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White House announcement on encryption--FORWARDED
by tcmay＠netcom.com 16 Apr '93

16 Apr '93

Cypherpunks, Here's a message from sci.crypt that's of relevance to us in several ways. I assume from its length, seriousness, and wording that it's not a spoof...I can't check the White House's signature! Some messages: 1. It tells us what Denning and Rivest were probably actually working on when they floated their "trial balloons" last summer and fall. 2. A goverment-sanctioned phone encryption technique has implications for the phone encryption topics we've discussed at the Cypherpunks meetings (notably with Paul Rubin and Whit Diffie). 3. As always, end-to-end encryption, bypassing such schemes as this, is looking better and better. 4. It is not clear if the government scheme will legally preclude other encryption schemes. 5. I expect a lively debate will soon take place in sci.crypt. Newsgroups: sci.crypt Path: netcom.com!netcomsv!decwrl!uunet!dove!csrc.ncsl.nist.gov!clipper From: clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (Clipper Chip Announcement) Subject: text of White House announcement and Q&As on clipper chip encryption Message-ID: <C5L17v.GH5(a)dove.nist.gov> Sender: news(a)dove.nist.gov Organization: National Institute of Standards & Technology Distribution: na Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:19:06 GMT Lines: 282 Note: This file will also be available via anonymous file transfer from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in directory /pub/nistnews and via the NIST Computer Security BBS at 301-948-5717. --------------------------------------------------- THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary _________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release April 16, 1993 STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY The President today announced a new initiative that will bring the Federal Government together with industry in a voluntary program to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement. The initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate the development and use of advanced and secure telecommunications networks and wireless communications links. For too long there has been little or no dialogue between our private sector and the law enforcement community to resolve the tension between economic vitality and the real challenges of protecting Americans. Rather than use technology to accommodate the sometimes competing interests of economic growth, privacy and law enforcement, previous policies have pitted government against industry and the rights of privacy against law enforcement. Sophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer. It is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files. While encryption technology can help Americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information, it also can be used by terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals. A state-of-the-art microcircuit called the "Clipper Chip" has been developed by government engineers. The chip represents a new approach to encryption technology. It can be used in new, relatively inexpensive encryption devices that can be attached to an ordinary telephone. It scrambles telephone communications using an encryption algorithm that is more powerful than many in commercial use today. This new technology will help companies protect proprietary information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electronically. At the same time this technology preserves the ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals. A "key-escrow" system will be established to ensure that the "Clipper Chip" is used to protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans. Each device containing the chip will have two unique 2 "keys," numbers that will be needed by authorized government agencies to decode messages encoded by the device. When the device is manufactured, the two keys will be deposited separately in two "key-escrow" data bases that will be established by the Attorney General. Access to these keys will be limited to government officials with legal authorization to conduct a wiretap. The "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of Americans. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology, the Attorney General will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices. In addition, respected experts from outside the government will be offered access to the confidential details of the algorithm to assess its capabilities and publicly report their findings. The chip is an important step in addressing the problem of encryption's dual-edge sword: encryption helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield criminals and terrorists. We need the "Clipper Chip" and other approaches that can both provide law-abiding citizens with access to the encryption they need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their illegal activities. In order to assess technology trends and explore new approaches (like the key-escrow system), the President has directed government agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on encryption that accommodates: -- the privacy of our citizens, including the need to employ voice or data encryption for business purposes; -- the ability of authorized officials to access telephone calls and data, under proper court or other legal order, when necessary to protect our citizens; -- the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build the National Information Infrastructure needed to promote economic growth and the competitiveness of American industry in the global marketplace; and -- the need of U.S. companies to manufacture and export high technology products. The President has directed early and frequent consultations with affected industries, the Congress and groups that advocate the privacy rights of individuals as policy options are developed. 