- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

RESTORATION
by Peter 18 Sep '02

18 Sep '02

Hello Sir/Ma, Good day. I wish to share something beautiful with you but will need your permission to do so. My point of focus is one based on somebody I know, love and have a relationship with (whom I think you should meet too). His name is Jesus Christ. Please kindly hear me out. But if you do not wish to do so, simply delete this message from your mail box and don't bother about it in any way. Reading to this point is even enough worth thanking you for. If on the other hand, you do not mind granting me audience, then I imploy you to graciously accept my invitation to read on. I believe you will like it. I thank you. What I have to share with you is something very important. In fact, for me,it is the most important thing to talk about on this axis of existence. Sure, all men should pay attention to it. It is obvious that this world is a place filled with violence, uncertainties and atrocities which mock man's claims to decency. But it could have been better. Someone cares and an encounter with that caring personality is needed to guarantee lasting ease on earth and hereafter because in here is "...no continuing city..." (Heb.13:14). Besides, "...we are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousness are as filthy rags;..." (Isa.64:6). The all important issue I would like to talk to you about is one that borders on where one would spend the rest of his or her life after dying physically. Listen up please. Confronting every man is this stark (and perhaps rude) reality that life continues after his or her last earthly breath. Sorry, there isn't anything like the state of nothingness after death (Heb.9:27). No. None. Eternity is great! It is endless! In fact, it is the lifetime of the never dying God. When we all eventually close our eyes in life here, we will surely open them in eternity - never to go back to correct any mistake done in the past. So the best we can do for ourselves in time now is to secure our chances of making it at last to God in heaven. And the agent of that security is the guy I started out talking to you about. He is self existent from eternity past (Prov.8). He could not be felt by man's conscious apparatuses i.e. his sense organs, so He had to take on a body (Heb.10:4-7) so that He could relate with humans like you and I in order to lead us back to God (Heb.2:14) from whom we logged off when Adam and Eve, our first parents sinned (Gen.3). The sin they committed stained the whole of the human race (Rom.5:16,17a,19,21). Little wonder King David quipped that "Behold I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me" (PS.51:5). Apostle Paul's own submission is "For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God" (Rom.3:23). But of more serious implication is it's consequence: The soul that sinneth, it shall die...(Ezek.18:20a). So only a sinless individual can offer help to it, something my hero did. His name again is Jesus Christ. Sinless from the start, He responded to the call for a saviour for mankind the instance it was made in heaven (Jh.10:17,18) and had to lay down His life in the process. "Why" you asked? Well, in spiritual parlance, life goes for life and by yielding to the temptation of the devil, Adam and Eve caused mankind to lose the life of God (Eph.4:18) but Christ paid the debt by dying on the cross of Calvary (Matt.27; Heb.9:22) and rising up again on the third day from the dead through the power of the Holy Spirit (Matt.28:1-6; Rom.6:4;1 Cor.15:3,4). Hallelujah! His action was a clear expression of God's unreserved love for mankind (Jh.3:16). Now, you and I need to willingly and consciously surrender the Lordship of our lives to Him in order to be secured from the eternal damnation of hell - out of God's holy presence. Please do note today that whoever allows Jesus into his or her life, would never live to regret the action taken (Rev.3:20; Jh.10:10). I therefore humbly invite you to do it now. The bible says whosoever comes to Christ, He would in no wise cast out (Jh.6:37). Whoever does so, is assured of eternal life (Jh.3:16). If you are ready to do the above, then simply follow these steps: First, acknowledge that you are a sinner who cannot save himself/herself no matter how much you try to. Second, believe in the provision that God has graciously made available for man to be saved - Jesus Christ (Acts 4:12). Then, simply say a prayer asking for forgiveness for your sins in Jesus name and He will save you (Ps.51:17). He is only the mention of His name far away from you. Your name will then be written in the book of life (Phil.4:3). That is when it is said that you are born again. That is when you can enjoy the true peace that only His spirit brings (Rom.14:11). That is when your own spirit is regenerated to be accostumed to His ways (Rom.8:10,11,14; 1 Cor.2:14,15). That is when you can safely escape the danger of eternal anguish for your immortal soul (Jh.3:18). However, you must be willing to depend on the sweet Holy Spirit to live a life which is pleasing to God. So are you born again or would you like to be now? Do take note that Jesus loves you dearly and He wants to save you today (Matt.11:28; Mk.10:45; Jh.6:36). Please give your heart to Him and you will be glad you did. I care about your welfare but God cares more. I am glad you could let me talk to you about Him. So I thank you very much for granting me your audience. May God bless you richly in Jesus name. Amen. Peter, Lagos.

