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someone wanted 12 shirts by Aug 16 -- who are you?
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

I received some mail a few days ago saying that someone wanted 12 shirts by the 16th.... that mail has been vaporized. who were you? thanks, -nate

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Re: Has the other shoe dropped ?
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

>From: bart(a)netcom.com (Harry Bartholomew) >Message-Id: <9308011855.AA26646(a)netcom5.netcom.com> >Subject: Has the other shoe dropped ? >Date: Sun, 1 Aug 93 11:55:32 PDT > Has nobody else heard on NPR's Weekend Edition that the FBI > has requested the banning of non-Clipper encryption ? > Or was I really not quite awake and recalling a bad dream ? I taped it, listened twice -- heard the opposite: that the FBI has no plans at present to ban other encryption. I can listen again, if you're dubious.

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Re: Encrypted BBS?
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

>Date: Sat, 31 Jul 1993 16:11:13 -0700 (PDT) >From: "Jeremy R. Smith" <jersmit(a)eis.calstate.edu> >Subject: Encrypted BBS? >Message-Id: <Pine.3.07.9307311613.A27337-9100000(a)eis.calstate.edu> > Would it be at all possible, given today's present state of >cryptography, to run a bbs in a totally encrypted form? If so, are there >any software packages out there that accomplish this at some level? We did this about 8 years ago at E&S using DEC VMS NOTES. We used a plain vanilla secret key algorithm and a key shared by all legitimate members of the group. We could do it today -- but why bother? If you have a key that widespread, it's effectively certain that a "wrong person" (however you define him/her) will have a copy of the key.

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Re: Public Key Servers
by dmandl＠lehman.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

> > Are the key servers listed in the PGP documentation still active? > > And if so, what is the general opinion of using them? > > Key server == list of people to bust and who knows who. > (compute the transitive closure of the signatures) Yeah, but there are >1501 keys on it (last time I checked, which was about three weeks ago). And the size seems to be growing pretty fast. Remember the "mandatory" draft registration imposed by Carter in 1980? I think about two kids were ever busted for not registering, and they were VERY active and vocal. The whole draft registration program was basically ignored, and what was the government going to, arrest every American male born after 1962? I think it's important to get as many keys on the servers as possible, for the same reasons that encryption itself should be used as widely as possible. --Dave.

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No Subject
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

Hi there, I tried to post anonymously to netnews using the remailers with not success. The procedure was for example: :: Request-Remailing-To: misc.test(a)cs.utexas.edu and I addressed my mail to let's say nowhere-cs.bsu.edu. Using cs.utexas.edu to post (not anonymously) works though. Any help is highly 8-) appreciated. Thanks in advance.

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Re: Recent AP story...
by Peter Wayner 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

Yes, it can. My information about the abuses of the NCIC came from an AP story by Lawrence Knutson. I didn't want to type the whole thing because it would violate copyright. Apparently, the Philadelphia Inquirer ran it on 7/29. -Peter

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Re: D. Bernstein's Open Letter
by s.summers1＠genie.geis.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

In-Reply-To: <9308010625.AA13452(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu> from "L. Detweiler" >From Ed Carp: > From L. Detweiler: >> Someone flamed once over including Usenet (esp. sci.crypt) postings >What was their rationale? I'd rather see relevent postings reposted here- >damnit, I don't have *time* to read 280MB a week of news! What's the >person's problem who flamed you? I second that. I _don't_ have Usenet access (I actually would be willing to read 280MB a week), or ftp access. This mailing list is my only source of information of this kind. If this person can back their rationale with a e-mail gateway to usenet newsgroups (not just an e-mail POSTING server like utexas'), I might see some justification... Sean

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Recent AP story...
by wayner＠cs.cornell.edu 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

Apparently, a recent Congressional investigation has revealed widespread misuse of the National Crime Information Center. The most scandalous case occured when an ex-officer found his ex-girlfriend using the system and killed her. In other cases, the girlfriend of a drug dealer ran all the new recruits through the system to see if they were undercover agents. In many cases, private investigators accessed the data for a number of different purposes. It is interesting to note that all of the access was caused by insiders (as a previous poster noted ). These are the people we're going to trust with the Clipper technology? -Peter

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Clipper counter-attack, technical
by jpp＠markv.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Law Enforcement Field is used by my clipper chip to make the session key it is using available to the gov't. Would it be possible that my clipper chip could have a subtle flaw causing the LEF (sp?) data to be corrupted? Would my chip still function; would I be able to use it to to communicate with other clipper chips? Would anyone be able to tell that my chip was broken without the help of the key escrow agents? Would the sesion key still be recoverable if the clipper chip at the other end were working 'correctly'? j' - -- O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp(a)markv.com 1250 bit key fingerprint = B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5 89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F 524 bit key fingerprint = 8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED 66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48 Public keys by `finger jpp(a)markv.com' or mail to pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.mit.edu Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex(a)sea.east.sun.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQBXAgUBLFyiN9C3U5sdKpFdAQGz3wILBs/DZRkKw8SwmnMuxqjH2GKwl+9FyLjh i5GaBE6mjyT53SDYBhVsUuimHI2lYsOVO1H9p6etX4fVlLK8k+/+1xDy -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[sci.crypt] Appendix (in LaTex) to SKIPJACK Review, Interim Report
by Derek Atkins 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

