- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Interesting web site
by legalchallenge2001＠yahoo.com 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

I have found a good site that proves that there indeed was a cover-up regarding Vince Foster's death. You can visit it at http://www.fbicover-up.com or <a href="http://www.fbicover-up.com">click here</a> (if html-mail enabled).

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FREE Offer From Adam & Eve!=> cypherpunks@toad.com
by editor＠newsletter.join4free.com 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

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Crypto Survey May 2001 by Markku J. Saarelainen (fwd)
by Jim Choate 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

-- ____________________________________________________________________ "...where annual election ends, tyranny begins;" Thomas Jefferson & Samuel Adams The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- -------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 06 Jun 2001 16:04:37 -0700 From: Markku Saarelainen <mjs.crypto(a)eudoramail.com> To: mjs.crypto(a)eudoramail.com Subject: Crypto Survey May 2001 by Markku J. Saarelainen ******************************************************** CRYPTO SURVEY MAY 2001 Cryptographic Survey, May 2001, Markku J. Saarelainen Email: cryptocom(a)hotvoice.com ******************************************************** A SUMMARY CONCLUSION: The major societal development since the 1st and 2nd crypto surveys in 1996 and 1997 has been the removal of many regulatory barriers for open trading of cryptographic products in the North America and globally. In addition, the number of cryptographic applications and component implementations has increased, while at the same time the variety of different types of solutions has risen. This does not necessarily mean the wider use of encryption in businesses and personal activities. Many same or similar behavioral barriers for the effective utilization of many security solutions still exist limiting the protection of communications, data storage and networking. In addition, the lack of the interoperability between solutions from different suppliers tends to decrease the number of effective cryptography users worldwide. It is clear that the awareness for encrypted communication and protected information activities has increased, while necessary regulatory changes for protectin! g ! entities from security vulnerabilities has enabled cryptographic product suppliers to satisfy market requirements in the U.S.A., in the North America and globally. However, regulatory and cultural differences exist from one nation or region to another creating a global unbalanced situation of the security use, which has the reducing effect on security practices and policy implementations of any global entity in different regions. This impacts on the interoperability of units of global entities. It is likely that there shall be greater competing drives in the information technology market place between different security strategies and approaches from different software and hardware product and security suppliers. ******************************************************** QUESTION 1. In your opinion, what are the 5-10 most significant applications of encryption technologies currently in commercial enterprises? ******************************************************** 1. HTTP over SSL (aka HTTPS) / SSL for credit card processing / SSL / Web-activity privacy (SSL) 2. IPsec 3. RSA Secure ID (maybe) 4. Online Credit Card Processing & Financial Transfers 5. VPNs / Virtual Private Networks for widely distributed offices / VPN for remote access to Intranet 6. Email encryption (via PGP/GPG or SMIME) / Encrypted Messages / Email Privacy 7. Digital signing authentication of messages 8. Consensus and voting software (not now but give it 5 years) 9. Encrypted file systems for sensitive data 10. Signing software for installation 11. Signing email messages to show official authority 12. Wireless local area network encryption 13. Password protection/access control 14. Data protection 15. Session protection (VPN's) 16. Authentication and authorization / Customer authentication (e.g. PIN checking) 17. Securing B2B file exchange 18. PKI 19. Remote secure teleworking 20. Digital signatures 21. Time-stamping ******************************************************** QUESTION 2. In your opinion, what are 5-10 main barriers currently that may prevent the successful implementation and utilization of encryption technologies in commercial enterprises? ******************************************************** 1. Ignorance of risks prevents purchase 2. Dishonest portrayal of product (i.e.: false security claims and blatant product holes in end-to-end protection) promotes distrust in the whole industry 3. Most products are a waste of time because they are not a comprehensive solution - e.g.: why bother using PGP when there is nothing in any NAI products to protect against back-office-style electronic eavesdropping attacks? 4. Many people do not care about cryptography and/or security products 5. Having lived happily without serious protection for a long while, most customers believe there is no point retrofitting an expensive solution for a problem they do not have (and many of them are probably right...) 6. Lack of knowledge by decision-maker 7. Low knowledge level of users 8. Lack of knowledge by computer scientists 9. Lack of complete standards (S/MIME to be extended, ...) 10. Cost 11. It is too hard to use / complexity / Not transparent enough and made user hard to use. 12. Difficult and complex configurations. 13. Diversity of enterprise 14. Trained security personnel 15. Commercial operating systems are too difficult to secure and hence there is no such thing as a rusted base 16. No widely accepted standard for smart cards or tokens 17. No facility for reading smart cards or tokens on mass market PCs 18. Character limit on Microsoft passwords 19. Bad advice on password generation 20. Unjustified prices for non-commodity products 21. Confused security market - lack of standards and best practices, everyone is trying to define their own market segment and different way to solve the same common problem. 22. Protectiveness of public sector - local solutions are preferred 23. No. 1 is the need of users training, as they tend not to understand too well what procedures are for encryption. This can mean huge resources/budgeting requirements and the aftermath of running Helpdesk support. 24. Key distribution is also a major consideration for large user groups. PKI seems to address this problem but it brings forth more problems of its own. PKI is not simple to set up in a production environment and certificates rollout is a noted issue. Incompatibility issues with various PKI vendors' product may bring down the whole PKI project. Very often customers are forced into accepting single PKI supplier solution. PKI related standards abound but incompatibility is still with us. Also an issue is the insufficient supply of security professional to serve customers' demand. 