- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

e$: Altered States. Transfer payment addiction, Le Infame, andPhil Dick's definition of reality.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Precedence: Bulk Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 11:57:32 -0400 From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: e$: Altered States. Transfer payment addiction, Le Infame, and Phil Dick's definition of reality. At 1:23 pm -0400 on 5/28/97, Bill Frantz wrote in cypherpunks: > I object to the state, providing addictive substances/experiences when > private enterprise could do the job. If they are against addiction, then > they should set a good example. For myself, I deplore the state's all-too-successful efforts to "provide" that ultimate addictive substance, the transfer payment. >From the oxymoron of "Social" "Security", to direct subsidies on everything from electricity to sugar to helium, from deliberately mispriced federal assets like lumber, water and mining rights, to indirect subsidies like the tax-deductibility of mortgage interest and health "insurance", we use our government to bleed money, initiative, and, ultimately, freedom from the people who produce wealth and material well-being and give almost all of it to people who do nothing but consume and obstruct. We've all become a nation of innumerate dole-junkies, unaware of the economic consequences of our actions because the state has hidden them behind a veil of pseudoeconomics and political cynicism. The heyday of Roman dole was nothing compared to the "compassion" we increasingly have for ourselves. So, like a lot of people, I hope and work for the day when that giant mosquito on the Petomaine :-) river -- and its larvae in places like Jefferson City -- starts sucking air instead of the economic and moral lifeblood of people who actually work for a living. Then, maybe, this nation of lotus eaters will wake up to the fact that we've no one to rely upon but ourselves. Science fiction author Phillip K. Dick said, "Reality is that which doesn't go away when you change your mind." I would ammend it to say that reality is that which is still there when transfer payments stop. Voltaire used to end all his correspondence with "Death to Le Infame". "Le Infame" translates as "the infamous thing". He was talking about the church then, but nowadays it seems that *all* of us take communion at Our Lady of the Federal Transfer Payment. The end of opressive religeous control of society was the advent of science, the enlightment, and the triumph of reason that resulted from them. The founding of this country was part of that revolution. Unfortunately, unreason shed its priestly vestments and immediately counterattacked in the form of Rousseau, Robespierre and the French revolution. Since then, through the mechanations of Rousseau's intellectual decendants like Karl Marx, and lately, the people that Harold Bloom calls the "School of Resentment", nation states have justified more and more oppression in the interest of unobtainable mirages like "equality" and "security", and in perverting words like "fairness" and "justice" to mean envy and arbitrary confiscation. The very touchstone of reason in political thought, this country's constitution, is now standing on the bottom of a vast lake of irrational statist excrement, with its nose barely above the waterline. Sometimes, I think that, when we can breathe no longer, and we try to return to the shore of reason, we'll forget the swimming lessons the founding fathers and the philosophes of the enlightenment taught us. That we'll drown in our own sloth, envy, resentment, and, more important, lack of faith in ourselves. However, most of the time, I'm much more optimistic. I believe that the increasing ubiquity of all information, and, more important, the means for each person to competitively process that information himself to get independently replicable results, will create a world where people and their computing technology become the equivalent of scientists, testing and verifying facts about the world themselves, rather than having reality served to them on a lotus leaf. The operative word in that Proustian sentence was "competitively". That means markets for everything which can be put into ones and zeroes and sent on a network, which in turn means instant settlement and clearing of those transactions, and, most important, a myriad of autonomous economic entities operating in efficient, competitive, auction markets for that information. Fortunately, we have the technology, in the form of things like the blind signature algorithm, public key cryptography, Moore's law and geodesic networks, to make this happen. I believe that we actually have no economic choice, and so it will happen. It's as if we have found the dole-receptors in our economic neurochemistry, and soon our transfer payment addiction will be a thing of the past. "Reality is that which doesn't go away when you change your mind." Kicking an addiction is by definition a mind-altering experience. :-). Polemically, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ ---------- The e$ lists are brought to you by: Intertrader Ltd: "Digital Money