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Book review from amazon.com: Internet Cryptography
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Internet Cryptography by Richard E. Smith Paperback, 356 pages List: $27.92 ~ Our Price: $27.92 Availability: This title usually ships within 24 hours. (You can always remove it later...) Internet Books Editor's Recommended Book, 11/01/97: For all the talk about the Internet's very real security weaknesses, information safety is not all that difficult to achieve. Yes, most Internet technology does a better job of making information accessible than it does of protecting privacy. Still, modern cryptographic products and techniques have made more than adequate security available to just about anyone who needs it. In Internet Cryptography, network security consultant Richard Smith explains the basics of online security. He avoids getting technical with too much cryptographic theory or the mathematics behind the magic. Instead he focuses on providing just enough information to enable information systems managers and administrators to make wise decisions. In fact, Smith pays close attention to matters of system configuration and operation, showing how even the best encryption methods can be ruined by careless operation. From there, Smith explains how today's techniques can protect information from being forged, altered, or stolen. Smith devotes most of his discussion of various cryptographic options to products that are presently on the market. Therefore, the techniques he describes are generally within the reach of most businesses and organizations. He progresses from the simplest to most complex approach, examining the strengths and weaknesses of each. As a result, readers wind up with a solid understanding of cryptographic security as well as a good feel for the level of security they require. Book Description : "This book provides an excellent overview of how encryption is used, its strengths and weaknesses, and what to look for when building or choosing real-world solutions. This is a must-have book for anyone considering the deployment of an important system relying on modern cryptography." - Marcus J. Ranum, Chief Scientist, V-ONE Corporation. Here, in one comprehensive, soup-to-nuts book, is the solution for Internet security: modern-day cryptography. Written by a security expert with a wealth of practical experience, this book covers network and Internet security in terms that are easy to understand, using proven technology, systems, and solutions. From the client workstation to the Web host to the e-mail server, every aspect of this important topic is examined and explained. The once-daunting subject of cryptography is demystified and applied to today's security challenges. Topics include: essentials of cryptography; networking and Internet fundamentals; encryption building blocks; virtual private networks; legal considerations; setting realistic security objectives; secured electronic mail; World Wide Web transaction security; and Internet Firewalls. This book is written for people who want to move data safely across the Internet and protect corporate resources from unauthorized access. Using real-life case studies, examples, and commercially available software products, cryptography is presented as a practical solution to specific, everyday security challenges.

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Re: Further costs of war
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Jim Choate wrote: > ARTICLE XVI. > > The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on >incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the >several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration. >[25 February 1913.] > >Notice the date of implimentation, considerably before WWII, it is in fact >the year before the US became involved in WWI. Perhaps you meant WWI instead >of WWII? Citizens of the US have been paying taxes since 1914. True, but a lot less citizens were paying income taxes in 1914 than in 1941. Following are some figures that I extracted from the "Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970", published in 1975 by the US Dep't of Commerce's Bureau of the Census: [Note: in a previous post I had said that the initial income tax was 1% on any person earning more than $4,000 per year. This is incorrect. It was 1% on any person earning more than $20,000 per year, or roughly $400,000 in today's money. Hardly the makings for a public outcry to the new "constitutional amendment." Let's face it: the American public was just as complacent toward unconstitutional legislation then as it is now.] In 1916, this figure was increased to 2%. The total US gov't income tax revenue for that year was $68 million. By 1940, the first income tax bracket had reached 4.4% on any person earning more than $4,000 per year for total yearly income tax revenue of $982 million. The numbers increased dramatically during World War II: Year % Income Total Individual Income Tax Revenue - ---- -- ------ ----------------------------------- 1941 10 2,000 $1.4 billion 1942 19 2,000 $3.2 billion 1943 19 2,000 $6.6 billion 1944 23 2,000 $18.2 billion 1945 23 2,000 $19 billion That's an increase of roughly 