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Re: Electracy: Evil Revisited
by paul＠poboy.b17c.ingr.com 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Fully participative electronic democracy is what you get when you cross cable TV with mob rule. I'm a little suprised no one has brought up Brunner's Oracle from _The Shockwave Rider_. For those of you who haven't read it, imagine a sort of Nintendo-meets-OTB system where you can vote- and *bet* - on the probability of certain events. Of course, the government has the means to effect the outcome of many such events (money supply, availability of crypto, who wins the Miss Teen USA pageant), but it's an interesting concept. The problem with Lance's positive reputation, et al system is that having power, money, status, influence, or a stout reputation doesn't automatically mean you're _right_. (cf. Armand Hammer, J. Edgar Hoover, Lani Guinier), and the lack thereof doesn't necessarily mean you're wrong or that your ideas shouldn't be heard (cf. Alger Hiss, the guy-who-invented-variable-delay-wipers, early Martin Luther King Jr.) -Paul - -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | "Change the world for a better tomorrow. But perobich(a)ingr.com | watch your ass today." - aaron(a)halcyon.com Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user- ask me how. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLGv2eyA78To+806NAQGeVgQAoHyolj84XGw5vIwl4+SxUCEGrdk7oKwo YQ+1qmI5bYcc8ldNDBxawg5vlLpfcBa1mMydazS8grJznos8SwkAz0xsh0rqxEy7 7QpOGXFFPj+z7fInK8yNmh5X58ZVAxC7VRrfyrXP4KUc+779N3VL/dTgsz9ct9MF BjejuvMxMp4= =vloB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

I may be out of date on beepers, but the ones I know about are recievers only, no transmitters. Cell phones *can* be used to track, though. Keith

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No Subject
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

Subject:Beepers can also be used to track you down! I had heard that Motorola was talking about pagers based on the cellular phone system, with hand off between cells, etc. That would imply XMIT. As far as local detection, I understand that in Britain vans go around with sniffing gear looking for IF freqs to find unlicensed TVs. When in the Air Force, we used to leave our pagers in Faraday cages when going into some of the SCFs, which were built with the copper mesh in the walls etc. The idea being that you didn't want any being carried on IF from the pager. As far as the microwave oven, fine you can hide in there, but watch out for them.. one of THEM may come by and turn it on...

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Re: [uk.transport] Speed Camera with OCR
by jon barber 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

The Oxfordshire police force here in the UK have introduced speed cameras. The way they work is to use radar to check oncoming cars speeds, and if its over the limit the camera takes a picture of the cars number plate. I guess a human back at police HQ has to do the bit about reading the plate, and then a fixed fine is sent through the post. They admit that there's a lot of dummy speed camera warning signs, as they only have 3 to cover the whole of the county. What they do is move the cameras around every now and then. Most regular motorists know where they are, as they're easy to see - big grey boxes in the middle of the road. Apparently ( I have no figures ) they've been a great success and police are amazed at how much speeding goes on ( I'm not ). Jon.

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customer tracking, et al...
by JAW7254＠ACFcluster.NYU.EDU 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I don't know about the camera's/recognition in retail stores that were mentioned, but at least here in NY, record stores are pushing something called the I-Card. The unit is a simple terminal in Tower Records(tho I think they've dropped it now), some Sam Goody Records', J&R, etc. When you 'apply' for a card, you fill out a customer survey, name/address/ etc. They then take two copies of a bar code, and put one on the survey, and one on a card they give you. The terminal allows you to see music and video previews and things of the sort, but to use it, you must slot your bar code. The result--a database somewhere with a profile on you including all participating record stores you've been to , and what music you've previewed. Perhaps that should be the Eye-Card, eh? Jim Wise JAW7254(a)ACF.NYU.EDU -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBVAgUBLGvvaAgFW+TtMfolAQHuSQH/dMXZx2OVJRJEJNqdUxyoAUW4/yoBUioH BkvWD2zT2M43AL+JaE69mMhE1LSN4GpyZuTcFX9j++gy4IRfi9lBow== =DeTs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Privacy-Friendly Auditing
by Hastings＠courier8.aero.org 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

I sent messages pertaining to the anonymous auditing problem to Neils Ferguson, and like someone who hopes the property owner forgives the trespass that occurs when someone walks up and rings the doorbell, I hope he doesn't "have a cow" that I'm sharing some of his remarks. >The anonymous auditing problem is, as far as I have understood, not >well defined. Duh!!! Ahem... >The purpose is to allow an external auditor compute the sum of all >the banks commitments without revealing the individual commitments >to the auditor. The problem is: who is going to provide the data to >the auditor? >The simplest answer would be that the customers are going to provide >the data. In this case the voting protocols described in literature >are a good start. It should even be possible to have the bank provide >signed account statements for a specific date to all clients which are >then used in the protocol to prevent clients from cheating and thereby >generating a false result in the audit. But any such scheme is not >practical as ALL customers have to cooperate. >If the bank is going to supply the information to the auditors, then >there must be some way to stop the bank from creating an entire >`shadow' bookkeeping. That is, the data must include some kind of >customers signature on the balance of each bankaccount, and the public >key of this customer must somehow be verified to belong to a real >person (to ensure that it was not generated by the bank itself). The >authentication of a public key and linking it to an actual person >requires another institution (government?) which keeps track of people >and authenticates that they are actual living persons. >Note that all this information does not have to be revealed to the >auditor, but it is necessary as input to the cryptographic protocol. >In general a cryptographic protocol cannot achieve anything that a >computer which is trusted by all parties cannot achieve. If someone >could give a description of the required functionality of this virtual >trusted computer, then the cryptographers can try to make it into a >protocol (and then try to make it practical). >Did I miss something when I quickly read your mail or is the notion of >an anonymous auditing still vague? >I havn't studied voting schemes but most of them have serious flaws. >Many of them have difficulty handling a dishonest minority, or require >too much resources to be practical. One requirement for voting schemes >which I have not seen in literature is the unprovability. After voting >a voter should not be able to prove what she voted to another party. >If this were possible, then buying votes (or blackmailing people to >vote a certain way) becomes possible. The old Italian voting system >had so many possibilities to cast your vote that this was used by the >Mafia in certain areas. They would approach a person and basically >state: "You'd better make sure that there is a ballot with exactly >these choices in the result or else....". >I don't read the cypherpunk mailing list. If it were a newsgroup I >would find it quite interesting, but as a mailing list it is much >harder for me to selectively read the articles. Also, my mail handler >doesn't support a kill file. When I tried a subscription I found the >signal to noise ration to be too low to read it as a mailing list. The >volume was also so high that it drowned out my other e-mail. With a >newsgroup you can safely ignore it for a while. Maybe I should get a >better mail handler, but when I mentioned this problem to Eric Hughes, >he said that they could have created a newsgroup but decided not to. A >clear mistake in my opinion. Anyways, maybe someone will create an >alt.cypherpunk newsgroup and put up a gateway from the mailing list to >the newsgroup. Niels Ferguson can be reached at niels(a)cwi.nl, and I'm sure one of you finks will rat on me and tell him I'm betraying confidentiality. Well, go ahead, you'll see what I do to you. Kent - <jkhastings(a)aol.com>

