- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Big Brother: Post Filtering the Clipper
by Harry Shapiro 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Some posters have speculated that it might be possible to get a phone, swap it with someone else, and then the feds would not be able to get the correct key-pair. An other poster assumed that each clipper chip would send out some sort of Clipper-ID in plain-text before and/or during and/or after a session. Which causes me to further speculate that it may be possible to filter out these plain text messages. (They are probally built in to the exchange of keys ritual and so can't be filtered out without preventing the Clipper to do it thing...). If they can be filter, filtering them may either be an out right criminal act or be considered probally cause for a warrent to determine why you are filtering them out, etc. -- Harry Shapiro habs(a)panix.com List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991

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Re: Clinton Administration crypto proposal/policy
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

The Clinton Administration's recent proposal, and responses to same from the net community, have left several questions in my mind: o Are these devices intended to be used as isolated pairs - such that two phones/modems/whatever will only speak with each other .. or will any such device speak with any other such device? If any device can communicate with any other device, how is the key(s) for en/decryption for any particular session determined? .. and what prevents an eavesdropper who is present from the beginning of the session from using that data to decrypt the conversation? o According to the EFF response to the proposal, there aren't really two keys, but two 40-bit halves of one 80-bit key. Doesn't this imply that were a "bad guy" able to get just one of those halves, the computing power required to do a brute-force attack is considerably lessened? (I'm asking a question here, not making a statement. I read about this because I think it's interesting but it's not really my field.) o Presumably, these devices will insert into the data stream some sort of "sender ID" which will allow eavesdroppers to know which key(s) they need a warrant for - doesn't this seem to make it pretty easy to keep track of data along the lines of "Station 12345 sent 500 packets to station 31415, who sent 7734 packets in return" .. which would seem to present privacy questions separate from (but dwarfed by :) the security of the encryption itself? Also, cypherpunks readers may find these two snippets from two articles re the proposal interesting (and chilling): --- _NY Times_, 4/16/93, p. A1 (National edition) "The Clinton Administration plans a new system of encoding electronic communications that is intended to preserve the Government's ability ^^^^^^^ to eavesdrop for law enforcement and national security reasons .." --- Eugene, Oregon's _Register-Guard_, 4/16/93, p. 3A "The Clinton Administration is about to announce a plan to preserve privacy in electronic communications, including telephone calls and electronic mail, while also insuring [sic] the government's right ^^^^^ to eavesdrop for law enforcement and national security reasons." --- Emphasis, of course, added by me. The Register-Guard article is taken from the NY Times' article (presumably from a wire service) and consists of paragraphs 2,3,4,5,6,8, and 9 of the NY Times article, with changes to the first paragraph noted above. Grr. -- Greg Broiles greg(a)goldenbear.com Golden Bear Consulting +1 503 465 0325 Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440 BBS: +1 503 687 7764

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Data Encryption Algorithm
by x62727g2＠usma8.USMA.EDU 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Fellow Cypherpunks, I am a cadet at West Point and have been involved in developing a new encryption algorithm which I believe is stronger than DES. I realize that many of you enjoy the challenge of breaking encryption schemes and I wondered if you might be interested in trying to break mine. I would be very interested in any analysis that you could give of my system. Please contact me if you are interested. Anthony J. Gatlin |-------------------------------------| CDT PVT, G-2 |PGP Public Key available on request. | |-------------------------------------|