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$100 turns into $16,000 - Immediate Results! 5199smlY1-726JnDY0859PRxM8-33-27
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17 Sep '02

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by lisa2111w51＠aol.com 17 Sep '02

17 Sep '02

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dripping Xlips gfsmn
by Valerie* 17 Sep '02

17 Sep '02

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Bush admin cybersecurity report weighs anonymity
by Declan McCullagh 17 Sep '02

17 Sep '02

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> -----

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Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM
by AARG! Anonymous 17 Sep '02

17 Sep '02

Niels Ferguson wrote: > At 16:04 16/09/02 -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote: > >Nothing done purely in software will be as effective as what can be done > >when you have secure hardware as the foundation. I discuss this in more > >detail below. > > But I am not suggesting to do it purely in software. Read the Intel manuals > for their CPUs. There are loads of CPU features for process separation, > securing the operating system, etc. The hardware is all there! > Maybe I have to explain the obvious. On boot you boot first to a secure > kernel, much like the Pd kernel but running on the main CPU. This kernel > then creates a virtual machine to run the existing Windows in, much like > VMware does. The virus is caught inside this virtual machine. All you need > to do is make sure the virtual machine cannot write to the part of the disk > that contains your security kernel. Thanks for the explanation. Essentially you can create a virtualized Palladium, where you emulate the functionality of the secure hardware. The kernel normally has access to all of memory, for example, but you can virtualize the MMU as VmWare does, so that some memory is inaccessible even to the kernel, while the kernel can still run pretty much the same. Similarly your virtualizing software could comput a hash of code that loads into this secure area and even mimic the Palladium functionality to seal and unseal data based on that hash. All this would be done at a level which was inaccessible to ordinary Windows code, so it would be basically as secure as Palladium is with hardware. The one thing that you don't get with this method is secure attestation. There is no way your software can prove to a remote system that it is running a particular piece of code, as is possible with Pd hardware. However I believe you see this as not a security problem, since in your view the only use for such functionality is for DRM. I do think there are some issues with this approach to creating a secure system, even independent of the attestation issue. One is performance. According to a presentation by the VMWare chief scientist [1], VMWare sees slowdowns of from 8 to 30 percent on CPU-bound processes, with graphics-intensive applications even worse, perhaps a factor of 2 slower. Maybe Windows could do better than this, but users aren't going to be happy about giving up 10 percent or more of their CPU performance. Also, Palladium hardware provides protection against DMA devices: "Even PCI DMA can't read or write memory which has been reserved to a nub's or TA's use (including the nub's or TA's code). This memory is completely inaccessible and can only be accessed indirectly through API calls. The chipset on the motherboard is modified to enforces this sort of restriction." [2] It's conceivable that without this hardware protection, a virus could exploit a security flaw in an external device and get access to the secure memory provided by a virtualized Palladium. But these are not necessarily major problems. Generally I now agree with your comments, and those of others, that the security benefits of Palladium - except for secure remote attestation - can be provided using existing and standard PC hardware, and that the software changes necessary are much like what would be necessary for the current Palladium design, plus the work to provide VMWare-type functionality. However that still leaves the issue of remote attestation... > Who are you protecting against? If the system protects the interests of the > user, then you don't need to protect the system from the user. The security > chip is only useful if you try to take control away from the user. This is a simplistic view. There are many situations in which it is in the interests of the user to be able to prove to third parties that he is unable to commit certain actions. A simple example is possession of a third-party cryptographic certificate. The only reason that is valuable is because the user can't create it himself. Any time someone shows a cert, they are giving up some control in order to get something. They can't modify that certificate without rendering it useless. They are limited in what they can do with it. But it is these very limitations that make the cert valuable. But let me cut to the chase and provide some examples where remote attestation, allowing the user to prove that he is running a particular program and that it is unmolested, is useful. These will hopefully encourage you to modify your belief that "The 'secure chip' in Pd is only needed for DRM. All other claimed benefits of Pd can be achieved using existing hardware. To me this is an objectively verifyable truth." I don't think any of these examples could be solved with software plus existing hardware alone. The first example is a secure online game client. Rampant cheating in the online gaming industry is a major problem which has gotten much attention in the past few months. Players can load hacks to let them see through walls, automate targetting and fire control, and employ other methods that give them an overwhelming advantage. The game industry is big business and is growing rapidly. Unless they can get a handle on this problem it could hurt the success of the industry. Remote attestation will allow game servers to be confident that users are playing on a level playing field, without the hacked