25. Lack of PKI or alternative 26. Expensive charges by digital certificate issuers 27. Difficulty of users managing passwords 28. Failures of interoperability between vendors implementing "standards" 29. IS department sees encryption as a limit on its monitoring activities 30. Users lack of security knowledge 31. Interoperability between heterogeneous systems 32. Not aware of the importance of security 33. Complex key management 34. Inefficiency 35. Most existing Public Key infrastructures are based on deeply flawed models of trust. They abandon the idea of trust and aim to prove identity instead - but fail to do even that since Verisign, etc, do not adequately protect themselves from fraud. 36. There are too few key authorities and the business has substantial barriers to entry. Basically, if you cannot get your root key into the default configuration of the majority browser (for which the software company that makes the majority browser will charge a very large amount of money) then your key authority is a non-starter. This creates a monopoly environment in which customers are being drastically overcharged and underserved for their key certificates, and also creates targets for hacking, fraud, or legal compromise, which would cause enormous damage if compromised. 37. The non-centralized key authorities favored by PGP et al are a better trust model and don't suffer from the few-points-of-attack problem, but they are being killed by apathy. The "web of trust" is no longer a web, it's a bunch of teeny bits of webbing blowing hither and yon. 38. Software Patents. Software patents have necessitated creating multiple incompatible versions of many things that ought to be public infrastructure and utilities by now. As long as users of one version of PGP can't read or verify messages created by another, due to software patents, all versions of PGP have diminished utility. 39. Development practices. It is almost impossible to write secure code using what is now considered "ordinary" Object-oriented programming. GUI's and windowing systems have so many deep security flaws that security is nearly impossible unless these things are reimplemented from the ground up. In particular, every windowing system on the market makes it possible to monitor keystrokes intended for a different program, and none even have an option to "clear" memory of what's on the screen before releasing the memory back to the system where another program can allocate it. 40. Protocol Impoverishment. There are many useful protocols that have been discussed and discovered, but very *VERY* few of them have ever seen a robust or publicly available implementation. ********************************************************* QUESTION 3. What are activities and projects that can be initiated and taken to lower and reduce above barriers (see the question 2.)? ********************************************************* 1. Introduce a new government law which makes security companies 100% liable and responsible for all damage and losses that occur as a result of their software failing to perform the purpose it was sold for, and failing to live up to their advertised claims. This will force product vendors to revise their claims, remove the lies from their packaging, and cause them to have to print lengthy explanations of what threats their products can not withstand. This will give customers an opportunity to understand what risks they really face after using various products and an opportunity to seriously compare different products pre-purchase. 2. Education and training 3. Consulting or outsourcing of enterprise security 4. More publicity 5. Standardization 6. Integration of security products into mass-market software 7. There is little we can do about the end-users, I think time is the best cure here. Imagine asking the government or any organization to provide free training on security practices to all. Hopefully, users will see encryption is a tool to protect them and help them rather than something hindering their work and therefore must fight against. On the (encryption) technology side I believe the industry can do something to help the poor users and itself as a side bonus. It would be much easier for security integrators if different vendors work together making their solutions friendlier to each other. I notice this trend has started already but I think it is not enough. There should be some form of non-vendor affiliated body that run some certification scheme to endorse/state "what product from which vendor is compatible with who" sort of reference. 8. Remove the barriers listed in Question 2 9. Develop an alternate Internet based on secure technology. 10. Education project to be launched in include cryptography in engineering and computer scientist basic school programs. 11. A widely accepted, free certificate issuer would solve the PKI and certificate-expense problems. This could be a government service. 12. Simplification of security standards and focusing on profiles, which represent limited but functional subsets will help with interop. 13. Most security standards are too complex. 14. Children should begin being trained in school to deal with network security throughout their lives. They should learn to memorize passwords and understand the basic functionality of two key cryptography. 15. Schools should prepare children for a life where crypto keys are tools they are as comfortable using as computers. 16. Push a practical PKI for ease of use. 17. Make interface more friendly and transparent to the users. 18. Reduce human interactions. 19. Make configuration easy. 20. Public domain or public-license sw for an extended set of protocols ought to be developed. Software patents have become a "poison pill" to compatibility, so they ought to be avoided and it ought to be possible to completely avoid them. GPG and OpenSSH are the two premier examples of this, and their existence has a lot to do with the technologies they represent having finally become important. 21. Public awareness of the probability and consequences of failure to keep data secure. This is sorely lacking now, although the IT departments of major companies are finally starting to "get it". 22. Public Key authorities need to be much easier to set up. 23. Crypto books aimed at kids and amateurs. The developers stuff is there already, but it's hard to draw new workers into the field beyond the stale "spy glamour" thing. Anyway, kids and amateurs are the future security pros who can solve the major problems with software and etc; we just need more people in the field who are willing to get their hands dirty and experiment with code. This is one of the most lopsided fields of software development, where we have *SCADS* of ideas from academics that no one has had time to properly implement yet. We need a lot of implementers to get really fired up about it. ******************************************************** ******************************************************** CRYPTO SURVEYS OF 1996 AND 1997 ******************************************************** SURVEY SUMMARY : ENCRYPTION FOLLOW-UP SURVEY MAY, 1997 Note: This survey summary contains raw survey results that have NOT been analyzed, evaluated or prioritized. The results are based on comments and opinions (all of which may not be facts) that were received from many individuals who responded to the original (October 1996) survey. ***************************** QUESTION 1: In your opinion, what are main developments in the adoption of encryption technologies in commercial enterprises since October, 1996? ***************************** "The continued government attempts to get 'key recovery', and a certain amount of reluctant