- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Mac Perl info
by robichau＠lambda.msfc.nasa.gov 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

As {promised | threatened} in my message to the list last night, here's the info file for Mac Perl, available at fine FTP sites like nic.switch.ch (the original site and holder of this file.) I don't use Perl myself, but you can contact either Matthias or Tim (see below); they have both been helpful with other stuff in the past. Regards, -Paul, posting from work for once WELCOME TO MPW PERL This is Perl for the Mac, ported to MPW C by Matthias Neeracher <neeri(a)iis.ethz.ch> and Tim Endres <time(a)ice.com>. It runs every program in the test suite that you could it reasonably expect to, and some you probably didn't expect. Feel free to give this program away according to the terms stated in the README file. System Requirements Perl really likes MPW. The standalone version is not much use yet. Some of the really cool features require ToolServer, System 7, and enough RAM (Notably stuff like `CFront MacApp.cp`, while (<Å.c>) or open(XXX, "Catenate Å.c |")) Some of the files barely compile with 5 megabytes of RAM. Bugs, Suggestions, Damnations Please send your bug reports and/or fixes to <neeri(a)iis.ethz.ch> (It is rather unlikely that any of the bugs are relevant to the UNIX version). Mailing list There is now a mailing list for announcing new releases, sharing scripts, and discussions about how to make MPW Perl change your life. To subscribe, send a mail to <mpw-perl-request(a)iis.ethz.ch> Revision History 24Jan93 4.0.6 - choose() for files no longer includes the terminating null character. - rename() and TCP sockets work better (thanks to Brad Pickering for reporting these bugs). - standalone version can read scripts from its data fork and accepts more startup files. - (hopefully) improved the documentation a little. Added ObiWan support. 20Dec92 4.0.5 - Supports sockets and symbolic links. - "ask", "answer" and "pick" are now builtins with a slightly changed syntax (sorry). - A few mac scripts are now provided in :t:mac and :macscripts: - The application now always searches for a #! line first. If none is found, the script is executed anyway, but the file has to be read twice. 27Sep92 4.0.4 This release upgrades the Mac version to UNIX patchlevel 35. 08Jun92 4.0.3 This release supports opendir (In fact, I thought the last one'd already support it. Thanks to Mike Meckler <meckler(a)egg.gg.caltech.edu> for reporting this bug). dbmopen & friends are now supported. 20Jan92 4.0.2 First public release. -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | May explode if disposed of improperly. Mission Software Development Div. | Printed on recycled phosphors. New Technology, Inc. | ** PGP 2.0 key available on request **

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Some questions
by Nickey MacDonald 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

{I have been reading the list for about a week now... This is my first post... I hope this is not a FAQ...} I am looking for solutions to a situation that people may find familiar... Say you have a text file that contains sensitive configuration data (in a particular case, the cross-index of anonymous ids and real mail addresses) taht you want a program to be able to read, but you want it stored in encrypted format. (Which means you will decrypt it each time you read it, and rewrite it in encrypted form when needed. It will only exist in decrypted in the computers RAM.) Is there some sort of scheme that will allow this, without having to have a user present to enter the password at startup (a pain if its supposed to be an unattended program, such as a remailer) or having the password compiled into the program... Also, I have seen a number of references to DC nets... I must confess I have never heard of the term before... can someone enlighten me? --- Nick MacDonald i6t4(a)jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca

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Re: anonymous mail
by paul＠fairgate.com 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

>Eli> You might want to work in perl, which would make the scripts work under >Eli> Unix and DOS, at least. Is there a Mac perl? > >... As for a Mac Perl, a quick scan of my >Camel book doesn't turn up a mention of one. I could have missed it. There is indeed a Mac perl; it exists as a standalone app and an MPW tool. I'll post the location tomorrow if I remember to look it up; the Internet-abled can try archie. -Paul -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | Fairgate Technologies: Macintosh support, paul(a)fairgate.com | training, and development. ..uunet!xavax!fairgate!paul | 'ripem' PEM key available.

