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Re: [liberationtech] Exactly how are satellite transmissions tapped/intercepted, in Syria and elsewhere?
by Brian Conley 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Thanks for your comments Jake. Those are all essentially my perceptions as well. This is why I see the primary goal to be informing people just how dangerous satellite phones are, and providing the best practices possible. In the case of Syrian activists, they've turned to satphones not because they believe they are the magical devices seen in "24" but because they are the best of a lot of bad options. Right now we know thuraya is compromised, but its important to ensure activists have the best possible information about the likelihood other networks will be compromised, etc. Where might I locate information about tampering with the location specifics? Would also be really happy to have your insight and other suggestions, on or off list. On Mon, Nov 28, 2011 at 7:16 PM, Jacob Appelbaum <jacob(a)appelbaum.net>wrote: > On 11/28/2011 04:22 PM, Gustaf Bjvrksten wrote: > > On 11/28/2011 05:42 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > >> Hi all, > >> > >> First of all, thanks Brett for that article about Area SpA, great news! > >> > >> Secondly, I'm in the middle of some research into how satellite > >> communications are being used by activists, as well as how they are > being > >> used/intercepted by Syrian authorities in an attempt to quell the > uprising. > >> I've read a number of articles in a disjointed fashion, and am just now > >> beginning to coordinate my efforts. I am working on a series of best > >> practices for being "most safe" as I'm not sure we can offer much better > >> than that with regard to satellite equipment, furthermore I'm hoping to > >> provide an educated understanding of just what the risks are and what > might > >> be done to mitigate them. However my impression is that the guide will > >> primarily be about understanding the full extent of the risk you place > >> yourself in. > >> > >> I have heard rumors about Syria's capacity direct from Syrian activists, > >> including that some calls made with thuraya phones have been recorded, > and > >> that a phone simply making a call, for the first time, in a distant > >> location was tracked by syrian authorities. unfortunately, as many of > you > >> know, such anecdotes are not as helpful as they might seem, and that its > >> important to understand, as best we can, just why thuraya phones seem > to be > >> "less safe" than inmarsat or iridium, and to ensure that syrians don't > >> become lax and begin to depend on an alternate tool to thuraya such as > >> inmarsat phones, only to find themselves equally targeted via that > means, > >> though it may take the regime longer to establish practices. > >> > >> Anyhow, what I'm looking for are accounts of how satphones have been > >> used/tracked in syria, as well as articles about syria's capacity to > >> monitor satellite transmissions. Separately I'll be researching the > >> practical capabilities of various satphones to ensure that readers of > the > >> guide have access to the best information available, though this will > >> obviously need to evolve over time. > > > > Hi Brian, > > > > Access has also heard a number of reports from Syria that Thuraya > > satellite devices have been giving away the location of the device > > operators as soon as the devices are used. Our reports suggest this is > > limited to Thuraya devices only, and that the use of satellite > > technology from other providers does not seem to have the consequence of > > position information leakage to the authorities at this time. > > > > This is not strictly correct. All satellite communications systems are > privacy invasive. BGAN, Thuraya, etc. > > > We do know that Thuraya devices transmit their location periodically as > > part of their communications protocol[1][2]. > > This is common in all satellite communications systems. > > > While this information is > > encrypted there seems to be some doubt as to the strength of that > > encryption. The US military complex did not have much faith in it and > > seems to have been able to bypass or crack the encryption to access the > > location information of Thuraya devices used by Iraqi Government > > officials[2]. While it is not clear exactly how this was achieved we do > > know that Thuraya devices were manufactured by Boeing and this fact may > > have contributed to an easy decryption route for US forces. > > > > Thuraya is easy to monitor. It's not even expensive. There are > commercial solutions and there are non-commercial projects that work > with common hardware. Satellite communication networks are absolutely > not secure to use without additional protection. If location anonymity > is important, I highly advise against using satellite communications > technology. Unless you've properly tampered with the device to falsify > the location reporting, you're probably not as secure as you'd like... > > > In addition to this the location information clearly appears in > > unencrypted form in server logs at Thuraya itself[1]. This is worrying > > as it turns out that Thuraya is predominantly owned by Etisalat, a telco > > from the UAE with a dark history regarding surveillance of their > users[3]. > > > > All of these systems keep logs. All of the satellite companies have a > dark history. > > > Etisalat have telecommunications interests in places including Egypt, > > Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Etisalat was also > > alleged to be involved in a $39 billion scam in 2010 in India[4], and > > they deployed and manage the internet censorship system under the > > direction of the authorities in the UAE[5]. > > > > Due