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Where R U? Text service tracks teens
by Brian Randell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dave: >From today's (UK) Guardian: >Where R U? Text service tracks teens > >Lucy Ward, social affairs correspondent >Wednesday July 20, 2005 >The Guardian > >It is a familiar dilemma for parents of teenagers testing new-found >independence - do you sit at home fretting over their after-school >whereabouts or call their mobiles and risk a tirade against over- >protectiveness? > >The answer, according to one company, is a hi-tech apron string >based on the mobile phone location tracking techniques used in >police investigations. > >The new KidsOK service, sold in shops including Boots and Bhs as >the summer holidays start, allows parents to use their own mobiles >and their children's to "discreetly" locate wandering offspring (or >their phones, at least) to within about 500m in built-up areas. > >Instead of dialling their teenager's number, parents subscribing to >the service send or "ping" a text message including the child's >name to a special mailbox. Within 60 seconds, they receive a map >(if they have a picturephone) or a description showing the position >of the youngster's phone. > >The system uses technology which traces the location of a mobile by >pinpointing it within the three nearest mobile phone masts. Because >the masts are clustered in built-up areas, the method is most >accurate in cities and gives a much less precise picture in rural >areas. > . . . . Full story: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,1532026,00.htm cheers brian -- School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK EMAIL = Brian.Randell(a)ncl.ac.uk PHONE = +44 191 222 7923 FAX = +44 191 222 8232 URL = http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/~brian.randell/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Where R U? Text service tracks teens
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[liberationtech] Brussels Cryptoparty March 23 - call for input and participation
by Raegan MacDonald 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi LibTech! The Hacker Space Brussels, the Net Users' Rights Protection Association (NURPA), Access and European Digital Rights (EDRi) are excited to announce the second-ever Brussels CryptoParty, on 23 March 2013, at the EDRi offices. While it is always important to promote the use of privacy enhancing tools, we are continuously surprised at the amount of policy people in the "Brussels Bubble" that don't use or are not aware of encryption, OTR, etc. We're also in the midst of the debate around the Data Protection Regulation, and hope to shed some light on the importance of privacy -- not only as a fundamental human right -- but as a means to ensure greater control over your identity. So far, we are planning to focusing on OTR, ToR, encrypting emails, SSL/HTTPS and disk encryption. We know that many of you have already participated in or organizing CryptoParties, and would love to have the benefit of your experience! The cryptoparty will take place on *Saturday 23 March 2013, from 15:00 until 18:00*. The address is: *EDRi Office* *Rue Belliard 20, 6th floor,* *1040 Brussels* Your comments, input and assistance are most welcome. Feel free to forward this invitation or even better: come join us! Thanks and best, Access, EDRi, NURPA, HSPBXL -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] How secure is Bluetooth?
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 01/29/2012 04:09 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > See my first email please. > > Are there any documented cases of monitoring the audio transmitted between > a Bluetooth headset and phone. I guess you're looking for some personal stories or big news stories? > > I am quite aware that Bluetooth is not safe for a variety of reasons. > Please note that your users will likely be targeted by cops with FinFisher: http://speciali.espresso.repubblica.it/pdf/spyfiles/it-intrusion.pdf > When preparing advice for non technical people with very real security > problems that are known, its important to provide the best advice about > what is not known in their situation. I've been