- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Review of new book on the NSA
by Steven Bellovin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

There's a new book on the NSA, based largely on documents received via Freedom of Information Act requests. Bamford's review is at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23231 . --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] How secure is Bluetooth?
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 01/29/2012 11:05 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > Thanks Jacob, > > I was looking for documentation from someone who has done it, had it done > to them, or is offering a product for sale. > > All I had found previously was documentation about sniffing, which is of > course well known. The FinBluez is interesting, however there are only 3 > references in google, one to the document you linked that says it will be > available in 2008. Either it never came out, or was renamed. > The FinFisher guys wrote this paper ages ago: http://www.remote-exploit.org/research/busting-bluetooth-myth.pdf (now gone) Here's a mirror: bluetooth-pentest.narod.ru/doc/busting_bluetooth_myth_sniffer.pdf The best quote is here: "Introduction During the last year, rumours had come to my attention that apparently it is possible to transform a standard 30USD Bluetooth. dongle into a full-blown Bluetooth. sniffer. Thinking you absolutely need Hardware to be able to hop 79 channels 1600 times a second I was rather suspicious about these claims." Basically, he took a $30 bluetooth device and constructed a sniffer that works with downloadable software. > However it seems clear that Ellisys and ConnectBlue both at least claim to > offer products that will do this. I was surprised that I found it so > difficult to locate something like this, since it seemed very likely it > existed. > Yeah - the fact that FinFisher offers it should cause concern. > Which brings us to the next question, what is the feasibility or likelihood > that an unknown individual, communicating via a bluetooth headset and > otherwise over secure means, can be located, targetted, and intercepted? > What's your threat model? It's impossible to meaningfully answer that question in the abstract. "It's feasible and likely" if the target warrants it and "possible" for a kiddie in a cafe. > Although there are documented accounts of located bluetooth signals from a > kilometer+ away, would it be reasonable to create such a device in > combination with one of the sniffers that will decode audio on the fly? > That sounds reasonable to me, though it seems a limited enough use-case > that its unlikely its been developed, but much more unlikely to be refined > and distributed widely. > I'm sure some of the cell phone intercept gear already does this as a bonus add on feature - probably in shopping malls for tracking movements. > I would not be surprised if American intelligence agents might have > something like this, though in some ways it seems more likely governments > in countries more prone to bluetooth sharing would be more likely to have > developed such a tool, however it still seems very unlikely. > FinFisher sells it and so governments have it. We know the Egyptians had it, I bet they had the Bluetooth module but I'm not certain. > The case I am considering here is something like this: > > Jane is an activist who is communicating via a phone that, for our > purposes, is secure except for her decision to use a bluetooth headset. > Jane is not a known activist nor likely to be targeted for special > monitoring. However the authorities are on a heightened sense of alert and > looking for activists. She makes, at most, one call per day, at different > times of the day, and from different locations. Her phone calls are kept > short, less than three minutes whenever possible, and certainly less than > five. Jane uses a Bluetooth headset because she wishes to be less > conspicuous making her phone call. Jane has patterns - Jane should use a connected headset and Jane will be better off. > > So what is the likelihood this person's Bluetooth traffic is being > monitored? It appears to me that the question "can this person's Bluetooth > traffic be monitored?" is decidedly yes. However the question "IS she being > monitored?" Is much more murky, however I could be missing something here. > Further it would be interesting to discuss whether any of the following > dramatically change the likelihood of her Bluetooth transmissions being > monitored: > > > A. the security of the phone itself > B. the timing of the call > C. the location of the call > D. the length of the call > E. the individual(s) she calls > F. ??? > The question is impossible to answer. You'll know for sure if the attacker tells you, not at all if they don't and they take no other actions, and you'll just go crazy if bad stuff starts to happen and you have no idea why. If that really is her weak point, I think she should use a headset that is wired into the phone. > And yes, I agree, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth#Security is pretty > funny reading. > It's a sad replacement for a wire, eh? > I think we'd all agree that one of the largest problems here, of course, is > the closed nature of the Bluetooth protocol, combined with its broad > adoption by manufacturers. That said, if you need to disguise the fact that > you are making a phone call, it may be the only option, unless a wired > headset is feasible. > Yeah, I'm not seeing how it's a good idea. The fact of the matter is simple - Jane is an activist trying to stay safe, Jane should not do unsafe things if she can help it. Bluetooth is a luxury that given the weaponized nature of some of the attackers, I think it is best avoided. Simply having it on will provide a relative tracking beacon - I imagine that some airplane modes on cell phones don't disable BT or Wifi... > Thanks as always for your time and consideration > Sure thing. I'm glad you're asking these questions. All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] How secure is Bluetooth?
