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Re: Cass Sunstein On "worthwhile" "governmental responses"
by Jennifer S. Granick 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

When Sunstein spoke here at Stanford, the most interesting thing he had to say was about studies showing decision making within like-minded groups tended to polarize independent opinion. It was those studies that led CS to his fear about the Internet. Well, there's nothing like facts to shoot a theory down: A Study Finds That Web Users Are More Tolerant http://chronicle.com/free/2001/06/2001061501t.htm At 10:41 PM -0400 6/3/01, Matthew Gaylor wrote: >[Note from Matthew Gaylor: I had asked Professor Cass Sunstein what >he meant by the term "worthwhile" as it relates to passing >"content-neutral regulation". -- Jennifer Stisa Granick Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, California 94305 (650) 724-0014 (650) 723-8440 fax jennifer(a)granick.com ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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EFF is looking for Tor DMCA test case volunteers
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Fred asked me to forward this to the list. If you have legal questions (and probably most questions about this count as legal questions), you should contact Fred and Kevin directly (fred at eff.org and bankston at eff.org) Fred also reminds us that any correspondence you have with me or others here would be discoverable, so that's an added incentive to go to them directly. Please look through this checklist, and decide if you match the profile they're looking for. I'd like to encourage you to contact them even if there are a few points you don't match so well -- I'd rather have a big pile of pretty-good volunteers than have everybody hold off because they are not perfectly suited -- then Fred and Kevin can make their own decisions from there. Thanks, --Roger ============ If record label and movie studio representatives continue sending infringement notices to Tor node operators and their upstream ISPs, it will become increasingly important to set a clear legal precedent establishing that merely running a node does not create copyright liability for either node operators or their bandwidth providers. In order to establish such a precedent, it will be necessary to bring or defend a test case. EFF is actively seeking clients willing to be the test case. Picking the right client is half the battle in any test case. Accordingly, we cannot promise that we will be able to defend any and all Tor node operators. There are several factors that are relevant in finding the right test case client. Here are some of them: 1. You must have received a complaint from a copyright owner about operating a Tor node. Complaints from your ISP about running a proxy do not count, even if they mention copyright infringement as the reason for their objection -- that's a contractual fight between you and your bandwidth provider. We are looking for node operators who have either received copyright complaints directly, or forwarded to them from their ISPs. 2. You should not be an infringer yourself, or be engaged in any other kind of unlawful activity. In litigation, the copyright owners will want to examine every hard drive and email message in your possession or control, looking for evidence that you are running Tor because you want to encourage people to infringe copyright. So if you are a big file-sharer, warez trader, or are involved in any other unlawful activities (even if unrelated to Tor), you are probably not the right person. 3. You should have a legitimate reason to run Tor. If you are the client for the test case, you will be deposed under oath and asked why you run Tor. You should be able to truthfully respond in a way that does not suggest that you are doing it to encourage any illegal activity, including copyright infringement. For example, running it because you value free speech is a legitimate reason. Same if you are running it for research purposes. Any documentary evidence from your past (e.g., emails, papers presented, etc) should not contradict your story. Most Tor node operators will qualify under this criteria, but if you wrote a bunch of emails and bulletin board posts describing how great Tor will be for the coming copyright revolution, you are probably not the ideal client. 4. You should be willing to see the case through. Litigation takes time -- often several years. The process will occasionally involve some inconvenience, including depositions and allowing the other side to go through most documents in your possession or control (including email, hard drives, etc). EFF will provide the legal services for free. But there is some risk of personal liability for damages, perhaps amounting to several thousand dollars, if we lose. We will do everything to minimize the risk, but cannot eliminate it altogether. 5. You should be located in the United States. Your Tor server should also be located in the United States. 6. You should have an upstream bandwidth provider who will stand by you. It would be less than ideal if your upstream ISP terminates your account before we ever get to court. Fred ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[Geowanking] cisco wi-fi geosurveillance tech
by Mike Liebhold 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

