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trivia question
by Alan Ruttenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A friend, (who wished to remain anonymous :) asks: Perhaps you can forward for me a trivia question I've been trying to get answered. I'm pretty sure the phreak magazine "2600" is named after 2.6KHz, which I think was a tone used for some phone billing system that got cracked (perhaps Cap'n Crunch's whistle frequency?) The trivia question is this: can anyone point me to a definitive reference for what 2600 really was? An ACM article or the particular phone system or the cracker who exploited it would suffice. thanks!

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My PGP key
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I finally got linux/a secure place for PGP set up-- here's my key. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiyGsCgAAAEEAKrK7SMIBaiBzQRigdhA5BlztMpiCrs4ooWeMEZYpCl8/FPf bz3LHri5dYRNBMLnpv7c8Ezn/nUTbcIPs0zVXpj/8t/4lP1AHHg6QDky1KwBYFaW 9LLAye4EBD3kKq3UvctmdIK225ouMKn6X5+PgNT+dbhwV5LPeXi7eNFdXppdAAUR tCpTYW1lZXIgUGFyZWtoIChzdHJvbmcpIDxzYW1lZXJAbmV0Y29tLmNvbT6JAJUC BRAsiAJ+C/JrSKEuC60BAaFuA/0cu/WBeLvnc1dIEIep/oI4JHqx96QwpC2TOJAp LK/IkVXF9fUUnNHYK6JtxnWj4iowoxYmsuVqJR3bfPND4wYk0Amgu9SQAHu1IDiz cFbXVJ9YwY1u/yZ1+CEQGnUD+ZcXSkIZh3UXu1ubW3iHcAIZ+AbVfuXd082tJo5E QWqzPLQvU2FtZWVyIFBhcmVraCA8Y3M2MGEtcXVAY29yeS5FRUNTLkJlcmtlbGV5 LkVEVT60JlNhbWVlciBQYXJla2ggPHNhbWVlckBnZW5lc2lzLm1jcy5jb20+tChT YW1lZXIgUGFyZWtoIDxzYW1lZXJAc29kYS5iZXJrZWxleS5lZHU+tCdTYW1lZXIg UGFyZWtoIDxzYW1lZXJAb2NmLmJlcmtlbGV5LmVkdT60KlNhbWVlciBQYXJla2gg PHNhbWVlckB1Y2xpbmsuYmVya2VsZXkuZWR1Pg== =Rgag -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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RE-RE-RE-RE: ZEE
by thomas.hughes＠chrysalis.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Random mailing routes actually make it easier to track down the >>original sender. >>Perhaps you missed an earlier message I sent to the list ("Anonymous >>Mail"). If the message proceeds randomly through the remailers, then >>every single site must somehow be told the final address. Therefore, >>instead of just one site knowing the final destination, every site >>must know the final destination. if every single site knows the final address, so what? how is this going to help them track down the original sender?? anyone at the final destination who wants to track down the original sender would need to hop-scotch backwards through the numerous sites and try to track down the path the message took. this is of course, IF someone really wants to go to this much trouble and if they think they can talk a slew of administrators into helping them with the witchhunt. 1 out of 5 odds that a "special processing script" is executed on the message and it is forwarded through a remailer or two using encryption. just set up 20 different scripts that route the message in encrypted form through various/random/secret/obscure remailer-paths.

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INFO: Word Cracking program
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw several requests for a program that can break the encryption on Word for Windows ans Word for Dos files....I have just uploaded WORDPWD>ZIP to (thats wordpwd.zip) to soda.berkeley.edu cd pub/cypherpunks/incoming. I think the author put it best; HELLO MICROSOFT: If any of you are listening; it would be very nice if future versions of Winword had competent encryption that can't be broken by any kid who understands his Spiderman Secret Decoder Ring. A false sense of security is much worse than none at all. It misleads people into thinking that they have assured the confidentiality of their documents when they have in fact not, and should have used another method to do so. The best approach is to have winword call an external program to do the encryption. This would let us plug in our favourite cryptengine and save you a lot of hassle vis-a-vis export controls on useful crypto technology. --- Marc Thibault | Automation Architect | All we are saying marc(a)tanda.isis.org | R.R.1, Oxford Mills, | is give global CIS:71441,2226 | Ontario, Canada K0G 1S0 | warming a chance. NC FreeNet: aa185 | | -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.0 mQBNAiqxYTkAAAECALfeHYp0yC80s1ScFvJSpj5eSCAO+hihtneFrrn+vuEcSavh AAUwpIUGyV2N8n+lFTPnnLc42Ms+c8PJUPYKVI8ABRG0I01hcmMgVGhpYmF1bHQg PG1hcmNAdGFuZGEuaXNpcy5vcmc+ =HLnv -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- enjoy... Brian D Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot

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TRW PhonePrint (fwd)
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FACT SHEET What is TRW PhonePrintTM ? TRW PhonePrintTM is a system designed to block illegal access to cellular networks by cellular "counterfeiters" who use stolen telephone identification numbers. How Does It Work? Each cellular telephone emits unique signal transmission characteristics - an electronic version of a human fingerprint - which cannot be duplicated. These characteristics are matched with the mobile identification number (MIN) and the electronic serial number (ENS) of the phone to develop a unique pattern for each legitimate customer, TRW PhonePrintTM uses sophisticated signal analysis hardware and software to analyze and file the patterns belonging to legitimate customers. When a caller attempts to access the network, the system compares incoming patterns to those on file. If the patterns do not match the call is immediately terminated. Who Benefits? Cellular telephone fraud costs the industry up to $300 million annually. TRW PhonePrintTM benefits cellular operators and customers by: o Terminating fraudulent calls before they can access the system o Eliminating the need for legitimate users to change phone numbers or codes. o Increasing the capacity of the network by eliminating the flow of illegal traffic. o Building customer confidence in the security of the cellular network. When Will It Be Available? TRW PhonePrintTM is currently being tested by PacTel Cellular, Los Angeles. Testing is expected to be completed in early 1994, and the system will be made available to cellular carriers nationwide. The Company TRW, headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio, is strategically focused on providing products and services with a high technology or engineering content.

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WARNING: direct-marketing email address list
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI... ____ begin forward ____________________________________________ Date: Mon, 1 Nov 93 10:11:21 xST From: [Anonymous] Subject: Direct E-Mail: J.S. McBride & Co. According to the Internet Business Report 1.3 (page 4), J.S. McBride and Company are selling access to a database of Internet addresses, including demographic information. They claim over one million entries. The net address is jim_mcbride(a)netmail.com, and I am sure they would enjoy hearing from anybody who would like to be removed from the list. [Equifax revisited? PGN] ____ end forward ______________________________________________

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re: Internet "mailing list"
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Hoping I don't get yelled at (TYPED at?) for something not suitably cypherpunkish...) I wonder if the Internet mailing list people have "ringers" in the list? They could set up accounts on netcom and other services, I suppose, and just keep a .forward file there. Of course, if one stole the list (or bought 1 use and decided to keep using it) but sent all mail through an anonymous remailer, that wouldn't do them much good (not that mailing through an anonymous remailer could do much good to a business abusing the list in an attempt to make a profit.) I wonder whether any well-used anonymous addresses are in it? One could, in principle, compile quite useful demographic information about a nym. And what if (gasp! shudder! my fluids!) several names in the list map to one real user? Could the purchaser of the list demand a partial refund? -- Mike McNally

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Re: WARNING: direct-marketing email address list
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> According to the Internet Business Report 1.3 (page 4), J.S. McBride and > Company are selling access to a database of Internet addresses, including > demographic information. They claim over one million entries. The net > I receive an unsolicited e-mail from these people just the other day. It said something to effect of "I have heard that you may be interested in implementing UNIX/Mac/PC software...I have a database of contact addresses that may interest you...I am NOT selling anything...If I have mis-read your intentions, I apologize. However, could you forward this letter to someone would may be interested." I deleted it. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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trusting software
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How does one know that one can trust the software that one is using on one's own machine for encryption, mailing, etc, or worse yet, how can one know whether to trust the software doing anonymous or other remailing on other machines? Web-of-trust schemes are only statistically reliable due to these concerns. These are rhetorical questions; the point is, I just realized that I didn't explain myself last month when I talked about an algorithm for verifying *intentions*. A number of people emailed me to complain that authentication should be a matter of establishing a person's *real* identity -- a valid issue, but I was off on a tangent and neglected to explain my actual point: Imagine you have a single piece of software which runs a dcnet over the internet by being instantiated on many nodes. Imagine that you're concerned that the NSA or someone will spoof a whole bunch of nodes, pretend to be the Real Software (which ordinarily helps guarantee anonymity, defeat traffic analysis, etc), but actually works to defeat the Real Software and the people who use it. One would like to somehow guarantee that when one talks to remote software as part of a web of trust scheme, that the software really is the One and Only True Software, and not some deceitful counterfeit. It is in *this* connection that one might wish to authenticate the unique identity of multiply instantiated *software* by a hypothetical process which ascertains the *intentions* of that software instantiation. I previously phrased this as if it were a person that the hypothetical algorithm was authenticating, leading to understandable objections. Apologies; I had gotten into a digressive train of thought about using it with people before I posted, and it's taken me this long to realize that I never communicated clearly. I still haven't described the algorithm ("this margin is too narrow" :-), but I hope it's more clear that such an algorithm is potentially more realizable for software than it would be for people. Doug

