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Re: [Clips] Feds mull regulation of quantum computers
by cyphrpunk 14 Nov '05

14 Nov '05

> WASHINGTON--Quantum computers don't exist outside the laboratory. But the > U.S. government appears to be exploring whether it should be illegal to > ship them overseas. > > A federal advisory committee met Wednesday to hear an IBM presentation > about just how advanced quantum computers have become--with an eye toward > evaluating when the technology might be practical enough to merit > government regulation. Suppose that quantum computers work and the NSA has them. What steps can or should they take to try to stop the propagation of this technology? If they come out too openly with restrictions, it sends a signal that there's something there, which could drive more research into the technology by the NSA's adversaries, the opposite of the desired outcome. If they leave things alone then progress may continue towards this technology that the NSA wants to suppress. Something like the present action isn't a bad compromise. Work towards restrictions on technology exports, but in a studiously casual fashion. There's nothing to see here, folks. We're just covering our bases, in the outside chance that something comes out of this way down the road. Meanwhile we'll just go ahead and stop exports of related technologies. But we certainly don't think that quantum computers are practical today, heavens no! CP

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RE: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
by Whyte, William 14 Nov '05

14 Nov '05

> > Don't ever encrypt the same message twice that way, or you're likely to > > fall to a common modulus attack, I believe. > > Looks like it (common modulus attack involves same n, > different (e,d) pairs). > > However, you're likely to be picking a random symmetric key as the > "message", and Schneier even suggests picking a random r in Z_n and > encrypting hash(r) as the symmetric key. > > More generally, I wonder about salting all operations to prevent using > the same value more than once. It seems like it's generally a bad > idea to reuse values, as a heuristic, and applying some kind of > uniquification operation to everything, just as it's a good idea to > pad/frame values in such a way that the output of one stage cannot be > used in another stage of the same protocol. I forget the beginning of this conversation... but if you're salting all public-key encryption operations you may as well just use a standard RSA encryption scheme, such as OAEP or RSA-KEM. OAEP is specified in PKCS#1, available from http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125; it's well- studied and has a proof of security, and should certainly be used in preference to any home-grown system. If you were talking about salting something other than public key operations, accept my apologies... William

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Re: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
by John Kelsey 14 Nov '05

14 Nov '05

>From: cyphrpunk <cyphrpunk(a)gmail.com> >Sent: Oct 27, 2005 9:15 PM >To: "James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> >Cc: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com, cypherpunks(a)jfet.org >Subject: Re: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems >On 10/26/05, James A. Donald <jamesd(a)echeque.com> wrote: >> How does one inflate a key? >Just make it bigger by adding redundancy and padding, before you >encrypt it and store it on your disk. That way the attacker who wants >to steal your keyring sees a 4 GB encrypted file which actually holds >about a kilobyte of meaningful data. Current trojans can steal files >and log passwords, but they're not smart enough to decrypt and >decompress before uploading. They'll take hours to snatch the keyfile >through the net, and maybe they'll get caught in the act. Note that there are crypto schemes that use huge keys, and it's possible to produce simple variants of existing schemes that use multiple keys. That would mean that the whole 8GB string was necessary to do whatever crypto thing you wanted to do. A simple example is to redefine CBC-mode encryption as C[i] = E_K(C[i-1] xor P[i] xor S[C[i-1] mod 2^{29}]) where S is the huge shared string, and we're using AES. Without access to the shared string, you could neither encrypt nor decrypt. >CP --John

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Re: How broad is the SPEKE patent.
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 14 Nov '05

14 Nov '05

"James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> writes: >James A. Donald: >> > I figured that the obvious solution to all this was >> > to deploy zero knowledge technologies, where both >> > parties prove knowledge of the shared secret without >> > revealing the shared secret. > >Florian Weimer <fw(a)deneb.enyo.de> >> Keep in mind that one party runs the required software >> on a computed infected with spyware and other kinds of >> Trojan horses. This puts the effectiveness of >> zero-knowledge proofs into question. > >My computers do not have spyware and Trojan horses. My computers have no undetected spyware and Trojan horses. Peter.

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RE: How broad is the SPEKE patent.
by James A. Donald 13 Nov '05

13 Nov '05

-- From: Charlie Kaufman > From a legal perspective, they would > probably have a better chance with SRP, since Stanford > holds a patent and might be motivated to support the > challenge. The vast majority of phishing attacks and other forms of man in the middle attack seek to steal existing shared secrets - passwords, social security numbers, credit card numbers. I figured that the obvious solution to all this was to deploy zero knowledge technologies, where both parties prove knowledge of the shared secret without revealing the shared secret. Now I see that zero knowledge technologies have been deployed - or almost so: SRP-TLS-OpenSSL http://www.edelweb.fr/EdelKey/ (not quite ready for prime time) And SRP GNU-TLS http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/manual/html_node/ Of course, actual use of these technologies means that the browser chrome, not the web page, must set up and verify the password. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG FtM0KMPHrqFLxpaSShaR05Rlxb8CnxF4pHnz9Yqy 4RHOMGs4NJv8heDXAxtfYQ4sYI82tcElZ5wJ4qgvc

