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MixMaster and mlist2...
by Gregory Hicks 05 Aug '05

05 Aug '05

Greetings: I have a bit of a problem here. The mixmaster I have set up is having problems retrieving the mlist2.txt file The address I have for it is: wget -O - http://xenophon.homeip.net/echolot/mlist2.txt > mlist2 && \ But this node does not respond. Any idea for another source of the list? Thanks! Regards, Gregory Hicks

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Well, they got what they want...
by Tyler Durden 05 Aug '05

05 Aug '05

...I'm sure most are aware that random searches has begun here in NYC, at subway stations and in the LIRR. Contraband (drugs, etc...) can get the owner arrested. The next step, of course, will be to start grabbing anyone carrying terrorist propaganda, such as the Qu'ran, leaflets, or even the New York Times. The sad thing is that it is still absurdly easy to get whatever you want into the subways. For one, not every station has any kind of significant police presence (funny, but the Chambers street station this morning had multiple possible places where someone could enter with a backpack, despite the fact that it opens directly inside "Ground Zero" and the path Trains to New Jersey). But even if there were police everywhere, there are still many places between stations where someone determined could enter. OK, OK...so the police are deterrents against a few lone crazy copycats, who don't have enough sense to enter away from police line-of-site. But it sure seems damned silly to be giving up constitutional protection for the sake of an image of protection.

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Re: MixMaster and mlist2...
by Gregory Hicks 05 Aug '05

05 Aug '05

> Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2005 14:39:45 -0700 (PDT) > From: Gregory Hicks <ghicks> > To: cypherpunks(a)jfet.org > Subject: MixMaster and mlist2... > Cc: ghicks > > Greetings: > > I have a bit of a problem here. The mixmaster I have set up > is having problems retrieving the mlist2.txt file Never mind. Found one and the mailer is back running. Appreciate opportunity to vent. Regards, Gregory Hicks > > The address I have for it is: > > wget -O - http://xenophon.homeip.net/echolot/mlist2.txt > mlist2 && \ > > But this node does not respond. Any idea for another source of the list? > > Thanks! > > Regards, > Gregory Hicks --------------------------------------------------------------------- Gregory Hicks | Principal Systems Engineer Cadence Design Systems | Direct: 408.576.3609 555 River Oaks Pkwy M/S 6B1 | Fax: 408.894.3479 San Jose, CA 95134 | Internet: ghicks(a)cadence.com I am perfectly capable of learning from my mistakes. I will surely learn a great deal today. "A democracy is a sheep and two wolves deciding on what to have for lunch. Freedom is a well armed sheep contesting the results of the decision." - Benjamin Franklin "The best we can hope for concerning the people at large is that they be properly armed." --Alexander Hamilton

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RE: Prosecutors: CIA agents left trail
by Tyler Durden 03 Aug '05

