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Re: Attacking networks using DHCP, DNS - probably kills DNSSEC
by Steven M. Bellovin 30 Jun '03

30 Jun '03

In message <iluof0gh7vy.fsf(a)latte.josefsson.org>, Simon Josefsson writes: > >Of course, everything fails if you ALSO get your DNSSEC root key from >the DHCP server, but in this case you shouldn't expect to be secure. >I wouldn't be surprised if some people suggest pushing the DNSSEC root >key via DHCP though, because alas, getting the right key into the >laptop in the first place is a difficult problem. > I can pretty much guarantee that the IETF will never standardize that, except possibly in conjunction with authenticated dhcp. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me) http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book)

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Re: Attacking networks using DHCP, DNS - probably kills DNSSEC
by Major Variola (ret) 30 Jun '03

30 Jun '03

At 01:05 PM 6/30/03 -0400, William Allen Simpson wrote: >"Steven M. Bellovin" wrote: >> >> I can pretty much guarantee that the IETF will never standardize that, >> except possibly in conjunction with authenticated dhcp. >> >Would this be the DHCP working group that on at least 2 occasions >when I was there, insisted that secure DHCP wouldn't require a secret, >since DHCP isn't supposed to require "configuration"? In some cases it would be trivial to distribute a key for DHCP trust purposes. My cable ISP distributes a CDROM which configures Wintel machines for it. (I don't use this.) It would be easy enough for them to distribute secret or public keys or even hash sigs that worked with their DHCP, *if* the clients could use it, and *if* the users paid attention to whatever UI accompanied problems. In other cases --the visitor who wants to connect a laptop to an office net-- there is a perhaps unacceptable burden.

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1st amend: non commercial publishers not liable for libel
by Major Variola (ret.) 30 Jun '03

30 Jun '03

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled last Tuesday that Web loggers, website operators and e-mail list editors can't be held responsible for libel for information they republish, extending crucial First Amendment protections to do-it-yourself online publishers. Online free speech advocates praised the decision as a victory. The ruling effectively differentiates conventional news media, which can be sued relatively easily for libel, from certain forms of online communication such as moderated e-mail lists. One implication is that DIY publishers like bloggers cannot be sued as easily. "One-way news publications have editors and fact-checkers, and they're not just selling information -- they're selling reliability," said Cindy Cohn, legal director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. "But on blogs or e-mail lists, people aren't necessarily selling anything, they're just engaging in speech. That freedom of speech wouldn't exist if you were held liable for every piece of information you cut, paste and forward." The court based its decision on a section of the 1996 Communications Decency Act, or the CDA. That section states, "... no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." Three cases since then -- Zeran v. AOL, Gentry v. eBay and Schneider v. Amazon -- have granted immunity to commercial online service providers. Tuesday's court ruling clarifies the reach of the immunity granted by the CDA to cover noncommercial publishers like list-server operators and others who take a personal role in deleting or approving messages for online publication. "Here, the court basically said that when it comes to Internet publication, you can edit, pick and choose, and still be protected," said Cohn. The case traces back to a North Carolina town in 1999, where handyman Robert Smith was repairing a truck owned by attorney and art collector Ellen Batzel. Smith claimed to have overheard Batzel say she was related to Nazi Gestapo head Heinrich Himmler. He said he concluded that the European paintings he saw in her home must be stolen goods, and shared this in an e-mail he sent to the editor of the Museum Security Network, an organization that publishes information about stolen art. Without telling Smith the e-mail would be published, Ton Cremers -- the sole operator of Amsterdam-based Museum Security Network –- made minor edits, then posted Smith's e-mail to a list of about 1,000 museum directors, journalists, auction houses, gallery owners and Interpol and FBI agents. Three months later, Batzel learned of the post. She contacted Cremers to deny both the stolen art and Nazi ancestry allegations. She also said Smith's claims were motivated by financial disputes over contracting work. Smith said he had no idea Cremers would publish a private e-mail on the list or on the Web. Batzel sued Smith, Cremers and the Museum Security Network for defamation and won. Cremers appealed. The appeals court questioned whether Cremers' minor edits to Smith's e-mail altered it so much that the post became a new piece of expression, and decided it had not. But because Smith claims he didn't know the e-mail would be published, the court also questioned whether the immunity provision of the Act applied, and passed the case back to the district court. The lower court will reconsider whether Cremers had reasonable belief that Smith's e-mail was intended for publication. "Some weblogs are interesting mixes of original and forwarded content, so this issue may come up again in the courts," EFF's Cohn said. "Where that legal line is drawn may become a point of contention." Ellen Batzel says the case changed her life. "This was a small, North Carolina mountain town -- I talked to the (district attorney) and he said 'Get a dog, get a gun, get a security system or better yet get out of town.' I sold my house and moved. I've been hurt in my professional reputation and in my private life. "I know what free speech is, and I support it, but this is about invasion of privacy and my civil liberty. Every time I meet someone now, I have to say, 'Hi, I'm not Himmler's granddaughter." Attorney Howard Fredman, who represented Batzel in the case, said the next legal steps could include a rehearing before the appeals court, or petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court. http://wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,59424,00.html

