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From the LA Times story
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Robert Lee Hotz did a good job with this one -- except he tripped over my favorite soapbox, as do most people. Is he on the list? Does anyone know how to reach him? He wrote: "Not so many years ago, powerful encryption techniques were the monopoly of military and intelligence agencies." If this was true, it was for a short span of years -- perhaps 1932 to about 1975 -- but even then, Vernam's one-time-tape was published in 1920 and you can't get any stronger than that. What *was* true is that the gov't agencies and the press made it sound like real encryption was the property of the governments while we peons played around with simple substitution preserving word separation. I wish more people would read the history chapters of Kahn...especially the one about the dominance of the amateurs (in the early polyalphabetic days). Ah, well..... - Carl

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Re: Strong PRNGs
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Message-Id: <9310061432.AA16969(a)snark.lehman.com> >Subject: Re: Strong PRNGs >Date: Wed, 06 Oct 1993 10:32:26 -0400 >From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger(a)lehman.com> >Carl Ellison says: >> I can think of two: >> >> 1. a long-period PRNG (like subtract-with-carry) feeding a >> cryptographically strong hash function (perhaps triple-DES >> in ECB mode with both key nad input taken from the PRNG >> and output becoming the new PRNG output); > >What would the point of using this for a one time pad be, though? Why >not just use triple-DES and be done with the bulk and complexity? I'm not advocating it as a replacement for triple-DES. I was answering a question. I have many uses for random numbers and none of them is XOR encryption. However, I can even see a point for using this for XOR encryption [I prefer not to call anything using a PRNG One-Time-Pad]. I can see two points, even: 1. You might have traffic which operates in very high speed bursts (faster than your triple-DES can go) but for which the average throughput is well within the speed of your triple-DES. So, you keep your PRNG/DES grinding and building a buffer of bytes to be used, then you use them at high speed during the burst. 2. Knuth's Algorithm M (from someone else) mixes two PRNG streams and the result is stronger than either of the two sources. I haven't read the paper he references, so I don't know how much stronger, but if there's any strength to be gained, someone might want to use it. - Carl

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Possible Change In Crypto Export Controls
by ssteele＠eff.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I haven't had time to confirm this yet, but I thought everyone here would want to see it ASAP. I'll get back to the list with confirmation. Shari >Date: Wed, 6 Oct 1993 15:06:09 -0400 >From: Christopher Davis <ckd(a)kei.com> >To: editors(a)eff.org >Subject: [alt.security.pgp] Possible Change In Crypto Export Controls >X-Attribution: ckd > >------- Start of forwarded message ------- >Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto,alt.security.pgp,comp.org.eff >From: dave(a)blackjoke.bsd.uchicago.edu (Dave Griffith) >Subject: Possible Change In Crypto Export Controls >Organization: University of Chicago -- Academic & Public Computing >Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 20:26:43 GMT > > >What I know: > Yesterday, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown presented to Congress a report on > >export policy, including proposals for legislation. Included in this was a >proposal for updating the Export Control Act to allow export of many items >currently restricted for out-dated security purposes. The Commerce Department > >estimates that $40 billion per year in sales are lost to such restrictions. > Attempting to get a copy of this report lead me into a bureaucratic maze, >eating up an unknown amount of telephone charges and producing no results. > >What I want to know: > Is crypto on the suggested list of changes? If not, whose office should we >call to get it on such a list? > >In any case, it seemed like something the EFF would want to know about, hence >the crossposting. > >- -- >Dave Griffith, Information Resources, University of Chicago, >Biological Sciences Division dave(a)delphi.bsd.uchicago.edu >Will build secret weapon for food. > >------- End of forwarded message ------- > >

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Re: Quantifying similar graphic images (was Re: criminal gif upload)
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Message-Id: <cggmhoe00VolIKwEcW(a)andrew.cmu.edu> >Date: Wed, 6 Oct 1993 16:32:52 -0400 (EDT) >From: Matthew J Ghio <mg5n+(a)andrew.cmu.edu> >Subject: Quantifying similar graphic images (was Re: criminal gif upload) >"Pat Farrell" <pfarrell(a)gmu.edu> writes: > >> We can prove statistical insignificance of duplication using strong >> hashing functions. Can we find a way to statistically prove "looks like" >> on a numerical basis? > >Yes. If you were to take an image and divide it into let's say about 20 >sections horizontally, and 20 sections vertically, and then average the >intensities of all pixels in each of the 400 rectangles formed, you >would create a fuzzy low-resolution version of the original picture >which could be used to compare other pictures You would have a better chance if you took just the low frequency components of a 2D Fourier transform of the pictures in question -- perhaps at only certain frequencies -- to get a vector describing features of the picture. You'd have to choose your 2D frequencies and build a set of such indicators and then look to see what distance between two vectors suggests that the pictures are the same. You'd want to use only the magnitude of the transform, to remove translation effects. You could use a sum around a circle of frequencies to remove rotation effects. The low res picture by averaging is easily confused by any translation or rotation of the image. - Carl

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Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

X-Anonymousity: none Putting anonymity indications in message headers is a useful courtesy; it's not foolproof, since somebody can always go run their own remailer, but standardization would make it easier for most people to use them consistently from their mail/news readers. There are times when people really need to get rid of lots of anonymous messages, such as harassment or mailbombs or freaked-out gateways, basically for self-defense, and this will make it more convenient.