------- Start of forwarded message ------- Oops.. I didn't see this article when I sent the last one. Sorry. -derek From: denning(a)guvax.acc.georgetown.edu Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Appendix (in LaTex) to SKIPJACK Review, Interim Report Date: 1 Aug 93 22:11:40 -0400 Distribution: world Organization: Georgetown University \documentstyle{article} \textheight 8.25in \topmargin -.25in \textwidth 6.5in \oddsidemargin 0in \begin{document} \parskip .25in \large \raggedright \setcounter{page}{8} \centerline{\bf Appendix A} {\bf A.1 Cycle Structure Tests} The first set of tests examined the cycle structure of SKIPJACK. Fix a set of keys, $\cal K$, a plaintext, $m$, and a function $h\; : \; {\cal M} \longrightarrow {\cal K}$, where ${\cal M}$ is the set of all 64 bit messages. Let $f \; : \; {\cal K} \longrightarrow {\cal K}$ be defined as $f(k) = h ( SJ(k,m))$ (where $SJ(k,m)$ denotes the SKIPJACK encryption of plaintext $m$ with key $k$). Let $N = |\cal K|$. The expected cycle length of $f$ is $\sqrt{\pi N /8}$. We chose sets of $\cal K$ with $N \; = \; 2^{10}, 2^{16}, 2^{24}, 2^{32}, 2^{40}, 2^{48}, 2^{56}$. For all of these $N$, the mean of the cycle lengths computed across all experiments was close to an expected relative error of $(1/\sqrt{j}$ for $j$ experiments) of the expected cycle length. We did not do this test with larger sets of keys because of the time constraints. \begin{center} \begin{tabular}{lrrrrr} $N$ & \# of exps & Mean cycle len & Expec cycle len & Rel Err & Expec rel err \\ \hline $2^{10}$ & 5000 & 20.4 & 20.1 & .019 & .014 \\ $2^{16}$ & 3000 & 164.7 & 160.4 & .027 & .018 \\ $2^{24}$ & 2000 & 2576.6 & 2566.8 & .004 & .022 \\ $2^{32}$ & 2000 & 40343.2 & 41068.6 & .018 & .022 \\ $2^{40}$ & 1000 & 646604.9 & 657097.6 & .016 & .032 \\ $2^{48}$ & 10 & 8,980,043 & 10,513,561 & .145 & .316 \\ $2^{56}$ & 1 & 28,767,197 & 168,216,976 & .829 & 1 \\ \end{tabular} \end{center} {\bf A.2 Statistical Randomness and Correlation Tests} The second set of tests examined whether there were any correlations between the input and output of SKIPJACK, or between a key and the output. We also looked for nonrandomness in functions of the form $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k,m \oplus h)$ and functions of the form $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k \oplus h , m)$ for all $h$ of Hamming weight 1 and 2 and for some randomly chosen $h$. All results were consistent with these functions behaving like random functions. Given a set of $N$ numbers of $k$-bits each, a chi-square test will test the hypothesis that this set of numbers was drawn (with replacement) from a uniform distribution on all of the $2^k$, $k$-bit numbers. We ran the tests using a 99\% confidence level. A truly random function would pass the test approximately 99\% of the time. The test is not appropriate when $N/2^k$ is too small, say $\leq 5$. Since it was infeasible to run the test for $k = 64$, we would pick 8 bit positions, and generate a set of $N= 10,000$ numbers, and run the test on the $N$ numbers restricted to those 8 bit positions (thus $k=8$). In some of the tests, we selected the 8 bits from the output of the function we were testing, and in others, we selected 4 bits from the input and 4 from the output. Some of the tests were run on both the encryption and decryption functions of SKIPJACK. The notation $SJ^{-1}(k,m)$ will be used to denote the decryption function of SKIPJACK with key $k$ on message $m$. {\bf Test 1: Randomness test on output. } In a single test: Fix $k$, fix mask of 8 output bits, select 10,000 random messages, run chi-square on the 10,000 outputs restricted to the mask of 8 output bits. Repeat this single test for 200 different values of $k$ and 50 different masks, for a total of 10,000 chi-square tests. We found that .87\% of the tests failed the 99\% confidence level chi-square test. This is within a reasonable experimental error of the expected value of 1\%. On the decryption function, there were only .64\% of the tests that failed. This was on a much smaller test set. \begin{center} \begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \# $k$ & \# masks & function, $f(m)$ & mask & \% failed \\ \hline 200 & 50 & $SJ(k,m)$ & 8 of $f(m)$ & .87 \\ \hline 25 & 50 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m)$ & 8 of $f(m)$ & .64 \\ \hline \end{tabular} \end{center} {\bf Test 2: Correlation test between messages and output.