- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: PC Based One-Time Pad
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>In article <199311251654.AA02190(a)world.std.com> > kkirksey(a)world.std.com "Ken B Kirksey" writes: > > While I was reading though _Applied Cryptography_ last night, a thought > > struck me (no damage): Why hasn't anyone come up with a good Mac or PC based > > One-Time Pad system. > >Because they're trivial to write. I could do one in less that 15 minutes. I can see that for the XOR code, but the code (and possibly hardware) for generating, testing, and managing the pad files would take considerably longer, at least for me. You may be SuperHacker, though. :-) > > It seems like this would be a fairly easy system to implement, but since > > no one (to my knowledge) has yet done so, there must be something I'm > > missing. :-) > >Because very few people can be bothered driving half way across the >country to deliver the OTPs. It's *way* too much hassle for day to >day use of the kind we use pgp for. And if someone *is* doing it >for real security (like say AT&T shipping around their secure phone >circuit diagrams because they don't trust clipper :-) ) then they're >*not* going to be mentioning it in passing on usenet news groups... Well, it would really be one of those "just to see if I can do it" projects. I think that someone might find a use for it someday, though. Besides, it would be fun to write. >PS No, you *don't* send them in the mail. But you knew that, right? No, I'm not as stupid as I look. <g> Ken ============================================================================= Ken Kirksey kkirksey(a)world.std.com Mac Guru & Developer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest. - Mahatma Ghandi

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Re: Filtering LD
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In these days with much abdication of individual responsibility to various agencies, it seems to me that we should not encourage any entity to take care of poor old us and filter *anyone*, when we can do it as individuals. Any new members who are discouraged by the rants and raves of LD or any other messenger of boredom will learn to use the delete key or killfile. If they can't hack LD for a couple of days (till they figure out his rap), then there is not much to be done for them. I think we should give most newcomers the chance (as well as the credit for having a brain) to figure out the value of list conversation on their own, warts and all. Funny thing about warts, get rid of one and, alot of times, another crops up. Scott G. Morham !The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLPUS5z2paOMjHHAhAQEe7QP9HRQbKdgWar/72yJlgVJFvyie8I+hPGLm MCCmFt1ySwcfzWWi5JGFnAdndeTRclV6x/Jydp2IsaU2IEXkAjKfijJ2En5iEbjS mxYlV33CrreduTBox2ksGc8fBUgu7BtGR9exVsTHF7Oed9Jyv3EjIq6o0XRLPgKI todvsPgy8sA= =JidH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Traffic analysis and file size
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- There has been some list discussion about defeating traffic analysis of remailers by altering the incoming and outgoing size of the files. But is this not accomplished by merely encrypting with the remailers public key? Assuming it is an encryption supporting remailer that is. When the file size changes as PGP encryption is stripped off it and the files are not sent out in the exact same order as they arrive, would it not be very difficult to ascertain that file of size X enters a remailer and emerges as size X-y. Or can one easily deduce y from PGP's parameters? Even if y is easily deduced this problem can be overcome. I have used various layers of compression utilities and encryption to change message size so that as the first layer of encryption is stripped off, the file is then in a File.zip state. This is then unzipped revealing another encrypted message with an address header. Upon being sent to the next series of remailers this same course of events could then be replicated ad nauseum. Combine this strategy with file stuffers and one would likely have a hell of a time trying to match incoming/outgoing file sizes and where they originated from/are going to. Granted this is a pain, but it would seem that automation could easily be implemented. Scott G. Morham !The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLPVDjD2paOMjHHAhAQFclQP7BeTl891Edj2ZgSQvKgtHXPtRAGweu3+h Jee+6vOf8BKvcZMlc78PQ5BF+2YNc70NdTCSG8860X/Rc4oJYiLHLfKRPRP5JlsE ogZiMHxVEvRt+YLDvQTrE3VcvOdb25HUKpcZvNggoR7Ouge1YlH+14Tvf2+oogCD VXbcFVxNi+E= =Yt/P -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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newsgroup v news-list
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been mulling over the pro's and con's of both for a group such as this and realy I don't see it makes a great deal of difference. The problem right now to me is staying on topic (ie crypt and politics). Neither of these forums will provide that kind of discipline w/o some kind of moderation. Also, I would appreciate any more comments on the distinctions between this mail list, CypherPunks as promoted in the media, and the CypherPunks as it realy exists. I am intrigued by the various distinctions that I have recieved in private mail (and they span the whole gamut of views). If one thing has become clear is that everyone disagrees about what c-punks is and how it works.