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Re: Strong PRNGs
by Matthew B. Landry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Another point: it raises the possibility of an interesting loophole >in the ITAR. Cryptographic hash functions are exportable, as "systems >for authentication", or something to that effect. A random-number >generator based on a hash function should be exportable. After all, >as you say, >> I have many uses for random numbers and none of them is XOR encryption. > >But such an RNG *could* be used for encryption. If you package and >market it as such, you're asking for trouble. But packaged as a >library routine in a simulation library? It's not a fast PRNG, but >it should be pretty good statistically. Does it strike you as ironic that in this atmosphere where "exporting" basically secure products like PGP is illegal, that exporting the tools to generate one of the best possible (in the security sense) encryption systems known to current technology (better than anything that can be implemented in software, anyway) would be _legal_, because it also has ample uses that are unrelated to cryptography? If only One Time Pad style systems weren't so kludgey, this would present the _perfect_ solution to our problems with ITAR and the like. Unfortunately, there are some things they can't do. Oh well... Please don't bother to tell me that we'd need to physically build hardware to generate seeds for the hash functions, because I already know that. I didn't say it was entirely practical, just that it was an interesting bit of irony. -- Matthew B. Landry ml7694a(a)american.edu (Finally!) mbl(a)ml7694a.leonard.american.edu

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Posting Long Documents
by DON_HENSON＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the interest of saving money (for those of us who have to pay for our internet access), please DO NOT post long reference documents, such as the 'ASCII version of ECPA' directly to the list. A much better way to get this information out would be to post an anonymous FTP site where the document can be obtained. Would appreciate muchly. Don Henson PGP key avail on server or on request

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Macintosh System 7 Pro, e-mail, encryption
by msattler＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I installed Macintosh System 7 Pro (7.1.1) onto my PowerBook today. I'd heard that e-mail was part of the new package, but I was amazed to see how integral it is. When you start up for the first time you are asked for a userid and a password to protect your "PowerTalk Keychain". A mailbox and a "catalog" appear on your desktop; the latter is a list of entries in different domains (like AppleTalk, EtherTalk, etc.) so that you can authenticate yourself on all the places you exist with one login. E-mail comes free with the system and works automagically when multiple users install the new system. I haven't used a lot of this system since it's so new, but I sent this message because it heralds a new era of turnkey mail/network-identity. I'm investigating how this works with AppleEvents to see how PGP can be seamlessly integrated. A friend of mine went to the product launch at Apple and got a free "signed" RSA user identification voucher. I'd be very interested in hearing from others who have a clue about this stuff. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Michael S. Sattler msattler(a)netcom.com +1 (415) 358-3058 Digital Jungle Software Encrypt now; ask me how. (finger for PGP key) Evil will certainly triumph if good people do nothing at all.

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Digital Cash Primer
by DON_HENSON＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Shari Steele writes: -> Hey 'punks. Anyone know of an elementary primer on digital cash? I'm trying to get up to speed on this. <-- I would like an elementary primer also. How about posting the info to the list vice just to Shari. Thanks, Don Henson PGP key avail on server or on request

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brin on privacy
by peter honeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

david brin spoke in ann arbor recently at a library science school alumni meeting. his talk was titled "Information and the 21st Century: Privacy, Wealth and the Newest Threat to Freedom." here are my recollections; hopefully they're not too dim or biased. getting right to the punch line, tNTtF is this: privacy laws will be used as a weapon by the Rich and Powerful to restrict the free flow of information. brin feels that privacy laws will be ineffective against the RaP, will be sold to the rest of us through effective propaganda, and that they will be used by the RaP as a means to cement their power base. he argues that complete and open access to information provides the greatest social benefit and best serves The American Dream. asked about clipper, he suggested that key escrow was exactly the sort of tool that the RaP would use, and that we would all benefit by banning cryptography. asked whether private citizens should be barred from insuring personal electronic privacy, he replied that he felt that such measures would be ineffective agianst the RaP. (i concluded from these answers that cryptography is not brin's strong point.) brin's message was basically a populist one. he is concerned that the moguls of data will have the opportunity to control what we see and hear. what i found most fascinating about his talk was that while i generally agree with the social objectives he backs, i am in 180 degree disagreement on how to accomplish these ends. peter ps: anybody else get the willies (as it were) reading paul goggin's note about foia, where the asst atty genl was asked about fbi foias against individuals, and replied that the new foia regs presumed disclosure? hey brin, there oughtta be a law!

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