willingness from business." "Purely for e-commerce reasons have there been any advancements. The rest of the encryption world (privacy/freedom etc.) have been appallingly backward and most governments will tend to hold them back." "Network Computers (NCs)." "Slight easing of export restrictions. Development of several payment protocols. Increasing adoption of retail commerce over the net as evidenced by recent IPO of Amazon.com." "There is some movement towards more advanced mathematics. The market is searching for patent free/royalty free encryption. Governments are attempting to halt it, but are failing miserably." "Electronic payment via The Internet." "C2's bypass of the export regulations. The broader adoption of SSL. Eudora plugins for PGP." "-SSL has been widely used for the securing of data for a number of on-line Internet banks. -Encrypted tunneling products which extend the corporate Intranet/LAN are now becoming widely available. -Smart cards are finally appearing in North America. In Canada alone Visa Cash, Exact (Proton?), and Mondex are going through trials. -SSL is now widely used to protect credit card transactions on a number of internet retail sites -The US government continues to support key escrow for exported encryption. -Major players (i.e. banks, IBM, MS, HP, VeriFone) are taking steps to integrate SET into their range of products. -Future browsers are going to allow smart cards to Interface with the Internet." ***************************** QUESTION 2: In your opinion, what are 5-10 main barriers currently that may prevent the successful implementation and utilization of encryption technologies in commercial enterprises? ***************************** "-Legislation and government intervention for strong encryption. -Unfamiliarity with the technology will produce mistrust of its reliability. -Safe key-management processes are difficult to achieve. This will reduce the security of cryptography and thus its usefulness for many applications. -Cryptography is not user-friendly right now. Until it becomes so than it is unlikely to achieve widespread usage. -Licensing fees for cryptographic algorithms are not cheap. Until patents expire for things like the RSA public key algorithm the costs of developing reliable cryptographic products will remain high. - There are a large number of cryptographic products with no clear standards in sight." "Export regulations." "Lack of perceived need." "Lack of expertise among engineers and technicians." "a) Lack of interest in security b) Concentration on cost c) Lack of ready-to-use cheap tools d) Legislation and potential legislation e) Patents and licensing issues" "Government inadequacies in legislation, Vendors propensity to hand private keys to government (extrapolate that to insecurity when a person working for a vendor is bribed to give out a private key), Costs, Public reluctance in encryption (FUD factor)" "Threats to roles of traditional players (e.g., SET's effect on card issuers)., Seamless integration into products., Education of users., Regulatory obstacles. Widespread availability." "1) ease of use, 2) cost of real security, 3) an understanding of security details, 4) a lack of understanding the difference between cryptography and security 5) uncertainty as to what the government rules are" "- exportability (permissions are needed if a product implements cryptography, and 2 or more versions of the software has to be build), - patents (can't exploit algorithms without negotiating royalties)" "The governments export restrictions on strong cryptographic algorithms." " It is not a question of availability of software, but of interoperability between systems made/sold in different regions of the world." "Government FUD. Ease of use. Cost of training etc. Worry about leakage of secrets." ***************************** QUESTION 3: What are activities and projects that can be initiated and taken to lower and reduce above barriers (see the question 2.)? ***************************** "a) Wider accurate publication of security lapses. b),c) Cheap tools fitted for a job. I just read a Sun catalogue where much of the software (including security software) has laughable prices. Get a straightforward Virtual Private Network from 100 pounds for a start. d) Do strong lobbying and occupy lawmaker's time with other stuff when they seem to be going in the wrong direction. e) Wait for some important expiry dates. Have more reasonable contact with license-holders. Bypass licenses by producing new methods that get less restriction." "Continued integration into key products such as Netscape and IE. Perhaps even into OSes." "Lowering the barriers to deploying certification authority infrastructures for use w/in intranets. (in terms of cost, ease of administration, etc.), Further efforts at deregulation." "Lobby governments, Do not place restrictions for vendor based key management, Push for totally private key systems" "A not for profit, global, public education group should be created whose purpose is to help educate businesses. Secondarily it should educate the public on the issues of privacy, but the primary goal should be to get all businesses (mainly the small ones) to understand that simple pains can give a great deal of security, and that the cost is worth the money and time saved from fraud and theft." "An e-mail program that a "stoned hippy" could use and still not leak information is needed. It would not allow too much flexibility, but it would give "the masses" a hands on feel for what security is and how crypto plays a role in their everyday life. Six year old kids and their grandmothers could be using even this simple security level for e-mail. It would go a long way because people will ask many questions, and they will get many answers. It would more rapidly diffuse the information and education over the populace (world wide)." "Develop simple and user-friendly ways to use cryptography and manage keys effectively." "Reduce the ability for corporations to patent cryptographic processes, key-management techniques, and anything other than completely unique cryptographic algorithms. We don't need research into new cryptography we need open access to refinements of what exists. If people can patent those refinements then it reduces the access people have to these new technologies at the expense of society at large." "Eliminate export barriers on strong encryption." "Education (public): crypto is used for authentication as well as privacy. It is *not* military or espionage technology. It is (required) enabling technology for tomorrow's information superhighway." "Education (professional): principles of information security taught in all relevant courses. (e.g. computing, telecom, electronics, etc)." ----- Results of the original survey in October, 1996 ------- SURVEY SUMMARY: Encryption in Commercial Enterprises October, 1996 by M. J. Saarelainen SURVEY METHODS BRIEFLY: Three specific questions were sent to several mailing lists and news groups. The great number of responses was received. These responses were compiled as received to the list (without any priorities) below. No detailed analysis or evaluations were completed at this time. Please, review these questions and responses and let me know, if you like to add, remove or change something. Thanks. ------- QUESTION 1. In your opinion, what are the 5-10 most significant applications of encryption