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13 Nov '05

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[Clips] Feds mull regulation of quantum computers
by R. A. Hettinga 12 Nov '05

12 Nov '05

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips(a)philodox.com Date: Sat, 12 Nov 2005 12:34:00 -0500 To: Philodox Clips List <clips(a)philodox.com> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: [Clips] Feds mull regulation of quantum computers Reply-To: rah(a)philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces(a)philodox.com <http://news.com.com/2102-11395_3-5942445.html?tag=st.util.print> CNET News Feds mull regulation of quantum computers By Declan McCullagh http://news.com.com/Feds+mull+regulation+of+quantum+computers/2100-11395_3-… Story last modified Wed Nov 09 14:18:00 PST 2005 WASHINGTON--Quantum computers don't exist outside the laboratory. But the U.S. government appears to be exploring whether it should be illegal to ship them overseas. A federal advisory committee met Wednesday to hear an IBM presentation about just how advanced quantum computers have become--with an eye toward evaluating when the technology might be practical enough to merit government regulation. "I like to say we're back in 1947 at the time transistors were invented," David DiVincenzo, an IBM researcher who focuses on quantum computing, told the committee. Only rough prototypes of quantum computers presently exist. But if a large-scale model can be built, in theory it could break codes used to scramble information on the Internet, in banking, and within federal agencies. A certain class of encryption algorithms relies for security on the near-impossibility of factoring large numbers quickly. But quantum computers, at least on paper, can do that calculation millions of times faster than a conventional microprocessor. "It's clear there are promising avenues for doing this," DiVincenzo said of quantum computing research. "There's lots and lots of work done at the basic research level and a sense of progress in the community." The technology industry has been long bedeviled by federal export regulations, which were born during the Cold War and renewed by executive order. And although the highly regulatory approach of the mid-'90s has been relaxed, the export of "high-performance" computers is still subject to several rules, as is encryption software. It's not clear what steps the federal government might take next, and no proposals were advanced during the meeting. The charter of the panel, called the Information Systems Technical Advisory Committee, calls for the panel to "advise" the Commerce Department on export regulations and what technology is presently available. A practical quantum computer may still be far off, but the use of quantum physics already appears in some commercially-available technology. An approach known as quantum cryptography provides encryption that is theoretically impossible to crack--and, at the moment, carries a hefty price tag. The federal advisory committee didn't address quantum cryptography in its open session. A closed session was scheduled for Thursday. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips(a)philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[Clips] [e-gold-list] Phil Zimmermann in RO
by R. A. Hettinga 11 Nov '05

11 Nov '05

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips(a)philodox.com Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2005 17:41:02 -0500 To: "Philodox Clips List" <clips(a)philodox.com> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: [Clips] [e-gold-list] Phil Zimmermann in RO Reply-To: rah(a)philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces(a)philodox.com --- begin forwarded text From: "Graham Kelly" <kelly_clan(a)fastmail.fm> To: "e-gold Discussion" <e-gold-list(a)talk.e-gold.com> Subject: [e-gold-list] Phil Zimmermann in RO Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2005 17:25:03 -0500 Guys, Phil Zimmermann just called me from Romania; he's speaking there at Bucharest, and his schedule will also take him to Athens, Greece, in the next few days. Some of his potential investors were concerned that as he was requesting e-gold and PayPal donations, that his encrypted zfone project could be construed as "mickey mouse", so he has temporarily removed the e-gold and PayPal links from his site, until he evaluates the options. (Investors make the rules, right? LOL) For details on his latest zfone project, see http://philzimmermann.com/EN/zfone/index.html Graham Kelly CEO --------------------------------------------- GoldNow http://www.GoldNow.St US +1 (213) 341-1583 US Fax +1 (213) 559-8555 UK +44 (0)2081506659 Apply for a Swiss bank account! https://www.goldnow.st/sb_buy.asp --- You are currently subscribed to e-gold-list as: rah(a)shipwright.com To unsubscribe send a blank email to leave-e-gold-list-507998N(a)talk.e-gold.com Use e-gold's Secure Randomized Keyboard (SRK) when accessing your e-gold account(s) via the web and shopping cart interfaces to help thwart keystroke loggers and common viruses. --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips(a)philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [murphy.audie@gmail.com: Re: Hacker strikes through student's router]
by Major Variola (ret) 11 Nov '05

11 Nov '05

At 08:53 AM 11/9/05 +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: >Freemasons continued to communicate via private channels with secret >handshakes, etc. That is an authentication mechanism based on "what you know", not a confidentiality (privacy, comm endpoint control) technique.

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