- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: mistake on my part
by Andrew.Spring＠ping.be 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Looking for a place that: > >(1.) is reasonably free > >(2.) permits Americans to work > >(3.) a person trained as an engineer can earn enough to feed and shelter > self and 4 dependents. > Tattoo this on your arm: N.A.T.O. If you work overseas, you deduct 70 kilobucks from your gross income on your 1040. And NATO civilian employees pay NO INCOME TAX TO ANY OTHER NATO COUNTRY. Good bennies package, too. Downside? A Glacial Slug-like Beauracracy which doesn't seem to get alot done. 3-Year contracts only. Major competition from Euro's who seem to know about the perks. Organization Motto: "It's a cushy job, but somebody's got to do it." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6ui iQCVAgUBMAfXPo4k1+54BopBAQGxYwP/TkePpofICj/w554DfO2ugqKXo/Jzrz+0 YebTxGHi4cgjDSwnOco4a8GYjDtInbWdyCF9qwt1QzQli7hw4o5fjKKb6as8JOMX WGcotpJwmsiNgBcUC/aUshmAdHjpK/tkZrwumeV8hx5acxmgqvE8pGNT3Fc0QYhn QwtB/SWjS9k= =ejaZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Thank you VERY much! You'll be getting a Handsome Simulfax Copy of your OWN words in the mail soon (and My Reply). <Andrew.Spring(a)ping.be> PGP Print: 0529 C9AF 613E 9E49 378E 54CD E232 DF96 Thank you for question, exit left to Funway.

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Mods to Dining Cryptographers: legal questions...
by Phil Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sorry if I was a little mysterious about my reference to another use or mode of a DC-net; I'd _love_ to tell the rest of you flat-out, and put the idea in the public domain, but I'm not sure I _CAN_. (All of this is only relevant, however, if noone else has thought of it first; I think this is unlikely at the moment, as it would mandate a large rewriting of the section on DC-nets in the cyphernomicon. On the other hand, I'm kinda suprised that noone else has thought of this.) Anyway, I just have this awful feeling that if I post this, there's going to be a stupid patent application filed by someone like Jim Bidzos claiming this and I won't be able to do anything about it. (Please note I mean the people _like_ Jim Bidzos and not Jim Bidzos himself; he's merely an example of someone who has a lot of capital to spend on software patents. I don't, and don't mean to say that _he_ goes around stealing ideas from other people and patenting them.) How do I do this and protect myself from the people who do have the money to go through the intellectual property courthouse game? Should I just dump this in the public domain? Perhaps show it to a trusted individual (or two) on this list to look at and see whether it is worth further development (perhaps not?)? Are there any patents on Dining-Cryptographers networks that could interfere with the placing in the public domain, or the patenting, of an improvement to the network system? I need help. Phil +----------------+Quote from _Infinite In All Directions_, F.J. Dyson-----+ | Phil Fraering / \"The English Hierarchy, if there be anything unsound in| | pgf(a)tyrell.net\ /its constitution, has reason to tremble even at an air | +----------------+-pump or an electrical machine."---Joseph Priestly------+