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Re: Attacking networks using DHCP, DNS - probably kills DNSSEC NOT
by Steven M. Bellovin 30 Jun '03

30 Jun '03

In message <ilubrwggo11.fsf_-_(a)latte.josefsson.org>, Simon Josefsson writes: >Bill Stewart <bill.stewart(a)pobox.com> writes: > >>>* Your laptop see and uses the name "yahoo.com.attackersdomain.com". >>> You may be able to verify this using your DNSSEC root key, if the >>> attackersdomain.com people have set up DNSSEC for their spoofed >>> entries, but unless you are using bad software or judgment, you will >>> not confuse this for the real "yahoo.com". >> >> The DNS suffix business is designed so that your laptop tries >> to use "yahoo.com.attackersdomain.com", either before "yahoo.com" >> or after unsuccessfully trying "yahoo.com", depending on implementation. >> It may be bad judgement, but it's designed to support intranet sites >> for domains that want their web browsers and email to let you >> refer to "marketing" as opposed to "marketing.webservers.example.com", >> and Netscape-derived browsers support it as well as IE. > >It can be a useful feature, but it does not circumvent DNSSEC in any >way, that I can see. DNSSEC see yahoo.com.attackersdomain.com and can >verify that the IP addresses for that host are the one that the owner >of the y.c.a.c domain publishes, and that is what DNSSEC delivers. >The bad judgement I referred to was if your software, after DNSSEC >verification, confuses yahoo.com with yahoo.com.attackersdomain.com. > It's also not a new problem -- see RFC 1535. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me) http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book)

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Re: God speaks to Dubbya
by Tyler Durden 30 Jun '03

30 Jun '03

Interesting quote. Reminds me of Hernan Cortes (who probably had an IQ in the Dubbya range). -TD >From: Harmon Seaver <hseaver(a)cybershamanix.com> >To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com >Subject: God speaks to Dubbya >Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2003 06:28:22 -0500 > >http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=310788&contrassI… > >"According to Abbas, immediately thereafter Bush >said: "God told me to strike at al Qaida and I >struck them, and then he instructed me to >strike at Saddam, which I did, and now I am >determined to solve the problem in the Middle >East. If you help me I will act, and if not, >the elections will come and I will have to >focus on them."" > > >-- >Harmon Seaver >CyberShamanix >http://www.cybershamanix.com _________________________________________________________________ The new MSN 8: advanced junk mail protection and 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail

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Re: Attacking networks using DHCP, DNS - probably kills DNSSEC
by Steven M. Bellovin 30 Jun '03

30 Jun '03

In message <5.1.1.6.2.20030628124252.033e5600(a)idiom.com>, Bill Stewart writes: >Somebody did an interesting attack on a cable network's customers. >They cracked the cable company's DHCP server, got it to provide a >"Connection-specific DNS suffic" pointing to a machine they owned, >and also told it to use their DNS server. >This meant that when your machine wanted to look up yahoo.com, >it would look up yahoo.com.attackersdomain.com instead. > >This looks like it has the ability to work around DNSSEC. >Somebody trying to verify that they'd correctly reached yahoo.com >would instead verify that they'd correctly reached >yahoo.com.attackersdomain.com, which can provide all the signatures >it needs to make this convincing. > >So if you're depending on DNSSEC to secure your IPSEC connection, >do make sure your DNS server doesn't have a suffix of echelon.nsa.gov... > No, that's just not true of DNSsec. DNSsec doesn't depend on the integrity of the connection to your DNS server; rather, the RRsets are digitally signed. In other words, it works a lot like certificates, with a trust chain going back to a magic root key. I'm not saying that there can't be problems with that model, but compromised DNS servers (and poisoned DNS caches) are among the major threat models it was designed to deal with. If nothing else, the existence of caching DNS servers, which are not authoritative for the information they hand out, makes a transmission-based solution pretty useless. --Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me) http://www.wilyhacker.com (2nd edition of "Firewalls" book) --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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God speaks to Dubbya
by Harmon Seaver 30 Jun '03

30 Jun '03

http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=310788&contrassI… "According to Abbas, immediately thereafter Bush said: "God told me to strike at al Qaida and I struck them, and then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which I did, and now I am determined to solve the problem in the Middle East. If you help me I will act, and if not, the elections will come and I will have to focus on them."" -- Harmon Seaver CyberShamanix http://www.cybershamanix.com

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[sexpot@zork.net: 6:30 pm Monday 30 June 2003 Refund Day II: The case of Adam Kosmin vs. Toshiba, in the matter of Adam's refund, may be be tried but might be put off for another day.] (fwd)
by Jim Choate 30 Jun '03

30 Jun '03

----- Forwarded message from Jay Sexpot Sulzberger <sexpot(a)zork.net> -----

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Cypherpunks List Info
by cpunk＠lne.com 29 Jun '03

