an issue and threat that is of mutual concern to the private sector and the= government, but that at the highest levels of the President's Order and his= Committee, we see no private sector representation. It is merely on a= consultory basis. The Commission shall: (a) within 30 days of this order, produce a statement of its mission= objectives, which will elaborate the general objectives set forth in this= order, and a detailed schedule for addressing each mission objective, for= approval by the Steering Committee; (b) identify and consult with: (i) elements of the public and= private sectors that conduct, support, or contribute to infrastructure= assurance; (ii) owners and operators of the critical infrastructures; and= (iii) other elements of the public and private sectors, including the= Congress, that have an interest in critical infrastructure assurance issues= and that may have differing perspectives on these issues; (c) assess the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities of, and= threats to, critical infrastructures; (d) determine what legal and policy issues are raised by efforts to= protect critical infrastructures and assess how these issues should be= addressed; (e) recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation= strategy for protecting critical infrastructures from physical and cyber= threats and assuring their continued operation; (f) propose any statutory or regulatory changes necessary to effect= its recommendations; and (g) produce reports and recommendations to the Steering Committee as= they become available; it shall not limit itself to producing one final= report. I first wrote a National Infomation Policy in 1993, and I am pleased to see= that the President has included similar wording. However, a national policy= must, on balance, also provide for enhanced personal electronic security= for the average American. It cannot be a one-sided law enforcement issue.= =20 I worry about "consult with industry" along the same lines that the Key= Escrow adherents consulted with industry, but generally did what they= wanted to anyway. This has been an ongoing battle between industry and the= White House with respect to "Clipper" style proposals and export control= over encryption. Do we face the same situation with the Infrastructure= Protection Committee? In this same vein, the President did recognize some input by the private= sector: (a) The Commission shall receive advice from an advisory committee= ("Advisory Committee") composed of no more than ten individuals appointed= by the President from the private sector who are knowledgeable about= critical infrastructures. The Advisory Committee shall advise the= Commission on the subjects of the Commission's mission in whatever manner= the Advisory Committee, the Commission Chair, and the Steering Committee= deem appropriate. Again, the structure is that the government is in charge and the private= sector, whose very interests are at stake here, is reduced to an Advisory= status. This is a keen focus of concern. But then, a surprising phrase was in the President's Order: (f) The Commission, the Principals Committee, the Steering Committee, and= the Advisory Committee shall terminate 1 year from the date of this order,= unless extended by the President prior to that date. Only a year. I've been at this for years and years, and the awareness= process takes significant time. There are still major players both in the= government and the private sector who do not understand the nature of the= threats and vulnerabilities, and I fear that a mere one year effort, led by= some of the busiest people in the country today, will not receive the= attention it deserves. My Civil Libertarian lawyer friend had significant problems with the= following portion of the President's Order (for which I am blamed, of= course!). (a) While the Commission is conducting its analysis and until the President= has an opportunity to consider and act on its recommendations, there is a= need to increase coordination of existing infrastructure protection= efforts in order to better address, and prevent, crises that would have a= debilitating regional or national impact. There is hereby established an= Infrastructure Protection Task Force ("IPTF") within the Department of= Justice, chaired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to undertake this= interim coordinating mission. (d) The IPTF shall include at least one full-time member each from the= Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense, and the= National Security Agency. It shall also receive part-time assistance from= other executive branch departments and agencies. Members shall be= designated by their departments or agencies on the basis of their expertise= in the protection of critical infrastructures. IPTF members'= compensation shall be paid by their parent agency or department. "Oh, great!" he exclaimed. "Now we're gonna have the Army sitting with= M-16's outside the phone company, and the NSA listening in on Americans to= see if they pollute the water supply. This is too damned much." He= shuddered at the thought of having the these three groups working together= on a domestic basis. It brought back to him too many memories of bygone= days he would like to see remain in the past. On the other hand, what better group than the DoD to head up an effective= response organization? The President, rightfully so, put the FBI and the= Dept. of Justice in charge of the IPTF; after all they are responsible for= domestic national law enforcement. But the DoD has massive resources,= capabilities and manpower to deploy in times of trouble. The trouble is, and we will have to face this dilemma straight on, is that= the US Military cannot be deployed in domestically due to the Posse= Comitatus Act of 1878, without an Executive Order. And the NSA is similarly= restricted from domestic operation, but is standing up its own 1,000 man= Information Warfare division.=20 There are legitimate ways around these problems, and we do need to have= built-in oversights to satisfy the concerns of those who don't want the= government taking over the whole shebang. But the concept of the IPTF's= mission is again, absolutely on mark. (e) The IPTF's function is to identify and coordinate existing expertise,= inside and outside of the Federal Government, to: (i) provide, or facilitate and coordinate the provision of, expert guidance= to critical infrastructures to detect, prevent, halt, or confine an attack= and to recover and restore service; (ii) issue threat and warning notices in the event advance information is= obtained about a threat; (iii) provide training and education on methods of reducing vulnerabilities= and responding to attacks on critical infrastructures; (iv) conduct after-action analysis to determine possible future threats,= targets, or methods of attack; and (v) coordinate with the pertinent law enforcement authorities during or= after an attack to facilitate any resulting criminal investigation. The Committee is supposed to address the very issues that many of us have= been addressing - to full audiences, but often empty years. From where I= stand, the White House has caught the vision and it prepared to do= something about it. My complaints are essentially two fold: 1. We have to have greater civilian input and representation on the= Committee at the highest levels, not merely in an advisory capacity. 2. The 1 year term is short-sided. And yes, I do agree with my Libertarian pal, that however this all shakes= out, we must have a third party oversight process to insure we never do= return to the abusive days of yore. Kudos to the White House for putting Electronic Civil Defense on their= plate. For a complete copy of the Presidential Order: http://www.infowar.com Winn Schwartau ------------------------------------------------------------ END Infowar Sunday, November 10 1996 Volume 01: Number 02 DIRECT REQUESTS to: list(a)infowar.com with one-line in the BODY, NOT in the subject line. Subscribe infowar TO JOIN GROUP Unsubscribe infowar TO LEAVE GROUP Help infowar TO RECEIVE HELP=20 TO POST A MESSAGE: E-Mail to infowar(a)infowar.com =20 _____________________________________________________ Infowar.Com Interpact, Inc. Winn Schwartau winn(a)infowar.com http://www.infowar.com 813-393-6600 Voice 813-393-6361 FAX Sponsor Opportunities/Comments/Help Betty G. O'Hearn Assistant to Winn Schwartau http://www.infowar.com betty(a)infowar.com 813-367-7277 Voice 813-363-7277 FAX