and modified clients that allow cheating. Another example is a P2P file sharing network client. Faced with the threat from these file sharing networks, content industries are attacking them in various ways, including flooding them with bogus queries and lying about file hashes and contents. Also, some users are switching to clients that give them unfair priority, at the expense of the rest of the network. Recently a Salon article [3] reported that Gnutella developers are considering methods to check client integrity in order to avoid these problems. But this is not really possible today, especially with open source clients. What they need is secure attestation. That way they can be confident that client software is using the protocol fairly and appropriately. Of course, the Gnutella developers have no idea that the evil bogeyman of Palladium could actually help them out - no one in the security field is willing to say anything favorable about the technology. This conspiracy of silence is what I am trying to overcome. Online distributed computations can also benefit. Recently there was a comment on cypherpunks that pointed out that the RC5 keysearch effort has gone through 85% of the key space without success, raising the possibility that it somehow skipped the key. This particular search has gone on for almost five years, and all that work may come to nothing! Being able to check that users are running valid clients will eliminate one possible source of problems in these efforts. Remote attestation will be an easy way to improve the chances that if someone says that the key is not in a particular region, it really isn't. Turning to banking and e-commerce, there are many cases where it is not enough to be running a secure client; you must also be able to prove that you are doing so. According to Perry Metzger's earlier message, if a user is defrauded in a banking transaction due to a virus, he is supposed to be protected. It's not clear who has to pay him back, but let's suppose it is the bank. Now the bank has a very real economic interest in making sure that its clients are using the approved software. If there is third-party software out there, the bank can't be sure of its reliability and security. Secure attestation can improve the security of the entire system by making sure that third-party clients are not allowed to participate in transactions. The bank has control over its liability and its risk. The same reasoning applies to credit card purchases. If you've got a virtual-Palladium-based secure system, that's great; you're protected against a virus somehow getting your card number and using it. But actually it is the banks who eat the charges when cards are misused, at least in the U.S. It could make a great deal of sense for acceptors of credit cards to be able to check what software the user is running, make sure it is a secure system and that it is an approved client. This will give users incentives to move to secure systems, which will benefit everyone as the amount of fraud decreases. Secure attestation could even provide a way for commercial companies to prove to customers that they are running particular accounting software to hold data on their customers. Eventually, accounting software could be developed which is oriented around protecting the privacy of consumer data; for example, it could prevent wholesale exporting of the database into some format that could be easily copied or transferred. User agents could refuse to upload their personal data unless the company can prove that it is running one of these privacy-protecting software packages. Adam Back (who opposes Palladium) described several other possible applications all of which rely on secure attestation [4]. He listed: : - general Application Service Providers (ASPs) that you don't have to : trust to read your data : : - less traceable peer-to-peer applications : : - DRM applications that make a general purpose computer secure against : BORA (Break Once Run Anywhere), though of course not secure against : ROCA (Rip Once Copy Everywhere) -- which will surely continue to : happen with ripping shifting to hardware hackers. : : - general purpose unreadable sandboxes to run general purpose : CPU-for-rent computing farms for hire, where the sender knows you : can't read his code, you can't read his input data, or his output : data, or tamper with the computation. : : - file-sharing while robustly hiding knowledge and traceability of : content even to the node serving it -- previously research question, : now easy coding problem with efficient : : - anonymous remailers where you have more assurance that a given node : is not logging and analysing the traffic being mixed by it Of course, one of these is indeed DRM, and no one (least of all Microsoft) denies that DRM will be facilitated by Palladium or that it was one of the motivations for creating the technology. But the rest are all different, and hopefully they provide further evidence that Palladium, in its full form, is good for more than DRM. In particular, the idea of CPU-for-rent farms has been stymied for years because of concerns about sensitive corporate data. Secure attestation could be a breakthrough that will put the incredible power of idle machines to productive economic use, for tremendous benefits to society. The virtualized Palladium can't do any of the applications above, as far as I can see. These are all benefits of Palladium which rely on the secure hardware chip, and they go far beyond DRM. Many of these applications actually serve to enhance the user's security and privacy. I understand you aren't going to reply, but hopefully in your own mind you will see that there are far more benefits to the full version of Palladium, including its security chip, than just DRM. === [1] http://www.hotchips.org/pubs/hc99/hc11_pdf/hc99.s6.1.Rosenblum.pdf [2] http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/2002-07-05.html [3] http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/08/08/gnutella_developers/print.html [4] http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@wasabisystems.com/msg02526.html