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 01/29/2012 11:05 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > Thanks Jacob, > > I was looking for documentation from someone who has done it, had it done > to them, or is offering a product for sale. > > All I had found previously was documentation about sniffing, which is of > course well known. The FinBluez is interesting, however there are only 3 > references in google, one to the document you linked that says it will be > available in 2008. Either it never came out, or was renamed. > The FinFisher guys wrote this paper ages ago: http://www.remote-exploit.org/research/busting-bluetooth-myth.pdf (now gone) Here's a mirror: bluetooth-pentest.narod.ru/doc/busting_bluetooth_myth_sniffer.pdf The best quote is here: "Introduction During the last year, rumours had come to my attention that apparently it is possible to transform a standard 30USD Bluetooth. dongle into a full-blown Bluetooth. sniffer. Thinking you absolutely need Hardware to be able to hop 79 channels 1600 times a second I was rather suspicious about these claims." Basically, he took a $30 bluetooth device and constructed a sniffer that works with downloadable software. > However it seems clear that Ellisys and ConnectBlue both at least claim to > offer products that will do this. I was surprised that I found it so > difficult to locate something like this, since it seemed very likely it > existed. > Yeah - the fact that FinFisher offers it should cause concern. > Which brings us to the next question, what is the feasibility or likelihood > that an unknown individual, communicating via a bluetooth headset and > otherwise over secure means, can be located, targetted, and intercepted? > What's your threat model? It's impossible to meaningfully answer that question in the abstract. "It's feasible and likely" if the target warrants it and "possible" for a kiddie in a cafe. > Although there are documented accounts of located bluetooth signals from a > kilometer+ away, would it be reasonable to create such a device in > combination with one of the sniffers that will decode audio on the fly? > That sounds reasonable to me, though it seems a limited enough use-case > that its unlikely its been developed, but much more unlikely to be refined > and distributed widely. > I'm sure some of the cell phone intercept gear already does this as a bonus add on feature - probably in shopping malls for tracking movements. > I would not be surprised if American intelligence agents might have > something like this, though in some ways it seems more likely governments > in countries more prone to bluetooth sharing would be more likely to have > developed such a tool, however it still seems very unlikely. > FinFisher sells it and so governments have it. We know the Egyptians had it, I bet they had the Bluetooth module but I'm not certain. > The case I am considering here is something like this: > > Jane is an activist who is communicating via a phone that, for our > purposes, is secure except for her decision to use a bluetooth headset. > Jane is not a known activist nor likely to be targeted for special > monitoring. However the authorities are on a heightened sense of alert and > looking for activists. She makes, at most, one call per day, at different > times of the day, and from different locations. Her phone calls are kept > short, less than three minutes whenever possible, and certainly less than > five. Jane uses a Bluetooth headset because she wishes to be less > conspicuous making her phone call. Jane has patterns - Jane should use a connected headset and Jane will be better off. > > So what is the likelihood this person's Bluetooth traffic is being > monitored? It appears to me that the question "can this person's Bluetooth > traffic be monitored?" is decidedly yes. However the question "IS she being > monitored?" Is much more murky, however I could be missing something here. > Further it would be interesting to discuss whether any of the following > dramatically change the likelihood of her Bluetooth transmissions being > monitored: > > > A. the security of the phone itself > B. the timing of the call > C. the location of the call > D. the length of the call > E. the individual(s) she calls > F. ??? > The question is impossible to answer. You'll know for sure if the attacker tells you, not at all if they don't and they take no other actions, and you'll just go crazy if bad stuff starts to happen and you have no idea why. If that really is her weak point, I think she should use a headset that is wired into the phone. > And yes, I agree, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth#Security is pretty > funny reading. > It's a sad replacement for a wire, eh? > I think we'd all agree that one of the largest problems here, of course, is > the closed nature of the Bluetooth protocol, combined with its broad > adoption by manufacturers. That said, if you need to disguise the fact that > you are making a phone call, it may be the only option, unless a wired > headset is feasible. > Yeah, I'm not seeing how it's a good idea. The fact of the matter is simple - Jane is an activist trying to stay safe, Jane should not do unsafe things if she can help it. Bluetooth is a luxury that given the weaponized nature of some of the attackers, I think it is best avoided. Simply having it on will provide a relative tracking beacon - I imagine that some airplane modes on cell phones don't disable BT or Wifi... > Thanks as always for your time and consideration > Sure thing. I'm glad you're asking these questions. All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[drone-list] Apple rejects Drones+ iPhone app