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Re: ideal secure personal computer system
by tom bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> = ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) wrote: >> = tom bryce wrote: >> (2) Partition the hard drive into two partitions: >> install the system folder on one and a copy of CryptDisk >> make this the startup partition and make it READ ONLY with aliases to >> folders you want to be modiyfable (such as Eudora Folder in the sys >>folder) >> place these folders on the encrypted partition > >I don't think you will be able to do this. I have heard that too many >things modify files in the system folder for this to work. It wouldn't >surprise me if the OS modifies its own boot file from time to time. > >I'm not expert. If you get this working I would appreciate it if you >were to post it to the list or let me know directly. -and- >Watch out for the clipboard which appears to be stored as a file in >the system folder. Unfortunately, it has to be a real file - aliases >not allowed. This makes it harder to have a read only system folder >and, of course, every time you cut and paste something you leave a >ghost on the disk for an undefined length of time. It's hard to >work on the Mac without using the clipboard. The fact that you can start up and run your system from a CD rom proves that you can lock your startup disk. Grab a DISK TOOLS disk from your most recent system installer disks (mine is 7.5) and flip the write protect tab, then start up from it. Clipboard works, too. I haven't worked with such a system extensively enough to see if there are any glitches (such as copying large amounts of stuff to the clipboard, etc.) but it should get the job done for the truly paranoid. I have a few items in the system folder presently aliased out onto other disks - my Eudora Folder is on an encrypted partition, and there's no reason one couldn't do this with the whole preferences folder and other stuff. >> If locking the startup volume turns out to be too much of a pain, one could >> install trashguard from Highware software and set it to triple overwrite >> deleted files, and otherwise not lock the startup partition. > >I'm guessing you already know this, but once you've written something >to the disk you might as well assume it's there forever. Triple overwrite >of files will defeat Norton Utilities, but may not stop a determined >opponent. Right. I'm proposing this as a compromise if you wish to trade security for convenience. >Commercial data recovery services claim to be able to recover data >after nine formats of the disk. It is difficult to say for certain >what the technical limits of this technology are. For instance, maybe Colin Plumb gave me estimates of what you needed to wipe a disk clean once, which he researched for SFS. It depends on whether the erasure pattern is custom designed for the data to wipe. It was something vaguely like (don't quote me) 15 passes if custom designed, and 25 if not. This refers, as I recall, to data freshly written to the disk. Data that hangs out for a while 'leaks' deeper into the disk, with adjacent molecules becoming aligned further between tracks and deeper into the disk and is harder to erase. A dejanews search under colin's name should yield his extensive posts on this topic. Tom