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Vaccine developed for lethal ricin
by R. A. Hettinga 17 Sep '02

17 Sep '02

--- begin forwarded text

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Palladium block diagram
by AARG! Anonymous 17 Sep '02

17 Sep '02

Here is a functional block diagram of the Palladium software, based on a recent presentation by Microsoft. My notes were a bit sketchy as I rushed to copy down this slide, so there may be some slight errors. But this is basically what was shown. (Use a monospace font to see it properly.) Normal Mode Trusted Mode +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ | +-------+ | +-------+ | | Nubsys | App |---o | o---| Agent | | USER | exe | PdLib | | | PdLib | | | o +-------+ | +-------+ | | | | o | | | | | | |--------|----------------------------+-----------|---------------| | \-----------------\ | | | | | | | | | +---------+ +--------+ | +------------------+ | | | Main OS | | NubMgr |--o | o--| Secure Executive | | KERNEL | ++----+----+----+ | sys | | | Nexus | | | | HAL | Drivers | +--------+ | +------------------+ | | +-----+---------+ | | | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------------+ The idea is that initially only the left half exists. To launch Palladium the user runs the Nubsys.exe program. This goes into kernel mode and loads the NubMgr.sys module, which initiates trusted mode and launches the secure executive or "nexus". (This is what is also sometimes called the Nub or the TOR.) When a Palladium-aware app is launched in user mode, it is linked with a PdLib and requests to the Nexus to load the corresponding Trusted Agent. The Agent runs trusted in user mode, and has its own PdLib which lets it make system calls into the Nexus. The Trusted Agent and the application then communicate back and forth across the trusted/normal mode boundary.

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algebra.com becomes a more filtered node
by Igor Chudov 17 Sep '02

17 Sep '02

Just wanted to let everyone know that algebra.com is becoming a much more filtered node. Two things to be aware of: 1. I use a lot more of general antispam filtering. I use several dns based spamhaus blackholes, a access control list from wirehub.net, and my own list of spam patterns. At request of other nodes, I can share what I do which at this point has become rather effective. Spam that passes through other nodes is more difficult for me to eliminate. 2. (more controversial). I eliminate all traffic that I receive from, or that was sent to, one particular cypherpunk node, as well as everything that was sent by the node's owner. Essentially all traffic that is related to that node goes to the bit bucket. I am rather tired of both the content as well as the network bandwidth consumed by that node. I send nothing to that node either. The goal that I personally pursue is to make the list more readable to me and to use less of my bandwodth. I am not even sure how many valid addresses are subscribed to algebra.com, since I transferred a lot of them to minder.net a while ago. igor

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17 Sep '02

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