2000% in a very short span of time (1940-45). Who says war is not a lucrative business for gov't? >Monty Cantsin wrote: >> I doubt very much that income tax withholding would have been accepted >> if the War were not used to justify it. ("You don't want to pay >> taxes? What are you, a traitor?") > >What war? The taxes came about because of issues other than fighting a war >which hadn't even happened yet. Withholding was not implemented until 1943, smack in the middle of WWII. In 1943, $686 million of the $6.6 billion was collected by withholding, or just over 10%. By 1945, $10 billion of the $19 billion was collected by withholding, more than 50%. In 1970, $103 billion was collected in individual income tax, $77 billion by witholding (75%). In summary, WWII was a convenient way for the US gov't to tighten the screws on its citizens, and it continues to do so to this day. But I've discussed this already in a previous post. "Check the archives." :-) Nerthus -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNHtaqRa1d3zm4nqOEQIQKgCeN48fnrn5pDzUe/LZhvjJxzU3DKMAn2lT ZTERt+yWGwZTI6xV3qbQ/MsL =DpCh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Quoting Portions of a Signed Document
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>It would be neat if you could quote people and prove that they signed the >>particular paragraph quoted without supplying the entire text. Is there >>a way to do this? (It seems impossible, but so does mental poker.) > >>A crude approach would be to sign every paragraph or line >>separately, but that's obviously inelegant. > >Well this could be done by creating a document signature and then a >collection of sub signatures but it can get ugly real quick. Ugly's the word for it, alright. ;-) >What level of granularity does one use for the sub signature? It would be nifty if there was a way to show that any continuous set of bits were signed given only one signature on a whole document. Intuitively, it seems to me that this might be provably inconsistent with a secure hash. Still, crypto results are full of surprises, so I could imagine there is a way to do this. >Then what does the sub signature really tell you? Yes you can verify >that the quote was written by someone but it may be taken completely >out of context. Good point. It is nice that people who quote out of context now in a misleading way are convicted when you demand proof. Still, my sense is that this would be a pretty useful thing to be able to do and it would be technically interesting. For example, you might want to reveal parts of a message signed by somebody else without revealing the entire message. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNHtvB5aWtjSmRH/5AQEFvgf8C2gv6G9XZjAjfYy6+wtNY0n/3k8TZXj7 Yr0x9jidiJvfRXOi6cjKskmQ8WL98EbVkjHZkPN2t7rlLtLfQVQyQhBtW0jeXlav dC9tSbNO9ThpIAlztO4Wfpx75xNHgEyvMAMB0CnGj1ZcmgParL6F/WM9nkhaI+ZT R8Uu53BZXsCz408/YI4yu4t6E3SXhOJQYFjQ/JxaI8G9mTBpXXbNV9PoN4i2PjHe 0VfOeU0IAJNvWazFqbwcnTuDpcFvQRY70FhgR1exb7MzPYqJMm7D5kdUtZqFWLAH RkwjusDo01rE6+1YxPtq8dP4/8I1wEUsNLOtLyG9gQ2CT+xBhXfrDw== =FT0Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Freemen and Serfs
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- There is a widely held belief that cryptoanarchy is an all or nothing proposition; that is, the future can be a glorious cryptoanarchy or a dismal police state. (I think this is Tim May's analysis, but perhaps others also contributed.) It isn't clear to me that these two environments cannot co-exist in a stable equilibrium. Historically, in many societies which practiced slavery, large numbers of people were neither slaves nor slave owners. Given the naivete of large portions of the population and certain alarming technologies such as implants which are emerging, it seems clear that large numbers of people will become little more than cattle in the near future. (Incidentally, I do not know that this will be "Joe Sixpack" and his friends. Many of those who are "success" oriented are also most willing to be drug tested, the most reluctant to question authority, and the least reluctant to be little more than a cog in the machine.) In any event, those who perceive their environment and respond correctly may continue to be free while others will take the other path. It's tragic, of course, but perhaps not our problem. Monty Cantsin is willing to spend only so much time and effort encouraging people to protect their privacy. There's no reason why cypherpunks can't do business with the slavers. That is, in exchange for various products requiring actual work, cypherpunks (a.k.a. knowledge workers) can provide technical expertise and other services. Once it is clear that enslaving a cypherpunk is expensive, it may be that the slavers of the world discover they can live with it and that it may even be a good deal for them. There might be some turmoil getting to that point, of course. Many U.S. citizens have been told they were free, although the ruling elite tends to see them as chattle. This difference of opinion will have to be resolved one way or another. Hopefully it will be done peacefully. Perhaps instead of seeing ourselves as "The Sons of Liberty" we should see ourselves as "The Sons of Tleilax". Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNHt1oJaWtjSmRH/5AQElrAf+Pabkko9LIMO+9cZ7oxgk2xWPIOA5p3rg 8IceSAIutsqF08Erg+Fz/vj7IUE928rpFBOUkndljJjiIe0iqdpdu+Fm+NASy9TX 8TFcXqIKq0BK2daBTSIg3/+A4f/RDvZrZTzzaI0NMd5M3pB2/AiB8InSoGTJTbqk 694L5+sqIc1BV5UBDNEbKulnyr21/nSZHIqz+pJGAZk5XAF21Sk0XYgNqfkKeVlP /eXP6wq5JFbZHhCRU3AT0SfNSdxmCl22+i6WWKCWMdHIV41zMSd9j2HFn83x6ehf u33/yw6MWuCMlm/RcjzXghWRWQPnq/iA1gGgxlUJFfSaRL8Gezs46w== =k6oZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Newsletter Internetwk: InternetWeek Newsletter - Nov. 25