by Gregory Foster 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Wired (Aug 30) - "Apple Rejects App That Tracks U.S. Drone Strikes" [1]http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/drone-app/ One of Clay Shirky's students has received repeated rejections from Apple for an app which republishes The Bureau of Investigative Journalism's drone strike statistics. Their latest rejection simply states the content is "objectionable and crude." Indeed, it is. gf -- Gregory Foster || [2]gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> [3]http://entersection.com/ References 1. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/drone-app/ 2. mailto:gfoster@entersection.org 3. http://entersection.com/ _______________________________________________ drone-list mailing list drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[EPIC_IDOF] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
by Richard M. Smith 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

FYI -----Original Message----- From: Katherine Albrecht [mailto:kma@nocards.org] Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2005 4:09 PM To: press(a)nocards.org Subject: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant RFID IMPLANTS: FINE FOR THEE, BUT NOT FOR ME Ex-HHS Head Puts Off Being Chipped Despite July Promise Ex-Bush cabinet member Tommy Thompson still hasn't received an RFID implant despite a televised promise he made in July 2005 to do so. Shortly after joining the board of VeriChip Corporation last spring, the former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services and four-term governor of Wisconsin told CNBC that he would "get chipped" with a VeriChip implant, but he has no plans to undergo the procedure anytime soon, according to recent revelations. The VeriChip is a glass-encapsulated RFID device designed to be injected into human flesh for identification purposes and for use as a payment device. In public appearances, Thompson has suggested injecting the microchips into Americans to link to their electronic medical records. "It's very beneficial and it's going to be extremely helpful and it's a giant step forward to getting what we call an electronic medical record for all Americans," he told CBS MarketWatch in July. When confronted by a CNBC correspondent in another July interview about whether he would take a chip himself, Thompson replied, "Absolutely, without a doubt." However, when authors Liz McIntyre and Katherine Albrecht, who researched human chipping for their book "Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track Your Every Move with RFID," contacted the VeriChip Corporation on December 5, they were told that the chipping never took place. VeriChip spokesman John Procter said Thompson has been "too busy" to undergo the chipping procedure, adding that he had no clear plans to do so in the future. "I wouldn't put any type of time line on it," Procter said. The VeriChip spokesman also attributed the protracted delay in the chipping to Thompson's desire to investigate the procedure. "He wants to see it [the VeriChip] in a real-world environment first," said Procter, who said he's trying to arrange a tour for Thompson at Hackensack University Medical Center, the first hospital to implement the technology in its emergency room. But the authors question this explanation. "We would expect Mr. Thompson to investigate the device *before* advocating it to others," said Liz McIntyre. "It sounds like he has wisely decided to put off the implantation, perhaps due to the serious privacy and civil liberties implications of such devices, or perhaps due to the serious medical downsides, like electrical risks and MRI incompatibility." Albrecht added, "Perhaps the implants conflict with Thompson's religious beliefs. Whatever his reasons, he should share them with the American people, many of whom have loved and trusted him for years. He will be responsible if they take an implant because of his influence." Thompson may find himself under increasing pressure to get chipped in light of VeriChip Corporation's recent IPO announcement. The company is relying on Thompson's cooperation to give the much maligned human tracking chip an image boost. "He said it on live television," said Procter of Thompson's chipping intentions. "We look forward to setting a firm date in accordance to his schedule and other commitments....We want to maximize the impact of [Thompson's chipping] event...We'd certainly like to...really knock it out of the park." McIntyre is hoping that Thompson will resist the pressure. "Our