technologies currently in commercial enterprises? RESPONSES (# of responses = 29) TO QUESTION 1: 1. Secure E-Mail / Secure E-mail SMTP/POP3 mail client 2. Secure Internet-Shopping 3. Encrypt the entire internet ( encrypting routers etc. ) 4. Encrypted file systems - partition for laptops 5. Encrypted voice (cellular, cordless, wireline, voice-over-internet) 6. Secure FAX 7. Point-to-point encrypted links, for corporations using the Internet as a WAN. 8. EDI (both encryption & authentication), Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 9. Secure FTP client/server software 10. Secure FTP client only software 11. Secure UNIX FTP server software 12. Secure File based encryption for HD and Floppy 13. Accounting departments need to ensure their data can't be changed 14. Engineering needs to ensure competition doesn't easily steal ideas 15. Secure login (and insecure, in the case of Unix) 16. Network traffic encryption 17. Local file/data protection (incl. backup protection) 18. Protection of proprietary information while allowing company use of it. 19. Crypto applications as an element in the information security system 20. Regional and national electric power exchanges between companies 21. Large investment banks who want to coordinate across their own organizations and others in significant numbers 22. Healthcare cries out for encryption 23. The military for sensitive non-classified information. 24. Law enforcement is a natural for the internet, if they could agree on a common security solution. 25. Online banking, online sales and commerce, data protection on commercial database servers, secure transfer of govt. information, ie. tax information on citizens. 26. The most widely spread encryption technologies are pgp and proprietary hardware solutions by different providers like Cylink etc. SSL is now upcoming. 27. Protection and storage of Archives 28. Person to person communication within an organization. 29. Secure remote communications (over the Internet) -------- QUESTION 2. In your opinion, what are 5-10 main barriers currently that may prevent the successful implementation and utilization of encryption technologies in commercial enterprises? RESPONSES (# of responses = 22) TO QUESTION 2: 1. Cryptic user interfaces 2. ITAR regulations, Government regulation or restrictions of use of strong encryption, Government export restrictions for strong encryption. 3. Ignorance ( pegasus provides REAL encryption ) 4. Lack of knowledge of resources available to Business. 5. Misunderstanding that encryption is complicated. 6. Misunderstanding that encryption is costly. 7. General lack of knowledge as to how to write *strong* encryption 8. Lack of integration of strong encryption so that the user must learn/know too much in order to use it properly 9. General lack of understanding of the necessity of *strong* encryption 10. Difficult to use 11. Slow speed 12. Complexity makes choices difficult since no one can be a full expert 13. Workers have to wait for a supervisor 14. A lack of understanding of the technology 15. The lack of good cost-benefit analysis data 16. On the product development side, few companies have both the engineering and the marketing/industry expertise to successfully make good secure products which meet real market needs and demands 17. Key Management. The ability for a user to gain authentification for use of cryptographic programs, to access information for which that person is authorized. Passwords can be forgotten, or copied, verifying a user easily is very difficult. 18. Lack of standards, and most of all lack of good certification services. 19. The second barrier derives from a missing standard interface in E-Mail, ftp ... solutions.so transparently embed widely spread encryption 20. Lack of knowledge of encryption is a big hurdle to it's implementation. Non-technical people are required to evaluate the use of a technological product they may not understand completely. It's difficult to put your trust in an algorithm when you don't understand how it works. 21. Many enterprises may not be aware of how easy it is to begin using encryption within their organization. 22. Many organizations may not recognize the need to protect information within their organization. Some may not be aware of how easy it is to tap into electronic communications. -------- QUESTION 3. What are activities and projects that can be initiated and taken to lower and reduce above barriers (see the question 2.)? RESPONSES (# of responses = 27) TO QUESTION 3: 1. Integrated mail reader with PGP capabilities, easy to use 2. Spreading awareness of how useful strong crypto really is. 3. Spreading awareness of exactly *why* governments seeks to prevent the spread of crypto. 4. Writing strong encryption software and placing it in the public domain. 5. Proving by actual demonstration that existing encryption is inadequate. 6. Encouraging wealthy crypto advocates to speak freely. 7. Education of users and vendors of the issues 8. Lobbying of governments by aforementioned enlightened users/vendors 9. Different products need to be created which can interoperate transparently to the user, but not deliver data unless operator is valid 10. Smart cards which attach to every terminal, the cards go with the person and they can validate themselves at any terminal 11. Overcoming the complexity barrier requires patient teaching of each client 12. A set of brochures and pamphlets needs to be created which describes most systems in use for a particular level of security 13. A major project would be to simply educate the managers of most companies about crypto, to remove the magic and bring the whole thing down to earth 14. Manufacturers need to go to more trouble talking with customers before designing products and be more creative in finding ways to meet market needs 15. Security companies also need to audit themselves and demonstrate that they are trustworthy 16. Better turnkey low-cost enterprise-wide solutions to common problems (network encryption, for example) are needed. 17. Make applications easier to use, Build easy to use encryption into applications so that it is smooth or even transparent to users 18. Universal standards for dual key encryption 19. Reduce strength of encryption to increase speed 20. Large groups of customers must get together and dictate standards to the security industry. 21. The first thing is to implement a transparent interface to encryption function to all data transfer services. 22. The second would be to get all suppliers of encryption technologies to confirm to this standard. 23. I think the best thing is to initiate a workgroup at The Open Group responsible for encryption interfaces. 24. Public Software such as PGP should be widely available. The more people are experienced with this software the more likely they are to use and trust it. 25. Making software like PGP widely available means more than just making sure copies of it are accessible. It also means making it user-friendly enough. 26. Education is also required. I find that very few people really know about these issues. 27. People need to promote awareness of the current situation. -------- Join 18 million Eudora users by signing up for a free Eudora Web-Mail account at http://www.eudoramail.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Statement from McVeigh's Attorney
by Eric Cordian 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

