- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: More Euro Key Escrow
by Bryondp＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

take me off this list

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Re: Giving Kill Files a Workout...
by cvhd＠indyweb.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:52 AM 11/16/96 -0800, you wrote: >What a week! What is this? "Net Loon pig-pile on Cypherpunks day?" >So far i have killfiled three people in the past two days. (That is the >total number I filtered to trash before that date.) >For those of you who are sick of wading through this mess, I am willing to >show you what it will take to filter those of your choice to /dev/null or >its local equivelent. (procmail can be your friend!) >Maybe after some creative filtering, the list will settle back to the usual >noise, instead of the net-loon noise. As the smoke from the first rounds of cyber-gunfire of the Gilmore vs Vulius shootout were wafting thru C-space several of us were bemoaning the fact that the entire issue hadn't been handled thru creative filtering on the part of list members as opposed to the heavy-handed "Big-Bro'ish" plug pulling by Mr. Gilmore. The "net-loon noise" level increase was predictable. Like you I will continue to perform creative filtering in order to extract the 4 out of 240 messages worth reading in any given 48 hour period. cvhd

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Re: Mailing list liability (fwd)
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:13 PM 11/9/96 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: >> From markm@gak Sat Nov 9 21:03:24 1996 >> Note that none of these say anything about any commercial service being held >> liable for defamatory statements because the service cancelled a user's >> account or prevented a user from posting in certain areas. I really don't >> see why you consider unsubscribing someone from a mailing list the equivalent >> of monitoring posts and exercising editorial control. > >It is exactly editorial control because it prevents, a priori, submissions by >Vulis under that account. He is FORCED to resort to other means. That is >what the courts will see, it is what the jury will see, and it is what will >eventualy sink the list, and place its operator under financial burden for >years. This is inaccurate. Vulis is still sending posts to the list and they are distributed to subscribers. You seem to have assumed that submissions are only accepted from subscribers. This assumption is wrong. >I joined this list under my own volition, I agreed to no review by the list >operator at any time. I did not agree to not hurt his feelings with my >comments or views. I did not agree to agree with the operator of the list. >I did not agree to make him feel warm and fuzzy inside. I agreed to NOTHING >other than my permission for him to put your submissions in my email box. I have a very hard time seeing a contract here - I don't think there was anything close to a "meeting of the minds" to the terms you seem to imagine, nor do I see any consideration. As you've indicated above, you took on no obligations - which suggests that your relationship to the list owner is not that of a party to a contract, but as a recipient of a gift. The donor of a gift (or series of gifts) is free to stop giving at their whim. > The >only way I can be removed from this list and not open the operator up to >legal consequences is by my own volition or the total cessation of this list. >This applies to every member subscribed so long as their is no proviso posted >at subscription time. I disagree strongly. I also strongly disagree that there was/is any contract between Gilmore and list subscribers or authors. And I strongly disagree with your ideas about posting notices and the "default" situation where notices aren't posted. I think that you're mixing up your analyses re defamation and contract (they are **not** the same thing). I also think you're using contract-style language to describe obligations apparently imposed by law, which is misleading. Further, I'm not aware of any law which would impose the obligations you imagine. If you've got better information, perhaps you'd be kind enough to post a citation so the rest of us can catch up with you. The case summaries you posted don't support your conclusion. The only one that's even in the neighborhood is Stratton-Oakmont; which, as I pointed out before, is appreciably different factually (the degree of control was much greater, the forum was advertised as a controlled one, and the defendant inspected the message before it was made public), did not receive further scrutiny at an appellate level, and has been criticized by commentators and scholars as being poorly reasoned. Stratton-Oakmont is a poor case to rely upon. As far as I can tell, you're basing your legal conclusion on the depth and quality of your feelings about this issue, which is always a mistake. Finally (and dispositively), the entire field of liability for "publishers" of online information was changed by the Communications Decency Act. See <http://www.gdf.com/lb4-1.htm#N3> for more. But this discussion reminds me of the unproductive discussions that various legal-minded folks (myself included) have had with Jim Bell from time to time. And I try not to spend time on unproductive pursuits. So I am not going to write more about this. I've offered my analysis, and readers can & will give it whatever weight they think it merits. If I don't respond to your messages, it's not because I don't think you're wrong, it's because I don't think saying it over & over helps anyone. Mike Godwin has written and thought a lot about liability for defamation in the online service provider context. I recommend his work to people who want to learn more. It's clear that you think John Gilmore did the wrong thing when he excluded Vulis. The notion that a relatively inflexible and harsh liability scheme awaits system operators who wander into some form of content control can be an attractive one. I don't blame you for liking that idea. But your conclusion is not supported by case law nor traditional theories of contract, tort, or property law. The result you want (any content control = duty to inspect every message = harsh result) might be a good one but it is not the state of the law today. If you're getting your legal information from computer media or mass media you're probably getting partially incorrect information or interpretation. -- Greg Broiles | "In this court, appellant and respondent are the gbroiles(a)netbox.com | same person. Each party has filed a brief." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Lodi v. Lodi, 173 Cal.App.3d 628, 219 Cal. | Rptr. 116 (3rd Dist, 1985)