to the above-mentioned technical and ownership issues we > > recommend civil society do not use Thuraya satellite devices in the MENA > > region. To our knowledge devices from other vendors do not seem to be > > affected at this time. Access is working to gather further evidence from > > the ground in Syria and elsewhere in the MENA region to shine further > > light on the possible misuse of Thuraya satellite device location > > information. We also welcome any further information from anyone on this > > mailing list. > > > > It's all about threat models. If you're worried about people who have > control of Thuraya, use a BGAN. If you're worried about upsetting people > who have control of the Hughes network, use Thuraya. If you're worried > about location anonymity or evading content inspection, hack your device > to lie about the GPS location of your device. The location must be > within the same spot beam as your physical location or your device will > not sync with the birds in the sky. If you're using one of these devices > to transfer data at all, I highly encourage the use of Tor as you're > absolutely to be intercepted by multiple parties. > > Some BGAN devices can be programmed to only send the spot beam ID but > again, you're trusting closed source, proprietary software/hardware with > your life. That's not a thing I'd suggest. Certainly not in a place like > Syria or other extremely hostile places. > > All the best, > Jacob > _______________________________________________ > liberationtech mailing list > liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu > > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click > above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily > digest?" > > You will need the user name and password you receive from the list > moderator in monthly reminders. > > Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. > > Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech > -- Brian Conley Director, Small World News http://smallworldnews.tv m: 646.285.2046 Skype: brianjoelconley _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[tahoe-dev] two-phase-commit for Tahoe-LAFS, and Dropbox-like functionality
by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Folks: I posted some thoughts to #1755. If you're interested in distributed systems, please read and comment! I posted an argument for why distributed, end-to-end, two-phase commit will probably work fine for LAFS's purposes even though it has gained a well-deserved reputation for "not scaling up to the Internet" in other contexts. (Hint: the answer is, of course, that we're demanding less of it than most systems do.) Unfortunately I didn't yet get around to explaining what we actually want it for. I remember there being at least two different reasons why I really wanted end-to-end two-phase-commit in the LAFS storage protocol. One reason has to do with uploading large mutables and making modifications to large mutables, without asking any computer to "buffer up" all the changes so that it can apply them all quickly, and without opening a large window of time in which a failure in any of several places will leave a corrupted mutable share. The other reason, which I remember less precisely, has to do with multiple writers sharing write-access to the same mutable file or directory. LAFS currently handles that use case very badly. I think e2e 2PC can do better, handling write-collisions with a clean failure ("no can do!") instead of, as it currently does, with potential data loss. At least in almost all cases. But even so, multiple uncoordinated writes to the same resource still have to be held down to a low frequency and a small number of uncoordinated writers. A key insight into all this is that you should use shared access to LAFS's mutables as sparingly as possible, and instead manage almost all of your state with immutables and with single-writer mutables. A great example of this design pattern is the new design we came up with for Dropbox-like functionality on top of Tahoe-LAFS. That synthesizes a "magic folder" like Dropbox from the perspective of the user, but does so without *any* concurrent writes to a shared mutable. Instead, every writer has their own single-writer mutable and the client is responsible for reading all the mutables and synthesizing the result as those mutables get changed by their respective writers. Unfortunately the details of that design are sitting in a queue of "Notes From the Tahoe-LAFS Weekly Dev Call" that I am supposed to write up and post to this list ASAP... Regards, Zooko https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1755# 2-phase commit _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] Bruce Schneier on ID cards and the "illusion of security"
by Dave Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/02/0… How We Are Fighting the War on Terrorism IDs and the illusion of security Bruce Schneier Tuesday, February 3, 2004 San Francisco Chronicle | Feedback | FAQ In recent years there has been an increased use of identification checks as a security measure. Airlines always demand photo IDs, and hotels increasingly do so. They're often required for admittance into government buildings, and sometimes even hospitals. Everywhere, it seems, someone is checking IDs. The ostensible reason is that ID checks make us all safer, but that's just not so. In most cases, identification has very little to do with security. Let's debunk the myths: First, verifying that someone has a photo ID is a completely useless security measure. All the Sept. 11 terrorists had photo IDs. Some of the IDs were real. Some were fake. Some were real IDs in fake names, bought from a crooked DMV employee in Virginia for $1,000 each. Fake driver's licenses for all 50 states, good