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Re: Secure voice software issues
by fnerd＠smds.com 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

karn(a)qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) sez- > ...Finding a path through the PGP "web of > trust" back to a trusted public key that the other party already has > may be tricky. This is one thing that is much easier with a simple > tree a la PEM, as you simply give the path back up to a common, shared > root. > > I'm not sure how to do this with PGP. ... Maybe this is a good service for a key server to perform. Are there cases where you would want to endorse a key *privately*? I.e., tell certain people only that you've met someone? > If you first do Diffie Hellman and then immediately use the session > key it generates to conventionally encrypt the rest of the protocol, > including any RSA public key exchanges, this has the added benefit of > denying passive eavesdroppers any information that would identify the > parties to the call. The best an *active* eavesdropper (conducting a > man-in-the-middle attack against Diffie Hellman) could do is to trick > the parties into revealing their RSA public keys, and thus their > identities. But the parties would quickly discover this at the > signature step, before the voice conversation actually starts. What if you prepare RSA key pairs in advance in your computer's (phone's) spare time, then use one per conversation (at least for the initializing)? You would encode your public key with the session private key, and a conventional key with your private key, in advance. That would save time at the start of the conversation (although, to decode his keys would take two regular RSA steps.) Am I wrong, or is Diffie-Helman only useful when you *don't* have a way of verifying who each other are? -fnerd(a)smds.com quote me

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Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
by peter honeyman 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

>There's probably a way to disable the transmitter in the beeper, ... i should think that all the second amendment enthusiasts on this list could come up with something ... peter

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Re: Beepers can also be used to track you down!
by peter honeyman 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

> I carry both a pager and a cell phone. phil, i've known you a long time, so i'm used to the fact that you carry a slide rule and a calculator, a walkman and a transistor radio, wear a belt and suspenders, a ski hat and earmuffs, but with this, you've gone too far my friend. peter

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Making the World Safe for
by Duncan Frissell 13 Aug '93

13 Aug '93

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com H>As another example, suppose the government banned non-Clipper H>cryptography. H>Despite the brave comments of some, I think it would be very hard H>to overcome such a ban. H>My main point is that we cannot rely on the technology to save us. A H>concerted government effort could, in my opinion, stifle the growth of H>individual liberties that cryptography may offer. Clipper is just one H>battle in this longer war. We can't afford to fall victim to a smug H>confidence that victory will inevitably be ours. If we get to the H>point H>that steganography is the only way to communicate privately, we will H>have H>lost. H> H>Hal Finney H>hfinney(a)shell.portal.com H> Hal, the point is that the government actions you fear are politically unlikely and would be limited to one nation in any case. Par example - humorous letter to the editor in today's NYT from someone I'll call "Clueless in New Jersey." He promotes the idea of a 1% tax on the markets for currencies and derivatives (because they are volitile, unproductive and hurt governments). Even before the passage of such a tax, the currency traders would have relocated themselves (physically or virtually) to an untaxed location. They nice thing about the modern communications environment is not strong crypto, steganography, or anonymous networks (though these are fun) it is the ability to randomie your physical location while still living as full and productive life as you used to live when tied down to one spot. The multiplying power of the new technologies also llows you to "run a Fortune 500 corporation" from your back pocket as informal work groups form and disband as needed. Crackdowns by a single government will just speed up the process of people becoming Permanent Tourists (PTs). The control problems experienced by modern States do not grow out strong crypto (which is not yet deployed) but out of the growing relative power of individuals. Power=Choice=Control. If we have power (the ability to jet anywhere on earth at the speed of sound for 1 or 3 week's average salary) we can make choices and control ourselves. If we control ourselves others lose control over us. The individual's natural organiational superiority over larger entities (my right hand rarely wheels on in to federal court to force me to file an environmental impact statement before defecation) when enhanced by modern technology weakens those less organied institutions. Remember laws are *not* self-enforcing. The success of their legal regime depends upon obedience by the populace. Does anyone out there see obedience and deference *increasing*? I don't. If disobedience keeps increasing, at some point the rules will be meaningless. Duncan Frissell November 10th 1989 - Berlin Wall - Death for unauthorized crossing November 11th 1989 - No Berlin Wall Sic semper tyrannis - "What a Difference a Day Makes" --- WinQwk 2.0b#0

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