03 Aug '05

Reverse Rendition? Here's where Liberals can take a stand...let's round up some of these fuckers and stuff 'em in a shipping container on a Chinese barge to Italy. I've done a quick google search and I've only found a couple of the names. Is the complete list available? -TD >From: Eugen Leitl <eugen(a)leitl.org> >To: cypherpunks(a)jfet.org >Subject: Prosecutors: CIA agents left trail >Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2005 15:22:04 +0200 > >http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/28/cia.phonetrail.ap/index.html > >Prosecutors: CIA agents left trail >Cellphone calls blew their cover > >Thursday, July 28, 2005; Posted: 8:05 p.m. EDT (00:05 GMT) > >ROME, Italy (AP) -- It wasn't their lavish spending in luxury hotels, their >use of credit cards or even frequent-flier miles that drew attention. >Instead >it was a trail of casual cellphone use that tripped up the 19 purported CIA >operatives wanted by Italian authorities in the alleged kidnapping of a >radical Muslim cleric. > >Italian prosecutors who have obtained arrest warrants for the 19 -- none of >whom are believed to be in Italy -- presented evidence that the suspects >used >at least 40 Italian cell phones, some in their own names. > >Experts say that either they were bumbling spies, or they acted with >impunity >because Italian officials had been informed of their plan -- a claim the >government of Premier Silvio Berlusconi has publicly denied on several >occasions. (Full story) > >"If these were really CIA agents they've made a disaster," said Andrea >Nativi, >research director for the Rome-based Military Center for Strategic Studies. >"They strained relations between Italy and the U.S. and between the CIA and >Italian intelligence agencies." > >Italian judges issued a first batch of warrants last month for 13 Americans >accused of abducting Osama Moustafa Hassan Nasr, known as Abu Omar, on a >Milan >street on February 17, 2003. > >Another court this week issued another six warrants for a group the >prosecution claims planned the abduction. (Full story) >Vulnerable cellphones > >The Egyptian cleric was flown from Aviano, a joint U.S.-Italian air base >north >of Venice, to Ramstein Air Base in Germany and then to Egypt, where he was >reportedly tortured. The operation purportedly was part of the CIA's >"extraordinary rendition" program, in which terror suspects are transferred >to >third countries without court approval. > >In his request for the latest warrants, prosecutor Armando Spataro wrote >that >an analysis of mobile phone traffic showed that most of them were present >on >the route that Abu Omar habitually took from his home to a Milan mosque, >"including in the days before" the kidnapping. > >A track of their cell phones also showed them on those streets "nearly 100 >times" during the month before Abu Omar's disappearance, the prosecutor >said. >He concluded that the six were part "of a single group of Americans who >came >to Milan to carry out the operation." > >Why they would use their cell phones so openly has baffled experts, >particularly since prosecutors are certain that not all the names of the 19 >suspects are aliases. > >One has been identified by prosecutors as the former CIA station chief in >Milan, Robert Seldon Lady, who owns a retirement home in wine country in >Asti, >near Turin. Though police didn't find Lady there when they raided the >house, >they did discover a list of hotels where U.S. government employees received >discounts, including hotels where prosecutors contend the suspects stayed. > >Another person on the list has the same name as a man who now works at the >U.S. Embassy in Tanzania. > >Unless the power or the wireless antenna is turned off, a mobile phone >remains >in constant contact with the nearest cell towers even when it's not being >used >for a call. Information processed by the cells can be used to precisely >locate >or track the movements of a phone user. > >Nativi, the military expert, called the use of regular cell phone accounts >"a >huge weakness in the operation." > >It would have been more difficult to track anonymous prepaid cards, >satellite >phones or radios, he said. > >The wireless system used in Italy and most of the rest of Europe relies on >a >stamp-sized smart card that is inserted in the back of every handset. This >removable "SIM" card stores an individual's phone number and other account >data. > >A unique numerical identifier is assigned to every phone and every SIM, >said >Bruno Errico, director of consulting for Openwave Global Services, a >company >that provides tracking applications and other software to wireless >companies >worldwide. > >Wireless companies are obliged by law to keep records of the unique data >that >each phone exchanges with the cell network as well as the numbers to which >calls are placed, he said. > >Since a phone is served by several cells at any given time, investigators >can >easily triangulate the location of a device, Errico said. In an urban area, >where the network of cells is dense and overlapping, such tracking can have >a >margin of error of just a few yards. >Going uncovered > >Had the agents used non-Italian phones and SIMs, the local network would >still >have tracked them, but magistrates might have had a tougher time linking >the >phones to each of the suspects since not all countries require wireless >users >to provide identification, said Errico. To avoid tracking, the agents would >have had to use other systems not available to the general public, such as >radios, Errico said. > >"As long as you use public communication systems, there is no way you can >avoid being tracked," he said. > >Or, as Nativi put it: "When you go on this kind of operation, you need to >turn >off your damn phone." > >Yoram Schweitzer, a researcher for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies >in >Tel Aviv, said he wasn't surprised the operatives stayed in five-star >hotels, >which provide excellent cover for those posing as businessmen or >businesswomen. But analysts did question whether using of credit cards was >advisable. > >Chris Aaron, a former editor of Jane's Intelligence Review magazine, said >the >team must have known that local cells phones put them at risk of being >exposed. > >"A CIA team would have been aware of the Italian ability to log calls and >track their location, so they clearly weren't worried about that," he said. > >The CIA in Washington has declined to comment on the case. > >Copyright 2005 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.This material may >not >be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. > >-- >Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> >______________________________________________________________ >ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org >8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE > >[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which >had a name of signature.asc]