unable to find any > information on the viability of intercepting audio transmissions, even the > 2007 article doesn't appear to suggest for certain that they could > reconstruct the audio file, merely that the potential might be there. > Audio is a weird way to frame it. You have devices that communicate with Bluetooth (TM) use common cryptography and protocols. The crypto is busted: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E0_(cipher) This is a pretty funny read: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth#Security Overall, I think it's important to note that even if a device wasn't used in a discoverable mode, a sniffer can at least passively track and try to exploit devices nearby after seeing them transmit. This is likely similiar to Bluejacking: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluejacking Here's a project that uses a car as an audio bug: http://trifinite.org/trifinite_stuff_carwhisperer.html > I'm only asking if anyone has heard of documented cases of listening in to > Bluetooth audio. So far it only seems to happen if there is a prior exploit > in place and that doesn't even appear to be definitive. R&S sells a solution to sniff traffic between two devices: http://www2.rohde-schwarz.com/file_13603/Bluetooth_Sniffer_v2.4.pdf "In an active Piconet, where at least two Bluetooth. devices (one master, one or more slaves) interact with each other, the USB dongle is air sniffing the communication between those. This analysis is required to check interoperability of Bluetooth. devices from different vendors and to troubleshoot problems by detailed protocol decoding" Those guys also sell IMSI-catchers if you're in the market... This "Decrypting Encrypted Bluetooth data with FTS4BT" is also a good read: http://www.fte.com/docs/encryption%20and%20decryption%20in%20fts4bt.pdf Basically, the FTS4BT just needs the pin to decrypt the data and that's where h1kari's work comes in: http://openciphers.sourceforge.net/oc/ http://openciphers.sourceforge.net/oc/btpincrack.php Bluetooth Pin Cracking Core says: "The bluetooth pin cracking core implements the basic bluetooth pin cracking attack by generating possible PINs and running then through SAFER+ to verify if they are correct or not. This uses the pipelined implementation of SAFER+ and loops the output of the pipeline back into itsself 7 times to perform all of the E21/E22/E1 functions. The max clock speed we've been able to run it at on an E-12 is 75MHz which results in ~10 million PINs per second compared to roughly 40k on a modern CPU." the openciphers project supports the protocol analyser files produced by these devices: http://www.lecroy.com/protocolanalyzer/?capid=103&mid=511 This does HCI and air interface sniffing in sync: http://www.connectblue.com/products/sniffer-protocol-analyzers/bluetooth-sn… Note the features of that one: "Extracts Audio into WAV files: Supports A2DP, HSP & HF Profiles with playback for rapid quality check or performing a more detailed analysis" And if all of that doesn't convince you that someone can sniff Bluetooth - I encourage you to read this student's web page: http://nap.cse.bgu.ac.il/home/index.php/Bluetooth_Sniffing This seems to be the best buy for your money: http://compare.ebay.com/like/150735473216?var=lv&ltyp=AllFixedPriceItemType… $799.99 for the LeCroy Merlin CATC Mobile Bluetooth Protocol Analyzer seems like a deal. Even cheaper than the USRP! If you're looking for other devices for BT sniffing, I also found this: http://www.palowireless.com/bluearticles/bluetoothanalyzercompare1.asp And finally - the Ellisys equipment: http://www.ellisys.com/products/bex400/revolution.php "The new Ellisys All-Channel sniffer robustly records any packet, at any time, from any neighboring piconet, with zero-configuration and without being intrusive." http://www.ellisys.com/products/bex400/ has the best quote: "Determine PIN codes automatically and decrypt the data on the fly" Two nice photos of the device and software: http://www.ellisys.com/archive/images/bex400.png http://www.ellisys.com/archive/images/bex400_soft.png All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[p2p-hackers] Webcast Tonight: 25 Years After the AT&T Breakup