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FUCK ME HARD
by Igor Chudov ＠ home 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FUCK NME HARD

2 1

hahaha
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

test

1 0

Re: Dr. Vulis
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:59 PM 11/5/96 +0100, Gary Howland wrote: >> > I recall we've been through this over a year ago, when I saw an announcement >> > of a cypherpunks physical meeting where someone was excluded for his political >> > views, and I said that I don't consider myself a cypherpunk. I'm glad that >> > John and Bill, the auhorities on cypherpunk membership, finally concur. > > >I think he is referring to the explicit and public non-invite of Jim >Bell to a cypherpunks meeting, due to some of Jim Bell's Assination >Politics posts. >Gary I'd like to correct this impression. Alan Olsen was, apparently, quite aware of my AP posts when I (and everyone else) was invited to the first Portland CP meeting. I had heard no objection to them from him. The meeting was advertised as being sufficiently confidential that he specifically requested that nobody take pictures or record the meeting, etc. Fair enough, I thought. I generally interpreted this to mean that the meeting was at least approximately "off the record." Arriving at the meeting, I detected no indication that Alan Olsen was at all disturbed at me, or anything I had said previously. At the meeting all went well, _or_so_I_thought_. It was all very routine. One thing I decided to mention, actually only hint at, was a technical capability that I was working one. However, I gave merely the broadest hints; What I did say would certainly have sounded technically at least implausible, if not quite impossible. (The situation was somewhat analogous to the old story about the blind men coming across an elephant; one touches only the tail and calls it a snake, the other touches a leg and calls it a tree, etc.) Intentionally, I didn't explain how I would accomplish the goal I described. Even so, there was still no indication from Alan Olsen that anything was amiss. And the meeting ended on that note. Much to my surprise, Alan Olsen blurted out over the CP list only a barely fair description of what I had said (which itself was only the hints I chose to describe) and called me various names, etc. I think he used the term "voodoo" to describe what I was planning to develop. When, eventually, I _do_ explain the whole thing, and I repeat exactly what I told the assembled group, it will become obvious why what I described _sounded_ so implausible, yet was quite doable given modern technology. I should point out that given how little I told, avoiding the REAL explanation, it could very well have been taken for voodoo. And it didn't surprise me that SOMEBODY would have come to that impression. The surprising and shocking thing about it was that he (Alan Olsen) violated the very confidentiality he had insisted on, without any sort of warning, and after-the-fact. Needless to say, I raked him over the coals publicly, on CP, for having done this, and he was severely chastized because of this. "Ripped him a new one" might describe it, although he certainly deserved the treatment. Obviously, a number of people on this list got the mistaken impression that this disagreement had something to do with my AP proposal. As far as I know, quite the contrary, it did not. But I saw two possibilities, after the fact: One, Alan Olsen hid his disapproval for AP, hoping to catch me in some sort of contradiction. Two, after he was embarrassed by my calling him on his bad behavior, he grabbed at the first thing he could think of to criticize me. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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