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Re: MISC> Current US National Security Directives published
by jgrubs＠voxbox.norden1.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: voxbox!hypnos!ragnarok.oar.net!malgudi.oar.net!kira.cc.uakron.edu!neoucom.edu!news.ysu.edu!news.ecn.uoknor.edu!bubba.ucc.okstate.edu!news.ksu.ksu.edu!news.mid.net!news.mid.net!not-for-mail From: Gleason Sackman <sackman(a)plains.nodak.edu> Newsgroups: comp.internet.net-happenings Subject: MISC> Current US National Security Directives published Message-ID: <3tuelf$6e3(a)westie.mid.net> Date: 11 Jul 1995 13:07:43 -0500 Sender: infoserv(a)news.mid.net Organization: MIDnet, the Midwest's Gateway to the Global Internet. Lines: 96 Approved: ralphie NNTP-Posting-Host: westie.mid.net *** From Net-Happenings Moderator *** Date: Mon, 26 Jun 1995 18:15:21 -0500 From: SIMPSON(a)AUVM.AMERICAN.EDU Subject: Current US National Security Directives published CURRENT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVES PUBLISHED This announcement is likely to be of particular interest to librarians, historians, and journalists specializing in government documents, international affairs, military affairs and military history, nuclear policy, outer space, and US trade and technology policy..... Thank you for letting me share this with you. -- Christopher Simpson I've compiled an unusually complete collection of presidential National Security Decision Directives from the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush (1981-1993). The collection is similar in certain respects to the well known _Foreign Relations of the United States_ (FRUS) series, but is far more current. The declassified texts of more than 250 NSDD's are included; each text has an introduction describing its origin and context; and there is an extensive cross-index and subject index. The collection goes considerably beyond the NSDDs available at the US National Archives or in any other collection, because it includes verbatim texts of directives that have been leaked in whole or in part by the administration, but not formally declassified. It also includes tables of organization of the National Security Council. The new collection's format also makes it much less expensive, and easier to use, catalog and store than any comparable microform or hard copy collection. Major areas of coverage include: ++ management of US national security policy, covert operations, weapons procurement, arms control negotiations, and anti-terrorism policies; ++ US relations with Israel, Europe, USSR, China, Australia, Nicaragua, Mexico, Central America, East Africa, Japan, Germany, Southeast Asia, Micronesia, Libya, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, Yugoslavia, South Africa and Namibia, etc., etc. ++ nuclear weapons procurement and testing, nuclear arms control; internal debates over SALT, ABM, START, SDI and related matters; civil defense and FEMA; ++ Space policy, privatization of space assets, NASA-DOD conflicts, space and aerospace procurement; ++ Trade policy with Japan, G-7 summits, technology transfer, export controls, economic warfare, subsidies for strategic US industries; ++ Telecommunications and computer policy, including technology security policies; ++ drugs and US foreign policy; ++ the Iran-Contra affair and its aftermath; ++ internal security and emergency continuity of government policies; ++ war with Iraq; and much more. For further information: _National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations; The Declassified History of US Political and Military Policy 1981-1991,_ by Christopher Simpson. 1032 pages. Westview Press, 1995 isbn: 0-8133-1177-2 list: $119.95 telephone: 303-444-3541 fax: 303-449-3356 "... absolutely indispensable for studying U.S. national security policies during the Reagan and Bush administrations." Melvyn Leffler, President, Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations "... painstaking and expert analysis... an important benchmark" Charles Tiefer, Deputy General Council and Solicitor, US House of Representatives =====================================================

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Off Your But and Learn! ;*)
by an250888＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I am not a programmer either, but I am being motivated to become one. >If only there was more time. Neither am I, but may I suggest the following: S. Prata, C++ Primer Plus: Teach Yourself Object-Oriented Programming, 2d ed., Waite Group Press, ISBN 1-878739-74-3 (1995). Nuts & bolts. S. Lippman, C++ Primer, 2d ed., Addison-Wesley, ISBN 0-201-54848-8 (1993). Not quite so nuts and bolts, but good to read after covering the treatment of the same material in Prata. I've just starting working through these and find them effective. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. If you reply to this message, your message WILL be *automatically* anonymized and you are allocated an anon id. Read the help file to prevent this. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 (fwd)
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Fri, 14 Jul 95 21:28:27 -0400 >From: "Brian A. LaMacchia" <bal(a)martigny.ai.mit.edu> >Subject: Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 (fwd) > > > `(c) It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution under this > > section that the software at issue used a universal decoding device > > or program that was provided to the Department of Justice prior to > > the distribution.'. > > This isn't escrowed encryption being allowed here. This is straight giving > of keys (or a back door) to the gov't. Even Clipper fails this test. > >Why doesn't GAK satisfy this clause? [...] > >I don't see how Clipper fails the 1030A(c) test, except possibly for the >fact that the proposed escrow agents were not both within DOJ. I think >that's a minor point. Sorry. That's the minor point I was talking about. For example, one might make an exportable system by doing something really nice for the gov't and giving NSA a back door master key for it to use. That doesn't give it to the DoJ -- and I'm not so sure NSA would admit to the existence of a back door much less release the master key. - Carl

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Uk hackers
by Alex McLean 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, We're preparing to send a press release to all the UK newspapers and magazine that we can afford, on the subject of hackers. So far there haven't been many attacks by the media on this often misrepresented group, and we hope to start building a good relationship between hackers and the media while it is still possible. We plan to send them a comprehensive letter offering an alternative to the hacker stereotype, and maybe a floppy disk containing a few usenet faq files on the subject. If you have any ideas, suggestions or contributions to this effort, I'd very much like to hear from you. I'd also like to hear from you if you are a journalist yourself, and would like a copy of our release once it is done, or further information about our cause. Or if you'd just like a chat about this subject (wherever you are), feel free to mail me. Thanks, Alex -- All generalisations are false. That last sentence isn't a paradox of self-reference, and neither is this one.