concern is that the VeriChip Company would like to chip every person on the planet, and they're counting on Thompson to be their ticket to mass acceptance," said McIntyre. "We're hoping he will work for the best interests of humanity and refuse to be goaded into an ill advised action." According to Procter, only about 60 living persons in the U.S. have agreed to be chipped. In addition to the voluntary recipients, the company's implants were injected into the deceased victims of hurricane Katrina, and there are plans to chip mentally disabled patients at a residential center in Chattanooga. VeriChip has also had talks with the Pentagon about chipping military personnel, though Procter said that "no formal agreements have been reached." A transcript of Thompson's entire CBS MarketWatch interview is available at http://www.spychips.com/devices/tommythompsonverichip.html. ### ================================ For more information contact Katherine Albrecht or Liz McIntyre, co- authors of "Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track Your Every Move With RFID." Liz McIntyre (liz(a)spychips.com) 877-287-5854 or Katherine Albrecht (kma(a)spychips.com) 877-287-5854 ================================ Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track your Every Move with RFID is the winner of the Lysander Spooner Award for Advancing the Literature of Liberty. Authored by Harvard doctoral researcher Katherine Albrecht and former bank examiner Liz McIntyre, the book is meticulously researched, drawing on patent documents, corporate source materials, conference proceedings, and firsthand interviews to paint a convincing -- and frightening -- picture of the threat posed by RFID. ================================ "This is the first, and maybe the loudest, popular book on a crucial technology of our times...all of it is fascinating, some is gross and revolting, and most of it is hilarious...this is a masterpiece of technocriticism." -- From the foreword by Bruce Sterling, best-selling author and RFID "Visionary in Residence," Art Center College of Design Spychips "make[s] a stunningly powerful argument against plans for RFID being mapped out by government agencies, retail and manufacturing companies." --Evan Schuman, CIO Insight "The book makes a very persuasive case that some of America's biggest companies want to embed tracking technology into virtually everything we own, and then study our usage patterns 24 hours a day. It's a truly creepy book and well worth reading." --Hiawatha Bray, Boston Globe technology reporter "Spychips is one of the best privacy books in many years....The privacy movement needs a book. I nominate Spychips." - Marc Rotenberg, Georgetown University Adjunct Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) ========================================= _______________________________________________ EPIC_IDOF mailing list EPIC_IDOF(a)mailman.epic.org https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [p2p-hackers] Whistle-blower site platform design
by Len Sassaman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Thu, 23 Dec 2010, joss-p2phackers(a)pseudonymity.net wrote: > I think that it's worth re-emphasising what you say in your second > point: an idea like this is not going to succeed if it relies too > heavily on solving the fun technical problems. Creating a theoretically > nice leak submission/distribution system is definitely fun work, and I'd > love to come and play, but if it were to be truly applicable then there > is probably going to have to be serious compromise made in the > security/usability stakes. Absolutely agreed. I don't, personally, see it as a "compromise" to security that concessions are made to usability, given that usability is a factor in security. In fact, in this case we really must assume no technical sophistication on behalf of the whistleblower (and if some of the leaksites that have popped up are any indication, only minimal technical prowess on behalf of the site operators.) > (On that point: does Wikileaks' submission system rely on a Tor hidden > service, or is there one running that you can use if you jump through > the right hoops?) I believe it's the former, but I'm not certain. Can anyone comment? > A website seems necessarily the right model for access and submissions, > or at least for kicking off a submissions process. Computer = Internet = > web (and maybe email) for most people, and breaking that assumption is > counterproductive. No-one reading non-existent submissions isn't the goal. Agreed. > A threat model for source protection is surely going to be sender > anonymity against the standard global passive attacker. How you > bootstrap that from a "click here to submit" button will be interesting. > As you point out, though, we aren't seeing a great deal of technical > attacks against source anonymity. While it's definitely a real threat, > I'd say it's lower on the list of priorities than the availability problems. Agreed, though it remains a real problem. But we can divide the components of such a system so that working on solving the one doesn't block on solving