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Re: ATM AND IMAGE RECONGI
by Duncan Frissell 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com T >OK, you got me here. I wasn't thinking of cases where you might want T >to deceive your own bank! T >Tim May One tends to forget that an ATM card is a bearer instrument. Ive always thought it ironic that the first manifestation of the Orwellian technology of electronic payments that was supposed to strip us of our liberties was a *bearer* instrument. There are many circumstances where you might want to have someone other than the account holder use ATM or other Credit or Debit cards. Spouses, children, and employees might be given the card. If you want to make cheap instant overseas transfers you might give a trusted person an ATM card. If you want to make regular anonymous payments to someone you might open an account for that purpose, give them the card, and then just deposit whatever you want to transmit to them. If you've opened an account in a nome de guerre, it might be convenient not to have your image recorded. There are many more circumstances. For me the more significant concern is not getting my picture taken but the possibility that card use might be limited to the account holder only. I like the bearer instrument aspect of ATMs. Of course, as long as some banks on the net don't use pictures or other personal measurments as a replacement for pins, one can always use these institutions. Duncan Frissell As for the PC parts of Tim's post: How to handle fanatic evironmentalists/animal rightists/commies: "What's the matter; don't you believe in cultural diversity? Look, these days *I* have to put up with <anal-intercoursing> <oral-genital copulators> whether I like them or not. <Use Old English words instead of the Norman French above.> If *I* have to put up with <anal-intercoursing> <oral-genital copulators> whether I want to or not, then you have to put up with perverts like me." --- WinQwk 2.0b#0

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Re: On The Inherent Evil
by Duncan Frissell 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com S >Regardless of how cypherpunks feel about this issue, E.D. is one S >of the most powerful memes making its way thru current society, and S >we have to deal with it. S > S >Nick Szabo szabo(a)netcom.com By ignoring it like all other forms of "others" government (tyranny). How anyone can think that more efficiently allowing others to rule them (whether one man or many) is a good idea is beyond me. Tyrrany is tyrrany is tyranny. Maybe with ED we'll be benefitted by the fact that the government itself which is carrying out the orders of the populace will be so busy with system volitility that it won't have time to do much real harm. Duncan Frissell (Net Prime - 01000001st Fiberborne) "A Machine Age army can no more defeat an Information Age army than a Muscle Age army can defeat a Machine Age army." Join in the fun as Slick Willie and the other spearcarriers of the New World Order charge the machine guns of the Info Army. Cyberspace Wants You. Join the 01000001st Fiberborne - recruiting depot open at this address. Phase One guerilla operations have alredy begun... --- WinQwk 2.0b#0

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Electracy: Evil Revisited
by L. Detweiler 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