enough to fool anyone who isn't paying close attention, are available on the Internet. Or if you don't want to buy IDs online, just ask any teenager where to get a fake ID. Harder-to-forge IDs only help marginally, because the problem is not making sure the ID is valid. This is the second myth of ID checks: that identification combined with profiling can be an indicator of intention. Our goal is to somehow identify the few bad guys scattered in the sea of good guys. In an ideal world, what we would want is some kind of ID that denotes intention. We'd want all terrorists to carry a card that says "evildoer" and everyone else to carry a card that said "honest person who won't try to hijack or blow up anything." Then, security would be easy. We would just look at people's IDs and, if they were evildoers, we wouldn't let them on the airplane or into the building. This is, of course, ridiculous, so we rely on identity as a substitute. In theory, if we know who you are, and if we have enough information about you, we can somehow predict whether you're likely to be an evildoer. This is the basis behind CAPPS-2, the government's new airline passenger profiling system. People are divided into two categories based on various criteria: the traveler's address, credit history and police and tax records; flight origin and destination; whether the ticket was purchased by cash, check or credit card; whether the ticket is one way or round trip; whether the traveler is alone or with a larger party; how frequently the traveler flies; and how long before departure the ticket was purchased. Profiling has two very dangerous failure modes. The first one is obvious. Profiling's intent is to divide people into two categories: people who may be evildoers and need to be screened more carefully, and people who are less likely to be evildoers and can be screened less carefully. But any such system will create a third, and very dangerous, category: evildoers who don't fit the profile. Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, Washington-area sniper John Allen Muhammed and many of the Sept. 11 terrorists had no previous links to terrorism. The Unabomber taught mathematics at UC Berkeley. The Palestinians have demonstrated that they can recruit suicide bombers with no previous record of anti-Israeli activities. Even the Sept. 11 hijackers went out of their way to establish a normal-looking profile; frequent-flier numbers, a history of first-class travel and so on. Evildoers can also engage in identity theft, and steal the identity -- and profile -- of an honest person. Profiling can result in less security by giving certain people an easy way to skirt security. There's another, even more dangerous, failure mode for these systems: honest people who fit the evildoer profile. Because evildoers are so rare, almost everyone who fits the profile will turn out to be a false alarm. This not only wastes investigative resources that might be better spent elsewhere, but it causes grave harm to those innocents who fit the profile. Whether it's something as simple as "driving while black" or "flying while Arab," or something more complicated such as taking scuba lessons or protesting the Bush administration, profiling harms society because it causes us all to live in fear...not from the evildoers, but from the police. Security is a trade-off; we have to weigh the security we get against the price we pay for it. Better trade-offs are to spend money on intelligence and analysis, investigation and making ourselves less of a pariah on the world stage. And to spend money on the other, nonterrorist security issues that affect far more Americans every year. Identification and profiling don't provide very good security, and they do so at an enormous cost. Dropping ID checks completely, and engaging in random screening where appropriate, is a far better security trade-off. People who know they're being watched, and that their innocent actions can result in police scrutiny, are people who become scared to step out of line. They know that they can be put on a "bad list" at any time. People living in this kind of society are not free, despite any illusionary security they receive. It's contrary to all the ideals that went into founding the United States. Bruce Schneier, CTO of Counterpane Internet Security in Cupertino, is the author of "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World" (Copernicus Books, 2003). ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net

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[IP] Bruce Schneier on ID cards and the "illusion of security"
by Dave Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/02/0… How We Are Fighting the War on Terrorism IDs and the illusion of security Bruce Schneier Tuesday, February 3, 2004 San Francisco Chronicle | Feedback | FAQ In recent years there has been an increased use of identification checks as a security measure. Airlines always demand photo IDs, and hotels increasingly do so. They're often required for admittance into government buildings, and sometimes even hospitals. Everywhere, it seems, someone is checking IDs. The ostensible reason is that ID checks make us all safer, but that's just not so. In most cases, identification has very little to do with security. Let's debunk the myths: First, verifying that someone has a photo ID is a completely useless security measure. All the Sept. 11 terrorists had photo IDs. Some of the IDs were real. Some were fake. Some were real IDs in fake names, bought from a crooked DMV employee in Virginia for $1,000 each. Fake driver's licenses for all 50 states, good enough to fool anyone who isn't paying close attention, are available on the Internet. Or if you don't want to buy IDs online, just ask any teenager where to