- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Richard, get your FREE American Flag from USA Today
by specialoffers＠freesamples.com 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

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Verba Volant del 17-10-01
by verba＠rol.it 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

Verba Volant del 17-10-01, This e-mail is sent to 0 subscribers. Every day a new quotation translated into many languages. Logos Translations - www.logostranslations.com _________________ Quotation of the day: Author - M.K. Gandhi http://www.logos.it/bio/m_k_gandhi.html English - live more simply so that others may simply live Italian - vivere più semplicemente così che anche gli altri possano semplicemente vivere Spanish - vive más sencillamente para que otros puedan sencillamente vivir French - vivre plus simplement, pour que les autres puissent simplement vivre Portuguese - vive de forma mais simples para que os outros possam simplesmente viver Brazilian Portuguese - viva com simplicidade, de modo que outros possam simplesmente viver German - führe ein einfacheres Leben, damit andere einfach leben können Finnish - elä yksinkertaisemmin, jotta muutkin voivat yksinkertaisesti elää Catalan - viure més simplement, ixí com altres poden simplement viure Croatian - ivjeti najjednostavnije tako da i drugi mogu jednostavno ivjeti Czech - ít prosteji, aby jiní mohli proste ít Dutch - eenvoudiger leven, zodat de anderen eenvoudigweg kunnen leven Emiliano-Romagnolo - fe' na voida piò castigheda, ad modi ch'enca un elter a posa camper Latin - modestius vivamus ita ut et ceteri modeste vivere possint Latvian; Lettish - dzivo vienkarak, lai citi varetu vienkari dzivot Polish - zyc jak najprosciej tak aby inni mogli po prostu zyc Romanian - cauta sa traiesti cât mai simplu ca si altii sa poata trai simplu Slovak - it jednoduchie tak, aby aj iní mohli jednoducho it Venetian - vivare in maniera più senplice de modo che anca i altri possa senplicemente vivare Sicilian - campari cchiù semplicementi, in modu ca l'autri ponnu semplicementi campari Flemish - eenvoudiger leven doet eenvoudigweg leven Ferrarese - vivar più chiet, acsì c'anca i altar i pòsa chieti vivar _________________ All languages, please click on this link http://www.rol.it/owa-k/press.frasiproc.carica?code=424 _________________ To unsubscribe from Verba Volant, please follow this link: http://www.rol.it/owa-k/press.rol_ml.verbavolant and write in the empty field next to unsubscribe the email address that you find after "TO:" in the Verba Volant emails alternatively write to the following address: unsubscribe_volant(a)rol.it always copying the EMAIL address written after "TO:"

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Cordless Gsm
by ProTel sas 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

Fino ad esaurimento TELEFONO CORDLESS SENZA FILI SIOUX TELITAL con tecnologia digitale DECT a lire 169.000 con incluso IN OMAGGIO telefono cellulare GSM v150 Teo !!! Non perdere questa occasione,vieni a visitarci all'indirizzo: http://siouxtel.xoasis.com O in caso di non visibilita' agli indirizzi alternativi: http://sioux.6go.net http://digitalsioux.tsx.org ProTel sas Padova - telinfo(a)internetfan.com Il suo indirizzo e-mail e' stato trovato su Internet.Non e' incluso in nessuna nostra lista,per cui non ricevera' piu' e-mail da parte nostra.

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Executive Order - Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age (fwd)
by measl＠mfn.org 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

This is a fun one... ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 19:43:46 -0700 From: Barry Raveendran Greene <bgreene(a)cisco.com> To: nanog(a)nanog.org Subject: Executive Order - Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/print/20011016-12.html

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CDC Anthrax broadcast (fwd)
by measl＠mfn.org 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

For anyone interested... -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin(a)mfn.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 17:10:29 -0600 From: Jeffrey Mann <jmannemg(a)EARTHLINK.NET> Reply-To: EMED-L -- a list for emergency medicine practitioners. <EMED-L(a)ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU> To: EMED-L(a)ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU Subject: [EMED-L] CDC broadcast In light of recent events, CDC is broadcasting a live program THIS Thursday (Oct. 18) titled "Anthrax: What Every Clinician Should Know." The program will aim to help clinicians recognize, test, treat and report anthrax cases. Clinicians will be able to pose questions to the panel of experts. CDC is asking for our help to spread the word on this broadcast to the health care community. Please forward the information in this e-mail to grantees, training centers, relevant listservs-anyone who might be interested in this program. TIME: 4-5:30 p.m. EDT Rebroadcast: Monday, Oct. 22, 5-6:30 p.m. EDT There are three ways to participate in this program: 1. Via satellite (see http://www.cdc.gov/phtn/Anthrax%2010-18-2001.pdf for coordinates). Clinicians can contact their state health department's Distance Learning Coordinator and/or local hospital for viewing locations. 2. Via webcast (a link will be provided Thursday at http://www.cdc.gov/phtn ) 3. Via telephone (Dial 1-888-917-8047; passcode is Dr. Koplan; Leader Name is Jo Ann Bittle) Numbers for Call-In During Program * FAX: 800-553-6323 Int'l: 404-639-0181 * E-mail: phtnlive(a)cdc.gov * Technical Assistance Line: 800-728-8232 * Technical Assistance Int'l: 404-639-1289 * TTY: 800-815-8152 Int'l: 404-639-0182 Questions About the Program Call 1-800-41-TRAIN, or e-mail dlc(a)cdc.gov For more information, please see http://www.cdc.gov/phtn/Anthrax%2010-18-2001.pdf To unsubscribe, send the command "SIGNOFF EMED-L" to LISTSERV(a)ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU

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Next act of the drama ?
by Dave Emery 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

Cc: sme2(a)yahoogroups.com Folks, the MSP has placed the following BE ON THE LOOK OUT BULLETIN (BOLO) for a theft that occurred in New Jersey yesterday of a 45 foot trailer/truck combo with hazardous chemicals inside: Truck: Freightliner, 2000, license plate: NJ 171469, Penske Leasing on side of cab doors Trailer: 45 foot, 1988, has name "Crew Rockland" on trailer and a trailer number of 22A. License plate NJ T392VD BTW warning was placed not to open up the trailer if found. This is not meant to cause hysteria among us BUT again in our travels we just might see that trailer somewhere!!! ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Dave Emery N1PRE, die(a)die.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18

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NOW ITS PERSONAL
by mattd 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

"I've got these terrible flu symptoms...) S a n d y *"Bay Area Rapid Transit" for those not familiar with San Francisco." Sandy sandforts a compliment collector,Id like to be his funeral director.

