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by unknown＠example.com 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

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[MilSurplus] Sec 1062 of S.1416
by Bob Wilder 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

A message appeared on the list indicating we were in trouble because all military stuff would no longer be available. Itlookls like it was a scare tactic as can be seen by reading the entire contents of this section. Basically they are talking about weapons. SEC. 1062. AUTHORITY TO ENSURE DEMILITARIZATION OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EQUIPMENT FORMERLY OWNED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. (a) PROHIBITION- It is unlawful for any person to possess significant military equipment formerly owned by the Department of Defense unless-- (1) the military equipment has been demilitarized in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary of Defense; (2) the person is in possession of the military equipment for the purpose of demilitarizing the equipment pursuant to a Federal Government contract; or (3) the person is specifically authorized by law or regulation to possess the military equipment. (b) REFERRAL TO ATTORNEY GENERAL- The Secretary of Defense shall notify the Attorney General of any potential violation of subsection (a) of which the Secretary becomes aware. (c) AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE DEMILITARIZATION- (1) The Attorney General may require any person who, in violation of subsection (a), is in possession of significant military equipment formerly owned by the Department of Defense-- (A) to demilitarize the equipment; (B) to have the equipment demilitarized by a third party; or (C) to return the equipment to the Federal Government for demilitarization. (2) When the demilitarization of significant military equipment is carried out pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), an officer or employee of the United States designated by the Attorney General shall have the right to confirm, by inspection or other means authorized by the Attorney General, that the equipment has been demilitarized. (3) If significant military equipment is not demilitarized or returned to the Federal Government for demilitarization as required under paragraph (1) within a reasonable period after the Attorney General notifies the person in possession of the equipment of the requirement to do so, the Attorney General may request that a court of the United States issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of the military equipment in the same manner as is provided for a search warrant. If the court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is in possession of significant military equipment in violation of subsection (a), the court shall issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of such equipment. (d) DEMILITARIZATION OF EQUIPMENT- (1) The Attorney General shall transfer any military equipment returned to the Federal Government or seized pursuant to subsection (c) to the Department of Defense for demilitarization. (2) If the person in possession of significant military equipment obtained the equipment in accordance with any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense shall bear all costs of transportation and demilitarization of the equipment and shall either-- (A) return the equipment to the person upon completion of the demilitarization; or (B) reimburse the person for the cost incurred by that person to acquire the equipment if the Secretary determines that the cost to demilitarize and return the property to the person would be prohibitive. (e) ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZATION STANDARDS- (1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations regarding the demilitarization of military equipment. (2) The regulations shall be designed to ensure that-- (A) the equipment, after demilitarization, does not constitute a significant risk to public safety and does not have-- (i) a significant capability for use as a weapon; or (ii) a uniquely military capability; and (B) any person from whom private property is taken for public use under this section receives just compensation for the taking of the property. (3) The regulations shall, at a minimum, define-- (A) the classes of significant military equipment requiring demilitarization before disposal; and (B) what constitutes demilitarization for each class of significant military equipment. (f) DEFINITION OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EQUIPMENT- In this section, the term `significant military equipment' means equipment that has a capability described in clause (i) or (ii) of subsection (e)(2) and-- (1) is a defense article listed on the United States Munitions List maintained under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) that is designated on that list as significant military equipment; or (2) is designated by the Secretary of Defense under the regulations prescribed under subsection (e) as being equipment that it is necessary in the interest of public safety to demilitarize before disposal by the United States. 73 Bob Wilder, AF2HD / AFA2HD TSgt, USAF (Retired) 6032 Idlemoore Court Theodore, Alabama 36582-4036 (251)653-5274 *************************************************** <http://home.earthlink.net/~bwild/index.html> Region 2 MARS (REMOVED PER ORDER OF RMD) <bwild(a)earthlink.net> <af2hd(a)arrl.net> *************************************************** This message certified virus free by using AVG ver. 6.0 antivirus software. See <http://www.grisoft.com> for your copy of the software and protect yourself and friends. --- Submissions milsurplus(a)qth.net ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Dave Emery N1PRE, die(a)die.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18

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[MilSurplus] Sec 1062 of S.1416
by Bob Wilder 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