After reading the press release about Cisco's new low-cost wifi mesh systems, built from tecchnologies developed by Airespace.com ( cisco is a prinsipal investor) http://www.crn.com/sections/breakingnews/breakingnews.jhtml?articleId=17360… 41 I was clicking around for technical specs, I came across this: Besides mesh networks, Airespace offers central location surveillance capabilty to do [imprecise] tracking of users' and devices in realitme in an Airespace (cisco?) Wi-fi network. http://www.airespace.com/technology/benefits_of_location_tracking.php "Airespace uses advanced RF fingerprinting technology to identify and track users to within 10 meters of their exact location - anywhere they roam throughout an enterprise environment. This enables IT staff to establish access control policies that are based on geographic location, immediately identify the source of unauthorized WLAN activity such as rogue Access Points," _______________________________________________ Geowanking mailing list Geowanking(a)lists.burri.to http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: Cass Sunstein On "worthwhile" "governmental responses"
by Jennifer S. Granick 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

When Sunstein spoke here at Stanford, the most interesting thing he had to say was about studies showing decision making within like-minded groups tended to polarize independent opinion. It was those studies that led CS to his fear about the Internet. Well, there's nothing like facts to shoot a theory down: A Study Finds That Web Users Are More Tolerant http://chronicle.com/free/2001/06/2001061501t.htm At 10:41 PM -0400 6/3/01, Matthew Gaylor wrote: >[Note from Matthew Gaylor: I had asked Professor Cass Sunstein what >he meant by the term "worthwhile" as it relates to passing >"content-neutral regulation". -- Jennifer Stisa Granick Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, California 94305 (650) 724-0014 (650) 723-8440 fax jennifer(a)granick.com ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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EFF is looking for Tor DMCA test case volunteers
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Fred asked me to forward this to the list. If you have legal questions (and probably most questions about this count as legal questions), you should contact Fred and Kevin directly (fred at eff.org and bankston at eff.org) Fred also reminds us that any correspondence you have with me or others here would be discoverable, so that's an added incentive to go to them directly. Please look through this checklist, and decide if you match the profile they're looking for. I'd like to encourage you to contact them even if there are a few points you don't match so well -- I'd rather have a big pile of pretty-good volunteers than have everybody hold off because they are not perfectly suited -- then Fred and Kevin can make their own decisions from there. Thanks, --Roger ============ If record label and movie studio representatives continue sending infringement notices to Tor node operators and their upstream ISPs, it will become increasingly important to set a clear legal precedent establishing that merely running a node does not create copyright liability for either node operators or their bandwidth providers. In order to establish such a precedent, it will be necessary to bring or defend a test case. EFF is actively seeking clients willing to be the test case. Picking the right client is half the battle in any test case. Accordingly, we cannot promise that we will be able to defend any and all Tor node operators. There are several factors that are relevant in finding the right test case client. Here are some of them: 1. You must have received a complaint from a copyright owner about operating a Tor node. Complaints from your ISP about running a proxy do not count, even if they mention copyright infringement as the reason for their objection -- that's a contractual fight between you and your bandwidth provider. We are looking for node operators who have either received copyright complaints directly, or forwarded to them from their ISPs. 2. You should not be an infringer yourself, or be engaged in any other kind of unlawful activity. In litigation, the copyright owners will want to examine every hard drive and email message in your possession or control, looking for evidence that you are running Tor because you want to encourage people to infringe copyright. So if you are a big file-sharer, warez trader, or are involved in any other unlawful activities (even if unrelated to Tor), you are probably not the right person. 3. You should have a legitimate reason to run Tor. If you are the client for the test case, you will be deposed under oath and asked why you run Tor. You should be able to truthfully respond in a way that does not suggest that you are doing it to encourage any illegal activity, including copyright infringement. For example, running it because you value free speech is a legitimate reason. Same if you are running it for research purposes. Any documentary evidence from your past (e.g., emails, papers presented, etc) should not contradict your story. Most Tor node operators will qualify under this criteria, but if you wrote a bunch of emails and bulletin board posts describing how great Tor will be for the coming copyright revolution, you are probably not the ideal client. 4. You should be willing to see the case through. Litigation takes time -- often several years. The process will occasionally involve some inconvenience, including depositions and allowing the other side to go through most documents in your possession or control (including email, hard drives, etc). EFF will provide the legal services for free. But there is some risk of personal liability for damages, perhaps amounting to several thousand dollars, if we lose. We will do everything to minimize the risk, but cannot eliminate it altogether. 5. You should be located in the United States. Your Tor server should also be located in the United States. 6. You should have an upstream bandwidth provider who will stand by you. It would be less than ideal if your upstream ISP terminates your account before we ever get to court. Fred ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[Geowanking] cisco wi-fi geosurveillance tech
by Mike Liebhold 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