3 The Administration is committed to working with the private sector to spur the development of a National Information Infrastructure which will use new telecommunications and computer technologies to give Americans unprecedented access to information. This infrastructure of high-speed networks ("information superhighways") will transmit video, images, HDTV programming, and huge data files as easily as today's telephone system transmits voice. Since encryption technology will play an increasingly important role in that infrastructure, the Federal Government must act quickly to develop consistent, comprehensive policies regarding its use. The Administration is committed to policies that protect all Americans' right to privacy while also protecting them from those who break the law. Further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet. The provisions of the President's directive to acquire the new encryption technology are also available. For additional details, call Mat Heyman, National Institute of Standards and Technology, (301) 975-2758. --------------------------------- QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE Q: Does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations? A: No. "Clipper Chip" technology provides law enforcement with no new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of Americans. Q: Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device. What would they have to do to decipher the message? A: They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a court order, to do the wiretap in the first place. They would then present documentation of this authorization to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys and obtain the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers. The key is split into two parts, which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system. Q: Who will run the key-escrow data banks? A: The two key-escrow data banks will be run by two independent entities. At this point, the Department of Justice and the Administration have yet to determine which agencies will oversee the key-escrow data banks. Q: How strong is the security in the device? How can I be sure how strong the security is? A: This system is more secure than many other voice encryption systems readily available today. While the algorithm will remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow system, we are willing to invite an independent panel of cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all potential users that there are no unrecognized vulnerabilities. Q: Whose decision was it to propose this product? A: The National Security Council, the Justice Department, the Commerce Department, and other key agencies were involved in this decision. This approach has been endorsed by the President, the Vice President, and appropriate Cabinet officials. Q: Who was consulted? The Congress? Industry? A: We have on-going discussions with Congress and industry on encryption issues, and expect those discussions to intensify as we carry out our review of encryption policy. We have briefed members of Congress and industry leaders on the decisions related to this initiative. Q: Will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers? A: The government designed and developed the key access encryption microcircuits, but it is not providing the microcircuits to product manufacturers. Product manufacturers can acquire the microcircuits from the chip manufacturer that produces them. Q: Who provides the "Clipper Chip"? A: Mykotronx programs it at their facility in Torrance, California, and will sell the chip to encryption device manufacturers. The programming function could be licensed to other vendors in the future. Q: How do I buy one of these encryption devices? A: We expect several manufacturers to consider incorporating the "Clipper Chip" into their devices. Q: If the Administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices? A: This is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review. The key escrow mechanism will provide Americans with an encryption product that is more secure, more convenient, and less expensive than others readily available today, but it is just one piece of what must be the comprehensive approach to encryption technology, which the Administration is developing. The Administration is not saying, "since encryption threatens the public safety and effective law enforcement, we will prohibit it outright" (as some countries have effectively done); nor is the U.S. saying that "every American, as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." There is a false "tension" created in the assessment that this issue is an "either-or" proposition. Rather, both concerns can be, and in fact are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned, balanced approach such as is proposed with the "Clipper Chip" and similar encryption techniques. Q: What does this decision indicate about how the Clinton Administration's policy toward encryption will differ from that of the Bush Administration? A: It indicates that we understand the importance of encryption technology in telecommunications and computing and are committed to working with industry and public-interest groups to find innovative ways to protect Americans' privacy, help businesses to compete, and ensure that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to fight crime and terrorism. Q: Will the devices be exportable? Will other devices that use the government hardware? A: Voice encryption devices are subject to export control requirements. Case-by-case review for each export is required to ensure appropriate use of these devices. The same is true for other encryption devices. One of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to U.S. companies operating at home and abroad. With this in mind, we expect export licenses will be granted on a case-by-case basis for U.S. companies seeking to use these devices to secure their own communications abroad. We plan to review the possibility of permitting wider exportability of these products. -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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Proposal for anon chaining
by jthomas＠coconut.mitre.org 16 Apr '93

