- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

SKIPJACK PANEL
by Sandy 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Is it just me, or is anyone else dubious about Dorothy Dennings and company running their various Skipjack tests ON AN *NSA* CRAY COMPUTER? Since many of the objections to the whole plan arouse because of doubts about the intentions of the NSA, why would D.D. et al. trust them to run these critical tests? How difficult would it be for the NSA to spoof its own computer? Next big news items: United Nations hires Serbian troops to report on human rights violations in Bosnia. Farmer Brown puts fox in charge of henhouse. Film at eleven. S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: money tracing
by baumbach＠atmel.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

Thug writes: > The black ink that is used to print the front side of U.S. cash contains a > very finely ground black iron oxide powder. The ink is magnetic. This > magnetism is used mostly by vending & change machines to distinguish real > bills from forgeries/photocopies. >[...] > 3. Magnetic ink detection. Real bills are printed with magnetic > ink, forgeries/photocopies are not. Magnetic toner for laser printers does exist. Its purpose is to allow people to print their own checks. Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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LEEF->LEAF etc.
by technopagan priest 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

I think it is interesting how the Law Enforcement Exploitation Field has been renamed LEAF. Good P.R. move NIST! I'm personally not motivated to believe that Skipjack is a flawed algorithm, but at the same time I do not consider it tested until it has stood up to peer-reviewed public analysis. I am very concerned about the key-exchange system. As far as I can see, we still don't know exactly what it is, and whether that is safe. Public key systems are much more difficult to design securely than private key systems. The key exchange has to be secure from eavesdroppers and also proof against "man-in-the-middle" attacks. Furthermore, there is the traffic-analysis problem. Everything I have read so far has indicated there will be a single system key which will encrypt Clipper serial numbers. A trivial phone tap with someone armed with the system key could result in massive traffic-analysis, and the government could do this simply because they have the system key, the Mafia will follow soon. I think a good avenue of attack right now is to politically attack the key-escrow parts of Clipper, and get Skipjack as a published private-key standard. Write your congresscritters. -Thomas

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more T-shirt alternative
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

"celebrating 4000 years of personal privacy through strong cryptography"

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T-shirt detail
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

Sorry for distracting people with my T-shirt suggestion, but the more I think about it, the more I like "celebrating 4000 years..." -- possibly on the back. On the front, I'd have 4 boxes (or regions set apart): LEB KAMAI y_i = x_i + k_{(i mod m)} y_i = x_i (+) k_i y = x^e mod N -------------------------------------------------- 1. LEB KAMAI, in Hebrew characters from the Bible -- cf., Kahn's "The Codebreakers", pp. 77-78 -- atbash cipher, stronger than Caesar's and predating him by more than a month :-) 2. polyalphabetic substitution -- stronger than nomenclators (based on when attacks were known to exist) but ignored by gov't users for 100s of years 3. Vernam's tape -- theoretically unbreakable -- in the hands of citizens from about 1920 {the (+) is a circled "+" -- meaning XOR} 4. RSA -- 1978 -------------------------------------------------- It might be interesting to date the four boxes. Anyone have a date for the LEB KAMAI? - Carl

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No Subject
by Duncan Frissell 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com nobody(a)mead.u.washington.edu said: N.>This is the cypherpunks list, not the extropians list. The article was N.>about cypherpunks, not extropians, so it's irrelevent whether the N.>extrops are luddites. N.> N.>As for the c-punks, there's nothing inherently non-luddite about us. N.>Not all of us accept all uses of computers and technology without N.>question. There are certain machines that need to be trashed. I N.>liked the reference in the article. I don't think it was 100% accurate, N.>but you should be aware that there ARE cypherpunks Luddites lurking out N.>here... N.> .snail N.> However the list was founded and is dominated by extropians and (small e) expropianism is the dominent philosophy of the nets. Ned Lud and the boys wished to keep themselves and everyone else poor, smash technology, and stop the world just so they would not have to transform their lives. Just like the french farmers of today. Since one must already have transformed one's life to get connected to the nets (at least at this stage of technology) there can't be too many genuine luddites here. If anyone qualifies as luddites in this contrroversy it is the *government*. They are trying to slow the pace of technological transformation because it realizes that bureaucratic structures are hopless market competitors and will be destroyed by technological change. I, for one, am not going to permint the neeo-luddites of the coercive state apparatus to stop change just so they can avoid honest work. Duncan Frissell ************************************************************************* EDI, Temporary Employment, Quants, Securitization, Equipment Leasing, Fullfillment Companies, Overnight Delivery Services, Facsimile Machines - Not as sexy as Tim May's signature line but just as important. --- ~ WinQwk 2.0b#0 ~ Unregistered Evaluation Copy