get a fake ID. Harder-to-forge IDs only help marginally, because the problem is not making sure the ID is valid. This is the second myth of ID checks: that identification combined with profiling can be an indicator of intention. Our goal is to somehow identify the few bad guys scattered in the sea of good guys. In an ideal world, what we would want is some kind of ID that denotes intention. We'd want all terrorists to carry a card that says "evildoer" and everyone else to carry a card that said "honest person who won't try to hijack or blow up anything." Then, security would be easy. We would just look at people's IDs and, if they were evildoers, we wouldn't let them on the airplane or into the building. This is, of course, ridiculous, so we rely on identity as a substitute. In theory, if we know who you are, and if we have enough information about you, we can somehow predict whether you're likely to be an evildoer. This is the basis behind CAPPS-2, the government's new airline passenger profiling system. People are divided into two categories based on various criteria: the traveler's address, credit history and police and tax records; flight origin and destination; whether the ticket was purchased by cash, check or credit card; whether the ticket is one way or round trip; whether the traveler is alone or with a larger party; how frequently the traveler flies; and how long before departure the ticket was purchased. Profiling has two very dangerous failure modes. The first one is obvious. Profiling's intent is to divide people into two categories: people who may be evildoers and need to be screened more carefully, and people who are less likely to be evildoers and can be screened less carefully. But any such system will create a third, and very dangerous, category: evildoers who don't fit the profile. Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, Washington-area sniper John Allen Muhammed and many of the Sept. 11 terrorists had no previous links to terrorism. The Unabomber taught mathematics at UC Berkeley. The Palestinians have demonstrated that they can recruit suicide bombers with no previous record of anti-Israeli activities. Even the Sept. 11 hijackers went out of their way to establish a normal-looking profile; frequent-flier numbers, a history of first-class travel and so on. Evildoers can also engage in identity theft, and steal the identity -- and profile -- of an honest person. Profiling can result in less security by giving certain people an easy way to skirt security. There's another, even more dangerous, failure mode for these systems: honest people who fit the evildoer profile. Because evildoers are so rare, almost everyone who fits the profile will turn out to be a false alarm. This not only wastes investigative resources that might be better spent elsewhere, but it causes grave harm to those innocents who fit the profile. Whether it's something as simple as "driving while black" or "flying while Arab," or something more complicated such as taking scuba lessons or protesting the Bush administration, profiling harms society because it causes us all to live in fear...not from the evildoers, but from the police. Security is a trade-off; we have to weigh the security we get against the price we pay for it. Better trade-offs are to spend money on intelligence and analysis, investigation and making ourselves less of a pariah on the world stage. And to spend money on the other, nonterrorist security issues that affect far more Americans every year. Identification and profiling don't provide very good security, and they do so at an enormous cost. Dropping ID checks completely, and engaging in random screening where appropriate, is a far better security trade-off. People who know they're being watched, and that their innocent actions can result in police scrutiny, are people who become scared to step out of line. They know that they can be put on a "bad list" at any time. People living in this kind of society are not free, despite any illusionary security they receive. It's contrary to all the ideals that went into founding the United States. Bruce Schneier, CTO of Counterpane Internet Security in Cupertino, is the author of "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World" (Copernicus Books, 2003). ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net

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Secrecy News -- 08/08/12
by Steven Aftergood 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Format Note: If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2012, Issue No. 81 August 8, 2012 Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ ** SECRECY NEWS ODDS AND ENDS ** UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR MILLIONAIRES, AND MORE FROM CRS SECRECY NEWS ODDS AND ENDS A coalition of public interest groups asked the Senate and House Intelligence Committees to preserve an existing requirement for the Intelligence Community to produce an annual report on the number of security clearances. "We believe the annual report on security clearances provides exceptional value to the public and should continue to be published," the groups wrote. The Senate Intelligence Committee markup of the 2013 intelligence authorization bill would repeal the reporting requirement. http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2012/08/clearance_rpt.pdf Last week the Senate confirmed four of the five nominees to the long-dormant Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The nominations of James Dempsey, Elisabeth Collins Cook, Rachel Brand and Patricia Wald were unanimously confirmed. For unexplained reasons, the Senate did not act upon the nomination of David Medine to serve as Board chairman. http://bit.ly/MyauU7 The Naval Criminal Investigative Service