16 Apr '93

KINNEY WILLIAM H <kinney(a)spot.colorado.edu> writes: > Recent traffic on anonymous remailers/servers: > > >From: Eli <ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu> > >> From: Hal <74076.1041(a)CompuServe.COM> > >> This method of posting does not allow you to receive replies. I have set > >> "nicknames" for these two accounts as "Untraceable account" which will appear > > >in the "From" line on the postings. Hopefully that will offer a clue that > > >the normal reply mechanism doesn't work. Maybe the nickname should say so > >> more explicitly? > > > > > >The security provided by this technique could be provided without > >the IMHO serious disadvantage of having no return address. Eric's > >hybrid approach, where a pseudonym server hands mail to an remailer > >chain, is secure (barring sophisticated traffic analysis) if you > >trust the last remailer in the chain. Julf, have you thought about > >whether you want to do something like this? > > > Hal > > Here's an idea I haven't seen suggested before, which would remove the need > for a pseudonym server: > > [Description of chain-encrypted header info, separated from message text] > > This seems to me to be a very robust pseudonymous mail system which > could be implemented by relatively minor changes to the existing Cypherpunk > remailer structure. It has the additional advantage of being decentralized > and maintenance-free. It could be used for pseudonyms on net news, e-mail, > wherever, and could presumably be integrated in some way into Julf's > anon server. > Yes, this would seem to be the way to do this, and this type of nested-encrypted routing information is what I was referring to as an "SASE" in my front-end/back-end anonymous posting design. There are some drawbacks, however. Traffic analysis by watching a remailer's feed, and seeing messages come in and go back out is much easier, since the message _text_ is unchanged from one remailer to the next. In fact, however, such traffic analysis is not difficult with the present system, since message lengths can be used to correlate messages going in and out, and the remailers aren't getting enough traffic to do much internal "mixing" to avoid obvious FIFO behavior. The obvious solutions are a remailing protocol that supports padding out messages to a few "standard" lengths, and increasing the remailer traffic, perhaps with dummy messages. But this doesn't help in the above case, when routing information is separate from message text, and not known to the sender (except for the first hop). One possible solution relies on the fact that each remailer must know the next hop a message will take. When the remailer is forwarding mail with separately encrypted header information, it will append some random bits to the message, then encrypt it with the next remailer's public key. (Note that if the appending of random bits is skipped, the system provides no security against traffic analysis, since the adversary can simply try encrypting incoming messages with various remailers' public keys, then watch to see if that message comes back out). I've got some more ambitious ideas for this (encrypted return addresses as a MIME content-type?), but I think the version outlined above could be implemented pretty easily, although I admit I haven't really read through the remailer scripts. I'll take a crack at it as soon as I get my Linux box (a couple weeks) if people think it's a good idea. Joe

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Dorothy Denning's friends strike
by Perry E. Metzger 16 Apr '93

16 Apr '93

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, libernet(a)dartmouth.edu, extropians(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu [Libernet readers -- please do not follow up on libernet, as it is only for announcements. All readers -- please do not CC lists you are not on with replies.] According to a front page article in today's New York Times, the Clinton Administration is going to be releasing a standard encryption technology that commercial users will be encouraged to adopt that involves having the government keep copies of "back door" keys associated with every device deployed. The article is entitled, with unintentional irony, "Communications Plan to Balance Government Access with Privacy". The article indicates that the move is "inteded to resolve a long standing dilema[...] how to preserve the legitimate right for businesses and citizens to use codes [...] without letting criminals and terrorists conspire beyond the reach of the law". The implications are obvious. Perry Metzger

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ANON: Chaining to Penet remailer
by Hal 16 Apr '93