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Prosecutors: CIA agents left trail
by Eugen Leitl 03 Aug '05

03 Aug '05

http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/28/cia.phonetrail.ap/index.html Prosecutors: CIA agents left trail Cellphone calls blew their cover Thursday, July 28, 2005; Posted: 8:05 p.m. EDT (00:05 GMT) ROME, Italy (AP) -- It wasn't their lavish spending in luxury hotels, their use of credit cards or even frequent-flier miles that drew attention. Instead it was a trail of casual cellphone use that tripped up the 19 purported CIA operatives wanted by Italian authorities in the alleged kidnapping of a radical Muslim cleric. Italian prosecutors who have obtained arrest warrants for the 19 -- none of whom are believed to be in Italy -- presented evidence that the suspects used at least 40 Italian cell phones, some in their own names. Experts say that either they were bumbling spies, or they acted with impunity because Italian officials had been informed of their plan -- a claim the government of Premier Silvio Berlusconi has publicly denied on several occasions. (Full story) "If these were really CIA agents they've made a disaster," said Andrea Nativi, research director for the Rome-based Military Center for Strategic Studies. "They strained relations between Italy and the U.S. and between the CIA and Italian intelligence agencies." Italian judges issued a first batch of warrants last month for 13 Americans accused of abducting Osama Moustafa Hassan Nasr, known as Abu Omar, on a Milan street on February 17, 2003. Another court this week issued another six warrants for a group the prosecution claims planned the abduction. (Full story) Vulnerable cellphones The Egyptian cleric was flown from Aviano, a joint U.S.-Italian air base north of Venice, to Ramstein Air Base in Germany and then to Egypt, where he was reportedly tortured. The operation purportedly was part of the CIA's "extraordinary rendition" program, in which terror suspects are transferred to third countries without court approval. In his request for the latest warrants, prosecutor Armando Spataro wrote that an analysis of mobile phone traffic showed that most of them were present on the route that Abu Omar habitually took from his home to a Milan mosque, "including in the days before" the kidnapping. A track of their cell phones also showed them on those streets "nearly 100 times" during the month before Abu Omar's disappearance, the prosecutor said. He concluded that the six were part "of a single group of Americans who came to Milan to carry out the operation." Why they would use their cell phones so openly has baffled experts, particularly since prosecutors are certain that not all the names of the 19 suspects are aliases. One has been identified by prosecutors as the former CIA station chief in Milan, Robert Seldon Lady, who owns a retirement home in wine country in Asti, near Turin. Though police didn't find Lady there when they raided the house, they did discover a list of hotels where U.S. government employees received discounts, including hotels where prosecutors contend the suspects stayed. Another person on the list has the same name as a man who now works at the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania. Unless the power or the wireless antenna is turned off, a mobile phone remains in constant contact with the nearest cell towers even when it's not being used for a call. Information processed by the cells can be used to precisely locate or track the movements of a phone user. Nativi, the military expert, called the use of regular cell phone accounts "a huge weakness in the operation." It would have been more difficult to track anonymous prepaid cards, satellite phones or radios, he said. The wireless system used in Italy and most of the rest of Europe relies on a stamp-sized smart card that is inserted in the back of every handset. This removable "SIM" card stores an individual's phone number and other account data. A unique numerical identifier is assigned to every phone and every SIM, said Bruno Errico, director of consulting for Openwave Global Services, a company that provides tracking applications and other software to wireless companies worldwide. Wireless companies are obliged by law to keep records of the unique data that each phone exchanges with the cell network as well as the numbers to which calls are placed, he said. Since a phone is served by several cells at any given time, investigators can easily triangulate the location of a device, Errico said. In an urban area, where the network of cells is dense and overlapping, such tracking can have a margin of error of just a few yards. Going uncovered Had the agents used non-Italian phones and SIMs, the local network would still have tracked them, but magistrates might have had a tougher time linking the phones to each of the suspects since not all countries require wireless users to provide identification, said Errico. To avoid tracking, the agents would have had to use other systems not available to the general public, such as radios, Errico said. "As long as you use public communication systems, there is no way you can avoid being tracked," he said. Or, as Nativi put it: "When you go on this kind of operation, you need to turn off your damn phone." Yoram Schweitzer, a researcher for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, said he wasn't surprised the operatives stayed in five-star hotels, which provide excellent cover for those posing as businessmen or businesswomen. But analysts did question whether using of credit cards was advisable. Chris Aaron, a former editor of Jane's Intelligence Review magazine, said the team must have known that local cells phones put them at risk of being exposed. "A CIA team would have been aware of the Italian ability to log calls and track their location, so they clearly weren't worried about that," he said. The CIA in Washington has declined to comment on the case. Copyright 2005 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[fc-announce] CFP FC'06: Financial Cryptography and Data Security
by R.A. Hettinga 03 Aug '05