Statement of Robert Nigh, attorney, on the occasion of the execution of his client, Timothy McVeigh. ----- At 7 a.m. this morning, we killed Tim McVeigh, the person responsible for the Oklahoma City bombing. But we did much more than that. We also killed Sergeant McVeigh, the young man who joined the Army because he wanted to serve his country; the young soldier that was so dedicated to his duty that he became the top gunner in this battalion of 100. He was the young man who took up arms on his country's behalf and traveled half-way across the world to meet and engage our enemy. He placed his own life in jeopardy because we asked him to and because he thought it was his duty to do so. His actions were of such character that he was awarded the Bronze Star with designation of valor. But much more importantly than any of that, what we did this morning was to kill Tim McVeigh, friend to Bob Popovic, Allen Smith and Elizabeth McDermott. We killed Bill and Mickey's son this morning. And we killed Jennifer McVeigh's big brother. Of course, we can say that it was Tim himself that caused their pain. And we would be half-right. But it would be a lie to say that we did not double their pain and that we are not responsible, because there is a reasonable way to deal with crime that doesn't involve killing another human being. Although we might not express it in these terms because we know better, we might say that these people are simply collateral damage, but we know too well that there is no such thing as collateral damage. There are only real people with faces and names and loved ones who may never heal because of our actions, and that is true whether their grief was inflicted by Tim McVeigh or by federal law enforcement or by us collectively. To the survivors in Oklahoma City who have had the courage to come out against capital punish in spite of the tremendous pain that they have suffered, I say thank you. To the victims in Oklahoma City, I say that I am sorry that I could not successfully help Tim to express words of reconciliation that he did not perceive to be dishonest. I do not fault them at all for looking forward to this day or for taking some sense of relief from it. But if killing Tim McVeigh does not bring peace or closure to them, I suggest to you that it is our fault. We have told them that we would help them heal their wounds in this way. We have taken it upon ourselves to promise to extract vengeance for them. We have made killing a part of the healing process. In order to do that we use such terms as reasoned moral response, but I submit there's nothing reasonable or moral about what we have done today. That is true when killing a human being even means killing Tim McVeigh. There was a time when we recognized this in our country. In 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down the death penalty as it existed at the time. In its concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall wrote, ''The measure of a country's greatness is its ability to retain compassion in time of crisis. ''This is a country that stands tallest in troubled times; a country that clings to fundamental principles, cherishes its constitutional heritage and rejects simple solutions that compromise the values that lie at the roots of our democratic system. In striking down capital punishment, this court does not malign our system of government; on the contrary, it pays homage to it. In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest tribute. We achieve a major milestone in the long road from barbarism and join the approximately 70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their regard for civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment.'' There has been a movement in the states to celebrate the dignity of human life and to start a moratorium on executions. It did not come soon enough for Tim McVeigh, but it can come soon enough for others. Where we go from here is a question of critical importance. I have told you, honestly, that Tim cared for people. And some of the people he cared deepest about were his brothers on the federal death row. Even Tim recognized that our claims that we are not racially biased are false. If we believe that, then we ignore the reality that 18 of the 20 men behind me on the federal death row in Terre Haute are persons of color. Fully 90 percent belong to a minority. If we do not acknowledge that, we are lying to ourselves about what we are doing. We are killing the poor and the minority and people that we believe to be different and lesser than ourselves. Even in Tim McVeigh's case, to which the racial disparity doesn't apply, we were incapable of inflicting the death penalty in a fair manner. The FBI could not participate in the prosecution without breaching its obligation to turn over the witness statements. This must make us realize that we are too fallible, we are simply too human to extract so final and irreversible a punishment. If there is anything good that can come from the execution of Tim McVeigh, it may be to help us realize sooner that we simply cannot do this anymore. I am firmly convinced that it is not a question of if we will stop, it is simply a question of when. Thank you all very much. -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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The Chong-ster
by George＠Orwellian.Org 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