the other. [snip] > actual URL (see, for example, http://rww.to/a4egy9 ). The real-world net > censorship we see is akin to censoring a library by burning the catalogue. Very well put. > The critical Eternity Service (and Freenet) issue of hosts being > ignorant of the data that they carry will be important in resisting more > legal attacks. I'm not sure we should get hung up on that; that argument always stuck me as "legal cleverness" of the sort judges laugh at. If the purpose of this platform is to disseminate documents in the public interest, which happen to upset some legal entities be they corporations or governments, the "public interest" argument is what's going to keep them online, imo. Further, "But I don't technically know what I'm hosting" isn't going to change Amazon's mind when they want to pull the plug on you. > Corruption of the leaks via injection of false documents seems an > orthogonal problem, and I'm not sure how you'd automate that. So, I'm imagining a system where the "leak site" receives files from a source (somehow; we want this to be an anonymous submission process but it can be treated as a black box), *reviews them and selects documents for publication*, and then pushes them to a document distribution platform, which should be syndicated to mirrors to leverage jurisdictional arbitrage and affect censorship resistance. The problem of false documents entering the distribution process is one of human error; however, the leak-site operators are acting in the role of journalists, and the onus is on them to authenticate their source material. I don't think a technical fix is in order here. One thought I should mention: on the submission side, it would be very nice to have a built-in metadata stripper either as part of the submission process, or as part of the publication process. Where you put it depends on whether you want the leaksite operators to have access to potential metadata or not; arguments can be made either way. But we can't assume either party is sophisticated enough to worry about this themselves. (Nor can we expect to produce a metadata redaction filter that is anywhere close to comprehensive, and metadata will continue to be a major attack vector for outing whistleblowers, but the protections provided by this system are not binary.) > Anonymous access to the data seems to fit very neatly into Tor's > use-case, with the assumption that you mainly want a web interface. For > large chunks of data you might want something able to handle that kind > of load, and could probably tolerate higher latencies, but again you'd > probably want to start looking at building on a BitTorrent-style approach. I've used BitTorrent in conjunction with anonymous publication systems before; it served as the distribution protocol for the design of a Private Information Retrieval based nym server Bram and I proposed a few years back. I'm considering the suitability of PIR in the present use case; it turned out that our use of BitTorrent opened the system up to certain attacks on the querant's anonymity, but that may not apply in our use case. (For reference: http://www.abditum.com/pynchon/ ) --Len. _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [p2p-hackers] Whistle-blower site platform design
by Len Sassaman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Thu, 23 Dec 2010, joss-p2phackers(a)pseudonymity.net wrote: > I think that it's worth re-emphasising what you say in your second > point: an idea like this is not going to succeed if it relies too > heavily on solving the fun technical problems. Creating a theoretically > nice leak submission/distribution system is definitely fun work, and I'd > love to come and play, but if it were to be truly applicable then there > is probably going to have to be serious compromise made in the > security/usability stakes. Absolutely agreed. I don't, personally, see it as a "compromise" to security that concessions are made to usability, given that usability is a factor in security. In fact, in this case we really must assume no technical sophistication on behalf of the whistleblower (and if some of the leaksites that have popped up are any indication, only minimal technical prowess on behalf of the site operators.) > (On that point: does Wikileaks' submission system rely on a Tor hidden > service, or is there one running that you can use if you jump through > the right hoops?) I believe it's the former, but I'm not certain. Can anyone comment? > A website seems necessarily the right model for access and submissions, > or at least for kicking off a submissions process. Computer = Internet = > web (and maybe email) for most people, and breaking that assumption is > counterproductive. No-one reading non-existent submissions isn't the goal. Agreed. > A threat model for source protection is surely going to be sender > anonymity against the standard global passive attacker. How you > bootstrap that from a "click here to submit" button will be interesting. > As you point out, though, we aren't seeing a great deal of technical > attacks against source anonymity. While it's definitely a real threat, > I'd