contacted the Wired Danger Room blog to inquire where its reporter obtained a certain unclassified document five years ago and to ask that the document, which was marked "for official use only," be taken offline. "Danger Room, through its attorney, declined to provide the information, or to answer any questions related to the reporting of the story. The document has not been removed." http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/ncis-vs-danger-room/ A government information security official not involved in the matter said it was possible there was more to the story than appeared on the surface. "If the [NCIS] investigation is about the FOUO document, then it's ridiculous. If it's about something else, we might not ever know." The House Intelligence Committee filed its report on the extension of the FISA Amendments Act. Like its counterparts on the Judiciary Committee, the Intelligence Committee rejected amendments that would shorten the extension of the law and increase public oversight of its implementation. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_rpt/hrpt112-645pt2.html With little fanfare or self-congratulation, the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Security Agency have been steadily declassifying and releasing historical intelligence records. "This tremendous amount of information released in the past year is credit to an impressive declassification program within the intelligence services," wrote historian Dwayne Day in an assessment of the latest NRO releases. "The US military and intelligence space programs during the first couple of decades of the space age can now be described in incredible detail and understood far better than before." http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2131/1 UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR MILLIONAIRES, AND MORE FROM CRS Thousands of Americans who have a gross annual income of more than a million dollars have also been collecting unemployment benefits, according to IRS data compiled in a new report from the Congressional Research Service. That description fits only a tiny fraction of a percent of those receiving unemployment benefits, and is obviously not typical of recipients of unemployment insurance. But neither does it violate any law. The issue has prompted pending legislation to restrict benefits based on income. See Receipt of Unemployment Insurance by Higher-Income Unemployed Workers ("Millionaires"), August 2, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42643.pdf A persistent controversy in Japan concerning a U.S. Marine base in Okinawa is reviewed in another new report from the Congressional Research Service. See The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, August 3, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf Other new and updated CRS reports that CRS is not authorized to release to the public include the following. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments, August 3, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues, August 2, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41108.pdf Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, August 3, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21238.pdf Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF): Summary and Issue Overview, August 1, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42641.pdf Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education: A Primer, August 1, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42642.pdf Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices, August 6, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42647.pdf Department of Homeland Security: FY2013 Appropriations, August 3, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42644.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Why Skype (real-time) is losing out to WeChat (async)
by Nathan of Guardian 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 12/24/2012 05:10 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote: > I think that the reason is simple and obvious: society shifts to > preferring more impersonal communication. Same reason that teenagers > prefer texting to talking on phone, and hanging out to dating. >From what I can tell, it is the exact opposite. The ease of use and persistent connected design of these apps (aka you have these always-on, long running group chat rooms), and the ability to quickly send voice messages and video, makes it MORE personal. The users feel a constant connection to a whole group of friends no matter where they are on the planet, and can, with a press of a button, reach out and hear their voice. I am not saying this is a global phenom, applicable to all societies. I think within this occupied/exile dynamic, and also where standard telecomms are difficult, the impact of apps like WeChat and WhatsApp is perhaps greater than places where Skype, Facetime and Hangout work well. +n -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[tt] (VINT Labs) How a smart meter knows what I'm watching