Online" <http://www.intertrader.com/library/DigitalMoneyOnline> Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk Like e$? Help pay for it! <http://www.shipwright.com/beg.html> For e$/e$pam sponsorship, mail Bob: <mailto:rah@shipwright.com> Thanks to the e$ e$lves: Of Counsel: Vinnie Moscaritolo <mailto:vinnie@webstuff.apple.com> (Majordomo)^2: Rachel Willmer<mailto:rachel@intertrader.com> Commermeister: Anthony Templer <mailto:anthony@atanda.com> Interturge: Rodney Thayer <mailto:rodney@sabletech.com> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 28 May 1997, Tim May wrote: > At 5:02 PM -0400 5/27/97, Mark M. wrote: > > >I don't know the reason, but the IRS tax code requires that all passport > >applicants supply their SSNs to the IRS. The penalty for failing to > >notify is $500. I recently encountered this situation and just left > > Good for you, seriously, but you may not yet have heard the last of this. > As with "frivolous returns" (such as writing comments on the tax forms They can always harrass. Supposedly the State Department reports to the IRS anyone who does not give this info, but the IRS seems not to follow up, an the only thing they could do under the law is impose the $500 penalty which would probably not survive a court challenge (I forget the particular reasoning, but if they challenged and lost, no one would have any fear not giving their SSNs out, similarly to why they don't charge every cypherpunk under export laws - fear of grey is more useful than a clear line that will be more liberal than they want). When I applied for a passport (specifically because it is a government recognized ID that need not contain your social security number), I didn't write the IRS at all (you have no duty to notify them), and IF contacted, I would simply say "Who do I make the $500 check out to, and where do I send it, and who should my lawyer contact to challenge it". I have never been contacted. > The woman behind the desk didn't seem interested in my point and just said > that without a valid SS number, no registration tags would be issued. It > was then my choice to drive without tags (and get a ticket anytime a cop > noticed this and decided to act on it) or seek some kind of legal > restraining order (???, but probably $$$). IANAL, but: There is another statute which says that any time a government agency (it does not apply to corporations) asks for your SS# they have to state the reason and authority they have to ask for it (something like a state statute or order - I will look up the info and post here when I have time). Usually the behind-the-counter culture doesn't know about this. You can also give a religous objection. You can ask for the name of the person and their exact title then ask nicely to speak with a manager familar with the law or procedure, and that it might be illegal to ask for that information without citing the authority (with the above law in hand), etc. Since they have to have alternate ID numbers unless they only give licenses out to US citizens and not the Amish or others who have religous objections - you can ask for one of these alternate numbers. You can also be agreeable and say, OK, if you want to see my SSN so that you can confirm that I am me, I will show it to you, but I don't want that specific number on my license, and you can pick any number that is convienient to you, or I can supply my standard "alternate-ID" number. My state uses a number that is a wierd checksum of my name and birthdate and who knows what, so it doesn't apply to my drivers license. I had my SSN used (they didn't tell me that is what it was for, and this was before I was as aware of the privacy matters) on a professional license, and they did things like disclose it to people who bought their mailing list and it appeared in some mailings. I only had to call the state office, explain about the problems of identity fraud, and had a new license with a new number (which I use as my alt-id number) within a week (and they said they would not include SSNs with their mailing list). Some people are reasonable. Generally they try to find the easiest path. When it is clear that you won't go away quietly, and that you are going to be more hassle than it is worth (and that you aren't trying to evade any requirement, e.g. "You agree that I have proper ID, and qualify in every other way, and the only reason you won't is because I won't tell you my SSN even though you can't cite the authority you have ...") you can usually get them to either relent or say something slanderous in public. A silly but necessary game. Now if I can mail in a form, I usually use the alt-id number and write it in place of the SSN with a note right next to it saying it is not my SSN and that if you really want it you have to write me back and explain why they want it. (If they do, I send them a NDA with something to the effect that if I find it has leaked anywhere they have to cover all costs associated with correcting any record, etc.). Given that they are usually desparate to sign me up for whatever it is, and the mail is a hassle for them, they just enter the alt-id number. I keep a copy of the original form with the Not-my-SSN statement in case someone wants to accuse me of any kind of fraud.