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Re: anon.penet.fi hacking
by Tony Kidson 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

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Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
by nobody＠rosebud.ee.uh.edu 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

Beware of the message about the security bug in the anon.penet.fi software! If you do as requested, and send your true email address to an5877(a)anon.penet.fi then he will see both your true email address and your anonymous address (if you have one - if you don't, you will be assigned one and he will see that). Any future use you make of this anonymous server (say, to post anonymously) will appear under that same anonymous address - and this person will know your true email address that goes with it. an5877's message appears to be a trick, designed to collect anonymous/real address pairs. Johan Helsingius should take action against this trickster. Since he is learning other people's real addresses, perhaps it would be appropriate for his own real address to be revealed. But, this does point out that these systems which automatically assign anonymous addrsses have several security flaws. Johan has already had to introduce a "password" feature to make it more difficult to send fakemail that appears to be from a particular email address through the server, thus revealing the corresponding anonymous address when it is delivered. an5877's trick is a variant on one discussed in news.admin.policy where it is pointed out that you can mail to someone via anon.penet.fi and ask for information; when the return mail comes back it will be from that person's anonymous address. So again you can pair up real and anonymous addresses. These are serious problems. We need some discussion of how to avoid these simple tricks for defeating the anonymity while still having an easy-to-use system. ::Xavier::

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Dead(beat) give-away
by deltorto＠aol.com 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

"an5877(a)anon.penet.fi" (aka "deadbeat") sez: >> I believe I have uncovered a serious bug in the Finnish anonymous >> remailer, one that allows me to piece together anonymous id's and >> actual email addresses. >> >> I'm reluctant to publish the details here, but I'll explain how it >> works if you send me your email address. I smell something, and it's not my FPU overheating! Anyone who's "reluctant" to discuss a flaw in an anon remailer HERE... is definitely NOT on the up-and-up. Somebody "out" this weasel, PRONTO! (please!) d2t

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Mac HD Cypher... mostly
by deltorto＠aol.com 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

>>From: DDLEEDS(a)vm.cmp.ilstu.edu >>Subj: Mac HD Cypher... >> >>Does anyone know of a way or program that can completely encrypt a hard drive >>on a macintosh computer so that only the person that knows the key can decrypt it? Well, I don't know about "impenetrable" other than my first girlfriend when I was 9's underpants, but FWB's Hard Disk ToolKit (aka HDT) provides, besides very nice control over all aspects of SCSI drive configuration, three levels of 'protection': a driver-level password (keeps yer granny out) and two levels of block-by-block encryption - simple password-based (keeps your savvy mate from editing the file blocks and recovering your loveletters) or DES (keeps most non-Fed attackers out). The advantage of this device-driver level encryption is that the drive can be used normally as long as you know the password. Otherwise, if some spook with a warrant tries to mount it down at his office, he has to fill out a shitload of forms, FedEx it to Fort Meade and wait a few days for the lads in the lab to crack it for him before he can come back with the 'cuffs. I recommend giving the drive an HDT driver-level access password as well as DES encryption if you're really concerned that your girlfriend is gonna see the shit you been writing about her to that other chick. I use these options on a couple of 44 MB SyQuest removeables. I sleep pretty well at night (when I sleep, that is). >>I am looking for a crypt that is completely IMPENETRABLE!!! Dream on, Smedley. Anyone who's ever graduated from Paranoid U. can tell you that when the chips are down (i.e. the New Sons of Armageddon come a-knockin' at yer shack), DES is about as secure as my third girlfriend when I was 12's panties - not very. OK, so I enjoyed puberty, sue me... >>Your help would be appreciated, >> >> >>Jumping Jack Flash You can find HDT mentioned in any decent Mac 'zine. Happy Jumping. d2t PS: I'd tell you FWB's phone number in the 415 (SF) area, but that might sound like advertising. :-)