by Seth Johnson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

(Sorry for this one further notice -- webcast will be available. -- Seth) -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Webcast available --- Event TONIGHT -- 25th Anniversary. MARCH 6th, 2009 TIME: 6PM-9PM Date: Fri, 06 Mar 2009 05:12:13 -0500 From: Bruce Kushnick <bruce(a)newnetworks.com> To: <openinfrastructurealliance(a)gmail.com> FOR THOSE NOT IN NEW YORK CITY we've arranged a webcast. ALSO *** NEW SPEAKERS ADDED *** Carl Mayer, Esq. The State of Privacy in the US. Kenneth Levy Former FCC telecom lawyer at the time of Divestiture. Lou Klepner The New York City Co-op Fiber Network For Immediate Release (CONTACT INFO BELOW) EVENT: Has Divestiture Worked? A 25th Anniversary Assessment of the Breakup of AT&T WEBCAST AVAILABLE: For those not in New York City, there will be an available live web cast of the event. http://www.communityfiberproject.net/stream/ Complete agenda and speaker bios at: -- SEE NEW SPEAKERS. http://25thanniversaryofthebreakupofatt.blogspot.com/ DATE: * FRIDAY, MARCH 6th, 2009 TIME: 6PM-9PM LOCATION: New York University, Warren Weaver Hall 251 Mercer St. Room 109. PRICE: ADMISSION IS FREE. (RSVP requested, by email to: rsvp(a)bway.net -or- Facebook, LinkedIn, or MeetUp ISOC-NY) If you're concerned with the future of the Internet: How does America get gigabit, open and ubiquitous, broadband telecom infrastructure? The goal of this conference is to outline the history of the last 25 years, discuss the current market issues, then give a view of the future of broadband and telecom in the US that has been mostly untold in the media. It is a future that leads to ubiquitous, very high speed networks based on an infrastructure that is open to all competitors -- giving customers choice, lower prices and new quality products and innovative services. And widely acknowledged as critical for long term economic growth. AGENDA (subject to change) PANEL 1: Historical perspective: * Bruce Kushnick An overview and leading financial indicators. What happened over the last 25 years? * Tom Allibone Consumers: telephony costs and other & Dean Landsman issues of telephony and broadband. * Ken Levy Living history, perspective from within FCC during the Break Up! * Alex Goldman ISP/CLEC industry: regulatory follies over the past decade * Mark Cooper The Failure of Market Fundamentalism in the Telecom Sector: How Deregulation Derailed Divestiture or The Operation was Successful, but the Patient Died PANEL 2: The Present State: * Jonathan Askin The legal/regulatory environment then and now. * Dave Burstein Broadband market roundup * Joe Plotkin Small business broadband needs, and surviving as a small competitive provider. * David Rosen What filmmakers and other creators need to know * Carl Mayer Privacy and the latest on the wiretapping case PANEL 3: The Future State and Alternative Approaches: * Fred Goldstein The current state of fiber optic networks. Are new models like Structural Separation needed now? * Lou Klepner NYC co-op fiber network * Dana Spiegel The future of broadband spectrum * W. Scott McCollough Legally rewiring telecom infrastructure: What is possible? Divestiture2? Separation? =================== For More Information: Joe Plotkin T: 646-502-9796 E: bwayjoe(a)bway.net Internet Society, New York Chapter E: president(a)isoc-ny.org =================== _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: data remanence (was: Some legal trouble with TOR in France)
by Eric H. Jung 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

--- Michael Holstein <michael.holstein(a)csuohio.edu> wrote: > AFIK, there is no data remanence problem with DRAM Not apparently. I sent one of these links earlier in this thread IIRC. These papers are by Peter Gutman himself. "7. Methods of Recovery for Data stored in Random-Access Memory" "8. Erasure of Data stored in Random-Access Memory" http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html Data Remanence in Semiconductor Devices -- all 19 pages http://www.cypherpunks.to/~peter/usenix01.pdf It's been a few years since I've read these articles personally. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[p2p-hackers] Webcast Tonight: 25 Years After the AT&T Breakup