16 Apr '93

Well, after a fair amount of experimentation I have learned who the mysterious an10757(a)anon.penet.fi is. It's me. Or, more specifically, it is my remailer operating at hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu. If you send mail from this remailer to anon.penet.fi for posting or remailing it is identified as comin from an10757, the same address used in the post by "Nowhere, Man". This address is different from the address I get if I just send to ping(a)anon.penet.fi from that account. I think the reason is that the mail sent from the remailer is identified as comin from "nobody" instead of "hal" in the From: field. This causes Julf's remailing software to assign a different anonymous ID. I don't see any problems with this (not right away, anyway) and in fact it seems to me to be a desirable feature. I think we should document this for people who want to use the Penet remailer for posting, in a more untraceable way. Send mail to either: hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu (posts as an10757(a)anon.penet.fi) hfinney(a)shell.portal.com (posts as an19579(a)anon.penet.fi) Have as the first lines of your message: :: Request-Remailing-To: anon(a)anon.penet.fi X-Anon-To: news.admin.policy Follow this with a blank line, then your message. Put whatever newsgroups you like (separated by commas) after X-Anon-To. This method of posting does not allow you to receive replies. I have set "nicknames" for these two accounts as "Untraceable account" which will appear in the "From" line on the postings. Hopefully that will offer a clue that the normal reply mechanism doesn't work. Maybe the nickname should say so more explicitly? I believe this approach would work with most of the other Cypherpunks remailers. The one thing for remailer operators to watch out for is what is put in the From: line when the remailer sends it. You want it to be different from your regular account name or else your anonymous ID will be used for all messages through that remailer. Naturally, this is vulnerable to abuse. If "Nowhere" or someone else continues to post obscenities and flames then Julf may have to block off all of our cypherpunks remailers, which would be unfortunate. Until there are more remailers I think anonymous posters need to continue to exercise some self- restraint. Hal

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WARNING: Pointer article to soc.whistleblowers debate
by rclark＠nyx.cs.du.edu 16 Apr '93

16 Apr '93

The news software has been activated. David Tale has accepted the article, sans a paragraph specifying a procedural point (which I didn't think would fly, anyway) and bagging alt.sex and alt.drugs from the discussion, but keeping many others; I think if I hadn't put those two in, he might have knocked out a few I was serious about. So, in any case, the article, in a modified form, partially by me and partially by Tale, is now posted to news.announce.newgroups, and the debate shall begin shortly. Those of you who consider this newsgroup a beneficial and good thing, and who wish to discuss its implementation and name and other germane issues, should immediately go to news.groups and begin posting like lunatics. Those of you who consider this newsgroup a menace to society should go to news.groups and post scathing articles about my sexual preferences. (Humor, of course.) In any case, I have not identified myself as a cypherpunk or, for that matter, as an Extropian, not having the boundless arrogance to presume that cypherpunks all share my opinion of the methods of implementing this; so those of you who do agree with me, or disagree only on procedural points, should post your opinion; people have a larger tendency to vote YES when they think others agree with them. Also try to avoid excessively inflammatory postings (on the order of "You fucking moron, how DARE you disagree with me."), as these will tend to garner a bunch of NOs. I don't mean be a total schmuck and bend over backwards for a flaming, but flame back in a constructive spirit and without senseless _ad hominem_ attacks. I hope that this group can be created with as little sturm and drang as possible, but if it _does_ require sturm OR drang OR both, heat may need to be applied. Again, post whether or not you agree. And don't send votes yet, of course. I'll just junk them, according to net.law. If the cypherpunks wish to present this as a cypherpunk issue, or if individuals wish to support it as individuals, feel free. I'm not going to attach the name 'cypherpunk' to it myself because, not to be rude, it would further politicize an already highly-politicized issue. However, if we'd be more effective as THE DREADED Extropians/Cypherpunks bloc, which I don't think is necessarily the case, feel free. It's not my net. Apologies are extended for the lengthy crosspost, but it shall be the last crosspost; further discussion ought to occur in news.groups. And battle plans in cypherpunks, if we even need battle plans. With any luck, there won't be a battle. If we sneak this in by acclamation without a flamewar or controversy, we're ENTRENCHED. NOBODY can stop us, or any other people who could utilize this most valuable resource. But I'm not holding my breath on that one. Although I cross-posted mainly to groups with a large population of potential YES voters, and ignored, say, news admin hangouts, those who would oppose this are sure to find out about it; but I think we can muster sufficient political clout to pass this. Me? I'm currently going to enlist some old friends from talk.bizarre. . . Don't worry, they're not the current crop but the same crowd that passed comp.protocols.tcp-ip.eniac. I'll ask for as little inflammatory material as possible, like I did here, but I don't want this to become any more of a flamewar than necessary, and, again and for the last time, would prefer it didn't end up that way at all. End of crosspost. We now return you to your regular round of discussing radix sorts and monozygotic recessives. Thank you. ---- Robert W. Clark rclark(a)nyx.cs.du.edu PGP signature available by mail or finger