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Re: Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995 (fwd)
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9507150128.AA16854(a)toad.com> "Brian A. LaMacchia" writes: [...] I agree that as drafted any GAK'ed crypto satisfies the affirmative defense under Grassley's s. 1030(a). > > The proposed 1030A(c) provides a defense to prosecution under 1030A(a). > So if GAKed crypto satisfies 1030A(c) then it can be deployed without > fear of prosecution under 1030A(a). It might still violate ITAR, of > course, although I suspect any system that satisfies 1030A(c) would be > granted a CJ. AFAIK, neither Clipper nor Capstone have actually gotten export clearance yet. No demand? Fact that there were at last count no more than two beta versions of the decrypt processor in existence? Or is my info just out of date.... [...] -- Michael Froomkin until Aug 6: michael(a)umlaw.demon.co.uk U.Miami School of Law London, England mfroomki(a)umiami.ir.miami.edu <-- this will still find me PO Box 248087 Coral Gables, FL 33124-8087 Rain. Sun. Rain. Sun. Rain.

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Finally got pgp... here's my key.
by Phil Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know, it's not really signed/verified, but it'll have to do for now. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzAIbBcAAAEEANGhGNu6EcmxoqUC/1dHz+ZJinZIXJ1tyrsGdw2vR76uymqn hYGIzxFTAvB2WMZMko/6VEYOLXF8i6CUrZOg/ojzbExcaS9wYeBsNzY3FsjvEbfI v0kSIn8bN8YTdUO/OQ1HBgMUvUAGkTaac+hbM9Nxsj1mL8yCM+DFwYBSGL/hAAUR tCdQaGlsaXAgR2VyYXJkIEZyYWVyaW5nIDxwZ2ZAdHlyZWxsLm5ldD4= =T1NA -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- +----------------+Quote from _Infinite In All Directions_, F.J. Dyson-----+ | Phil Fraering / \"The English Hierarchy, if there be anything unsound in| | pgf(a)tyrell.net\ /its constitution, has reason to tremble even at an air | +----------------+-pump or an electrical machine."---Joseph Priestly------+

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Re: def'n of "computer network"
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rick hoselton writes: >> Perry, I don't understand. If the least significant bits in my gif file >> follow all the "known statistical distributions", how can anyone know >> whether they are "just noise" or are an encrypted message, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > Indeed -- how could the recipient even know to look, Assume we have good public key steganography tools (I am not aware of such tools.) The recipient would have to scan a large pile of random pictures in the hope that some of the messages, when decoded using his private key, decoded into a correctly formatted message. Although prearrangement is needed, otherwise he would not be scanning this pile of random graphics for secret messages, he does not know whether he will receive a message or not, and no one else can know if he has received a message or not. For example: "I have plutonium and bondage pictures of nine year old girls for sale" My public key is 7uL623uvGjg8N-u7hO789HcysFhGyvcAgyh Interested parties should post replies stegoed into images posted on alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.blondes.dinosaurs.oral.fetish.waifs Please use only new dirty pictures to hide your message in -- not images I have already seen. " Then people can post replies without anyone knowing they are posting encrypted messages. -- ------------------------------------------------------------------ We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.| jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: def'n of "computer network"
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:25 PM 7/15/95 +0100, Andrew Spring wrote: > If your attacker has a more sophisticated statistical model of noise > distributions than you do, then he can deduce the existence of message. Since each hardware scanning device, and each image source, has idiosyncratic forms of noise, it is much harder to detect unusual forms of noise, than it is to emulate a usual form of noise. The attacker will get a huge number of false positives. He will not know if there is a whole lot of stego going on, or he needs to adjust his noise models for a whole lot of cranky and/or funky scanners. -- ------------------------------------------------------------------ We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the omnipotent state.| jamesd(a)echeque.com

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