Buried in my latest delirious rant were multiple *pragmatic* descriptions of Electronic Democracy, and to my great chagrin all have been virtually completely ignored, save one thoughtful soul responding to me in email, who I've exhorted to post to the list. Where is the picking apart of the pieces? I expected the highly suggestive details to be pounced on like scrumptious food for further thought or (more likely) carrion for vultures, but instead get the standard vague marshmallow-philosophical Libertarian and Anarchic Promotional Literature. I'm really quite amazed at all the deathly pessimism and antipathy herein toward genuinely improving our governmental system. It seems that many believe that the natural state of `their' government is oppression, and that the goal is only to minimize it. The perverted Majority is fundamentally and invariably Untrustworthy, Capricious, and Painfully Stupid. It is always stated in terms of Us and They. But *we* *are* our government. How can it not be more obvious? What does it say about our character if we are resigned to deprivation? As I've already stated, the future will hold many developments that will gradually shift opinion, and give working models that won't be subject to immediate ridicule and vague philosophical ramblings about Inherent Evil. It seems everyone here is interested in debating the issue in terms of how they see government, how it has functioned in the past, *irrespective* of any novel mechanisms presented (which I took great pains to put on the table, to specifically address virtually all objections, with the same dramatic effect of shouting at a chasm). I've written about this in the past, and will write about it in the future, but for now I'm going to focus on a comment by N. Szabo <szabo(a)netcom.com>, to elaborate on an earlier item everyone conveniently ignores: [electronic democracy (electrocracy? electracy?)] >* A basic problem with E.D. is that nobody has an >incentive to vote correctly. People's political opinions >can be as stupid and wrong as can be and it won't have any >negative impact on their own lives, or at least none that >is disproportionate or easily recognized to be a result decisions >based on that opinion. Other people might have great opinions, which >if implemented would solve world hunger, clean up the environment, >grow the economy, etc. etc. but there is no special benefit to these >people for having done their altruistic homework and arrived at effective >solutions to these problems. Here are some ideas that my lone anonymous respondent picked up on, but that I've been taking as obvious and given, perhaps because I've thought about it for a long time, and overestimated the imagination of the reader (quite unexpected in this crowd). To make this more specific and tangible, consider a system where people can choose to vote non-anonymously (choosing to vote anonymously is of course always permitted). Now suppose that a `vote' is not something static but rather a pledge of support for a proposal that can vary over time. That is, one can revoke or increase support of a proposal over its entire lifetime, not at an instantaneous blip in a curtained booth. Further, imagine that people can propose different categories for bills such as National, Local, Environmental, Law Enforcement, Infrastructure Maintenance, National Information Infrastructure, Unemployed Programmers, etc. ad infinitum ad nauseam. When a bill is created the creator suggests the category. Categories are created and deleted by anyone. Others can propose the same bill in a different category if they think it merits it. People can refuse to vote on bills or against them based on the classification. Now imagine that everone has Status or Credit associated with their votes in any category. Under certain circumstances, with a certain amount of global support or combination of support based on tabulation of votes and the status (weight) associated with each, a bill becomes Law. The requirements for a bill to become National Law are themselves subject to modification but of course eventually stabilize (a bill to modify the current voting system itself can be introduced under the system). However, a whole set of different characteristics can be associated with bills that become Laws in each category (again subject to modification), and many less `formal' laws can be passed with less constriction in smaller spheres. When a new category is proposed under the system itself, the presenter also indicates that `status formula' associated with it. The status or `credit' is such that it can be impacted in various ways. If one consistently voted for bills in a category who declined in support, one's status in that realm would be diminished by intrinsic mechanisms (remember, a `vote' is dynamic and can change over time based on the owner's `maintenance'). Note that this can be done even with an anonymous voting record by an automated but concealed system. Also, there might be a way that people can trade their status to others whom they admire or respect in that category, based on past experience or their non-anonymous voting record. The status of people might become closely associated with not just their proposals of bills but their successful *real* implementation of them. Under this system, the status becomes very much like a currency system! The `status' itself of people may be advertised or hidden for further effect. (``How much is he worth, anyway?'') In fact, it is not really the case that this system sounds like today's currency, it is the case that our monetary system is actually a very small microcosm of this future Electronic Democracy. Look at all the synonyms associated with money: Power. Status. Influence. Money is the economy's built-in `voting mechanism'. It is an abstraction that, when implemented, causes a competition for improvement and superiority, an *incentive* for *evolution* and *success*. Similarly, under the new system sensible classifications, status formulas, and bills will prosper and persist, while nonsensical, inferior, and obsolete ones will die out. These ideas are all very cypherpunkesque in their allusions to digital cash, reputations, social upheaval, `anarchy' in the sense of a government so unobtrusive and natural it is virtually invisible yet omnipresent (sort of like God, eh? ah, well, a good role model.) I call on patriotic and guerilla cypherpunks to implement this system, to be a model for the world! all the critical features of technology are already in place -- methods of providing universal communication called `email', guaranteeing accurate voting via authenication called PGP, a widespead `proposal dissemination and discussion system' called Usenet, a library for past proposals and bills and resolutions called FTP. I guarantee that by *far* this will be the most important of all cypherpunk projects, if in the amazing odds it were actually adopted by one (considering the recent formidably frosty reception, currently all that is left of my attempt at a burgeoning snowball is a Dissolving Drip in Hell). In fact, the sheer dischordant cacophony on this group might be ameliorated through such a system. Imagine that we as a group (the most disorderly and uncooperative group ever to be called one) could vote and stabilize Cypherpunk Resolutions. (Nah -- some things are just fundamentally impossible.)

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Re: Spooking of neural nets and image recognition...
by smb＠research.att.com 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

Insofar as monitoring passage of people, I noted a few hours ago a new installation of cameras at the tollbooths on the George Washington Bridge, positioned to be under a meter from people's faces when they stop to fork over their $4.00. The police density at this toll plaza makes additional surveillance of would-be toll booth robbers unnecessary; while traffic analysis on the matching of facial patterns is probably out of their scope right now, it *is* a precedent, and food for thought... Well -- the cameras may have been prompted by the fact that the toll booths at the GWB have been the targets of armed robberies several times of late... FYI, the George Washington Bridge carries much, probably most, of the traffic into Manhattan and New York City...) Most? Hardly. Don't forget the bridges and tunnels from Brooklyn and Queens, and the two tunnels from New Jersey, and...