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On derivative information products
by hughes＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've never really made clear what is OK to do with cypherpunks list material and what is not. The answer is easy: Do whatever you want with it. Hal Finney runs an encrypted cypherpunks list which sends you an encrypted version of the main list. Great. If someone wants to create edited or digested versions, fine by me. If someone wants to create an LD-free list, it's OK by me. In fact, those who for whatever reason still pay by the message may want a ranter-free list just to cut down their charges. If you think you don't have the resources to do stuff like this yourself, that's incorrect. The cypherpunks remailer can be hacked to run all sorts of email services out of a user account. If you want some special feature in the mailing list, do it yourself or convince someone to do it for you. If you want some feature and will not be doing the implementation, feel free to ask on the main list for someone to do it. Eric

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Re: Subscriber encapsulation
by ferguson＠icm1.icp.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >> systems' to solve all sorts of sticky problems, but none have ever > > >ideal anonymous environment is a GOO THING (tm)). Anon mail from > > Is a GOO THING the solution to a sticky problem? Absolutely. Remeber "Vinegar and Honey..." Remember "Medusa, The Executioner and (now) The Pervert?" Lions and tigers and bears (oh my).... - Paul

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900 Mhz phones
by analyst＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry about the mistake in my question. I had quickly read an article the other day that left the idea in my mind that Cylink was one of the two producers of the Clipper chip, actually quite the opposite is true: >Cylink unveiled a civilian agency alternative >to the Clinton Administration-advocated Clipper Chip and SKIPJACK >algorithm for data communications security, saying it has begun >shipping a product implementation of the Data Encryption Standard >(DES) with an IC it claims will do instantaneous triple DES >encryption. Coupled with the article in the Economist about them also making the chip for at least one digital cordless phone, my latent (but growing) paranoia about the intentions of this government with respect to our privacy jumped to the false (??) conlusions I implied in my question. Any more info from anyone about which of these phones might be more or less secure? What kind of algorithms would we really like to see implemented for wireless communications? Who's doing it? (I think there is a story about Qualcomm wanting stronger security for their CDMA digital cellular standard but being forced to weaken or eliminate it due to government(?) pressure--but that may be my paranoia again...) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Benjamin McLemore analyst(a)netcom.com --

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Cryptosplit 2.0
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Colin Plumb's suggestion, I rewrote my first Shamir secret sharing program to work over GF(2^8). I didn't do this the first time because I thought writing all the low level GF math routines would be a pain -- so I opted out by using G++'s Integer class to work over Z_p. Imagine my surprise when it turned out the math code over GF is easier. The hard part was actually generating the tables for x=g^n and n=lg x (g=primitive element), but I got maple to do it for me after I read the docs. Multiplication is simply the macro A*B=g^(lg A + lg B) (3 table lookups) and addition is, of course, XOR. And x^-1 is just two table lookups unlike the euclidean algorithm I needed to work over Z_p. (p being huge) Since I'm working over GF(2^8), I adapted my program to work on arbitrary length binary files instead of integers. Now you can take any file and split it up into m pieces, k being needed for reconstruction. The program is much more usable now. It's also written in C now, not G++. As before, if you want it, e-mail me. -Ray -- Ray Cromwell | Engineering is the implementation of science; -- -- rjc(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu | politics is the implementation of faith. --

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"Pretty Good Paranoia" and "Dining Detweilers Net"
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pseudospoofer Wannabees, Are you unable to pseudospoof the way The Pervert can? Do you find yourself using your True Name instead of a wonderful nym like The Executioner or Psychopunk? Well, now there's hope. After buying our product, "Pretty Good Paranoia," you too will be able to indulge in florid flights of fracturous fantasy, constructing long, rambling missive like this: "My tortured and WRACKED soul is becoming INCREASINGLY MADDENED AND DISGUSTED by the unspeakable actions of the leading SickoPunks in beaming RADIO SIGNALS into my cranial cavities while I dream of slaying Miss Medusa and her TENTACLES of depravity and cyberspatial indifference." Yes, you can _own_ the computer program that generated this stupendous piece of prose. Fool your friends, amaze your enemies. Send 620 digital marks to "Paranoids 'R Us," Box 666, Boulder, CO, 12070. Offer not good in Sector R. As a special bonus you'll all receive instructions on how to implement your own "DD-Net." Based loosely on David Chaum's DC-Net, in the "Dining Detweiler Net" each player flips a coin. Heads, he barfs on his neighbor to the right, tails, he just sits there and drools. A great time will be had by all. Not. --Klaus! von Future Prime (My nom de humor on the Extropians list.)

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Public-key secret sharing
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone combined polynomial secret sharing with public-key cryptography to create a public-key secret sharing system? For example, encrypt a file with a session key, SK. Use secret sharing to split SK into n parts, with m required for decryption. Encrypt each of the n parts with a different person's public key. Publish the encrypted file and public-key encrypted pieces of the key. To decrypt, m of the trustees use their secret keys to recover their shares of SK, combine them, and retrieve SK to decrypt the file. This has the advantage of requiring only one copy of the file, and requiring no pre-arrangement with the trustees. Is there a better way to do this (especially so the size of the file does not grow linearly with the number of trustees)? When is PGP 3.0 with the toolkit coming out? This should make it easy to implement these things, along with digicash and other projects. The MPI library and conventional crypto is fairly accessible, but the code which creates PGP-format packets is not easy to call from another program. --- MikeIngle(a)delphi.com

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