After reading the press release about Cisco's new low-cost wifi mesh systems, built from tecchnologies developed by Airespace.com ( cisco is a prinsipal investor) http://www.crn.com/sections/breakingnews/breakingnews.jhtml?articleId=17360… 41 I was clicking around for technical specs, I came across this: Besides mesh networks, Airespace offers central location surveillance capabilty to do [imprecise] tracking of users' and devices in realitme in an Airespace (cisco?) Wi-fi network. http://www.airespace.com/technology/benefits_of_location_tracking.php "Airespace uses advanced RF fingerprinting technology to identify and track users to within 10 meters of their exact location - anywhere they roam throughout an enterprise environment. This enables IT staff to establish access control policies that are based on geographic location, immediately identify the source of unauthorized WLAN activity such as rogue Access Points," _______________________________________________ Geowanking mailing list Geowanking(a)lists.burri.to http://lists.burri.to/mailman/listinfo/geowanking ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [Freedombox-discuss] BitTorrent Sync
by Philip Hands 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Jonathan Wilkes <jancsika(a)yahoo.com> writes: > ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: Philip Hands <phil(a)hands.com> >> To: Chris Troutner <Chris.Troutner(a)PACCAR.com>; freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org >> Cc: >> Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2013 8:02 AM >> Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] BitTorrent Sync >> >> Chris Troutner <Chris.Troutner(a)PACCAR.com> writes: >> >>> I ran across this article on Slashdot about the new Sync platform in >>> alpha test by BitTorrent. Apparently it's 'like' Dropbox, but >> it uses >>> your own machine. It allows file synchronization between two (or more) >>> computers, like your laptop and personal server. >>> >>> http://hardware.slashdot.org/story/13/01/25/1941226/bittorrent-launches- >>> dropbox-alternative >>> >>> Does anyone know more about this? >> >> I don't, when I read about it I thought that if I wanted such a thing, >> I'd almost certainly use git-annex instead (and 'git annex >> assistant' in >> particular). See: >> >> http://git-annex.branchable.com/assistant/ > > It's like bittorrent sync, except it doesn't scale and doesn't use > encryption out of the box. Well, since you put it like that, I guess I have to set you straight: It uses ssh out of the box -- so there's your transport encryption, and it optionally uses GPG encryption for special remotes (i.e. dumping your files in Amazon S3, or a USB stick, say), so yes, it does do encryption out of the box in the places where one might actually want it. http://git-annex.branchable.com/encryption/ As for scaling, it depends what you're after, but since (if using the assistant) you can nudge remotes into attempting to pull from one another via XMPP, I think it's got quite a few of the real world use cases covered for scalability too. The big win for me is that it builds on proven technology, that is easy to trust. I know I'd much rather trust the crypto in ssh and GPG than something alpha from bittorrent. Git's had a fair amount of testing too (as has git annex). Bittorrent sync on the other hand is currently in an invitation-only pre-alpha phase, it seems. Cheers, Phil. -- |)| Philip Hands [+44 (0)20 8530 9560] http://www.hands.com/ |-| HANDS.COM Ltd. http://www.uk.debian.org/ |(| 10 Onslow Gardens, South Woodford, London E18 1NE ENGLAND _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] US fraction of world's traffic
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

________________________________________ From: David P. Reed [dpreed(a)reed.com] Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2008 11:56 AM To: David Farber Cc: ip; Whitfield Diffie Subject: Re: [IP] US fraction of world's traffic I would think that the more interesting question is not the official one, but the correct one. To the extent that NSA uses this as a tool for claiming that monitoring calls from country A to country B is legitimate, the "correct" answer matters more. There seems to be some dim, secret ruling (perhaps in FISA) that says that it is legal to intercept bits that pass through the US. If I were the NSA, and I claim (without being able to prove the negative) that I'm not, I would pursue the following strategy: 1. find a way to tamper with foreign switches to route communications through the US based facilities. Easy - just send the right routing-table updates - whether IP or SS7, this is pretty easy. 2. install deep packet inspection equipment. This is becoming COTS, with sales to ISPs starting to drive costs down ane performance up. 3. select and record into a high-performance RAID cluster. COTS. Same techniques work remarkably well for tapping and recording competitor and economic target traffic. Interesting thought. To tap US-US communications, why not just route the traffic out through Gitmo and back? There also seems to be dim secret rulings that allow spying on traffic that goes across the border. Supposedly the legal framework is about calls that "terminate" outside the US. But I'm sure that "terminate" can be carefully redefined by good legal scholarship and a few pet lawyers in DoJ and DoD to include something like storing on disk for one disk rotation (17 msec) and then resending it. All hypothetically, of course. :-) David Farber wrote: > ________________________________________ > From: Whitfield Diffie [whitfield.diffie(a)sun.com] > Sent: Monday, January 14, 2008 1:02 PM > To: David Farber > Subject: US fraction of world's traffic > > Monday 14 January 2008 at 09:55 > > Have you yet been pestered with the following question: > > Any chance you can help me discern the percentage of the world's > phone calls and e-mails that pass through U.S.