http://www.writtenbyme.com/content/49232 # # Legalization of Marijuana 'High Priority' of Tommy Chong's # Presidential Bid in 2004 # # by wyoming farnsworth, 7th June 2001. # # Under Chong's vision, the Benevolent United Radical Party (BURP) # has adopted a political agenda that's considered 'extreme' even # by political extremists. At present, BURP has publicly committed, # through printing of its party agenda, to: # # Disband the United States of America in favor of # "a less-is-more kinda country"; # # Establish any and all Taco Bell restaurant food entrees as a # "Fifth Food Group" to the currently existing "Four"; # # Ban all 'country' but not 'western' music, along with # dismantling and "burning at the stake" all of the entire # Nashville record-producing community; # # Utilize the vast resources of the FBI, CIA, and the NSA to # locate the long-rumored-dead Elvis Presley, Marilyn Monroe, # and Buddy Holly; # # Motorize all grocery stores shopping carts; and # # Globally legalize, cultivate, and distribute marijuana. # # "Yeah," Chong said, scratching his genitalia for several moments # as he ponders his party's future. "I think the marijuana thing's # gonna be a bitch. You know? Like, can the U.S. make law for the # whole world? I think it can, and, if I get elected president, # you know, like, it'll happen." # # The Benevolent United Radical Party maintains its headquarters # in Tiujauna, Mexico, although for purposes of eluding taxation # they appear to have multiple HQ locations in Delaware, South # Dakota, Iowa, Wyoming, Georgia, and Oregon. # # "Actually, what it is is a big f**king mobile home," Chong # explains. "It's painted just like the f**king Partridge Family # bus, you know, with colorful squares and cubes and trapezoids # and shit. BURP goes wherever the wind blows, man." # # "Like, that's what makes it magic, man."