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Subject: Newsletter Internetwk: InternetWeek Newsletter - Nov. 25 Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 08:01:13 -0500 From: "Eric S. Johansson" <esj(a)harvee.billerica.ma.us> Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: "Eric S. Johansson" <esj(a)harvee.billerica.ma.us> ------- Forwarded Message That Ain't No Standard Spec It looks like SET may have run out of breath before even leaving the starting gate. Despite a dogged insistence by its sponsors that the 6-month-old Secure Electronic Transactions specification is essential to the growth of Internet commerce, the technology's creators cannot point to one operational deployment. And with good reason, apparently. The two main beneficiaries of the technology--merchants and banks--say the technology is severely flawed. They say compliance with the spec does not guarantee compatibility across vendor implementations. They further charge that SET is too complex to integrate cleanly with legacy transaction systems. In short, they say, the standard is not a standard at all. "It's an enormously complex technology that's flawed from the bottom up," according to Aberdeen Group analyst Chris Stevens. "The only people who are interested in it are the credit card associations, analysts, the press, Hewlett- Packard and IBM." Two of SET's inventors, Hewlett-Packard's VeriFone division and IBM, all but admitted SET's shortcomings earlier this month when they announced a program to ensure that their SET 1.0-enabled products are interoperable. The results will be published in a reference guide for developers. But SET products are supposed to be interoperable by definition, according to the published spec. Other features of the spec are confidentiality of information, integrity of data, card holder account authentication and merchant authentication. The preliminary 0.0 version of the spec has been extended to February of next year so retailers can work with a more tested version through the Christmas season. Version 2.0 is already in the works for release late next year. As a result of the glitches, the sponsors of the initiative, mainly the credit card issuers and E-commerce software vendors, are loosening their definition of a standard. "In the SET 1.0 specification, we tried to be as precise as possible, but any specification is open to interpretation," said Steve Mott, MasterCard's senior vice president for E-commerce. "The marketplace will determine if it's a standard." Mott acknowledged that the root of SET's troubles is its complexity. SET relies on a three-tier architecture-the client wallet, the merchant server and the gateway to processing banks. Not only does each tier have to exchange transaction data, but it must be able to do so with software developed by different vendors. Moreover, as a certificate-based system, SET requires the management of digital certificates for millions of merchants and consumers. All of this has left the banking industry holding the ball. "There are a lot of operational issues left unresolved, like the problem of integrating SET and a new level of certificate information with the banks' legacy systems," said Stephanie Denny, until recently the vice president and director of marketing for Bank of America's credit card unit. By Matthew Friedman http://techweb.cmp.com/internetwk/news/news1124-1.htm ************************* - ------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 1997 CMP Media Inc. a service of InternetWeek. - ------------------------------------------------------- Distributed by Email Publishing Inc. - http://www.emailpub.com ------- End of Forwarded Message For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Cato Institute request for policy papers on encryption
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---- Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 10:18:33 -0500 From: Solveig Singleton <solveig(a)cato.org> Subject: Request for short policy papers Cato Institute's progam for information studies (that is, privacy and crypto) is interested in receiving proposals for **short** policy papers (five to thirty pages) on different aspects of the encryption debate. In particular, I am interested in detailed, well-argued but concise papers addressing the following: * The costs (narrowly conceived) of mandatory key recovery: OMB has one estimate with no particular empirical support beyond the assertions of national security folks. We are interested in cost estimates that move the debate forward in being based on something more concrete and reliable than what has been offered thus far--so, we won't need years of carefully calibrated econometric data (which just isn't