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Re: One Big Telecoms Company
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:23 PM 11/15/96 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >Progress? Most major cities (when I was a kid) had *several* competing >newspapers, Few realize that NYC today has circa 20 daily newspapers (circa 5 in English and circa 15 in other languages). In addition, I can read a hundred daily newspapers (or more) on the nets. DCF

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Re: THAT is what makes ---Snipshit---------
by dshipman＠ewol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> time for ------Snipshit--------- >> An excellent --------Snipshit------------- > >In that case ---------------Snipshit------------ >Jai Maharaj >%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:%:% Om Shanti %:%:% Splash!! Another one falls from filter to Crap Bucket. Damn, a week ago I didn't even know how to *use* a filter! DLS --------------- A fanatic is one who can't change his mind and won't change the subject. -- Winston Churchill

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RE: WinKrypt
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

By way of JYA: > >"WinKrypt's marriage of highly sophisticated technology -- such > >as the advanced, not-for- export 256-bit GOST encryption > >algorithm contained in the KeyMail program -- with a > >user-friendly interface virtually redefines the PC security > >category," said Syncronys. >> >> http://www.syncronys.com. ROTFL! Marvelous. This from the folks who brought us SoftRam95, arguably the most blatant fraud ever perpetuated on the software buying public. For that, they recently got off with a remarkably soft slap on the wrist from the FTC. (See http://ftp.uni-mannheim.de/info/OReilly/windows/win95.update/softram.htm l for the story.) I wouldn't buy a _screen saver_ from these folks, let alone a mission critical piece like email encryption! Tunny ====================================================================== James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C ====================================================================== >

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Rush disses anonymity
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sitting here listening to Rush, and he's talking about Pierre Salanger's recent "discovery" ;-) of the anonymously posted friendly-fire TWA800 internet message of a few months back. In the process of discounting the story, and praising FBI pal Kalstrom, he bemoans the anonymity of the net, calling it a "nest of kooks", (mixed in with all the other "right thinking people", of course...). Given this, and, of course, our own fun and games with anonymous, er, slander, on this list, I'm frequently tempted to agree with him. After all, if someone says something wrong about you, how do find them and punish them? How do you know what the truth is, unless you know who said it? (What? An appeal to authority? Moi? I'm *shocked* you would assert such a thing...) Until, of course, I remember that anonymity is unpreventable, and, frankly, economically necessary for true internet commerce. Remember what agrarianism did to try to stop industrialism (up to, and including, socialism <he said, trolling for leftists>), and expect the worst, folks. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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RE: Validating a program
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> wrote (regarding PGP's security): >> In short, if you're paranoid, feel free to look over the >>source. But the fact that most people have never peeked under the >>hood is not a strike against pgp at all. Ed replies: >Maybe you missed my point, or I miss-communicated. My question is as >follows: If PGP and DES are as secure as thought to be, then why is it >not ruled illegal software, just as they do with silencers, narcotics, >certain type weapons, etc..... My opinion is "NOT A PARANOID VIEW, BUT >RATHER A REALITY". I find it impossible that software that could be a >National Security Threat, being shared by the masses! I believe >either people are nieve, or ignorant of the capability of the NSA. If >there are "back-doors to the algorithms, you can bet your life you and no >one else will find out. The conceivability that encryption on the Net >is safe, is ludicrous! > >Just my thoughts, and not paranoia. > > >Ed Why does it follow that these must be crackable, or the government would have outlawed them? Despite recent moves to limit encryption, there are currently NO domestic (U.S.) restrictions on crypto. Nothing prohibits you from using a true One Time Pad, which is mathematically proven to be unbreakable, now and forever, even against infinite resources. If this is not prohibited (and it isn't), doesn't that refute your argument? You may find it impossible that the masses are allowed to use truly unbreakable crypto, but it's true -- for the time being, anyway. Tunny ====================================================================== James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C ======================================================================