03 Aug '05

--- begin forwarded text To: fc-announce(a)ifca.ai From: Avi Rubin <rubin(a)jhu.edu> Subject: [fc-announce] CFP FC'06: Financial Cryptography and Data Security Sender: fc-announce-admin(a)ifca.ai Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2005 13:58:29 -0400 <x-flowed> Call for Papers FC'06: Financial Cryptography and Data Security http://fc06.ifca.ai/ Tenth International Conference February 27 to March 2, 2006 Anguilla, British West Indies Submissions Due Date: October 17, 2005 Program Chairs: Giovanni Di Crescenzo (Telcordia) Avi Rubin (Johns Hopkins University) General Chair: Patrick McDaniel (Penn State University) Local Arrangements Chair: Rafael Hirschfeld (Unipay Technologies) At its 10th year edition, Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC'06) is a well established and major international forum for research, advanced development, education, exploration, and debate regarding security in the context of finance and commerce. We will continue last year's augmentation of the conference title and expansion of our scope to cover all aspects of securing transactions and systems. These aspects include a range of technical areas such as: cryptography, payment systems, secure transaction architectures, software systems and tools, user and operator interfaces, fraud prevention, secure IT infrastructure, and analysis methodologies. Our focus will also encompass financial, legal, business and policy aspects. Material both on theoretical (fundamental) aspects of securing systems, on secure applications and real-world deployments will be considered. The conference goal is to bring together top cryptographers, data-security specialists, and scientists with economists, bankers, implementers, and policy makers. Intimate and colorful by tradition, the FC'06 program will feature invited talks, academic presentations, technical demonstrations, and panel discussions. In addition, we will celebrate this 10th year edition with a number of initiatives, such as: especially focused session, technical and historical state-of-the-art panels, and one session of surveys. This conference is organized annually by the International Financial Cryptography Association (IFCA). Original papers, surveys and presentations on all aspects of financial and commerce security are invited. Submissions must have a visible bearing on financial and commerce security issues, but can be interdisciplinary in nature and need not be exclusively concerned with cryptography or security. Possible topics for submission to the various sessions include, but are not limited to: Anonymity and Privacy Microfinance and Auctions Micropayments Audit and Auditability Monitoring, Management and Authentication and Operations Identification, including Reputation Systems Biometrics RFID-Based and Contactless Certification and Payment Systems Authorization Risk Assessment and Commercial Cryptographic Management Applications Secure Banking and Financial Commercial Transactions and Web Services Contracts Securing Emerging Digital Cash and Payment Computational Paradigms Systems Security and Risk Digital Incentive and Perceptions and Judgments Loyalty Systems Security Economics Digital Rights Management Smart Cards and Secure Financial Regulation and Tokens Reporting Trust Management Fraud Detection Trustability and Game Theoretic Approaches to Trustworthiness Security Underground-Market Economics Identity Theft, Physhing and Usability and Acceptance of Social Engineering Security Systems Infrastructure Design User and Operator Interfaces Legal and Regulatory Issues Voting system security Submission Instructions Submission Categories FC'06 is inviting submissions in four categories: (1) research papers, (2) systems and applications presentations, (3) panel sessions, (4) surveys. For all accepted submissions, at least one author must attend the conference and present the work. Research Papers Research papers should describe novel scientific contributions to the field, and they will be subject to rigorous peer review. Papers can be a maximum of 15 pages in length (including references and appendices), and accepted submissions will be published in full in the conference proceedings. Systems and Application Presentations Submissions in this category should describe novel or successful systems with an emphasis on secure digital commerce applications. Presentations may concern commercial systems, academic prototypes, or open-source projects for any of the topics listed above. Where appropriate, software or hardware demonstrations are encouraged as part of the presentations in these sessions. Submissions in this category should consist of a short summary of the work (1-6 pages in length) to be reviewed by the Program Committee, along with a short biography of the presenters. Accepted submissions will be presented at the conference (25 minutes