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You Can Have Your Rights Back When We're Done
by Anonymous 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59466-2001Oct14.html

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None
by Mark Staton 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

What is ur phone #? Does this $3 envelope program require any personal advertising I have to do myself like placing an ad in a newspaper or do u give me all the evelopes stams supplies, etc needed to complete the task? _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp

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Public Anonymity (Re: FIPR Release 16/10/2001: EMERGENCY POWERS ALLOW MASS-SURVEILLANCE FOR NON-TERRORIST INVESTIGATIONS
by Peter Fairbrother 17 Oct '01

17 Oct '01

> Richard Clayton wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > > In article <005f01c1572f$060bca80$742b4ed5@fleetfoot>, Paul R. Pettitt > <prpettitt(a)onetel.net.uk> writes > >> All you need do is use a free service like that at http://www.anonymisers.com >> and nobody is able to monitor or log what you read or post. >> > "nobody" is too strong ... the people who run that web site are in a position > to log what you do -- they may well not choose to do so, but that's not quite > the same thing. > > They seem to have a clear understanding of what they are offering, and their > FAQ is quite sensible, starting as it does with the sentence: > > The answer to the big question quite simply is - no. It is not possible to > ever be totally anonymous on the Internet despite what anyone else may try and > tell you. > This is simply wrong. There are several techniques which can provide public anonymity, ie anonymity when _all_ parts of the communication system are compromised. Some are well-known. I have been working on this for some time, for possible inclusion in m-o-o-t. I'm thinking of publishing a paper on this soon, and I have attached part of an early draft of the introduction, which gives an overview. It's just notes, I haven't finished it, so don't expect total accuracy (or clarity). -- Peter Fairbrother ............................. Public Anonymity. Public anonymity is anonymity when all the inner workings of the transmission system are public, so anyone can see what is transmitted, stored, manipulated, see who did it, but still can't detect if a message is sent, or who the sender or recipient are *. To set a scene, Alice wants to send Bob an email. Alice's comms with her ISP are tapped, so are Bob's, and all the mail servers and anonymous remailers in the world are secretly run/compromisable by the FB!/NSA/GCHQ. Also, Alice and Bob are potentially subject to Court orders to reveal keys to encrypted data. There are several ways that this can be accomplished. Steganography (sending hidden messages in eg pictures on the web that are accessed by many people) is an obvious example, but it suffers from the disadvantage that if a receiver is compromised than the sender can potentially be identified. So, to a lesser extent, do simple broadcast systems or just-a-bunch-of-files systems (I just stole/made up those terms). (Also, most stego software writers don't know what they are doing, which I can quite understand as it is usually theoretically impossible for them to do so **.) A simple broadcast system works like this: eg 1 million users (including Alice) each contribute on average 10 (some random, some signal) bytes/sec to a 10MB/s broadcast signal. It's fairly easy to arrange for only intended recipients (or a subset of them) to be able to determine which bytes of the broadcast are meant for them, and to be able to decode only those bytes. This system requires Bob to be online all the time. A just-a-bunch-of-files system works like this: Sid (the server) makes a lot of files and fills them with random data. Alice (and everyone else) overwrites some of them with either encrypted or random data (and perhaps a time). Bob reads _all_ the files from Sid's public database, and decrypts those files intended for him, including Alice's message, with covertraffic from the other users for anonymity. This requires Bob to read a lot of data, but allows him to do it not in real time, ie Alice and Bob don't have to be online at the same time. It also requires that Bob collects his messages within a short time, otherwise they will be overwritten. Anonymity in both these systems comes from Bob receiving lots of data, only some of which is meant for him. The senders of data meant for him can't be identified. Another twist, to foil traffic analysis and provide plausible deniability against Court orders to reveal keys, is the sending of meaningless data as a part of the system, eg: whenever Alice logs on, whether or nor she has a message to send, she sends data. With good crypto it is impossible to tell if she actually sent a message. The difficulty with both these systems is the large amount of data Bob has to read. It is possible to put this large transfer requirement on Alice instead of Bob, but not much is gained overall by doing so. Simple techniques to reduce transfer in these systems, eg Bob connecting at a set time of day in the first case, or reading only a subset of the files in the second, only reduce anonymity. ----------------------------- (the paper itself will describe two methods for reducing this transfer requirement, without decreasing anonymity, They're based on SFS-like technology, undetectably moving hidden data around a too-big-to-transfer SFS, actually doing it as part of other user's writes) (I hope, it's not finished yet!) ---------------------------- * (There is another potential qualification, that the very existence of Alice and Bob's comms can't be detected, but I won't fully address that here, because in the present situation it isn't relevant. If Governments impose requirements for key escrow, or mandate encryption software control, it may become relevant. This attack can be defeated, though the useable bandwith may become very low, and users may be required to generate lots of plausible covertext and/or (shared) key material.) ** I'd love to argue this with you, but I will only do so once (unless you are really interesting).

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