- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: improving public acceptance: "alt" mail domain
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Andy Dustman <andy(a)CCMSD.chem.uga.edu> writes: > FYI, anonymous.net is registered to John Gilmore. SHIT!!! Someone, quick, complain to the InterNIC. Who let the cocksucking NSA shill kidnap a domain name? --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: [OFF TOPIC]Comments about CFP '97
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:55 pm -0500 on 3/25/97, Timothy C. May wrote: > Yes, inasmuch as I already have a Troy-Bilt chipper/shredder for disposal > of the byproducts of home defense. > > (Bought even before I saw "Fargo."] Actually, what you *really* want is one of those 400-lb-flywheel jobs that the tree surgeons use to mulch big tree limbs up with. I worked behind one one summer in college. They are *indeed* impressive. Don't forget to freeze everything before you put it in there, though. Works cleaner and faster. Actually, there was a case a few years where a guy did exactly that with his wife, her deep-frozen and all. Only problem was the cops figured it out after they found out he had rented one of these things shortly before she disappeared. Though they didn't find anything of her after the critters in woods behind his house had their "one *tasty* burger", John Law did break the tree mulcher down and find DNA-confirmed microscopic bits of her in the machine's um, interstices... Remember, return the tools clean folks, or you don't get your deposit back. Reminds me of the headless biker we talked about here a while ago. Whoops! Gotta run. Time for lunch! I *love* this list... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/

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TEMPEST Doc
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We've digitized several chapters of the US Army Corps of Engineers "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and TEMPEST Protection for Facilities." http://jya.com/emp.htm Pretty good specs for what to do outside the laboratory to protect against compromising emanations (and rude nukes), many previously discussed here. Reminder: Joel McNamara hosts the non-classified cornucopia: http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempest.html

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Re: KRAP
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jeremey Barrett wrote: > > Key Recovery Agents Plan > I dunno, but they couldn't have picked a better acronym :-) Good eye. I read about it and never noticed their truth-in-advertising acronym. You are hereby awarded 50,000,000 Toto Eca$h credits. (1,000,000,000,000,000,000 = 1 peso) -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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New remailer
by Kevin McGowan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Features: cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub Public key for remailer(a)neva.org -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzL2F4AAAAEEAL2G5u427j6LBWgUi8S1OlCsnaPhoB6h4V0xS2FQfuIQQS9Q dtTL/p406sdGAKtQEm/BecIgY+MLNKNukuOU9ifgz7jAs3kmm7i4yS714ua4vwag Kg3fJIOiNxIk38ieKJE0s3vfPMZPeGNt8x8y7jfxZuMvuVyjNrYJG4a+gwxNAAUR tBoyTXVsZXMgPHJlbWFpbGVyQG5ldmEub3JnPg== =ta0J -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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WebWorld 17-18
by Bubba Rom Dos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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No Subject
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

its deployer. Subject: Re: game theoretic analysis of junk mail Bryce wrote: > If I send a message to cpunks, and it is destined to reach > 1000 mailboxes, do I have to include USD 100.00 with my > message, which will be split by the majordomo into 1000 > 10-cent pieces? Yikes! And then I have to hope that all of > the cypherpunks return my deposit. Sounds like a bad bet. All discussions of eca$h charges for email seem to refer to a figure of $ .10 as a reasonable sum. I suspect that this is due to people subconsciously equating email with snail mail. I think that email, however, is a creature of its own design, and its essence lies somewhere between snail mail and conversation. Think about this: What if, everytime you spoke to someone during the day, you had to pay a dime? How would this change the interpersonal rapport that goes on daily between friends, acquaintances, and strangers? What if you are a polite person, who thanks others regularly? And it costs you a dime every time you do so? What if people rarely reply, "You're welcome." and it ends up costing you an arm and a leg to be polite? This is just a simple conversational example, to illustrate that a small cost can have major ramifications when applied to various situations. The Internet and the Web indeed have the potential to bring global change in the arenas of knowledge and communications, but the question is, will it do so in a manner that promotes equality, or in a manner that promotes elitism and increased class-structures? The concept of limiting UCE/Spam through use of an email surcharge may be viable, but then one has to deal with issues surrounding those who have a need to communicate and few funds to devote towards doing so. For example, people with disabilities who have legitimate needs to receive support and information via support forums. The minute that $$$ enter the picture, then a class-system begins to develop, and all sorts of individual, corporate and government entities come out of the woodwork to level the playing field, or to build many different levels on the playing field. The Internet's future may well parallel the development of the public school system, in some ways. Public education was indeed something which raised the level of all, but private schools made certain that those who had the edge kept it. My view is that the nadir point in any new direction that society takes comes fairly early after its inception. Thus the near future is the time when it will be decided which direction the Net and the Web will move, and in what areas its potential will be developed. Those who shape the Internet and the Web in the next year or so will have a vast effect on the future. TruthMonger

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Re: Corrupted "From:" headers in my posts
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alec wrote: > At 01:27 AM 3/26/97 -0600, Toto wrote: > |I emailed John Gilmore, asking his advice, and he informed me that > |he has run into this problem before, and would be happy to provide the > |solution, on one condition. > | He wants one million monkeys to send 5737 messages to the list, saying > |"John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker." > | Then, he will provide the solution, and not a moment before. > OK, John, count me in. #1! > "John Gilmore is NOT a cocksucker." EHHHH! John Gilmore IS a cocksucker. This "yes" vote makes up for 10 "no" votes, so you folks better get real busy.