per presentation), and a one-page abstract will be published in the conference proceedings. Panel Sessions Proposals for panel sessions are also solicited, and should include a brief description of the panel as well as prospective participants. Accepted panel sessions will be presented at the conference, and each participant will contribute a one-page abstract to be published in the conference proceedings. Surveys A limited number of surveys presentations may also be included in the program. We encourage submissions that summarize the current state of the art on any well-defined subset of the above listed submission topics. A limited description of visions on future directions of research in these topics would also be appreciated. Survey submissions can be significantly shorter than research paper submissions. Preparation Instructions Submissions to the research papers, systems/application presentation categories and surveys must be received by the due date. Papers must be formatted in standard PostScript, PDF format, or MS Word. Submissions in other formats will be rejected. All papers must be submitted electronically according to the instructions and forms found on this web site and at the submission site. Authors should provide names and affiliations at submission time, and have the option of including or not names and affiliations in their submitted papers, that must include on their first page the title of the paper, the a brief abstract, and a list of topical keywords. Accepted submissions will be included in the conference proceedings to be published in the Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) series after the conference, so the submissions must be formatted in the standard LNCS format (15 page limit). Authors of accepted submissions will be required to complete and sign an IFCA copyright form. A pre-proceedings volume containing preliminary versions of the papers will be distributed at the conference. Questions about all conference submissions should be directed to the Program Chairs. Paper Submission Authors should only submit work that does not substantially overlap with work that is currently submitted or has been accepted for publication to a conference with proceedings or a journal. Please check back as the deadline approaches for a link to the submission server. The Rump Session FC'06 will also include the popular "rump session" held on one of the evenings in an informal, social atmosphere. The rump session is a program of short (5-7 minute), informal presentations on works in progress, off-the-cuff ideas, and any other matters pertinent to the conference. Any conference attendee is welcome to submit a presentation to the Rump Session Chair (to be announced). This submission should consist of a talk title, the name of the presenter, and, if desired, a very brief abstract. Submissions may be sent via e-mail, or submitted in person through the Monday of the conference. Program Committee Matt Blaze, University of Pennsylvania Alfredo De Santis, University of Salerno, Italy Sven Dietrich, CERT Research Center Juan Garay, Bell Labs Dan Geer, Verdasys Ari Juels, RSA Aggelos Kiayias, University of Connecticut Yoshi Kohno, University of California San Diego Arjen Lenstra, Bell Labs and Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Helger Lipmaa, Cybernetica AS and University of Tartu Steve Myers, Indiana University Andrew Odlyzko, University of Minnesota Tatsuaki Okamoto, NTT Carles Padro, Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya Andrew Patrick, NRC, Canada Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Ruhr-University Bochum Kazue Sako, NEC Dawn Song, CMU Stuart Stubblebine, University of California Davis & Stubblebine Labs Adam Stubblefield, Independent Security Evaluators Paul Syverson, NRL Mike Szydlo, RSA Gene Tsudik, University of California Irvine Doug Tygar, Berkeley University Alma Whitten, Google Yacov Yacobi, Microsoft Research Moti Yung, RSA & Columbia University Yuliang Zheng, University of North Carolina Important Dates: Paper Submission: October 17, 2005 Notification: December 8th, 2005 Pre-Proceedings: January 27th, 2005 Conference dates: February 27 to March 2, 2006 Post Proceedings: April 10, 2006 ************************************************** Avi Rubin Professor, Computer Science Technical Director, Information Security Institute Johns Hopkins University rubin(a)jhu.edu 410-516-8177 (Voice) 443-264-2406 (Fax) http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~rubin/ ************************************************** _______________________________________________ fc-announce mailing list fc-announce(a)ifca.ai http://mail.ifca.ai/mailman/listinfo/fc-announce </x-flowed> --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[Clips] Finger points to British intelligence as al-Qaeda websites are wiped out
by R.A. Hettinga 02 Aug '05