29 Jun '03

Cypherpunks Mailing List Information Last updated: Sep 12, 2002 This message is also available at http://www.lne.com/cpunk Instructions on unsubscribing from the list can be found below. 0. Introduction The Cypherpunks mailing list is a mailing list for discussing cryptography and its effect on society. It is not a moderated list (but see exceptions below) and the list operators are not responsible for the list content. Cypherpunks is a distributed mailing list. A subscriber can subscribe to one node of the list and thereby participate on the full list. Each node (called a "Cypherpunks Distributed Remailer", although they are not related to anonymous remailers) exchanges messages with the other nodes in addition to sending messages to its subscribers. A message posted to one node will be received by the list subscribers on the other nodes, and vice-versa. 1. 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Is Priceline Founder Walker's Plan To Police Sites Genius or Just Goofy?
by R. A. Hettinga 29 Jun '03

29 Jun '03

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB10569205648909100,00.html> The Wall Street Journal June 30, 2003 PORTALS By LEE GOMES Is Priceline Founder Walker's Plan To Police Sites Genius or Just Goofy? Jay Walker, who made a fortune with Priceline , the name-your-price airline ticket company, describes himself less as a businessman than an inventor, using the Internet to rethink how things work. Having helped remake the way the country buys plane tickets, Mr. Walker is now working on changing the way it fights terrorists. His USHomeGuard, a for-profit company that Mr. Walker and associates are now talking up in Washington and elsewhere, is one of those ideas that will either leave you applauding its cleverness and ambition, or cringing at its kookiness and opportunism. I think Mr. Walker is on to something, though not in quite the same way he probably imagines. As do most other terrorism entrepreneurs, Mr. Walker begins by noting that there are tens of thousands of pieces of "unprotected infrastructure" in the country: power plants, gas tanks, petroleum refineries and the like. USHomeGuard would point Webcams at all of them. Those photographs would then be distributed over the Internet to the home PCs of Americans who have signed up to earn money -- an estimated $10 an hour -- working as what Mr. Walker calls "citizen spotters." Most of us would just call them security guards. These spotters would be shown still pictures, one after another, selected randomly from somewhere around the country. If everything in the picture looks OK, they'd press the equivalent of an All Clear button. If something seems out of the ordinary -- a vehicle is parked where it isn't supposed to be -- they'd press a second button. Mr. Walker explains that since these are places no one is supposed to be, it would be easy to detect an interloper. When a spotter spots a potential problem, a central facility gets notified. USHomeGuard employees would then be able to talk with the intruder over a loudspeaker. If they weren't satisfied with his answers, they'd call the police. To make sure the citizen spotters were paying attention, every now and then, the system would send out a staged photo, purporting to show some sort of intrusion. Spotters would be required to recognize these as potential problems -- or else be briefly suspended from duty. It's easy to find flaws in all this. The bad guys in USHomeGuard's publicity material skulk around otherwise empty sites carrying satchels. In real life, they tend to drive trucks with bombs or board planes carrying box cutters. It's also unclear how someone not intimately familiar with a facility would know that the fellow in the truck parked next to a big gas tank, who can't hear the loudspeaker because of a passing rainstorm, isn't a terrorist, but rather Al, the maintenance guy, on his weekly rounds. Mr. Walker says he's come up with a highly effective way of preventing terrorism. It seems to me that he has come up with a minimally effective way of preventing a bunch of high-school kids from parking their van by the reservoir and getting stoned. And a likely side effect is an epidemic of false alarms, like the ones that happen with all those high-tech security systems in Beverly Hills. What I think Mr. Walker has done right, though, is the manner in which he has again recognized the transformational nature of the Internet, just as he did with Priceline. I can't imagine a remote monitoring system like USHomeGuard being used to protect anything truly critical. But for second-tier locales -- the infrastructure equivalents of the unsold airplane tickets that Priceline sells -- why not? Maybe one day soon, that reservoir will indeed be guarded by someone at a PC far away. But USHomeGuard isn't taking the economic and technical logic of the Internet to its logical conclusions. As Americans by the hundreds of thousands are learning, if a job can be done at a keyboard and monitor, chances are good it can be done anywhere in the world. In the publicity material for USHomeGuard, the citizen spotters look just like folks you see in a Charles Schwab brochure: earnest middle-class types wearing Lands' End sweaters, absorbed in their Dells. But there's no reason to pay citizen spotters even $10 an hour when the work can be done for a tenth or twentieth of that overseas. And I mean seriously overseas: the polite English-speaking programmers and help desk attendants of Bangalore, India, are vastly overqualified for this kind of work. You don't need English skills, or many skills at all, to know whether a truck is, or is not, in a TV picture. And they are no more or less handicapped at recognizing Al, the maintenance guy. Also, the safeguards used to prevent snoozing spotters in the U.S. would work equally well abroad. The real value of Mr. Walker's proposal is in the way it reminds us about the easy exportability of labor in the 21st century, if not for USHomeGuard, then eventually for someone else. How will we continue to pay for all the infrastructure Mr. Walker wants to guard when the earning power of Americans keeps heading overseas via the Internet? Now there's a problem I'd like to see an Internet entrepreneur try to crack. * Send your comments to lee.gomes(a)wsj.com 1, and check back on Friday for some selected letters at WSJ.com/Portals 2. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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