there)--but we do want something more than speculation. * Also needed, a short paper illustrating the impact of the export control regime on experimental software or hardware ventures. What are the costs of the regulatory process in time and money, from the standpoint of the developer? Anecdotes welcome. * I would also like to do a paper on the uses of encryption in combatting human rights violations worldwide, again replete with examples and anecdotes... * and A short paper on the ease of evading export controls--detailing the ease with which encryption programs can be homemade, purchased from foreign sources, etc.; * and a short paper on the strength of U.S. assertions that other countries are likely to go along with U.S. attempts to foist mandatory key escrow upon everyone by international agreement. Please contact me if you are interested. Solveig Singleton (202) 789-5274 (202) 842-3490 (fax) Director of Information Studies Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001

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Re: Singapore & Freedom
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SingMonger wrote: >Don't forget the other good points, no guns or bullets, color >copiers are (were?) restricted, all media controlled by the >government (even Time magazine was banned), mandatory savings >program (CPF), National Service, and the government attitude of >those that are not with us are against us. Also, don't forget >that the Singaporean government has brought the Big Brother >concept to reality. .............................................................. Sounds like the kind of place suitable for people who don't have a Mind of Their Own, nor a personal vision of, or mission in, life (besides maintaining an active DNA pool). .. Blanc

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official CyberCash response
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: cme(a)cybercash.com Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 15:37:14 -0500 To: rah(a)shipwright.com From: Carl Ellison <cme(a)cybercash.com> Subject: official CyberCash response Cc: cme(a)cybercash.com Mime-Version: 1.0 If you know of any lists where the message appeared but the official response didn't, you're welcome to post the following. - Carl -------------------------------------------- [The following should appear in its entirety if it's printed at all.] The following message appeared on the net. From: Anonymous <anon(a)ANON.EFGA.ORG> Subject: Major security flaw in Cybercash 2.1.2 To: BUGTRAQ(a)NETSPACE.ORG CyberCash v. 2.1.2 has a major security flaw that causes all credit card information processed by the server to be logged in a file with world-readable permissions. This security flaw exists in the default CyberCash installation and configuration. The flaw is a result of not being able to turn off debugging. Setting the "DEBUG" flag to "0" in the configuration files simply has no effect on the operation of the server. In CyberCash's server, when the "DEBUG" flag is on, the contents of all credit card transactions are written to a log file (named "Debug.log" by default). The easiest workaround I've found is to simply delete the existing Debug.log file. In my experience with the Solaris release, the CyberCash software does not create this file at start time when the DEBUG flag is set to 0. The inability to turn off debugging is noted on CyberCash's web site under "Known Limitations". The fact that credit card numbers are stored in the clear, in a world readable file, is not. We have taken this quite seriously and have put through a full release of our software which will be available Monday 11/24 for three platforms and others shortly thereafter. The flaw was in the debug logging function, not in the protocols or core implementation. Nonetheless, the effect was an unnecessary exposure of potentially sensitive information, and it shouldn't have gone out the door that way. We're tightening our internal processes to avoid this in the future. That said, here's the actual exposure. The credit card information that's in the clear in the log comes from "merchant-initiated" transactions, which means the merchant obtains the credit card number from somewhere -- phone, mail, fax, SSL-protected Internet interaction, or unprotected Internet interaction. The merchant thus has the same info in the clear already. If the card number was provided via a wallet, then the card number is blinded at the consumer's end. It is therefore not in the clear as it passes through the merchant's machine and the reported exposure does not apply.. In order for the unprotected log to pose a risk of exposure, someone has to be able to gain access to the merchant's machine. If the machine is well protected, viz behind a firewall and/or carefully configured, presumably an outsider won't be able to gain access. And in terms of the *additional* exposure the open log represents over existing risks, if the same information is accessible in the clear elsewhere on the machine, eliminating from the log or encrypting the log provides little or no real protection. We continue to advise merchants to take strong steps to protect their machines. To our knowledge, the exposure documented above has not resulted in the actual loss of any customer data or other security incident. ---------------------------------- Steve Crocker Desk: +1 703 716 5214 CyberCash, Inc. Main: +1 703 620 4200 2100 Reston Parkway Fax: +1 703 620 4215 Reston, VA 20191 crocker(a)cybercash.com --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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The Databasix gang (Paul Pomes @ Qualcomm) is now harrassing the bureau42 remailer