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Mailing list
by TSadoff197＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please send

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Surveillance State Delayed
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Fascinating article in last Saturday's New York Times about INS plans to revoke the U.S. citizenship of 5,000 people who got that citizenship sans criminal background checks so they could vote for Clinton in '96. Now, the INS revokes a big 25 citizenships a year so they really have a job ahead of them. Demonstrates the enforcement challenges of bureaucracies living in a mass society. They think they can get away with administrative revocations but even those can be appealed to federal court. 5,000 appeals would be quite a burden. If they wait too long and two years pass from time of granting, the Service will lose the administrative option and will have to do full court proceedings to revoke. Even if they revoke, the "aliens" will still have their old proofs of citizenship (passports, etc) as well as their former status as permanent residents so revocation may be meaningless in any case. That's not the cutest bit, though. In addition to the 5,000 new Clinton voters with provable criminal records, they had to go through 180,000 records of people with various sorts of documentation problems to see if any of them were criminals. But the Feds couldn't do it themselves. They lacked the capability. They hired one of the big accounting firms (Peat-Marwick?) to CHECK THE NAMES against the NCIC. They got some 9,000 positive matches but naturally, they can't tell how many of those 9,000 matches are false positives. Lots of work ahead. The gloom and doom types like to claim that it is trivial for the almighty Feds to find out everything about every one, look inside the souls of all of us, separate the good from the evil and unerringly punish the evil. Omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence. Oddly enough, this claim is often made by people who, otherwise, don't believe in God. But this article on citizenship revocation gives lie to this claim of state power. Citizenship applicants have submitted vast quantities of information about themselves to the Feds. They have undergone years of a staged and complex process to move from nonresident alien to resident alien to citizen. At every point, they NARCed themselves out in detail directly to the federal government. And yet, that same government can't even tell if these people are "criminals." If they can't efficiently surveil and regulate this group, what chance do they have to regulate and surveil the other 260 million of us? DCF -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 5.0 beta Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBM43tToVO4r4sgSPhAQHhcAP+O3Kn/rTtonspM+fWF7S/MeoV/zENTgll Di4GCB1oZTlvU9je6ucRxpXvezsjgibmurApR22j3J0rhgHAVOCT8+EjNLAi3yGh mwXXuCH/Z55nAXVit8mZvXSrJ8OPFWMn57Nma33uaD48QJ7AFqVxISi7+pSI91Mx LR0oZ1nJE/8= =oo4o -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Press Release Pretty Good Privacy Receives Government Approval to Export Strong Encryption SAN MATEO, Calif., May 28, 1997 -- Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. (www.pgp.com) the world leader in digital privacy and security software, today announced that the U.S. Department of Commerce has approved the export of Pretty Good Privacy's encryption software to the overseas offices of the largest companies in the United States. This makes Pretty Good Privacy the only U.S. company currently authorized to export strong encryption technology not requiring key recovery to foreign subsidiaries and branches of the largest American companies. Click here to view the list of approved companies. The approval allows Pretty Good Privacy to export strong, 128-bit encryption without a requirement that the exported products contain key recovery features or other back doors that enable government access to keys. More than one-half of the Fortune 100 already use PGP domestically to secure their corporate data and communications. "Now we are able to export strong encryption technology to the overseas offices of more than 100 of the largest companies in America, without compromising the integrity of the product or the strength of the encryption," said Phil Dunkelberger, President of Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. "We worked closely with the State Department when they controlled the export of encryption, and are now working with the Commerce Department. And we have never had a license application denied." The license allows export of strong encryption technology, without government access to keys, to the overseas subsidiaries and branch offices of more than 100 of the largest American companies, provided that the offices are not located in embargoed countries, namely Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan or Syria. "As far as we know, Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. is now the only company that has U.S. government approval to sell strong encryption to the worldwide subsidiaries and branch offices of such a large number of U.S. corporations, without having to compromise on the strength of the encryption or add schemes designed to provide government access to keys," said Robert H. Kohn, vice president and general counsel of Pretty Good Privacy. "Pretty Good Privacy still opposes export controls on cryptographic software, but this license is a major step toward meeting the global security needs of American companies." The U.S. government restricts the export of encryption using key lengths in excess of 40 bits. However, 40-bit cryptography is considered "weak," because it can be broken in just a few hours. Generally, the U.S. government will grant export licenses for up to 56-bit encryption if companies commit to develop methods for government access to keys. For anything over 56 bits, actual methods for government access must be in place. Pretty Good Privacy's license permits the export of 128-bit or "strong" encryption, without any requirement of a key recovery mechanism that enables government access to the data. A message encrypted with 128-bit PGP software is 309,485,009,821,341,068,724,781,056 times more difficult to break than a message encrypted using 40-bit technology. In fact, according to estimates published by the U.S. government, it would take an estimated 12 million times the age of the universe, on average, to break a single 128-bit message encrypted with PGP. "Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. has been working diligently to ensure compliance with the export control laws. Clearly, the Commerce Department recognizes the needs of reputable American companies to protect their intellectual property and other sensitive business information using strong cryptography," said Roszel C. Thomsen II, partner at the law firm of Thomsen and Burke LLP. "User demand for strong cryptography is growing worldwide," said Marc Rotenberg, director of Electronic Privacy Information Center, and a leading privacy-rights advocate. "This is just one more example of the need to remove obstacles to the export of the best products the U.S. can provide." Companies that are approved for the export of Pretty Good Privacy's strong encryption should contact Pretty Good Privacy's sales office at 415.572.0430 or visit the company's web site at www.pgp.com. Companies that are not currently on the list of licenses obtained by Pretty Good Privacy, but would like to gain approval to use strong encryption in their branch offices and subsidiaries around the world, should also contact Pretty Good Privacy at 415.572.0430 for information about how to be included in future government-approved export licenses for PGP. About Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Pretty Good Privacy (www.pgp.com) founded in March 1996, is the leading provider of digital-privacy products for private communications and the secure storage of data for businesses and individuals. Pretty Good Privacy's original encryption software for email applications (PGP) was distributed as freeware in 1991 by Phil Zimmermann, Chief Technical Officer and Founder of Pretty Good Privacy, and allowed individuals, for the first time, to send information without risk of interception. With millions of users, it has since become the world leader in email encryption and the de facto standard for Internet mail encryption. Over one half of the Fortune 100 companies use PGP. In order to provide only the strongest encryption software, Pretty Good Privacy publishes all of its encryption source code and algorithms for extensive peer review and public scrutiny. The company can be reached at 415.572.0430; http://www.pgp.com. For more information, please contact Mike Nelson, Pretty Good Privacy's Director of Corporate Communications, at 415.524.6203.

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No Subject
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last Friday, in a town hall meeting on education in Clarksburg, West Virginia, President Clinton made some news on the technology front. Answering a question from a parent about how to keep children safe on the Net, the president talked about the Communications Decency Act's travails in federal court. Then he said "we're working on" a technological fix, a V-chip for PCs that could protect children from harm. Later, reporters pressed White House aides on whether there was a new V-chip initiative. The new chip is out there, they said, somewhere "within the industry." From White House transcripts of the event and later briefings: Jim Eschenmann: Mr. President, my name is Jim Eschenmann. I'm a proud parent of a 4-year-old preschooler. Your administration, as well as the local board of education, has placed a large emphasis on connecting every classroom to the Internet. What additional measures can we take to protect our school students from the harmful areas of the Internet while guaranteeing full access to post-secondary students and to protect the freedom of speech? President Clinton: Well, you know, I signed a bill - when I signed the telecommunications bill ... I had a provision in there to try to protect against young people being exposed to some of the harmful things that are on the Internet. Not just pornography but, as I'm sure a lot of you know because of the events in the news in the last couple of years, there are even instructions on how to build bombs and things like that. There are lot of things on there that we wouldn't want our children to see. That provision has been thrown out by a court and is still in the courts, I think. So it may be that what we have to do is try to develop something like the equivalent of what we're developing for you for television, like the V-chip, where it's put in the hands of the parents or the educators. And then if it were in the hands of the educators the school board could approve certain guidelines. It's technically more difficult with the Internet. As you know, there are hundreds of new services being added to the Internet every week. It's growing at an explosive capacity and we're in the process actually of trying to develop an Internet II. But I think that is the answer. Something like the V-chip for televisions. And we're working on it. I think it's a serious potential problem myself. But let me say it would be a serious potential problem if they were not in the schools. I think putting them in the schools, because the kids are normally under supervision, you have a far less likelihood that the Internet will be abused or that the children will be exposed to something they shouldn't see during the school hours, in all likelihood, than at home. But I do think you need guidelines in both places and we're doing our best to try to figure out if there's some technological fix we can give you on it. Briefing by spokeswoman Ann Lewis (22 May): Q.: Three things that Clinton said - suggesting V-chips for the Internet, endorsing year-round schooling, and speaking favorably of high school competency tests before graduation. Are any