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Re: >Clipper trapdoor?
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

>Message-Id: <00541.2828009147.4718(a)washofc.cpsr.org> >From: David Sobel <dsobel(a)washofc.cpsr.org> >Date: Thu, 12 Aug 1993 14:01:54 EST >Subject: Re: >Clipper trapdoor? David, You wrote: >[...] I think the question you raise is a critical one -- under what >guidelines will the escrow agents determine the validity of an NSA >request for the key without a FISA warrant? If I were the NSA, I would *never* permit a key request to leave the building at Ft. Meade. The fact that it wanted a given key is, itself, intelligence. I am one person who believes that the gov't would never be able to establish a key escrow agency secure enough even for my customers (Stratus customers: already extra-careful purchasers of high priced fault tolerant equipment: banks, large funds transfer people, stock brokers, hospitals, ...). It's too cheap for organized crime to bribe or break in at the escrow agencies. Therefore, I'm on record as a commercial crypto consultant recommending against any customer of ours using any escrowed-key mechanism, no matter how strong the algorithm or how trustworthy the key generation process. If the agency is too flaky for me, they're bound to be too flaky to be trusted with a paper trail of NSA's eavesdropping targets. The traffic analysis of that trail would be worth an absolute fortune. I'd give it a week before it was compromised. So: I wouldn't go to the escrow agencies in any way at all. ---------- Now, there was an interesting thing from DERD the other day -- that the original key generation mechanism is out, replaced by one which is classified (for nat'l security reasons, I assume). ---------- As I mentioned in alt.privacy.clipper the other day, if I were the NSA I would: 1. pick a *very* secure block cryptosystem (secure enough for them to use to send top secret crypto keys around the world, where the enemy is sure to intercept the message) 2. encrypt the chip's serial number in that algorithm, using a single key which only the agency knows 3. use the output of that encryption as the chip's key [that output will look totally random to the outside observer, because the encryption algorithm is so good] 4. make the two escrow copies, as before, and deliver them to the escrow agencies 5. keep the key generation process secret, for fear of inciting rebellion among civil liberties groups ----------- - Carl P.S. One of my questions for CSSPAB was why the key generation procedure didn't just use a hardware random number generator. That's the accepted practice and there's no reason to classify it. P.P.S. Is there any way to get NIST to answer my list of 22 questions?

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Re: anonymous contact ser
by M..Stirner＠f0.n0.z1.FIDONET.ORG 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

-=> Quoting Uucp to All <=- Uu> Apologies for replying on the list.... That's OK with me. This probably answers some questions for a few others, too. Uu> Here's why. I can't reply directly to your message, as some gateway on Uu> the way barfs on the ".." in your name. This seems to come and go. Uu> This is probably also what screws up anon.penet.fi. This is extremely interesting! This "problem" was supposedly fixed some time ago, but this is why I have alternate accounts elsewhere with more common names. In any event, I will pass this information along to the proper persons. > repl: bad addresses: > "M. Stirner" <M..Stirner(a)f0.n0.z1.fidonet.org> -- no mailbox in > local-part (.) This is yet another problem that was supposedly repaired - it should read m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org, but a curious glitch in the BBS reply software that handles conversions of mailings to conferences & automatic routing of replies periodically enters all zeroes in the "f" & "n" fields. I will pass this along, also. Uu> Another problem is that your address keeps changing. Thus you have Uu> several ID's on anon.penet.fi, some with passwords, some without. Your Uu> message was from m..stirner(a)f0.n0.z1.fidonet.org, but in your sinature Uu> you claim you are also m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org (or Uu> ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!0!0!M..Stirner). Yes, the zeros are wrong & were inserted by software out of my control. I also have different addresses, true enough, but there is no f0.n0.z1 in fido; that address is a software error. I suspect it'll be on this message, too. STILL....the problem I have is not addressed: I cannot make a multi-line header (as in the required "X-Anon-Password: password" line) work through this UUCP gate, as far as I can tell. I have been attempting to route my mail to the penet remailer via other cypherpunks remailers with the syntax: :: Request-Remailing-To: anon(a)anon.penet.fi From: anXXXXXX(a)anon.penet.fi X-Anon-Password: password X-Anon-To: alt.foolishness But I am not sure if the cypherpunk remailer's address conflicts with my From: field or not - I _think_ it does. If so, I cannot use password header lines unless anon.penet.fi can handle having blank lines between the header fields: To: anon(a)anon.penet.fi From: anXXXXX(a)anon.penet.fi X-Anon-Password: password X-Anon-To: alt.foolishness The above header will pass the UUCP gate here. Without the blank lines, the header gets grunged after the To: anon(a)anon.penet.fi line. . Thank you for your personal attention to this vexing problem. . ~ . M. ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!0!0!M..Stirner INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f0.n0.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Home Banking Patent
by Jin S Choi 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

I'm surprised I haven't seen any discussion of this at all. Is anyone else just a little surprised at this patent? I was using a home banking system in the early 80s; when did this Online Resources & Communications Corp. file for their patent? Does anyone know where I can find more info on this patent? What it covers, and so forth? Is anyone gearing up to fight this?