-based equipment? > > This seems like an FCC or DoC sort of question that must have an oficial answer > if you know where to look for it. Do you know where it resides? > > > Whit > > > > ------------------------------------------- > Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now > RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ > Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com > > ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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<nettime>
by Caroline Heatlie 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/apr2004/blun-a24.shtml Twenty years after 1984, the date for George Orwell's dystopian vision, the British home secretary hopes to introduce a new category of imprisonable offence-"thought crime," or guilt by association. According to two recent newspaper articles, David Blunkett is considering jailing those who merely "sympathise" with so-called extremist Islamic groups or who continue to "associate" with alleged terrorist suspects. The Observer wrote on April 11, "Sympathisers with extremist Islamic groups will risk jail under controversial plans to make merely associating with a suspected terrorist a crime." The next day, the Times reported, "Those whose names were found on seized mobile phones, computers or e-mails and who tried further contact would find themselves facing prison." The paper added that the home secretary would like a formal warning given to "every known contact of a terror suspect or extremist Islamic group." A source close to the home secretary was quoted saying, "We are targeting support networks, the things that enable terrorism to be perpetrated by other people. It is intended to deter people from hanging around the fringes of undesirables." The latest musings of Blunkett are a double attack on democratic rights. Firstly, the proposal to introduce "guilt by association" makes criminals of those who have committed no crime. Secondly, by extension the so-called "undesirables" with whom they associate face a form of banning order reminiscent of the apartheid regime in South Africa, preventing them from coming into contact with anyone. Barry Hugill, spokesman for civil rights group Liberty, said, "You cannot start imprisoning people for what may or may not be going on inside their head." The Labour government has introduced some of the most draconian "anti-terrorist" legislation in Europe. Britain has declared a "technical" state of emergency, enabling the suspension of sections of the European Convention on Human Rights. This then makes possible the indefinite internment of foreign nationals as "terrorist suspects," without recourse to the normal juridical process. The 14 individuals who have been locked up under the terms of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) enter a Kafkaesque world where they may not see the evidence that supposedly justifies their incarceration, nor may they appoint an independent legal representative to challenge their imprisonment in the courts. They can only be set free if they agree to be deported back to the country from which they have fled, where their life may well be in danger. The choice is stark: indefinite detention without due legal process, or possible death. In February, Blunkett proposed the introduction of a form of "pre-emptive" justice, where suspects could be jailed based on charges for crimes they had not yet committed. It is a measure of the disregard for longstanding democratic norms that permeates official politics and most of the media in Britain that the home secretary's latest proposal passed largely without comment or criticism. See Also: Britain: home secretary proposes "pre-emptive" justice [10 February 2004] Britain prepares its own version of US Patriot Act [21 January 2004] # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: majordomo(a)bbs.thing.net and "info nettime-l" in the msg body # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)bbs.thing.net --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [IP] more on Mid-level military officers on
by Jock Gill 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

responsibility for Iraq Dave, For another perspective on a core problem, please feel free to share this pointer with IP. "U.S. Intelligence, like the Department of Defense, is a dinosaur from the Cold War, a direct outcome of allowing the military- industrial-congressional complex to specify how we spend the taxpayer dollar without regard to reality or proper intelligence. We have a special interests spy world and a special interests heavy-metal military." <http://www.greaterdemocracy.org/archives/000470.html> 10 Threats to the Public Interest & Security Robert David Steele 04.18.06, 6:00 PM ET Why Secret Intelligence is Bad Director of National Intelligence [DNI] Covers 17.5% In the Age of Information, when secret sources are less valuable and open sources are more essential in understanding reality and crafting responsible public policy, what are the ten greatest threats to the United States of America? What ten questions should the reformed and revitalized Director of National Intelligence (DNI) be able to answer for Congress and the public? This challenge has been answered generally by the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world, Our shared responsibility (United Nations, 2004), but nothing the DNI is doing today is helpful in actually addressing, in a substantive sustained way, each of these threats. -------- continued at: <http://www.greaterdemocracy.org/archives/ 000470.html> Regards, Jock On Apr 24, 2006, at 7:15 AM, David Farber wrote: > > >Begin forwarded message: > >From: EEkid(a)aol.com >Date: April 24, 2006 2:16:53 AM EDT >To: dave(a)farber.net >Subject: Re: [IP] Mid-level military officers on responsibility for >Iraq > > >Mr. Farber, > >Unfortunately, I think the writer of this article doesn't