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SOURCE to Macintosh PGP 2.2 released
by grady＠netcom.com 15 Apr '93

15 Apr '93

Complete Symantec THINK C 5.0.4 source code including projects and user documentation is available via anonymous FTP from: netcom.com [192.100.81.100] in directory pub/grady file is type ASCII, Compact Pro .sea processed with BinHex 4.0. MGET MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx MGET MacPGP2.2srcSIGNATURE HQX file is digitally signed by me; verification of signature via public key servers or by phone. Please distribute this code widely -- read the READ ME file included with the package.

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Chaining to Julf's remailer
by hal＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 15 Apr '93

15 Apr '93

On news.admin.policy, a 'nym' called Nowhere, Man called somebody an asshole and told them to fuck off. Someone objected, and Nowhere responded: > You're right, and I'm really sorry if my insults got somebody bent out > of shape. I just think some people deserve to get flamed once in a while. > Also, the mail return address doesn't work becuase this message goes therough > a chain of other remailers before it gets to JUlf's base. So netnews is > the only way to get messages to me. Hey, maybe there should be a board > just for messages to nyms. Crypted, even. How about it, news.admin.policy > phreaks, should we put it to a vote? Nowhere, Man . Apparently it is in fact possible to chain remailers now. I assume that he is chaining through cypherpunks remailers into penet. I'm curious to know which remailer is being used for this purpose? Perhaps we could add a description of how to do this to the documentation. My guess is that "Nowhere" reads this list. Hal

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.....
by trump＠pluto.ee.cua.edu 15 Apr '93

15 Apr '93

ok well i am sure that there are a lot of people out there that want to learn how to do basic cypher/decyphering... so i think it would be nice if people gave their knowledge on how to do decryption... even if its very very basic and perhaps a faq could be made out of this info... Clovis

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Re: alt.whistleblowers
by KINNEY WILLIAM H 15 Apr '93

15 Apr '93

Some comments on alt.whistleblowers from an (up to now) lurker. In brief, this strikes me as being a very foolish idea. In detail: -- Does anyone really think this is going to have much of an effect on anything? My suspicion is that a forum providing unlimited ability for people to anonymously post undocumented accusations against powerful people will be summarily ignored, not just by the targets of the accusations, but by everybody else with an actual life. There seems to be no discussion of the biggest weakness of this idea: the expected signal to noise ratio. This accomplishes nothing if it is overrun by, say, Kennedy asassination loons. It doesn't seem wise to me for the Cypherpunks' first major public act to be something this pointless and ill-conceived. Ok. Suppose I'm wrong about the above, and this thing works like people seem to think it will. -- The tools available to accomplish this task (PGP, remailers, anon servers) are certainly impressive, but I really don't think they're well developed enough yet to give cause for much confidence in taking on the government and the entire U.S. corporate sector in a frontal assault. -- Is this really in line with the purpose of the Cypherpunks? To quote from the charter "Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress." I like this paragraph, and what it says to me is that (a) people are, in the end, responsible for their OWN security and need to be made to realize this, and (b) PATIENCE is the most important prerequisite for success. Both of these principles are being violated by the hasty creation of alt.whistleblowers. This has nothing to do with enabling people to independently achieve data security, and it shows no patience whatsoever. Wouldn't everybody be better served by quiet, patient development and distribution of tools, instead of a huge juvenile "FUCK YOU!" to people who could really care less? Let's not piss away a solid foundation with cheap theatrics. -- Will "Getting people to fight by letting the force of momentum work is like rolling logs and rocks. Logs and rocks are still when in a secure place, but roll on an incline; they remain stationary if square, they roll if round. Therefore, when people are skillfully led into battle, the momentum is like that of round rocks rolling down a high mountain -- this is force." -- Sun Tzu *** PGP PUBLIC KEY AVAILABLE BY FINGER