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No Subject
by nowhere＠bsu-cs.bsu.edu 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- David, > As was said, the doubleblind system is a great idea, but incomplete > if you want to correspond to someone without revealing your anon id. Well, I don't agree that doubleblind is a great idea. For example, if at any time, Alice sends pseudonymously to Bob, Bob can not reply directly: this would expose his identity at anon.penet.fi. Bob must reply through a remailer. Note the irony -- Bob must take special steps to protect his pseudonym because anon.penet.fi is acting affirmatively to conceal his actual identity. If Bob slips up and simply replies, he is exposed. Hal, > (It's interesting that he also sent his message via one of the Cypherpunks > remailers. Maybe he thought they worked like the Penet remailer and > he could break anonymity on those as well.) Actually, I don't know why my message went through a Cypherpunks remailer -- I didn't ask it to. I don't know of any weaknesses in the Cypherpunks remailers (other than extreme vulnerability to social engineering). > Evidentally there is positive harm that can occur by automatically > anonymizing all messages which pass through a remailer. ... For > anonymous posting and for mail to a non-anonymous address, it's more > reasonable to assume that anonymization is desired. ... But when > sending a message to an anonymous address, it's not known whether the > sender wants to be anonymized or not. I think it's imperative that the sender use X-Anon-To to be pseudonymous. This is consistent with the principle of least astonishment. > It might seem that people should just be careful about what they > send through Penet, but there are some problems with this. What do > you do if you get a message from an5877(a)anon.penet.fi asking for > advice on cryptography mailing lists? If you reply, your questioner > can figure out who the reply is coming from, and sees your Penet > alias. There is no way to prevent this from happening currently. A Cypherpunks remailer can be used to conceal the correspondent's pseudonymous identity. > Also, I have seen proposals that anonymous ID's should be made less > recognizable, so that instead of an5877(a)anon.penet.fi we would have > joe(a)serv.uba.edu. In such a situation it might be tedious to > scrutinize every email address we send to (via replies, for example) > to make sure it isn't a remailer where you have an anonymous ID. It would be a real boon to make pseudonyms less prominent -- this seems to have kicked over a hornet's nest on USENET (even though pseudonyms have been quietly in use for years). But were this the case, scrutiny would be an understatement. > All in all, I think some changes need to be made in how anonymous > addresses are used and implemented in order to provide reasonable > amounts of security. I agree that more discussion is in order. I'm especially concerned about the broader issues regarding anonymity through remailers. DEADBEAT -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.1 iQBFAgUBK4mrrvFZTpBW/B35AQE+PQGAh69FcaATFD05lIuhqqK8ZMmV+8xNi/LN 7kxDSgFgB9J/A9rRgAL6S1Ux2ojU4opP =RGlc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. *IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update(a)anon.penet.fi for details.

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anon.penet.fi remailers
by mark＠coombs.anu.edu.au 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

>For example, if at any time, Alice sends pseudonymously to Bob, Bob can >not reply directly: this would expose his identity at anon.penet.fi. >Bob must reply through a remailer. > >Note the irony -- Bob must take special steps to protect his pseudonym >because anon.penet.fi is acting affirmatively to conceal his actual >identity. If Bob slips up and simply replies, he is exposed. This, unfortunately, is true. I *have* to use a remailer to hide any anon.penet.fi alias I have or the sender will see it and know I am (for eg) anon1234@penet. I balk at Yet-More-F******-Header-Lines (YMFHL) but a _possible_ patch is to have a: X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no (in the header), or: :: X-Show-My-Anon: yes|no (in the body) addition so people who reply to a message from penet can feed their real email address through the system rather than having it bounced to the recipient as their anon id. This would require either a smart mailer, checking exactly who the orig letter was addressed to (your anon or your real address) and inserting the line as appropriate. It *should* be automatic actually. All it has to do is check a local list of your anon addressed and if someone has mailed it then alter the above line as needed. This raises question of the security of local lists of your anon addrs of course.. but you get the idea.. Comments? (BTW I saw someone's .sig where they *advertised* their anon id on USENET. Presumably this was because he thought thats what you had to do so others could email them anonomously... obviously he wont be a whistle blower :) Mark mark(a)coombs.anu.edu.au

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anon.penet.fi hacking
by Hal 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

Well, I think I have deduced the identity of "Deadbeat" from his posting style. I don't think Julf should say who he is. This was an important demonstration of a weakness in the security of the remailers. The Penet remailer seems now to require a password for all messages; at least, I wasn't able to send to an5877(a)anon.penet.fi ("Deadbeat") without using my password. So chaining through Cypherpunks remailers to Penet would seem not to be possible now. Unless Eli's suggestion works - having our remailers put out a random "From:" line (perhaps just on mail to Penet?) might cause Penet to issue a new pseudonym for that apparent new user. This would be kind of wasteful from Penet's perspective - all those pseudonyms are never going to be re-used. But it might allow this form of chaining, without compromising the pseudonym of the remailer operator. (I had put my patch into the maildelivery file before Johan instituted his password system, when I realized this weakness existed. I forgot to mention it here at the time. My motivation was to protect my own Penet pseudonym.) Another possibility would be for there to be a command to Penet to allow users to send truly anonymous mail, mail which does not have a meaningful "From" line (and in particular which does not have the user's Penet pseudonym displayed as the "From" address). We could set our remailers to use that command for any mail sent to Penet. Mail sent with that command would not need a password. This would be an alternative way for users to deal with some of the other attacks, such as the one Deadbeat demonstrated. Hal P.S. - My, the list has sure been lively today. Looks like we beat Extropians again on volume!

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