A message appeared on the list indicating we were in trouble because all military stuff would no longer be available. Itlookls like it was a scare tactic as can be seen by reading the entire contents of this section. Basically they are talking about weapons. SEC. 1062. AUTHORITY TO ENSURE DEMILITARIZATION OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EQUIPMENT FORMERLY OWNED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. (a) PROHIBITION- It is unlawful for any person to possess significant military equipment formerly owned by the Department of Defense unless-- (1) the military equipment has been demilitarized in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary of Defense; (2) the person is in possession of the military equipment for the purpose of demilitarizing the equipment pursuant to a Federal Government contract; or (3) the person is specifically authorized by law or regulation to possess the military equipment. (b) REFERRAL TO ATTORNEY GENERAL- The Secretary of Defense shall notify the Attorney General of any potential violation of subsection (a) of which the Secretary becomes aware. (c) AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE DEMILITARIZATION- (1) The Attorney General may require any person who, in violation of subsection (a), is in possession of significant military equipment formerly owned by the Department of Defense-- (A) to demilitarize the equipment; (B) to have the equipment demilitarized by a third party; or (C) to return the equipment to the Federal Government for demilitarization. (2) When the demilitarization of significant military equipment is carried out pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1), an officer or employee of the United States designated by the Attorney General shall have the right to confirm, by inspection or other means authorized by the Attorney General, that the equipment has been demilitarized. (3) If significant military equipment is not demilitarized or returned to the Federal Government for demilitarization as required under paragraph (1) within a reasonable period after the Attorney General notifies the person in possession of the equipment of the requirement to do so, the Attorney General may request that a court of the United States issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of the military equipment in the same manner as is provided for a search warrant. If the court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is in possession of significant military equipment in violation of subsection (a), the court shall issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of such equipment. (d) DEMILITARIZATION OF EQUIPMENT- (1) The Attorney General shall transfer any military equipment returned to the Federal Government or seized pursuant to subsection (c) to the Department of Defense for demilitarization. (2) If the person in possession of significant military equipment obtained the equipment in accordance with any other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense shall bear all costs of transportation and demilitarization of the equipment and shall either-- (A) return the equipment to the person upon completion of the demilitarization; or (B) reimburse the person for the cost incurred by that person to acquire the equipment if the Secretary determines that the cost to demilitarize and return the property to the person would be prohibitive. (e) ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZATION STANDARDS- (1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations regarding the demilitarization of military equipment. (2) The regulations shall be designed to ensure that-- (A) the equipment, after demilitarization, does not constitute a significant risk to public safety and does not have-- (i) a significant capability for use as a weapon; or (ii) a uniquely military capability; and (B) any person from whom private property is taken for public use under this section receives just compensation for the taking of the property. (3) The regulations shall, at a minimum, define-- (A) the classes of significant military equipment requiring demilitarization before disposal; and (B) what constitutes demilitarization for each class of significant military equipment. (f) DEFINITION OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EQUIPMENT- In this section, the term `significant military equipment' means equipment that has a capability described in clause (i) or (ii) of subsection (e)(2) and-- (1) is a defense article listed on the United States Munitions List maintained under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) that is designated on that list as significant military equipment; or (2) is designated by the Secretary of Defense under the regulations prescribed under subsection (e) as being equipment that it is necessary in the interest of public safety to demilitarize before disposal by the United States. 73 Bob Wilder, AF2HD / AFA2HD TSgt, USAF (Retired) 6032 Idlemoore Court Theodore, Alabama 36582-4036 (251)653-5274 *************************************************** <http://home.earthlink.net/~bwild/index.html> Region 2 MARS (REMOVED PER ORDER OF RMD) <bwild(a)earthlink.net> <af2hd(a)arrl.net> *************************************************** This message certified virus free by using AVG ver. 6.0 antivirus software. See <http://www.grisoft.com> for your copy of the software and protect yourself and friends. --- Submissions milsurplus(a)qth.net ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Dave Emery N1PRE, die(a)die.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18

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[RANT] Deja Vu? 07 Dec 1941 with Edward R Murrow
by attila! 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

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Rethinking the design of the Internet: The end to end arguments vs. the brave new world"
by Steve Schear 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