by Seth Johnson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

(Sorry for this one further notice -- webcast will be available. -- Seth) -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Webcast available --- Event TONIGHT -- 25th Anniversary. MARCH 6th, 2009 TIME: 6PM-9PM Date: Fri, 06 Mar 2009 05:12:13 -0500 From: Bruce Kushnick <bruce(a)newnetworks.com> To: <openinfrastructurealliance(a)gmail.com> FOR THOSE NOT IN NEW YORK CITY we've arranged a webcast. ALSO *** NEW SPEAKERS ADDED *** Carl Mayer, Esq. The State of Privacy in the US. Kenneth Levy Former FCC telecom lawyer at the time of Divestiture. Lou Klepner The New York City Co-op Fiber Network For Immediate Release (CONTACT INFO BELOW) EVENT: Has Divestiture Worked? A 25th Anniversary Assessment of the Breakup of AT&T WEBCAST AVAILABLE: For those not in New York City, there will be an available live web cast of the event. http://www.communityfiberproject.net/stream/ Complete agenda and speaker bios at: -- SEE NEW SPEAKERS. http://25thanniversaryofthebreakupofatt.blogspot.com/ DATE: * FRIDAY, MARCH 6th, 2009 TIME: 6PM-9PM LOCATION: New York University, Warren Weaver Hall 251 Mercer St. Room 109. PRICE: ADMISSION IS FREE. (RSVP requested, by email to: rsvp(a)bway.net -or- Facebook, LinkedIn, or MeetUp ISOC-NY) If you're concerned with the future of the Internet: How does America get gigabit, open and ubiquitous, broadband telecom infrastructure? The goal of this conference is to outline the history of the last 25 years, discuss the current market issues, then give a view of the future of broadband and telecom in the US that has been mostly untold in the media. It is a future that leads to ubiquitous, very high speed networks based on an infrastructure that is open to all competitors -- giving customers choice, lower prices and new quality products and innovative services. And widely acknowledged as critical for long term economic growth. AGENDA (subject to change) PANEL 1: Historical perspective: * Bruce Kushnick An overview and leading financial indicators. What happened over the last 25 years? * Tom Allibone Consumers: telephony costs and other & Dean Landsman issues of telephony and broadband. * Ken Levy Living history, perspective from within FCC during the Break Up! * Alex Goldman ISP/CLEC industry: regulatory follies over the past decade * Mark Cooper The Failure of Market Fundamentalism in the Telecom Sector: How Deregulation Derailed Divestiture or The Operation was Successful, but the Patient Died PANEL 2: The Present State: * Jonathan Askin The legal/regulatory environment then and now. * Dave Burstein Broadband market roundup * Joe Plotkin Small business broadband needs, and surviving as a small competitive provider. * David Rosen What filmmakers and other creators need to know * Carl Mayer Privacy and the latest on the wiretapping case PANEL 3: The Future State and Alternative Approaches: * Fred Goldstein The current state of fiber optic networks. Are new models like Structural Separation needed now? * Lou Klepner NYC co-op fiber network * Dana Spiegel The future of broadband spectrum * W. Scott McCollough Legally rewiring telecom infrastructure: What is possible? Divestiture2? Separation? =================== For More Information: Joe Plotkin T: 646-502-9796 E: bwayjoe(a)bway.net Internet Society, New York Chapter E: president(a)isoc-ny.org =================== _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [cryptography] Digital cash in the news...
by James A. Donald 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 2011-06-13 9:26 AM, Ian G wrote: > However. Unless the laws of financial conservation have been repealed by > the design, those who follow have to invest a lot and come out with less... Financial conservation does not apply to money. If paper currency collapses, and is replaced by gold, those who invest in bitcoin will come out with nothing. If paper currency collapses, and is replaced by bitcoin, they will come out with immense fortunes. The market is at present rating the prospect of the world going to a bitcoin standard rather than a gold standard at two chances in a million, which seems reasonably conservative. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] How secure is Bluetooth?