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Paul Pomes is one of the least intelligent members of the Databasix gang. He's been harrassing Jeff B.'s upstreams and employers with false complaints at the same time Gary Burnore, Belinda Bryant, and the rest of the Databasix gang did, eventually killing the huge cajones remailer. Now they're after on bureau42. For some reason Pomes slipped and cc'd me one his false complaints (even though he was ordered not to send me any more e-mail). I ask everyone to a) complain about Paul Pomes to Qualcomm, his employer b) discuss what we can do to protect bureau42 from Databasix harrassment Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by zelkova.qualcomm.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id SAA10389; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:52:26 -0800 (PST) From: Paul Pomes <ppomes(a)Qualcomm.com> Organization: Qualcomm, Inc. Subject: More spam from vulis Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Id: <10385.880512741.1(a)zelkova.qualcomm.com> To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com, remailer-admin(a)bureau42.ml.org Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:52:25 -0800 Message-Id: <10387.880512745(a)zelkova.qualcomm.com> Sender: ppomes(a)Qualcomm.com A mis-edit of my killfile let the following gem from Dimi Vulis through. FYI /pbp ------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Received: from warlock.qualcomm.com (warlock.qualcomm.com [129.46.52.129]) by zelkova.qualcomm.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id SAA10273 for <ppomes(a)zelkova.qualcomm.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:37:14 -0800 (PST) Received: from moria.qualcomm.com (qualcomm.com [192.35.156.11]) by warlock.qualcomm.com (8.8.5/1.4/8.7.2/1.13) with ESMTP id SAA19074 for <ppomes(a)Qualcomm.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:35:25 -0800 (PST) Received: from sirius.infonex.com (sirius.infonex.com [206.170.114.2]) by moria.qualcomm.com with ESMTP id SAA19347 for <ppomes(a)Qualcomm.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:36:21 -0800 (PST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.8/8.7.3) id LAA07735 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:56:04 -0800 (PST) Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.8/8.7.3) id LAA07459 for cypherpunks(a)infonex.com; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:54:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from rigel.cyberpass.net (root(a)rigel.infonex.com [206.170.114.3]) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.8/8.7.3) with ESMTP id LAA07440 for <cpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:52:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by rigel.cyberpass.net (8.8.8/8.7.3) with ESMTP id LAA10626 for <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:48:59 -0800 (PST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id LAA03665 for cypherpunks-unedited-outgoing; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:43:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from corsica.shorelink.com (mail(a)corsica.shorelink.com [207.155.180.7]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id LAA03660 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:43:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from uucp by corsica.shorelink.com with local-rmail (Exim 1.62 #1) id 0xaQss-0008Rq-00 (Debian); Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:42:58 -0800 Received: (from remailer@localhost) by bureau42.ml.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id OAA27483; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 14:47:01 GMT Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 14:47:01 GMT Message-ID: <EPtLawOnbaoGUl8PvUSglw==(a)bureau42.ml.org> From: bureau42 Anonymous Remailer <nobody(a)bureau42.ml.org> Comments: This message did not originate from the Sender address above. It was remailed automatically by anonymizing remailer software. Please report problems or inappropriate use to the remailer administrator at <remailer-admin(a)bureau42.ml.org>. To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Precedence: bulk Reply-To: bureau42 Anonymous Remailer <nobody(a)bureau42.ml.org> X-List: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Content-Type: text Content-Length: 206 May Timothy C[ocksucker] Maya's forgeries get stuck up his ass so he'll have to shit through his filthy mouth for the rest of its miserable life. /~~~\ {-O^O-} Timothy C[ocksucker] Maya \ o / (-) ------- End of Forwarded Message