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Second Tier remailers ...
by kelly＠netcom.com 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

To All, The idea of second tier remailers may be MUCH more palatable to all to run as they add more hops in the chain... as they dont introduce such a visible liability to the operator they could possibly be a LOT easier to propagate than first tier remailers. One additional facility neede is the ability to recognize a signed and/or encrypted control message to update their remailer maps from a periodic posting...maybe this last needs a lot of thought. cheers kelly --

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NSA Requests Delay in CPSR Clipper Lawsuit
by L. Detweiler 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

Tidbits: NSA has classified an `entire Federal program in substantial part' surrounding Clipper. Also, CPSR filed similar suit over NSA secrecy & classification of DES. Note: This is a standard NSA tactic, evasion by delay. They don't respond to FOIA requests in the legislated time frame (1-2 weeks) using the same delay technique. Maybe if we send nasty email to the laywers all will be well =) ===cut=here=== From: Dave Banisar <banisar(a)washofc.cpsr.org> Organization: CPSR, Washington Office Subject: NSA Asks For One Year Delay in Clipper Case NSA Seeks Delay in Clipper Case The National Security Agency (NSA) has asked a federal court for a one-year delay in a lawsuit challenging the secrecy of the government's "Clipper Chip" encryption proposal. The suit was filed by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) on May 28 and seeks the disclosure of all information concerning the controversial plan. In an affidavit submitted to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on August 9, NSA Director of Policy Michael A. Smith states that NSA's search for records responsive to [CPSR's] request is under way, but is not yet complete. Because the Clipper Chip program is a significant one involving the participation of organizations in four of NSA's five Directorates and the Director's staff, the volume of responsive documents is likely to be quite large. Moreover, because the Clipper Chip program is highly complex and technical and is, in substantial part, classified for national security purposes, the review process cannot be accomplished quickly. CPSR called for the disclosure of all relevant information and full public debate on the proposal on April 16, the day it was announced. While NSA has insisted from the outset that the "Skipjack" encryption algorithm, which underlies the Clipper proposal, must remain secret, the Smith affidavit contains the first suggestion that the entire federal program is classified "in substantial part." In the interest of obtaining timely judicial review of the agency's broad classification claim, CPSR intends to oppose NSA's request for delay in the court proceedings. In another case involving government cryptography policy, CPSR has challenged NSA's classification of information concerning the development of the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The court is currently considering the issue and a decision is expected soon. CPSR is a national public-interest alliance of computer industry professionals dedicated to examining the impact of technology on society. CPSR has 21 chapters in the U.S. and maintains offices in Palo Alto, California, and Washington, DC. For additional information on CPSR, call (415) 322-3778 or e-mail <cpsr(a)cpsr.org>.

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Making the World Safe for Steganography
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

I agree with Tim's suggestion that it would be good if steganography and cryptography tools were widely available, especially in light of the government's obvious hostility towards cryptography. But I can't agree that these tools will be sufficient to bring about Tim's concept of "crypto anarchy", of "libertaria in cyberspace". If we really want to achieve these goals I think it will be necessary to take political action. Technology alone will not be enough. After all, even today techniques exist which would in principle allow a digital cash system to develop. Yet no such system exists. There needs to be an infrastructure, a network of bankers, sellers, users, and other participants. All this will take time to develop even in the best of cases. But if the government is actively fighting such technology, I don't see how Tim's proposed subterfuges with DAT's and CD's are going to be enough to overcome this additional barrier. Without the ability to publically negotiate the tricky issues of standards and contracts, I don't see how a financial infrastructure of the sophistication needed for digital cash could arise. As another example, suppose the government banned non-Clipper cryptography. Despite the brave comments of some, I think it would be very hard to overcome such a ban. Look at the problems PGP has had, faced merely with the relatively weak threat of patent suits (patents which have not, to my knowledge, been tested in court). PGP is constantly being taken off FTP sites based just on letters from the patent holders. Even Tim himself suggested some time back that Cypherpunks should rethink support for PGP given the patent situation. Imagine how much worse it would be if the government actually could put people in jail for using PGP. My main point is that we cannot rely on the technology to save us. A concerted government effort could, in my opinion, stifle the growth of individual liberties that cryptography may offer. Clipper is just one battle in this longer war. We can't afford to fall victim to a smug confidence that victory will inevitably be ours. If we get to the point that steganography is the only way to communicate privately, we will have lost. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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