} Single test: Fix $k$, fix mask of 4 message bits and 4 output bits, select 10,000 random messages, run chi-square. \begin{center} \begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \# $k$ & \# masks & function, $f(m)$ & mask & \% failed \\ \hline 200 & 1000 & $SJ(k,m)$ & 4 of $m$, 4 of $f(m)$ & 1.06 \\ \hline 25 & 1000 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m)$ & 4 of $m$, 4 of $f(m)$ & 1.01 \\ \hline \end{tabular} \end{center} {\bf Test 3: Randomness test on the xor of outputs, given a fixed xor of inputs. } Single test: Fix $k$, fix mask of 8 output bits, select 10,000 random messages. Let $\cal H$ be the union of all 64 bit words of Hamming weight 1 (64 of these), all 64 bit words of Hamming weight 2 (2016 of these), and some randomly chosen 64 bit words (920 of these). Repeat this single test for all $h \in \cal H$, 50 different masks, and 4 different values of $k$. \begin{center} \begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \# $k$ & \# masks & \# $h$ & function, $f(m)$ & mask & \% failed \\ \hline 4 & 50 & 3000 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k,m \oplus h)$ & 8 of $f(m)$ & .99 \\ \hline \end{tabular} \end{center} {\bf Test 4: Correlation test between message xors and output xors. } Single test: Fix $k$, fix mask of 4 bits of $h$ and 4 bits of output, select 10,000 random $(m,h)$ pairs. \begin{center} \begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \# $k$ & \# masks & function, $f(m,h)$ & mask & \% failed \\ \hline 200 & 1000 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k,m \oplus h)$ & 4 of $h$, 4 of $f(m,h)$ & .99 \\ \hline 25 & 1000 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m) \oplus SJ^{-1}(k,m \oplus h)$ & 4 of $h$, 4 of $f(m,h)$ & 1.02 \\ \hline \end{tabular} \end{center} {\bf Test 5: Correlation test between messages and output xors.} Single test: Fix $k$, fix mask of 4 bits of $m$ and 4 bits of output xor, select 10,000 random messages. Let $\cal H$ be the union of all 64 bit words of Hamming weight 1 (64 of these), some of the 64 bit words of Hamming weight 2 (100 of these), and some randomly chosen 64 bit words (100 of these). \begin{center} \begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \# $k$ & \# masks & \# $h$& function, $f(m)$ & mask & \% failed \\ \hline 2 & 1000 & 264 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k,m \oplus h)$ & 4 of $m$, 4 of $f(m)$ & .99 \\ \hline \end{tabular} \end{center} {\bf Test 6: Correlation test between keys and output.} Single test: Fix $m$, fix mask of 4 key bits and 4 output bits, select 10,000 random keys. \begin{center} \begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \# $m$ & \# masks & function, $f(k)$ & mask & \% failed \\ \hline 200 & 1000 & $SJ(k,m)$ & 4 of $k$, 4 of $f(k)$ & 1.00 \\ \hline 25 & 1000 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m)$ & 4 of $k$, 4 of $f(k)$ & 1.02 \\ \hline \end{tabular} \end{center} {\bf Test 7: Randomness test on the xor of outputs, given a fixed xor of keys. } Single test: Fix $m$, fix mask of 8 output bits, select 10,000 random keys. Let $\cal H$ be the union of all 80 bit words of Hamming weight 1 (80 of these), all 80 bit words of Hamming weight 2 (3160 of these), and some randomly chosen 80 bit words (760 of these). Repeat this single test for all $h \in \cal H$, 50 different masks, and 2 different values of $m$. \begin{center} \begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \# $m$ & \# masks & \# $h$ & function, $f(k)$ & mask & \% failed \\ \hline 2 & 50 & 4000 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k\oplus h,m )$ & 8 of $f(k)$ & .99 \\ \hline \end{tabular} \end{center} {\bf Test 8: Correlation test between key xors and output xors. } Single test: Fix $m$, fix mask of 4 bits of $h$ and 4 bits of output, select 10,000 random $(k,h)$ pairs. \begin{center} \begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \# $m$ & \# masks & function, $f(k,h)$ & mask & \% failed \\ \hline 200 & 1000 & $SJ(k,m) \oplus SJ(k\oplus h,m )$ & 4 of $h$, 4 of $f(k,h)$ & 1.02 \\ \hline 25 & 1000 & $SJ^{-1}(k,m) \oplus SJ^{-1}(k\oplus h,m )$ & 4 of $h$, 4 of $f(k,h)$ & 1.1 \\ \hline \end{tabular} \end{center} \end{document} ------- End of forwarded message -------

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