02 Aug '05

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips(a)philodox.com Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2005 23:01:38 -0400 To: Philodox Clips List <clips(a)philodox.com> From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: [Clips] Finger points to British intelligence as al-Qaeda websites are wiped out Reply-To: rah(a)philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces(a)philodox.com <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-523-1715166-523,00.html> The Times of London July 31, 2005 Finger points to British intelligence as al-Qaeda websites are wiped out Over the past fortnight Israeli intelligence agents have noticed something distinctly odd happening on the internet. One by one, Al-Qaeda's affiliated websites have vanished until only a handful remain, write Uzi Mahnaimi and Alex Pell. Someone has cut the line of communication between the spiritual leaders of international terrorism and their supporters. Since 9/11 the websites have been the main links to disseminate propaganda and information. The Israelis detect the hand of British intelligence, determined to torpedo the websites after the London attacks of July 7. The web has become the new battleground of terrorism, permitting a freedom of communication denied to such organisations as the IRA a couple of decades ago. One global jihad site terminated recently was an inflammatory Pakistani site, www.mojihedun.com, in which a section entitled How to Strike a European City gave full technical instructions. Tens of similar sites, some offering detailed information on how to build and use biological weapons, have also been shut down. However, Islamic sites believed to be "moderate", remain. One belongs to the London-based Syrian cleric Abu Basir al-Tartusi, whose www.abubaseer.bizland.com remained operative after he condemned the London bombings. However, the scales remain weighted in favour of global jihad, the first virtual terror organisation. For all the vaunted spying advances such as tracking mobile phones and isolating key phrases in telephone conversations, experts believe current technologies actually play into the hands of those who would harm us. "Modern technology puts most of the advantages in the hands of the terrorists. That is the bottom line," says Professor Michael Clarke, of King's College London, who is director of the International Policy Institute. Government-sponsored monitoring systems, such as Echelon, can track vast amounts of data but have so far proved of minimal benefit in preventing, or even warning, of attacks. And such systems are vulnerable to manipulation: low-ranking volunteers in terrorist organisations can create background chatter that ties up resources and maintains a threshold of anxiety. There are many tricks of the trade that give terrorists secure digital communication and leave no trace on the host computer. Ironically, the most readily available sources of accurate online information on bomb-making are the websites of the radical American militia. "I have not seen any Al-Qaeda manuals that look like genuine terrorist training," claims Clarke. However, the sobering message of many security experts is that the terrorists are unlikely ever to lose a war waged with technology. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips(a)philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "When the hares made speeches in the assembly and demanded that all should have equality, the lions replied, "Where are your claws and teeth?" -- attributed to Antisthenes in Aristotle, 'Politics', 3.7.2

6 9

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by Chasity Brewster 02 Aug '05

02 Aug '05

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by Melody Bender 02 Aug '05

02 Aug '05

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Diebold - might be of interest (fwd)
by J.A. Terranson 01 Aug '05