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 01/29/2012 04:09 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > See my first email please. > > Are there any documented cases of monitoring the audio transmitted between > a Bluetooth headset and phone. I guess you're looking for some personal stories or big news stories? > > I am quite aware that Bluetooth is not safe for a variety of reasons. > Please note that your users will likely be targeted by cops with FinFisher: http://speciali.espresso.repubblica.it/pdf/spyfiles/it-intrusion.pdf > When preparing advice for non technical people with very real security > problems that are known, its important to provide the best advice about > what is not known in their situation. I've been unable to find any > information on the viability of intercepting audio transmissions, even the > 2007 article doesn't appear to suggest for certain that they could > reconstruct the audio file, merely that the potential might be there. > Audio is a weird way to frame it. You have devices that communicate with Bluetooth (TM) use common cryptography and protocols. The crypto is busted: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E0_(cipher) This is a pretty funny read: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth#Security Overall, I think it's important to note that even if a device wasn't used in a discoverable mode, a sniffer can at least passively track and try to exploit devices nearby after seeing them transmit. This is likely similiar to Bluejacking: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluejacking Here's a project that uses a car as an audio bug: http://trifinite.org/trifinite_stuff_carwhisperer.html > I'm only asking if anyone has heard of documented cases of listening in to > Bluetooth audio. So far it only seems to happen if there is a prior exploit > in place and that doesn't even appear to be definitive. R&S sells a solution to sniff traffic between two devices: http://www2.rohde-schwarz.com/file_13603/Bluetooth_Sniffer_v2.4.pdf "In an active Piconet, where at least two Bluetooth. devices (one master, one or more slaves) interact with each other, the USB dongle is air sniffing the communication between those. This analysis is required to check interoperability of Bluetooth. devices from different vendors and to troubleshoot problems by detailed protocol decoding" Those guys also sell IMSI-catchers if you're in the market... This "Decrypting Encrypted Bluetooth data with FTS4BT" is also a good read: http://www.fte.com/docs/encryption%20and%20decryption%20in%20fts4bt.pdf Basically, the FTS4BT just needs the pin to decrypt the data and that's where h1kari's work comes in: http://openciphers.sourceforge.net/oc/ http://openciphers.sourceforge.net/oc/btpincrack.php Bluetooth Pin Cracking Core says: "The bluetooth pin cracking core implements the basic bluetooth pin cracking attack by generating possible PINs and running then through SAFER+ to verify if they are correct or not. This uses the pipelined implementation of SAFER+ and loops the output of the pipeline back into itsself 7 times to perform all of the E21/E22/E1 functions. The max clock speed we've been able to run it at on an E-12 is 75MHz which results in ~10 million PINs per second compared to roughly 40k on a modern CPU." the openciphers project supports the protocol analyser files produced by these devices: http://www.lecroy.com/protocolanalyzer/?capid=103&mid=511 This does HCI and air interface sniffing in sync: http://www.connectblue.com/products/sniffer-protocol-analyzers/bluetooth-sn… Note the features of that one: "Extracts Audio into WAV files: Supports A2DP, HSP & HF Profiles with playback for rapid quality check or performing a more detailed analysis" And if all of that doesn't convince you that someone can sniff Bluetooth - I encourage you to read this student's web page: http://nap.cse.bgu.ac.il/home/index.php/Bluetooth_Sniffing This seems to be the best buy for your money: http://compare.ebay.com/like/150735473216?var=lv&ltyp=AllFixedPriceItemType… $799.99 for the LeCroy Merlin CATC Mobile Bluetooth Protocol Analyzer seems like a deal. Even cheaper than the USRP! If you're looking for other devices for BT sniffing, I also found this: http://www.palowireless.com/bluearticles/bluetoothanalyzercompare1.asp And finally - the Ellisys equipment: http://www.ellisys.com/products/bex400/revolution.php "The new Ellisys All-Channel sniffer robustly records any packet, at any time, from any neighboring piconet, with zero-configuration and without being intrusive." http://www.ellisys.com/products/bex400/ has the best quote: "Determine PIN codes automatically and decrypt the data on the fly" Two nice photos of the device and software: http://www.ellisys.com/archive/images/bex400.png http://www.ellisys.com/archive/images/bex400_soft.png All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: data remanence (was: Some legal trouble with TOR in France)
by Eric H. Jung 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

--- Michael Holstein <michael.holstein(a)csuohio.edu> wrote: > AFIK, there is no data remanence problem with DRAM Not apparently. I sent one of these links earlier in this thread IIRC. These papers are by Peter Gutman himself. "7. Methods of Recovery for Data stored in Random-Access Memory" "8. Erasure of Data stored in Random-Access Memory" http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html Data Remanence in Semiconductor Devices -- all 19 pages http://www.cypherpunks.to/~peter/usenix01.pdf It's been a few years since I've read these articles personally. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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