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Social Security Numbers and health insurance
by Dr. Evil 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

I need to sign up for health insurance tomorrow. I'm going to buy individual coverage from Kaiser. On their form, it asks for an SSN, of course. Well, Kaiser is not a government agency, and is certainly not associated with the Social Security Adminisrtation in any way, so they have no legitimate need for my SSN, and I don't want to give it to them. I'm wondering how best to go about doing this: 1. I could make up an SSN and give it to them. I basically just have to make sure it's one that hasn't been taken, and corresponds to my real birth county, right? 2. I could say that I don't have an SSN. Most people in the world don't have SSNs. Would they then require proof that I'm not a US citizen? Or will they just assign me some kind of policy number? That would be ideal. 3. I could refuse to give it to them, but I think they would probably then refuse to give me coverage. Any thoughts? I have absolutely no health problems that I'm aware of, and I'm not trying to hide any pre-existing condition, and my only medical records are things which say, "he's healthy", so I'm not trying to commit any kind of fraud here, I just want my privacy. Thanks

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Re: Social Security Numbers and health insurance
by Faustine 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

At 3:47 AM +0000 6/11/01, Dr. Evil wrote: >I need to sign up for health insurance tomorrow. I'm going to buy >individual coverage from Kaiser. On their form, it asks for an SSN, >of course. > >Well, Kaiser is not a government agency, and is certainly not >associated with the Social Security Adminisrtation in any way, so they >have no legitimate need for my SSN, and I don't want to give it to >them. Try to get your employer to arrange to use employee ID numbers rather than SSNs as the healthcare identifier. If it can work in New York, it can work anywhere... Failing that, why not save up the money you would have paid out every month in a separate account and insure yourself? If you're young and in good health, it might be worth the risk while you save up a good amount for later. I used to work at a place that paid me fifty bucks every month for NOT signing up with their health plan. Wouldn't hurt to ask! I've heard enough horror stories about Kaiser to think there's got to be a better option for you out there, at any rate. ~Faustine. *** The whole of the developments and operations of analysis are now capable of being executed by machinery. ... As soon as an Analytical Engine exists, it will necessarily guide the future course of science. Passage from the Life of a Philosopher, Charles Babbage (London 1864)