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(fwd) Re: Once tapped, your code is no good any more.
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Cypherpunks, I agree with Arthur Abraham that we ought to first make our arguments in public and not preach to the converted here on this list. Unless the ideas presented are Cypherpunks-related. In this spirit, here's something I wrote about the consequences of key escrow. Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.org.eff.talk,comp.security.misc,comp.org.acm,comp.org.ieee From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Once tapped, your code is no good any more. Date: Sat, 17 Apr 1993 04:53:55 GMT Brad Templeton (brad(a)clarinet.com) wrote: : It occurs to me that if they get a wiretap order on you, and the escrow : houses release your code to the cops, your code is now no longer secure. : : It's in the hands of cops, and while I am sure most of the time they are : good, their security will not be as good as the escrow houses. : : : What this effectively means is that if they perform a wiretap on you, : at the end of the wiretap, they should be obligated to inform you that : a tap was performed, and replace (for free) the clipper chip in your : cellular phone so that it is once again a code known only to the : escrow houses. Getting the court order to reveal the key *also* makes decipherable all *past* conversations (which may be on tape, or disk, or whatver), as I understand the proposal. I could be wrong, but I've seen no mention of "session keys" being the escrowed entities. As the EFF noted, this raises further issues about the fruits of one bust leading to incrimination in other areas. But is it any worse than the current unsecure system? It becomes much worse, of course, if the government then uses this "Clinton Clipper" to argue for restrictions on unapproved encryption. (This is the main concern of most of us, I think. The camel's nose in the tent, etc.) And it may also become much worse if the ostensible security is increased, thus allowing greater access to "central office" records by the government (the conversations being encrypted, who will object to letting the government have access to them, perhaps even automatically archiving large fractions...). This was one of the main objections to the S.266 proposal, that it would force telecom suppliers to provide easy access for the government. One the government has had access to months or years of your encrypted conversations, now all it takes is one misstep, one violation that gets them the paperwork needed to decrypt *all* of them! Do we want anyone to have this kind of power? -Tim May, whose sig block may get him busted in the New Regime -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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Big Bubba's Wiretapping Directive
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

While I don't share Sandy Sandfort's wild optimism, at least steganography becomes a bit easier - the default assumption is about encrypted material becomes "Oh, it's just encrypted with the Tapper Chip, we can break it later" rather than "Oh, boy, it's encrypted, we can confiscate his computer!", and if it gets taken to court, and the wiretap approved by the Rubber Stamp Agency and then isn't able to be decrypted, the average person can say "I don't understand how the Secret Government Wiretapping Chip works, so I can't tell you what's wrong here!" On the more technical side, what precisely does the Mykotoxin chip *do*? Does it generate random keys for DES/etc., saving a copy for later? Or does it actually *do* the encryption with some classified algorithm? If it's the former, the user could presumably replace it with a pin-compatible non-wiretapping random number generator, unless there's some requirement that export-approved systems have soldered-in chips, and a foreign-made version might be compatible with US phones while not being tappable. On the other hand, if the MicroToker chip actually *does* encryption, whether secret-key or RSA or other public-key, or some other essential part of the encryption process, then you *have* to use it to be compatible. Assuming the US approves it for widespread use in phones, etc., it provides an incentive for everybody in the world to use it, especially if the Feds agree to share keys with their fellow governments who can wiretap their own citizens, and gives a boost to the balance of trade by being one product that you've got to buy from the US. Some questions that Clinton's Q&A blatantly stepped around are "When the Two Agencies approve the wiretap, *what* conversations become tappable? Everything they've recorded? The last N conversations? Future conversations only?" "Once one government group has YOUR phone wiretap key from the Two Agencies, can they pass it around to the IRS, FBI, local cops, and everyone else? "What if they make a mistake on a tap - do you have to buy a new phone now that they've spread YOUR phone wiretap key around?" We *do* have to try to control the language here - the Clintonistas are referring to the subjects of a hypothetical wiretap as "the drug smugglers" but we ought to redirect it to "YOUR phone's wiretap key" so people remember we're talking about them and their privacy. It might also be good for us to give examples like "The IRS suspects you're cheating on your income tax so they want to wiretap your phone calls to your accountant, so they do XXXXX." because it feels like something that might happen to THEM. Sigh. Bill Stewart

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Q&A DataBase
by ORNTS188＠ksuvxb.kent.edu 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Hello All, does anyone know much about the this program? I would like to be able to pick the passwords out of the database file. In this program (Q&A) the database can be set up so that users have limeted access to different areas of the files. I just got the code and doc files for WP hack, and they were great. I am still going thur the code. Well thanks Red :)