say it's lower on the list of priorities than the availability problems. Agreed, though it remains a real problem. But we can divide the components of such a system so that working on solving the one doesn't block on solving the other. [snip] > actual URL (see, for example, http://rww.to/a4egy9 ). The real-world net > censorship we see is akin to censoring a library by burning the catalogue. Very well put. > The critical Eternity Service (and Freenet) issue of hosts being > ignorant of the data that they carry will be important in resisting more > legal attacks. I'm not sure we should get hung up on that; that argument always stuck me as "legal cleverness" of the sort judges laugh at. If the purpose of this platform is to disseminate documents in the public interest, which happen to upset some legal entities be they corporations or governments, the "public interest" argument is what's going to keep them online, imo. Further, "But I don't technically know what I'm hosting" isn't going to change Amazon's mind when they want to pull the plug on you. > Corruption of the leaks via injection of false documents seems an > orthogonal problem, and I'm not sure how you'd automate that. So, I'm imagining a system where the "leak site" receives files from a source (somehow; we want this to be an anonymous submission process but it can be treated as a black box), *reviews them and selects documents for publication*, and then pushes them to a document distribution platform, which should be syndicated to mirrors to leverage jurisdictional arbitrage and affect censorship resistance. The problem of false documents entering the distribution process is one of human error; however, the leak-site operators are acting in the role of journalists, and the onus is on them to authenticate their source material. I don't think a technical fix is in order here. One thought I should mention: on the submission side, it would be very nice to have a built-in metadata stripper either as part of the submission process, or as part of the publication process. Where you put it depends on whether you want the leaksite operators to have access to potential metadata or not; arguments can be made either way. But we can't assume either party is sophisticated enough to worry about this themselves. (Nor can we expect to produce a metadata redaction filter that is anywhere close to comprehensive, and metadata will continue to be a major attack vector for outing whistleblowers, but the protections provided by this system are not binary.) > Anonymous access to the data seems to fit very neatly into Tor's > use-case, with the assumption that you mainly want a web interface. For > large chunks of data you might want something able to handle that kind > of load, and could probably tolerate higher latencies, but again you'd > probably want to start looking at building on a BitTorrent-style approach. I've used BitTorrent in conjunction with anonymous publication systems before; it served as the distribution protocol for the design of a Private Information Retrieval based nym server Bram and I proposed a few years back. I'm considering the suitability of PIR in the present use case; it turned out that our use of BitTorrent opened the system up to certain attacks on the querant's anonymity, but that may not apply in our use case. (For reference: http://www.abditum.com/pynchon/ ) --Len. _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[EPIC_IDOF] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
by Richard M. Smith 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

FYI -----Original Message----- From: Katherine Albrecht [mailto:kma@nocards.org] Sent: Tuesday, December 06, 2005 4:09 PM To: press(a)nocards.org Subject: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant RFID IMPLANTS: FINE FOR THEE, BUT NOT FOR ME Ex-HHS Head Puts Off Being Chipped Despite July Promise Ex-Bush cabinet member Tommy Thompson still hasn't received an RFID implant despite a televised promise he made in July 2005 to do so. Shortly after joining the board of VeriChip Corporation last spring, the former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services and four-term governor of Wisconsin told CNBC that he would "get chipped" with a VeriChip implant, but he has no plans to undergo the procedure anytime soon, according to recent revelations. The VeriChip is a glass-encapsulated RFID device designed to be injected into human flesh for identification purposes and for use as a payment device. In public appearances, Thompson has suggested injecting the microchips into Americans to link to their electronic medical records. "It's very beneficial and it's going to be extremely helpful and it's a giant step forward to getting what we call an electronic medical record for all Americans," he told CBS MarketWatch in July. When confronted by a CNBC correspondent in another July interview about whether he would take a chip himself, Thompson replied, "Absolutely, without a doubt." However, when authors Liz McIntyre and Katherine Albrecht, who researched human chipping for their book "Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track