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:29 AM 11/8/1996, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: > Peter's point: If everyone in the US wants a ban on strong crypto, > excepth the people on this list and the million-odd terrorists who are > using strong crypto to murder, rape, pillage, etc., then strong crypto > will be banned. Yes, you've mostly got it. I would quibble a little bit - if any of the real bad things happens (id est, Assassination Politics) even many of the members of this list will be calling for GAK. > Furthermore, terrorrim and etc do not depend upon secure > communications to work. People tend to be able to talk face-to-face in > isolated environs, this is just as effective as a good public-key > cryptosystem. Crypto won't suddenly protect the types of people who > are professional killers/terrorists from scrutiny. It meerly would > allow them to communicate securely over distances of more than 10 > feet. This, IMO, is not much of a win for them. Face-to-face communications in isolated environs does not a cryptoanarchy make. > So, you're right. Given the proper conditions, strong crypto could > probably be mostly stopped. However, these conditions are quite > unlikely to arise. I agree that they are unlikely to arise. But, this raises a sticky point for the GAKers - what's all the hurry? Why don't we work with the technology for awhile and see what develops before scurrying off to outlaw it? Here's what they cannot say: "We want to ban cryptography now because it won't be that bad and people will want to use it." Maybe that's part of the classified debriefing that the Star Chamber gets to see. Outlawing cryptography has some obvious problems. It is expensive. It impedes activities which are nearly universally seen as positive, such as net commerce. Combined with the increasing capability for mass surveillance and computer assisted population management, it has Orwellian implications. Outlawing cryptography - at this time - has a high political cost because there is so little justification for it. That means indecisive judges, indecisive politicians, and an increasingly vocal pro-crypto movement. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:53 AM 11/8/1996, Douglas B. Renner wrote: >[snip] >> The key here is that in these cases the practice has become widely >> accepted. By widely accepted, I mean that very significant numbers of >> people believe that there is nothing all that wrong with the practice. >> Those who disagree do not feel it is worth the trouble to put a stop >> to it. >[snip] > While this might be the case, I don't believe it is "key". > Also, I'm not sure why you used this as a counterpoint. Are you saying > that there are not a significant number of people who think there is > nothing wrong with sending truly private messages? I would disagree > with such an assertion based on my own converastions with crypto-ignorant > aquaintances. Most people either trust the gov't implicitly or haven't > thought about it or (erroneously) consider it irrelevant - but deep down > they definitely value their privacy. They also definitely value their safety. Sure, right now there are lots of people who think strong cryptography is a good idea. If the Four Horsemen scenario is correct, that will change very quickly. The reason I used this as a counterpoint is that the premise of my discussion is that it would be possible - maybe even easy - to suppress the use of non-GAKed cryptography were it unpopular. A commonly shared belief among GAKers and Cypherpunks is that strong cryptography is a magic bullet. It isn't. If it's not obviously a disaster, strong cryptography will be widely used. But if it is a disaster and requires GAK, that's a policy option we will always have. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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