"Rethinking the design of the Internet: The end to end arguments vs. the brave new world" Marjory S. Blumenthal Computer Science & Telecommunications Board, NRC mblument(a)nas.edu David D. Clark M.I.T. Lab for Computer Science ddc(a)lcs.mit.edu A version of this paper to appear in the ACM Transactions on Internet Technology A version also to appear in Communications Policy in Transition: The Internet and Beyond, edited by Benjamin Compaine and Shane Greenstein, MIT Press, Sept. 2001 Abstract This paper looks at the Internet and the changing set of requirements for the Internet that are emerging as it becomes more commercial, more oriented towards the consumer, and used for a wider set of purposes. We discuss a set of principles that have guided the design of the Internet, called the end to end arguments, and we conclude that there is a risk that the range of new requirements now emerging could have the consequence of compromising the Internet's original design principles. Were this to happen, the Internet might lose some of its key features, in particular its ability to support new and unanticipated applications. We link this possible outcome to a number of trends: the rise of new stakeholders in the Internet, in particular Internet Service Providers; new government interests; the changing motivations of the growing user base; and the tension between the demand for trustworthy overall operation and the inability to trust the behavior of individual users. Introduction The end to end arguments are a set of design principles that characterize (among other things) how the Internet has been designed. These principles were first articulated in the early 1980s, and they have served as an architectural model in countless design debates for almost 20 years. The end to end arguments concern how application requirements should be met in a system. When a general purpose system (for example, a network or an operating system) is built, and specific applications are then built using this system (for example, e-mail or the World Wide Web over the Internet), there is a question of how these specific applications and their required supporting services should be designed. The end to end arguments suggest that specific application-level functions usually cannot, and preferably should not, be built into the lower levels of the system-the core of the network. The reason why was stated as follows in the original paper: "The function in question can completely and correctly be implemented only with the knowledge and help of the application standing at the endpoints of the communications system. Therefore, providing that questioned function as a feature of the communications systems itself is not possible." In the original paper, the primary example of this end to end reasoning about application functions is the assurance of accurate and reliable transfer of information across the network. Even if any one lower level subsystem, such as a network, tries hard to ensure reliability, data can be lost or corrupted after it leaves that subsystem. The ultimate check of correct execution has to be at the application level, at the endpoints of the transfer. There are many examples of this observation in practice. Even if parts of an application-level function can potentially be implemented in the core of the network, the end to end arguments state that one should resist this approach if possible. There are a number of advantages of moving application-specific functions up out of the core of the network and providing only general-purpose system services there. o The complexity of the core network is reduced, which reduces costs and facilitates future upgrades to the network. o Generality in the network increases the chances that a new application can be added without having to change the core of the network. o Applications do not have to depend on the successful implementation and operation of application-specific services in the network, which may increase their reliability. Of course, the end to end arguments are not offered as an absolute. There are functions that can only be implemented in the core of the network, and issues of efficiency and performance may motivate core-located features. Features that enhance popular applications can be added to the core of the network in such a way that they do not prevent other applications from functioning. But the bias toward movement of function "up" from the core and "out" to the edge node has served very well as a central Internet design principle. As a consequence of the end to end arguments, the Internet has evolved to have certain characteristics. The functions implemented "in" the Internet-by the routers that forward packets-have remained rather simple and general. The bulk of the functions that implement specific applications, such as e-mail, the World Wide Web, multi-player games, and so on, have been implemented in software on the computers attached to the "edge" of the Net. The edge-orientation for applications and comparative simplicity within the Internet together have facilitated the creation of new applications, and they are part of the context for innovation on the Internet. Moving away from end to end For its first 20 years, much of the Internet's design has been shaped by the end to end arguments. To a large extent, the core of the network provides a very general data transfer service, which is used by all the different applications running over it. The individual applications have been designed in different ways, but mostly in ways that are sensitive to the advantages of the end to end design approach. However, over the last few years, a number of new requirements have emerged for the Internet and its applications. To certain stakeholders, these various new requirements might best be met through the addition of new mechanism in the core of the network. This perspective has, in turn, raised concerns among those who wish to preserve the benefits of the original Internet design. [One particularly civil liberty oriented except--] The rise of third-party involvement: An increasingly visible issue is the demand by third parties to interpose themselves between communicating end-points, irrespective of the desires of the ends. Third parties may include officials of organizations (e.g., corporate network or ISP administrators implementing organizational policies or other oversight) or officials of governments, whose interests may range from taxation to law enforcement and public safety. When end-points want to communicate, but some third party demands to interpose itself into the path without their agreement, the end to end arguments do not provide an obvious framework to reason about this situation. We must abandon the end to end arguments, reject the demand of a third party because it does not "fit" our technical design principles, or find another design approach that preserves the power of the end to end arguments as much as possible. Continued at: http://www.ana.lcs.mit.edu/anaweb/PDF/Rethinking_2001.pdf

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PATRIOT bill, Leahy's USA
by citizenq＠hushmail.com 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

This shit just keeps on rolling, last week was only round 1, not the bout. What's up phreadom phighters? - it's been kind of quiet around here regarding the latest legislative activities. Leahy's bill is found at CDT, http://www.cdt.org/security/010911response.shtml Here's some status on PATRIOT from Thomas for the lazy. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEW SEARCH | HOME | HELP -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- H.R.2975 Sponsor: Rep Sensenbrenner, F. James, Jr.(introduced 10/2/2001) Latest Major Action: 10/3/2001 House committee/subcommittee actions: Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 36 - 0. Title: To combat terrorism, and for other purposes. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jump to: Titles, Status, Committees, Related Bill Details, Amendments, Cosponsors, Summary -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE(S): () POPULAR TITLE(S): Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (identified by CRS) MATA (Mobilization Against Terrorism Act) (identified by CRS) Mobilization Against Terrorism Act (MATA) (identified by CRS) SHORT TITLE(S) AS INTRODUCED: PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001 OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED: To combat terrorism, and for other purposes. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS: (color indicates Senate actions) 10/2/2001: Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), International Relations, Resources, and Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. 10/2/2001: Referred to House Judiciary 10/3/2001: Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held. 10/3/2001: Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 36 - 0. 10/2/2001: Referred to House Select Committee on Intelligence 10/2/2001: Referred to House International Relations 10/2/2001: Referred to House Resources 10/2/2001: Referred to House Ways and Means