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IMPORTANT--WE WON......NOT!
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Sandy Sandfort looks on the bright side. Unfortunately, I can't agree with him. He writes: >FIRST, THE BAD NEWS--The government wants to control encryption. >Though they are playing coy about it, it's clear that eventually >they will try to ban "the good stuff." It's clear Zimmermann, >and others, have gotten their attention. > >NOW, THE GOOD NEWS--I t d o e s n o t m a t t e r. The game >is over. We won. The government may engage in holding actions, >but it still doesn't matter. What we have here, is the State's >pitiful attempt to make the best of a bad situation. This >amazing "policy" announcement is a tacit admission of defeat. > >HOW CAN I BE SO SURE?--The cat is out of the bag. Free, mil spec >data encryption is readily available to all. Within a year, >equivalent voice encryption freeware will join it. There is no >way the government can stuff the encryption cat back in the bag. >They can pass their laws. We will do as we please--and they will >help us. ...rest of post elided.... Drugs are freely available on nearly every inner city street corner. The "cat is out of the bag," as you say. And yet.... - the War on (Some) Drugs.... - mandatory hard time for first offenses (ask the Santa Cruz kid doing 10 years without parole for possession of some amount of acid...the weight of the blotter paper kicked it up to the 10-year level) - civil forfeiture... "We find a roach, we get your yacht." - midnight raids, often killing innocent citizens (ask the Malibu retired guy who got zapped by the Feds...turns out they'd already greedily started to divvy up his land to various parks...and of course he was totally innocent--and now dead) - "D.A.R.E."-type brainwashing of children, encouraging them to turn in their parents ...and so on. You should all know about these things, on this of all days (16 April 1943, 50 years ago, was the discovery of LSD). Restricting crypto means the government has a big club they use to threaten, intimidate, force cooperation, etc. Just like with taxes, drugs, and everything else they control. Under the civil forfeiture laws, my assets (which I depend on to live out the rest of my life on!!) could be seized if the government suspects I'm using "illegal crypto." Not under current laws, but certainly under the laws that follow from the "Clinton Clipper." Anyone with assets to seize--a house, a business, a stock account--becomes a fair target. > > But never doubt it, W E H A V E W O N. > No, but we haven't lost yet. -Tim -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.

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ANON: Chaining suggestions
by Hal 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

Will Kinney suggests a form of anonymous return address in which "Request-Remailing-To" headers are nested and encrypted, then used for addressing. This is a fine idea, Will, but we're way ahead of you on this. This approach has been used ever since we added encryption to the remailers. Karl Barrus even wrote a script specifically for constructing anonymous addresses like this. It's available from the Cypherpunks ftp site. (soda.berkeley.edu, /pub/cypherpunks. I think the file is something like "scripts.tar".) The problem with this in practice is, first, that the return address block is rather large, especially if more than one level of nesting is used (often 10, 20 lines or more); and second, that it does not lend itself to automatic use of the "reply" function. Instead, the replier has to cut and paste this block of text from the message he's replying to and put it in the right place in his own message. And he has to be instructed in how to do this. (Karl's script adds the instructions when it creates the return address.) This is pretty complicated. This is why Eli suggested (based on suggestions from Eric Hughes) that at least Julf's remailer be enhanced so instead of just mapping, say, an12345 to joe(a)foo.com, it would map to a Cypherpunks return address of the type Will is describing - a block of encrypted text. People could then have the convenience of automatic replies to an12345 along with the security of a chained address. I don't think the idea quite works in this form, since I don't see how messages to Julf get translated to an12345. Presumably only messages from one specific user should get posted under this ID (the user whose address is buried in the encrypted return address to which Julf's remailer will forward replies). Perhaps another set of commands is needed to tell the remailer what ID to use to post under. By the time you do this much I don't think that what you have bears much resemblence to Julf's current software. I am stymied in doing experimentation in this area by one fundamental problem. I do not have the power to create user ID's on any systems which I use, so I can't create pseudonym accounts. I have tried various tricks. For example, I sent mail with a "Reply-To:" of "hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu (Pseudonym 12345)". I hoped that if someone did a reply to this mail, it might come to me with that whole field in the "To" line, and I could then parse it for the pseudonym number. That didn't work on the particular reply mailer that I used; it stripped the comment field in parentheses. The one other idea I've had is to put something at the beginning of the Subject: line, so if the user remailed a message with a Subject: of "How's it going, Jack?" it would actually go out as "Subject: (P12345) How's it going, Jack?". Then when they reply it will probably come back as "Subject: Re: (P12345) How's it going, Jack?" or something similar, and I can parse for the (Pxxxxx). This might work pretty often but munging the Subject line is bad for news posting since a lot of news readers sort by subject line. I could put the (Pxxxxx) at the end but it might get truncated? Maybe not. I wonder if anyone knowledgable in mail systems could suggest a relatively robust way of setting up outgoing headers so that return mail will (A) come back to me (hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu in this case) and (B) be marked in some unique way that would let me do a pseudonym mapping. Any ideas would be appreciated. Hal Finney 74076.1041(a)compuserve.com