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UK domestic crypto regulation proposal *is* Clipper
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've seen several comments on cypherpunks that misconstrue the UK proposal. E.g. Phillip Hallam-Baker said: > First off the proposals are not intended as a Trojan horse for > the Clipper chip "or any other colonial scheme". > ... > They are emphatically not trying to introduce a Clipper chip proposal. Unfortunately, I believe he is wrong. It's worse than Clipper, since it outlaws the competition. The proposed legislation would make it illegal to offer the UK public any service related to key management, including simply signing peoples' keys, without being licensed by the state. This licensing scheme includes a GAK requirement, an interoperability requirement, and a whole pile of requirements that may need a little translation. This means that there would only be *one* public-key infrastructure in the UK (they claim this as a feature for end-users, since it provides interoperability -- though they apparently haven't picked *whose* PKI they are going to enshrine as a monopoly). Unfortunately it would be completely subverted by the government. Users would have no choice about whether to use a different infrastructure, say from another country, or by setting it up themselves using PGP, Secure DNS, or whatever. The "trust" they offer is 100% sham, since you yourself don't get to pick who you trust. They do. "It will be necessary to ensure that TTP security personnel are competent, suitably qualified, trusted, & have successfully completed a recognised security vetting procedure." Translation: "Public key certification authorities will need a security clearance." "Checks will need to be undertaken to ensure that the background and other business interests of [TTP company] directors would not compromise the trust placed in a TTP." And later, "Checks will be made to ensure that those who own, or effectively control, an organisation, are suitable candidates for ownership of a TTP." Translation: "We will only license people who we believe will turn over anyone's key on demand. If they show any sign that their customers could actually trust them to keep private keys private, their license will not be approved." It explicitly states: It will be a criminal offence for a body to offer or provide licensable encryption services to the UK public without a valid license. This isn't a requirement on USERS, it's a requirement on OFFERERS. However, what this means for users is that if you want to use digital signatures, you have to use a Traitorous Third Party. It will be illegal for anyone else to offer you a digital signature service. Perhaps you could use encryption without using digital signatures, but you've just lost most of the benefits of public-key cryptography. I believe the proposal outlaws Secure DNS services. Merely signing the keys of sub-domains, for free or for money, would be illegal. You will only be able to secure the Internet if you first subvert the Internet by turning over the keys. And while the government mentions in several places that it isn't interested in access to authentication keys, the proposal still requires that anyone providing authentication services (like signing keys) be a licensed TTP and subject to GAK. John Gilmore

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Re: improving public acce
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In> Adam Back, <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk>, writes: > What we need to do, is to arrange a wide-spread anonymous mail system > on the internet, which is accepted as unchangeable on a practical > basis, where no reply addresses, and no indication of sender is given, > and it accepted as a given that the sender can not be traced. Hmm, could a NYM account maybe serve as entry and exit point for a remailer? That would - - have the advantage, that the remailer, the domain and the operator aren't even known ("Anonymity for anonymous remailers" - my former proposal of usage of "shared account" remailers becomes an actual possibility here) and therefore shut-downs are unlikely. With the exception of the NYM-account, which is trivial to replace. - - make traffic analysis even harder, for alone by the reply block chain an incoming and outgoing message would "disappear" in other traffic, not to mention, that the NYM account remailer (and the attached reply block chain) could be only one adress in an even longer chain of remailers. - - encrypt even plain-text messages at least on their way through the reply block chain conventionally, thereby adding to resistance to traffic analysis. - - even out the message load of the available remailers by using preferrably the remailers with only little traffic for the reply block chain, yet again helping against traffic analysis of the general remailer network. Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMzoCVTltEBIEF0MBAQEWPwf/VnssE40IAI0IbHsuzMpYcEg2NaivLXTL teqLYujZJEZPOKh+N+/uZrsPx1qyzppLXtPHLfbG7H4YGsZLX/nDcesRfwHMC5z5 R8SE90VEKkTRIWGE5OsXaeJaNWhb+GBJzzRosGlgLv6YT5lTuMO5jfuNxdmbcprh M2W6RPRljNpg2SRlq/Y1Ci8dOAJFigQUoiZju0+ZrmnZUCddE0Ot5zDA/su8yKX2 5/Ul4/1ccZeBJNbZbZF/c4zEDshZcWqwD+5vAdg9yIhyixMPsJb184+SKLl/Nwrb nAkDIn7QBWJiRJnW2ZYl2KmuKmjPGhZ2FSvCuAjYD5K3eCvuh9wO9A== =uiY3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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