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Re: firing a high-powered combat rifle in an airport could do more har
by Nomen Nescio 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

The cypherpunk's grip on reality has long been tenuous, but the reality distortion field has now been tuned to maximum. The plain language of printed text is now apparently invisible to the cypherpunk eye: > Notice how its not an evil "assault rifle" but a "combat rifle" now... > > http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-000079569oct05.story?coll=la%2Dheadlin… > National Guard troops with M-16 assault rifles are to report for guard ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > The harder bullet used by the assault rifle is more likely to ricochet ^^^^^^^^^^^^^

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Apologies to Ethel Merman & Irving Berlin.
by citizenq＠hushmail.com 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

"The costumes, the scenery, the makeup, the props The audience that lifts you when you're down The headaches, the heartaches, the backaches, the flops The sheriff who escorts you out of town The opening when your heart beats like a drum The closing when the passengers won't come There's no business like show business Like no business I know Everything about it is appealing Everything the traffic will allow No where could you have that happy feeling ... Let's go on with the show Let's go on with the show! The show! The show!" Anyone who thinks for a nanosec that this is anything but showbiz is a total idiot. >RESPONSE TO TERROR >L.A., S.F. Airports to Get National Guard >Safety: Soldiers armed with loaded M-16s will boost security, starting >today. The rifles will be >fired as a last resort, a spokesman says. > >By PETER Y. HONG, TIMES STAFF WRITER >National Guard troops with M-16 assault rifles are to report for guard >duty at Los Angeles International and San Francisco airports today, in >a move Gov. Gray Davis called "a symbol of the changes that have >occurred at airports to enhance passenger safety."

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Very nice article on Antennas and 802.11
by Steve Schear 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

http://www.byte.com/documents/s=1422/byt20010926s0002/1001_marshall.html Antennas Enhance WLAN Security By Trevor Marshall October 1, 2001 Antennas are most often used to increase the range of WLAN (wireless LAN) systems, but proper antenna selection can also enhance the security of your WLAN. A properly chosen and positioned antenna can reduce the signal leaking out of your workspace, and make interception extremely difficult. In this article, I analyze the signal of different antenna designs, and how the positioning of the user's antenna makes a difference in signal reception. <snip>

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Re: Anthrax...coincidence?
by auto301094＠hushmail.com 05 Oct '01

05 Oct '01

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim wrote: >I speed-read Tucker's "Scourge" several days ago, and yesterday I sat >down at my local Borders and speed-read the new Judith Miller, William >Broad, etc. book "Germs." (When I "speed-read" I read for the important >parts; I can usually absorb a book like this in an hour or so. I would >read the book at my leisure, but I hate paying $30 for a book I can skim >and get the gist of.) >Nothing we didn't already know, except some stuff that goes beyond Ken >Alibek's "Biohazard." Especially about the weapons plants in Uzbekistan, >Kazakhstan, and other places very close to Afghanistan! I'd thought from >Alibek's book that most of the Biopreparat facilities were in Sverdlovsk >and other places in Siberia. (Not that shipping a flask of India-1967 or >anthrax another 2000 miles is difficult.) There's a great anthology of more technical essays previously published in JAMA called "Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat" (Joshua Ledford, BCSIA Studies In International Security, MIT Press, 2000). I remember a particularly interesting study someone did which compared potential death rates on an unprotected target city versus one in which the population knew rudimentary bio- civil defense procedures, (ie. masks and protective clothing at the ready, sealing all windows and doors with duct tape, etc.) Huge difference. Another great resource: Bioterrorism: Homeland Defense Symposium: The Next Steps -- An Executive Summary, ed. Maurice Eisenstein (RAND conference proceedings, 2000, PDF): Seeks to identify the elements of an integrated homeland defense against bioterrorism, identify critical gaps, and offer suggestions on how a relatively cost-effective homeland defense program might be achieved. http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF155/ And a word to everyone stocking up on antiboitics: don't forget to stockpile gatorade or some other rehydrating solution! "Have a nice day" indeed... ~F. *** "It may be that we shall by a process of sublime irony have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation." - --Winston Churchill, 1955 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: Hush 2.0 wl8EARECAB8FAju+LZMYHGF1dG8zMDEwOTRAaHVzaG1haWwuY29tAAoJEKadvsVlUK4P SgAAmwQBVwQx4hURn18P8qDn09Nq3AZaAJwPgFZK85fCW6gfFiJ00BOcSgcXOQ== =LRNa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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