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Bring a water-mister or aluminized umbrella to the next WTO fun.... (more on nonlethal radar weapon)
by Alfred Qaeda 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

11 June 2001 Millimeter-wave energy to be used in a weapon By Peter Clarke EE Times June 6, 2001 (5:39 p.m. EST) LONDON Stories of the soldiers who operate the Arctic radar stations and stand in front of the transmitter to get warm will surely be repeated now that the U.S. Department of Defense has gone public with plans to use the heating effect of millimeter waves within a weapon. The U.S. Marine Corps says it has developed a 95-GHz system as an antipersonnel "heat ray" and is conducting tests on animals and volunteers. The supposedly nonlethal weapon, called "active-denial technology," has been in the works for the last 10 years at the Air Force Research Laboratory (Kirtland, N.M.), in tandem with the Marine Corps' Joint Non-lethal Weapons Directorate. About $40 million has been spent developing the weapon, according to the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), although it could be nearly another decade before it is used in conflict. The earliest estimate for deployment is 2009. The system includes a millimeter-wave energy source with waveguides to direct the energy to a dish antenna measuring about 3 x 3 meters, which forms a beam that can be swept across a battlefield or hostile crowd. The aim is to deter or drive off adversaries caught out in the open with a beam that inflicts pain without causing permanent damage. According to an AFRL fact sheet, the 95-GHz energy penetrates 1/64 inch into the skin and produces an intense burning sensation that stops when the transmitter is switched off or when the individual moves out of the beam. Top skin layer takes heat "It works by heating the water molecules in the top 1/64-of-an-inch layer of the skin," said Marine Corps spokesman Maj. David Andersen. According to reports, a 2-second burst from the system can heat the skin to a temperature of 130° F. Elsewhere, the AFRL describes the sensation as similar to touching an ordinary light bulb that has been left on for a while. "Unlike a light bulb, however," says the AFRL fact sheet, "active-denial technology will not cause rapid burning, because of the shallow penetration of the beam and the low levels of energy used." Beam size, whether it is a convergent, focused beam or a divergent beam, and its range are all classified information. "This is a beam that is going to be directed. It's not harmful to internal organs because it doesn't penetrate the skin beyond 1/64 of an inch," said Conrad Dziewulski, a spokesman for the directed-energy division of AFRL. "It will be swept across the battlefield or directed at an individual for a few seconds." Dziewulski said the system was intended to protect military personnel against small-arms fire, which is generally taken to mean a range of 1,000 meters. Elsewhere, the system is described as having a range of 700 yards. While early tests have been carried out using a fixed antenna, the military now plans to develop a mobile version of the system, otherwise known as Vehicle Mounted Active Denial System, or Vmads. AFRL said Vmads could be mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (more commonly referred to as a Humvee). Later it could be mounted on other vehicles such as aircraft, helicopters and ships, officials said. However, countermeasures against the weapon could be quite straightforward for example covering up the body with thick clothes or carrying a metallic sheet or even a trash can lid as a shield or reflector. Also unclear is how the active-denial technology would work in rainy, foggy or sea-spray conditions where the beam's energy could be absorbed by water in the atmosphere. The technology was developed by two Air Force Research Laboratory teams: one from the laboratory's Directed Energy Directorate at Kirtland Air Force Base, and the other from the Human Effectiveness Directorate at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. The Air Force's Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass., will manage acquisition of the Humvee Vmads system.

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Ben and Jerry's new Militia Mint ice cream
by Alfred Qaeda 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

"Timothy McVeigh downed a couple of pints of mint chocolate-chip ice cream" So when do Ben & Jerry come out with "ANFO Chip"? Militia Mint? Waco Whirl? Ruby Ridge Sorbet? or a "Baked Davidians" kit including brandy & a lighter?

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timmy mcveigh
by RIFFAT BHATTI 11 Jun '01

11 Jun '01

the day he blasted the fbi building in oaklahoma city i knew he had something to do with iraq , the us unjust and brutal acts of terror in iraq must be avenged and it happened in the heart of america ,may his soul rest in peace the avenger the great timmy mc veigh .down with us and its terroist act , now what about the killings of palistinian children and innocint women and we pray that many many more timmys will be born in side us and avenge the cruel and brutal govt of us _________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com.

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