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lookin' for a slogan for Tshirts
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

It looks like I'll be making a set of Big Brother inside T-shirts, and I would like to ask for slogan ideas.... The ones that I like so far are: "They can have my private key when they pry it from my cold, dead hands." "When privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy." thanks, -nate

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No Subject
by nobody＠mead.u.washington.edu 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

> Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> sez: > I didn't like being called a neo-luddite, however. I don't see many > paralells between extropianism and cypherpunks and Ned Lud. > > Duncan Frissell This is the cypherpunks list, not the extropians list. The article was about cypherpunks, not extropians, so it's irrelevent whether the extrops are luddites. As for the c-punks, there's nothing inherently non-luddite about us. Not all of us accept all uses of computers and technology without question. There are certain machines that need to be trashed. I liked the reference in the article. I don't think it was 100% accurate, but you should be aware that there ARE cypherpunks Luddites lurking out here... .snail

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Re: Sterilized medflies of crypto
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

>Message-Id: <9308020407.AA26817(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu> >To: cme(a)ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison) >Subject: Re: Sterilized medflies of crypto >Date: Sun, 01 Aug 93 22:07:21 -0600 >From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu> >>By "milking the algorithm talk", I'm talking about getting everybody to look >>at the algorithm which might easily be secure and ignore the weakness: >>the registration of keys. >> >>I don't care about the algorithm. I care about registration. That's what I >>want to see people/press/citizens outraged about. > >amen. Sorry you didn't elaborate on this on the list. OK -- here's my replies for the list. >The whole Key Escrow thing is totally ill conceived. It is clearly not >the underlying point of the proposal. They don't name the entities. >Denning comes up with some strange explanation of laptops in a vault >shortly after the announcement. It is so transparent it is >pathetic--but unfortunately the issue is largely framed as `who will be >the agencies' in many places so far... I believe key registration is the *whole point* of the Skipjack proposal. This is the first time in the history of cryptography, as far as I can tell, when a government has tried to interfere with the private citizenry's ability to use strong cryptography -- and they're doing it strictly through key registration. However, being clever folks, they have added a strawman to the proposal. They proposed an NSA-designed algorithm -- something people would fight in such a way that the government could hopefully turn around and call the opponents paranoid and get the public to believe the gov't, writing off the opposition. Look back at the original announcement. The gov't said, in effect, 'if you don't like to use NSA's algorithm, you're free to design algorithms of your own provided they permit key escrow.' Then they left that as a note -- an aside -- and proceeded to take on all comers w.r.t. the Skipjack algorithm. I say: don't fight their strength, even if it's flawed. It's a tar baby at best. We should fight the only thing which matters: key registration. What's important about key registration, to me, isn't the details. It's the philosophy. This is the first time in the history of the world that the government has laid any claim at all to a citizen's cryptographic keys. The government has never had a right to private keys. The private crypto users have always had strong crypto. The government should never have the right to private keys. Private crypto users should always have strong crypto in the future. - Carl

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REMAIL: list 8/2/93
by Karl Barrus 02 Aug '93

02 Aug '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist? A1: 1: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 3: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 4: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu 5: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu 6: hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu 7: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 8: phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu 9: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 10: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 11: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com 12: remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu 13: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 14: remailer(a)utter.dis.org 15: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org 16: remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com NOTES: #1-#5 no encryption of remailing requests #6-#15 support encrypted remailing requests #16 special - header and message must be encrypted together #9,#14,#15,#16 introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect) #9,#14,#16 running on privately owned machines ====================================================================== Q2: What help is available? A2: Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19). Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files. The public keys for the remailers which support encrypted remailing requests is also available in the same directory. Mail to me (elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLF0iL4OA7OpLWtYzAQHfUwP/RdoFAsUHn5N30Y4nUbskx4iXtrC36uai LoktYeLaHEDPz0B46nmSt0Szzf4LWSVAAS6cdQQ+jMHKnL66avP/cmQ+aeY8xx5r AJ69hLmkXLpdSc5566aKlSV1kCv5Yika7mp3WNlh+1OuW7uOFg5hcnVnXmx3aLye hBIJtB3Yga4= =AKHS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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