really >understand the problem. Prior to the Iraq war, many of our >nation's military officers were clueless to the realities of the >battle field. Sure, some of the most senior officers knew, but >they became senior officers because at some point in time, they >became politicians in uniform. This article brings to mind a day I >had a couple years before 9/11. I was attending a Marine Static >Display, which is a display of military hardware. I stood there >shooting the breeze with an officer and we were talking about how >great the Humvee's were. I asked if the composite body panels >where bullet proof and he said no. I was a bit surprised that they >didn't take such a rugged design to the next level with some light >Kevlar armor. He added, that Humvee's aren't used in areas where >fighting occurs. He made some comment about the only time "jeeps" >are on a battle field is in the movies. Immediately my thoughts >traveled back in time to a family friend who was severely wounded >in Vietnam while driving a jeep down a dirt road. He was shot with >an AK-47. This wasn't on a battle field. We moved on to another >display which featured an M-16 with a third generation night vision >scope. He commented that the technology was new and only available >to the military.. I was a bit shocked that he didn't know this >exact same scope was available on the internet. In fact, I later >printed out an ad from the internet and gave it to him later. The >display also had several confiscated AK-47's and he commented that >they were worthless at a hundred yards because they were so >inaccurate. Well, I've personally shot many types of AK-47's from >all over Europe and Asia and every single one was accurate enough >to put a bullet on a pie plate at 100 yards with ease. I walked >away wondering what would happen if we ever had to go to war. > >In addition to this experience, I once had a conversation with an >officer regarding our reliance on very expensive, slow to produce, >high tech weaponry. I commented that we could never fight a large >scale protracted war with these weapons because we simply couldn't >build them fast enough. His response was we will never fight >another large scale war. I said, what happens if we were to go to >war with China? He said, we will never let that happen because we >know we can't win without using nuclear weapons. I walked away >stunned. > >I'm not criticizing our military here. Let me make an analogy. >Suppose you have an engineer who graduated from a good engineering >school. He then hangs out with other engineers from other good >schools. Yet, none of them have ever designed anything. After a >decade or so, they're suddenly given a very complex, large scale >and taxing engineering project to do in a short amount of time. >They are going to make mistakes and miscalculations, we as humans >can learn from books but we learn the most about our environment by >doing. Sure, I know our military constantly trains, but I bet they >didn't train in an environment with real roadside IED's and car >bombs in public places on a regular basis. > >Jerry > > >In a message dated 4/23/2006 7:09:40 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, >dave(a)farber.net writes: > > >There is a fascinating article in this morning's New York Times, >based on interviews with mid-level officers and others, suggesting >widespread discontent and debate within the military over the >failure of senior officers to give candid advice to Rumseld and >the Adminsitration about the reasoins why the invasion of Iraq >would be a mistake. > >http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/washington/23military.html? >hp&ex=1145851200&en=307b714052e595e5&ei=5094&partner=homepage > >Officers making such comments as, > >"This is about the moral bankruptcy of general officers who lived >through the Vietnam era yet refused to advise our civilian >leadership properly," said one Army major in the Special Forces who >has served two combat tours. "I can only hope that my generation >does better someday." and > >"The history I will take away from this is that the current crop of >generals failed to stand up and say, 'We cannot do this mission.' >They confused the cultural can-do attitude with their >responsibilities as leaders to delay the start of the war until we >had an adequate force. I think the backlash against the general >officers will be seen in the resignation of officers" who might >otherwise have stayed in uniform." > >There was also an interesting angle on Condoleeza Rice's famous >comment about "thousands of errors," casting it in a light I had >not considered, as a slap at the military and a deflection of >responsibility for the Administration's own failures: > >The debates are fueled by the desire to mete out blame for the >situation in Iraq, a drawn-out war that has taken many military >lives and has no clear end in sight. A midgrade officer who has >served two tours in Iraq said a number of his cohorts were angered >last month when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that >"tactical errors, a thousand of them, I am sure," had been made in >Iraq. > >"We have not lost a single tactical engagement on the ground in >Iraq," the officer said, noting that the definition of tactical >missions is specific movements against an enemy target. "The >mistakes have all been at the strategic and political levels." > > > > >Paul Alan Levy >Public Citizen Litigation Group >1600 - 20th Street, N.W. >Washington, D.C. 20009 >(202) 588-1000 >http://www.citizen.org/litigation > > >------------------------------------- >You are subscribed as jock(a)jockgill.com >To manage your subscription, go to > http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip > >Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting- >people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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