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WARNING: Forward of unposted alt.config message
by rclark＠nyx.cs.du.edu 14 Apr '93

14 Apr '93

I am sending this here _prior_ to posting it to give advance warning; responses received have varied on the methods of creation of the group, but have largely tended toward a consensus that it is wise to have some sort of discussion period; in addition, I have chosen a cross-post to those groups most likely to have an interest in creating the group, and if this results in a flamewar in alt.config, so be it. After I tally the votes and they vastly outnumber the NOs I will create the newsgroup without further delay. I just wish for people to clarify; sorry if you missed it, but this is going out in four hours exactly to the aforementioned newsgroups. I will implement all important suggestions mailed to me by that time, including alteration of procedural points, wording changes, alteration of Newsgroups: line, etc. I will also delay posting if valid and immediate concerns are brought to light; however, since I leave the major axes: Moderated or unmoderated, length of discussion period, length of voting period, open for discussion, it should not be a disaster if it goes out in its current form. Join the discussion, and if you like the idea, PLEASE send a YES vote only WHEN the Call for Votes is posted. Additionally, suggestions for additions/deletions of Newsgroups from the crosspost, or a more appropriate place to redirect replies, or any suggestions whatever will be adopted if suitable. If you have no interest in the privacy issue, please type 'd' now. ---- Newsgroups: alt.config, alt.privacy, alt.privacy.anon-server, soc.motss, alt.sex, alt.sex.bestiality, alt.drugs, comp.protocols.tcp-ip.eniac Followup-to: alt.config Subject: Call for discussion: alt.whistleblower In light of the current debate concerning whether anonymous posting can serve a useful purpose, I propose the immediate experiment of creating a group which shall provide a genuinely useful service to the public. This newsgroup is to be called alt.whistleblower, and is for the purpose of allowing those who might otherwise be unwilling to come forward to provide information about the illegal activities of government agencies, large corporations and similar malefactors without fear of illegal reprisals against them. The need for this group is evident in light of the extreme usefulness of information concerning the behavior of the governing bodies of the United States, and the large number of government employees and corporate employees with access to the Internet and anonymous posting services. This group could also include reports of illegal discrimination by those who fear reprisal if they reveal their names, information concerning safety issues by those who know that their company is releasing an unsafe or dangerous product, or defrauding customers by dishonest and illegal means. Considering the immediate need for this newsgroup in light of those who, in many cases, provide services for a fee and then provide an inadequate service by cutting their downstream sites from reading anything that the service-provider deems is inappropriate, I request a waiver of procedure in this matter and that, if significant interest is present and seems to form a general consensus, it shall be accepted that I revise and present a prospectus for this newsgroup and a call for votes on a date no sooner than seven days from this initial posting and no later than ten days after the call for discussion. Procedural points concerning the length of the voting period are to be addressed in the public discussion, and anyone wishing to send anonymous mail should forward it to me. This newsgroup is necessary and of great potential use, as those of you with a legitimate need for privacy know well. If you value your privacy, let us discuss this wisely and equitably in order to reach a consensus. Whether this newsgroup is to be moderated or unmoderated, whether the name is appropriate or another hierarchy would be preferable, and all procedural points are to be decided based on the general consensus. I realize there will be those who will oppose the creation of this newsgroup on the oft-cited grounds that "Anyone who needs privacy must be hiding something." This is true; however, in our society there are many things which need to be revealed as well as many things which need to be concealed. I believe that a corollary truism could be applied to those who oppose the notion of public privacy. "Anyone who fears privacy must be hiding something." Let the discussion begin. Final note: Do NOT, repeat, NOT send votes until I post a "Call for Votes" at the end of the discussion period. The length of the discussion period may be increased if some drastic occurrence requires it, but I'm planning to post it in one week. Vote then. I thank you for your consideration in this matter. ---- "Occasionally an honest man is sent to the legislature." Mark Twain rclark(a)nyx.cs.du.edu PGP key available by mail or finger rclark(a)metal.psu.edu

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