01 Aug '05

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2005 16:01:13 -0700 From: Lance James <lancej(a)securescience.net> To: "cryptography(a)metzdowd.com" <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: Diebold - might be of interest Hi all, I don't know if this is appropriate on this list, but I know that diebold voting systems have been an issue in the cryptography community for a while now. Having said that, I'm pasting an article that I received (from my parents actually) that might be of interest to this group. If it is not, just moderate :) *Subject:* Black Box Darkness is settling over the election process in San Diego. I say get rid of anything electronic that has to do with elections. Realistic sentiment?! Gene VIEWING THE DIEBOLD VOTE-TALLYING SCREEN PROHIBITED Jim March, a member of the Black Box Voting board of directors, was arrested Tuesday evening for trying to observe the Diebold central tabulator (vote tallying machine) as the votes were being counted in San Diego's mayoral election (July 26). (- online discussion: http:/www.blackboxvoting.org -) According to Jim Hamilton, an elections integrity advocate from San Diego, he and March visited the office of the registrar of elections earlier in the day. During this visit, March made two requests, which were refused by Mikel Haas, the San Diego Registrar of elections. 1) March asked that the central tabulator, the computer that tallies up the votes from all the precincts, be positioned so that citizens could observe it. According to Hamilton, this would have required simply moving a table a few feet. 2) March also asked for a copy of the ".gbf" files -- the vote tally files collected during the course of tabulation - to be provided for examination after the election. During the tallying of the election, the Diebold computer was positioned too far away for citizens to read the screen. Citizens could not watch error messages, or even perceive significant anomalies or malfunctions. Unable to see the screen, March went into the office where the tabulator was housed. Two deputies followed him and escorted him out. According to Hamilton: "He was not belligerent, not at all. After he went inside the tabulator room he came [was escorted] out and he said clearly 'I'm not resisting.' They handcuffed him, took him out of the building. They put him in a squad car. They're going to take him to the police station, book him and take him to jail," said Hamilton. "He's getting charged with a felony, 'interfering with an election official.'" March's actions are the culmination of two years of increasing frustration with the refusal of election officials to respond to security deficiencies in the voting machines. The software that tallies the votes in San Diego is made by Diebold Election Systems, a company that has already paid the state of California $2.8 million for making false claims, due to a lawsuit filed by March and Black Box Voting founder Bev Harris. On July 4, a report was released by European computer security expert Harri Hursti, revealing that the Diebold voting system contains profound architectural flaws. "It is open for business," says Hursti, who demonstrated the flaws on Leon County, Florida Diebold machines. He penetrated the voting system in less than five minutes, manipulating vote reports in a way that was undetectable. Despite the critical security alert issued by Hursti, San Diego County sent 713 voting machines home with poll workers, increasing the risk that the "memory cards" housed in the machines could be hacked, and removing the argument that "inside access" was carefully safeguarded. The arrest of Jim March underlines a fundamental problem facing Americans today as, increasingly, they lose the ability to monitor, verify, or watch any part of the counting process. The San Diego registrar of elections knew of the security flaws in the voting system. Diebold has never denied the vulnerability identified in Hursti's report, found at http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf. Despite knowledge of the increased risks, Haas made the decision to create additional vulnerability by sending the machines home with hundreds of poll workers. While San Diego officials will no doubt point to a small seal on the compartment housing the memory card (the component exploited in Hursti's study), Black Box Voting has interviewed a former San Diego poll worker, who reported that all that is necessary to dislodge and then reaffix the seal is a small pair of pliers. IN A NUTSHELL: - The machines have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to undetected tampering - The San Diego registrar of voters chose not to take appropriate precautions - The main tally machine was placed in a location that was impossible for citizens to observe - Many voting integrity advocates have come to believe that voting machine reform now rivals the urgency of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s. Jim March acted on those beliefs. * * * * * If you share the feelings that Jim March has expressed about voting system secrecy, please forward this message to your lists and to online blogs as appropriate. Permission granted to reprint, with link to http://www.blackboxvoting.org. * * * * Black Box Voting --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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