by Tomasz Rola 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[ http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?p=6272 ] (... links deleted ...) How a smart meter knows what I'm watching Posted on [32]January 15, 2013 by [33]Menno van Doorn Last year Researchers of from M|nster University of Applied Sciences demonstrated that consumers can be identified via the data collected by a smart meter, from the types and amount of devices, TV shows being watched and scan for copyright-protected (or pirated) movies. If you want to see how they predict what movie you are watching, based on data form your smart meter, start at approx 14:40 minutes. The video is called "Smart Hacking For Privacy" IFRAME: [34]http://www.youtube.com/embed/YYe4SwQn2GE The brightness of the backlight influences the energy use and is refelcted in the data that go to the smart meter. The fact that smart meters collect data every two seconds makes it possible to get very accurate graphs. That's how they are able to recognize patterns in energy use and compare with patterns in a movie database. What's your opinion? Should we keep these Privacy Intrusive Technologies out of our homes? Or should we fix the problems with Privacy Enhancing Technologies? Here's what I think. Fix it: we need a smarter grid. Gerelateerde Berichten: * [35]Intel inside, idiot outside * [36]VINTlabs Big Data Bookmarks: @ThomasvanManen * [37]Powershift part 2 * [38]Powershift * [39]A little big data, a lot more efficient energy management * Share this post: * IFRAME: [40]http://platform.twitter.com/widgets/tweet_button.html?url=http %3A%2F%2Fblog.vint.sogeti.com%2F%3Fp%3D6272&counturl=http%3A%2F%2F blog.vint.sogeti.com%2F%3Fp%3D6272&count=horizontal&text=How%20a%2 0smart%20meter%20knows%20what%20I%27m%20watching: * IFRAME: [41]http://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?href=http%3A%2F%2Fblo g.vint.sogeti.com%2F%3Fp%3D6272&layout=button_count&show_faces=fal se&action=like&colorscheme=light&height=21&locale=nl_NL&width=90 * * * This entry was posted in [42]Big Data and tagged [43]Privacy, [44]Smart Meters by [45]Menno van Doorn. Bookmark the [46]permalink. About Menno van Doorn Menno van Doorn is Director of the Research Institute for the Analysis of New Technology (VINT) in the Netherlands. He mixes personal life experiences with the findings of the 17 years of research done at the VINT Research Institute. Menno has co-authored five books on the impact of new technology on business and society. Awards: IT Researcher of the Year in the Netherlands. [47]Twitter, [48]LinkedIn [49]View all posts by Menno van Doorn -> (... links deleted ...) References Visible links 32. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?p=6272 33. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?author=2 34. http://www.youtube.com/embed/YYe4SwQn2GE 35. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?p=6132 36. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?p=4862 37. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?p=3717 38. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?p=3556 39. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?p=6082 40. http://platform.twitter.com/widgets/tweet_button.html?url=http%3A%2F%2Fblog…: 41. http://www.facebook.com/plugins/like.php?href=http%3A%2F%2Fblog.vint.sogeti… 42. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?cat=12 43. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?tag=privacy 44. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?tag=smart-meters 45. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?author=2 46. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?p=6272 47. https://twitter.com/MennovanDoorn/ 48. http://nl.linkedin.com/pub/menno-van-doorn/1/693/91a 49. http://blog.vint.sogeti.com/?author=2 _______________________________________________ tt mailing list tt(a)postbiota.org http://postbiota.org/mailman/listinfo/tt ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Power politics
by Somebody 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Bob, I've been reading Noam Chomsky's book on Kosovo and came across this quote from a Cabinet note written by Churchill in January 1914 explaining the need for increased military expenditure (taken in turn from Clive Ponting's Churchill, 1994, P 132): "We are not a young people with an innocent record and a scanty inheritance. We have engrossed to ourselves an altogether disproportionate share of the wealth and traffic of the world. We have got all we want in territory, and our claim to be left in the unmolested enjoyment of vast and splendid possessions, mainly acquired by violence, largely maintained by force, often seems less reasonable to others than to us." I thought you might appreciate it. <Somebody's .sig> --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "...our claim to be left in the unmolested enjoyment of vast and splendid possessions, mainly acquired by violence, largely maintained by force, often seems less reasonable to others than to us." -- Winston Churchill, January 1914

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Re: LA Times on NYT spying story
by Bill Stewart 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, Brock, Dave - the URL lost a hyphen when it got folded; the two halves are: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/ la-na-media20dec20,1,3657594.story?coll=la-headlines-nation Meanwhile, not only is this yet another reminder of the fallacy of the right-wing rants about liberal press bias, but President Bush has been asserting that he's told Congress a dozen times that he's doing this, and none of the Congresscritters who were informed have seen fit to tell the public either, so the President and NYTimes have a lot of unindicted co-conspirators. Another LA Times story http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/ la-na-spy20dec20,1,4766037.story?coll=la-headlines-nation reports that the main difference between Bush's authorization and the powers already granted under the 1978 FISA laws is that FISA has the Constitutional requirement for a court to find "probable cause" for issuing warrants, while Bush's order allows an NSA shift supervisor to decide there's "a reasonable basis" for wiretapping, even if there's not enough evidence for a FISC rubber stamp. Bill Stewart ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on LA Times on NYT spying story
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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