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Er?
by Johan Helsingius 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone have any idea what this is about? Anon.penet.fi is being bombarded by an endless flow of these... Julf ------- Forwarded Message X-Envelope-To: na26436 Received: from hydra.acs.uci.edu by anon.penet.fi (5.67/1.35) id AA21686; Thu, 4 Nov 93 16:42:48 +0200 Received: by hydra.acs.uci.edu id AA24199 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for na26436(a)anon.penet.fi) Thu, 4 Nov 1993 05:47:52 -0800 Date: Thu, 4 Nov 1993 05:47:52 -0800 From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON(a)hydra.acs.uci.edu> Message-Id: <199311041347.AA24199(a)hydra.acs.uci.edu> To: na26436(a)anon.penet.fi Subject: Returned mail: Return receipt ----- Transcript of session follows ----- ----- Message header follows ----- Received: from orion.oac.uci.edu by hydra.acs.uci.edu with SMTP id AA24194 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for <athomas(a)hydra.acs.uci.edu>); Thu, 4 Nov 1993 05:47:52 - 0800 Received: from relay2.UU.NET by orion.oac.uci.edu with SMTP id AA28377 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for <athomas(a)orion.oac.uci.edu>); Thu, 4 Nov 1993 05:47:50 - 0800 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA04164; Thu, 4 Nov 93 08:45:13 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA23509; Thu, 4 Nov 93 05:37:38 PST Received: by toad.com id AA23503; Thu, 4 Nov 93 05:35:10 PST Return-Path: <jik(a)security.ov.com> Received: from pad-thai.aktis.com ([192.231.148.11]) by toad.com id AA23499; Th u, 4 Nov 93 05:35:05 PST Errors-To: na26436(a)anon.penet.fi Received: from gza-client1.aktis.com by pad-thai.aktis.com (8.6.4/) with ESMTP id <IAA14324(a)pad-thai.aktis.com>; Thu, 4 Nov 1993 08:35:27 -0500 Received: from localhost by gza-client1.aktis.com (8.6.4/4.7) id IAA28688; Thu, 4 Nov 1993 08:35:26 -0500 Received: from relay2.UU.NET by pad-thai.aktis.com (8.6.4/) with SMTP id <WAA26264(a)pad-thai.aktis.com>; Wed, 3 Nov 1993 22:05:39 -0500 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA29104; Wed, 3 Nov 93 22:02:57 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA18024; Wed, 3 Nov 93 18:57:31 PST Received: by toad.com id AA18012; Wed, 3 Nov 93 18:56:25 PST Received: from punisher.caltech.edu ([131.215.48.151]) by toad.com id AA18007; Wed, 3 Nov 93 18:56:20 PST Errors-To: na26436(a)anon.penet.fi Received: from alumni.cco.caltech.edu by punisher.caltech.edu (4.1/DEI:4.41) id AA29935; Wed, 3 Nov 93 18:56:14 PST Received: by alumni.cco.caltech.edu (4.1/DEI:4.41) id AA20137; Wed, 3 Nov 93 18:52:10 PST Date: Wed, 3 Nov 93 18:52:10 PST Message-Id: <9311040252.AA20137(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu> To: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, cypherpunks(a)toad.com X-Mail-Duplicate-From: nobody(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu Comments: This message is NOT from the person listed in the From line. It is from an automated software remailing service operating at that address. Please report problem mail to <hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu>. Subject: Re: ANON: mail concerns From: Eternal Optimist <na26436(a)anon.penet.fi> Return-Receipt-To: na26436(a)anon.penet.fi Reply-To: na26436(a)anon.penet.fi Errors-To: na26436(a)anon.penet.fi ------- End of Forwarded Message

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