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NEW TRAVEL INFO -- Togo (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From owner-travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu Wed Nov 26 03:44:15 1997 Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1997 11:27:10 -0500 From: owner-travel-advisories <owner-travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu> Subject: NEW TRAVEL INFO -- Togo Sender: Wally Doerge <76702.1202(a)compuserve.com> To: travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu Message-ID: <199711241131_MC2-2974-E60C(a)compuserve.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Precedence: bulk STATE DEPARTMENT TRAVEL INFORMATION - Togo ============================================================ Togo - Consular Information Sheet June 20, 1997 Country Description: Togo is a small west African nation with a developing economy. Tourism facilities are limited, especially outside Lome, the capital city. Entry Requirements: A passport and visa are required. Proof of yellow fever immunization is required. Travelers should obtain the latest information and details from the Embassy of the Republic of Togo, 2208 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008. The telephone number is (202) 234-4212. Overseas inquiries should be made at the nearest Togo embassy or consulate. Areas of Instability: Togo has experienced periodic violence and strikes over the past five years. Although the situation has been calm since 1994, the potential exists for unsettled political conditions. Medical Facilities: Medical facilities in Togo are limited. Some medicines are available through local pharmacies. Doctors and hospitals often expect immediate cash payment for health care services. U.S. medical insurance is not always valid outside the United States. The Medicare/ Medicaid program does not provide for payment of medical services outside the United States. Travelers have found supplemental medical insurance with specific overseas and medical evacuation coverage to be useful. For additional health information, travelers can contact the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's international travelers hotline at (404) 332-4559. Internet: http://www.cdc.gov. Information on Crime: Pickpocketing and theft is common, especially along the beach and in the market areas of Lome. There has been an increase in the reports of carjacking. Business fraud stemming from Nigerian scam operations target Americans and pose dangers of financial loss and physical harm. Persons contemplating business deals in Togo with individuals promoting investment in Nigeria, especially the Central Bank of Nigeria or the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, are strongly urged to check with the U.S. Department of Commerce or the U.S. Department of State before providing any information, making financial commitments, or traveling to Togo. The loss or theft abroad of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to local police and to the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. The pamphlets "A Safe Trip Abroad" and "Tips for Travelers to Sub-Saharan Africa" provide useful information on protecting personal security while traveling abroad and on travel in the region in general. Both are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Drug Penalties: U.S. citizens are subject to the laws of the country in which they are traveling. In Togo, the penalties for possession, use or trafficking in illegal drugs are strictly enforced. Convicted offenders can expect jail sentences and fines. Road Safety/Automobile Travel: Intercity roads are generally paved; however, conditions are poor and dangerous. Overland travel off the main network of roads generally requires a four-wheel drive vehicle. Poorly-marked armed checkpoints, often manned by undisciplined soldiers, exist throughout the country. Nighttime travel on unfamiliar roads is dangerous. Banditry, ranging from extortion by security forces to armed robbery, has been reported on all major intercity highways, including the Lome-Cotonou coastal highway. Credit Card Usage: Not all major credit cards are accepted in Togo. Travelers planning to use credit cards should be aware which cards are accepted before they commit to any transaction. Embassy Location/Registration: U.S. citizens are encouraged to register with the Consular Section of the U.S. Embassy at the intersection of Rue Polisher Caventou and Rue Vauban, Lome, telephone (228) 21-29-91, and to obtain updated information on travel and security in Togo. The Embassy's fax is (228) 21-79-52 and the mailing address is B.P. 852, Lome. No. 97-106 This replaces the Consular Information Sheet dated May 3, 1996, to update information on entry requirements and provide information on credit card usage. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- The "travel-advisories(a)stolaf.edu" mailing list is the official Internet and BITNET distribution point for the U.S. State Department Travel Warnings and Consular Information Sheets. To unsubscribe, send a message containing the word "unsubscribe" to: travel-advisories-request(a)stolaf.edu Archives of past "travel-advisories" postings are available at the URL: "http://www.stolaf.edu/network/travel-advisories.html" or via Gopher: gopher.stolaf.edu, Internet Resources/US-State-Department-Travel-Advisories

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