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1984 deja vu
by Arthur Abraham 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

If you haven't heard about John Markoff's article yet, it' cause you've been spending all your time reading Cypherpunks instead of the front page of the Friday NY Times... read it now. There's an awful lot to be said about this article, mostly we know what it is, and mostly we agree about it. This a major social issue that must be corrected, so here's my proposal: ==> DON'T POST ANYTHING ABOUT THE MARFKOFF ARTICLE. <== We shouldn't waste time writing each other letters that we'll learn nothing by reading. We should spend that same time writing to newspapers, congress people, phone companies, Clinton, Gore, and anybody else who thinks they can get away with this because they feel the citizenry either doesn't care about or doesn't understand the issues. What I want to see in re this issue on this list is something I don't already know, like the name and address of AT&T's president's secretary -- s/he'll complain to the prez if enough privacy mail arrives. Be imaginative, be active, rattle cages, but telling me how pissed you are won't change a thing, except to decrease the time we're both spending on doing something effective. Be effective. Please. -a2.

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New versions of encryption software released
by Peter Meyer 17 Apr '93

17 Apr '93

I suppose I could use a fig leaf to cover the price of this software so that this posting might seem less "commercial", but - what the hell - this isn't sci.crypt and we're not concerned with maintaining academic purity. This encryption software is available *now*. You might consider shelling out a few bucks (which allows you to make use of the result of a few years' work) before the govt. makes it illegal to buy, sell or use encryption software. New Version Release Announcement Dolphin Software releases three new versions of MS-DOS encryption software Dolphin Software's data encryption software has been released in two new versions, Dolphin Encrypt (V. 2.11) and Dolphin Encrypt Advanced Version (V. 2.10). The encryption routines are also available as a C function library. Both Dolphin Encrypt and the Advanced Version use a symmetric key encryption process to encrypt data on MS-DOS computers, and can encrypt multiple files with a single command. File pathnames are supported and there is extensive error checking. If you wish to transmit encrypted data as email then Dolphin Encrypt can be told to output the encrypted data as text. There is no limit on the size, the type or the number of files. Files are normally compressed during encryption. Screen output can be sent to a file or to a printer for a record of operations. The encryption process, described in detail in the documentation, relies partly on the RSA Data Security, Inc., MD5 Message Digest Algorithm. The Advanced Version has all of the features described above, and also encrypts whole floppy disks. All common disk sizes are supported and are automatically recognized. Additional command line options are supported, including the options of echoing or not echoing the encryption key during entry. There is a decrypt-and-display-only option (with no plaintext written to disk). The Advanced Version can be run silently from another application program to encrypt or decrypt files. It has a script language (with if-else-endif) which allows automation of frequently-performed, complex or conditional operations. The Advanced Version comes with utility programs to read multiple text files, compare files, purge files and wipe a disk clean of data; these can be called from scripts. The Dolphin Encryption Library is a C function library containing functions for encrypting and decrypting blocks of data in memory (from 1 byte to about 10K in size). Complete source code is included. Dolphin Encrypt is priced at $64.00 and the Advanced Version at $128.00. The function library is available for licensing to developers. For more information contact Dolphin Software at 4815 W. Braker Ln. #502, Austin, TX 78759 (phone 512-479-9208).

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