Your Every Move with RFID," contacted the VeriChip Corporation on December 5, they were told that the chipping never took place. VeriChip spokesman John Procter said Thompson has been "too busy" to undergo the chipping procedure, adding that he had no clear plans to do so in the future. "I wouldn't put any type of time line on it," Procter said. The VeriChip spokesman also attributed the protracted delay in the chipping to Thompson's desire to investigate the procedure. "He wants to see it [the VeriChip] in a real-world environment first," said Procter, who said he's trying to arrange a tour for Thompson at Hackensack University Medical Center, the first hospital to implement the technology in its emergency room. But the authors question this explanation. "We would expect Mr. Thompson to investigate the device *before* advocating it to others," said Liz McIntyre. "It sounds like he has wisely decided to put off the implantation, perhaps due to the serious privacy and civil liberties implications of such devices, or perhaps due to the serious medical downsides, like electrical risks and MRI incompatibility." Albrecht added, "Perhaps the implants conflict with Thompson's religious beliefs. Whatever his reasons, he should share them with the American people, many of whom have loved and trusted him for years. He will be responsible if they take an implant because of his influence." Thompson may find himself under increasing pressure to get chipped in light of VeriChip Corporation's recent IPO announcement. The company is relying on Thompson's cooperation to give the much maligned human tracking chip an image boost. "He said it on live television," said Procter of Thompson's chipping intentions. "We look forward to setting a firm date in accordance to his schedule and other commitments....We want to maximize the impact of [Thompson's chipping] event...We'd certainly like to...really knock it out of the park." McIntyre is hoping that Thompson will resist the pressure. "Our concern is that the VeriChip Company would like to chip every person on the planet, and they're counting on Thompson to be their ticket to mass acceptance," said McIntyre. "We're hoping he will work for the best interests of humanity and refuse to be goaded into an ill advised action." According to Procter, only about 60 living persons in the U.S. have agreed to be chipped. In addition to the voluntary recipients, the company's implants were injected into the deceased victims of hurricane Katrina, and there are plans to chip mentally disabled patients at a residential center in Chattanooga. VeriChip has also had talks with the Pentagon about chipping military personnel, though Procter said that "no formal agreements have been reached." A transcript of Thompson's entire CBS MarketWatch interview is available at http://www.spychips.com/devices/tommythompsonverichip.html. ### ================================ For more information contact Katherine Albrecht or Liz McIntyre, co- authors of "Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track Your Every Move With RFID." Liz McIntyre (liz(a)spychips.com) 877-287-5854 or Katherine Albrecht (kma(a)spychips.com) 877-287-5854 ================================ Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track your Every Move with RFID is the winner of the Lysander Spooner Award for Advancing the Literature of Liberty. Authored by Harvard doctoral researcher Katherine Albrecht and former bank examiner Liz McIntyre, the book is meticulously researched, drawing on patent documents, corporate source materials, conference proceedings, and firsthand interviews to paint a convincing -- and frightening -- picture of the threat posed by RFID. ================================ "This is the first, and maybe the loudest, popular book on a crucial technology of our times...all of it is fascinating, some is gross and revolting, and most of it is hilarious...this is a masterpiece of technocriticism." -- From the foreword by Bruce Sterling, best-selling author and RFID "Visionary in Residence," Art Center College of Design Spychips "make[s] a stunningly powerful argument against plans for RFID being mapped out by government agencies, retail and manufacturing companies." --Evan Schuman, CIO Insight "The book makes a very persuasive case that some of America's biggest companies want to embed tracking technology into virtually everything we own, and then study our usage patterns 24 hours a day. It's a truly creepy book and well worth reading." --Hiawatha Bray, Boston Globe technology reporter "Spychips is one of the best privacy books in many years....The privacy movement needs a book. I nominate Spychips." - Marc Rotenberg, Georgetown University Adjunct Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) ========================================= _______________________________________________ EPIC_IDOF mailing list EPIC_IDOF(a)mailman.epic.org https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] FW: Tommy Thompson Puts off RFID Implant
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

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