of those new, or are those things he has said before? Ann Lewis: From my understanding, looking at the conversations back and forth on the V-chip for the Internet, as you know this is a principle the president has talked about for a long time, which is giving parents the tools they need, and it's the principle he referred to when he supported the - came out in support of the V-chip. He thinks it continues to be an issue. Second, if you go back and look at his speech on Net Day, when he gave a radio address and we did some talking about the Internet, he announced that he had asked the Department of Education and Secretary [Richard] Riley to come up with a parents' guide to the Internet, recognizing that it is a wonderful resource but that many families also feel they could use some help in ensuring that their children get the most out of the Internet. And, third, it's our understanding, and we just checked this with people at the White House who know much more about technology than all of us put together, that there is in fact technology being developed that would serve as the equivalent of a V-chip for the Internet, and we think that's what the president referred to. Q.: Clinton has talked before about giving parents ways to protect their children on the Internet, but has he ever before suggested the idea of a V-chip for the Internet? Lewis: Not that we know of, but we know - as is clear, I think, from his wording, he is aware that the technology has been developing. Q.: But has he talked about this before? Lewis: We don't think so. We were going to try to do a huge Nexis search; that's going to take a long time. We don't remember that conversation.... Q.: You said the technology is being developed - who is developing it? Lewis: I can't, but we can get you more information. It's my understanding it's being developed within the industry. Q.: That's like the stuff like Kidsitter and all the stuff that's already available on the Internet. There are a lot of sites. Lewis: There are a lot of sort of monitors you can put on that. We think this may be a little more advanced, and we're trying to get more information. White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry and spokesman Barry Toiv (23 May): Q.: Mike, yesterday the president endorsed the idea of a V-chip for the Internet. Was that the first time he did that, and how does the White House plan to proceed? Mike McCurry: Did anyone work on that yesterday? That was - there is some, I think, R&D work, technical work that's being done to develop new software. I'm not sure where within the government they're doing it.... Q.: Mike, I'm still trying to figure out, was yesterday the first time the president endorsed a V-chip for the Internet? McCurry: Did you do any yesterday on the V-chip question? Barry [Toiv] may have handled this up in West Virginia yesterday. Barry Toiv: Well, I'm not sure I have more than you got yesterday from Ann Lewis. The president has not specifically mentioned the V-chip, but this is work that we've been doing because he's been concerned, obviously, about ways that parents can help - can protect their kids with regard to stuff that comes through on the Internet. Apparently, it's our understanding that technology does exist within the industry. It's being developed by the industry. And so I think the president was referring to that yesterday. Q.: Is there any procedure that - I mean, is it something that - is there any kind of official "endorsement" you expect? Toiv: Well, right now - not right at this moment, but it's something we're looking at.

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Anonymizer upgrades
by lcottrell＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: alt.security, alt.privacy,alt.anonymous,alt.privacy.anon-server) I am pleased to announce two significant improvements to The Anonymizer (www.Anonymizer.com) First, we have fixed the HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR and HTTP_VIA security holes. This was a problem for people accessing The Anonymizer though a web proxy. Second, we have introduced accounts on the Anonymizer. The poor performance of The Anonymizer (to put it lightly) has been due to our attempts to keep it from completely swamping our T1. Paid accounts on The Anonymizer bypass the slowdown mechanisms, and also provide access to anonymous news and anonymous anonymous FTP. Finally, while it has been true for some time, it is not widely known that the Anonymizer is owned and operated by Infonex. We took over management of the Anonymizer several months ago. For those not familiar with Infonex, we have been active in the privacy business for some time. We host several anonymous remailers, we offer anonymous shell accounts through our subsidiary Cyberpass (www.cyberpass.net) and I personally developed the Mixmaster anonymous remailer system. Lance Cottrell -- Lance Cottrell President, Infonex lcottrell(a)infonex.com http://www.infonex.com/~loki

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Crypto Disputes
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For full versions of the stories below: http://jya.com/kinkey.txt ---------- For two years, the IETF Security Group has labored to hammer out the IP Security (IPSec) protocol, a standard way that businesses can open up an encrypted link to a trading partner's network. The link is encrypted after authentication by means of an X.509 digital certificate at an IPSec-based firewall or gateway. But an unresolved, bitter dispute over the technique for automatically swapping keys over the 'Net - referred to as key management - has resulted in two incompatible schemes in the IPSec specification. In this battle of the acronyms, the debate centers on the Simple Key Management for IP (SKIP), developed by Sun Microsystems, Inc., and the Internet Secure Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), developed by the National Security Agency. ---------- Responding to Sun's announcement that it would license 128-bit encryption algorithms from Elvis+Co., a Russian company, the White House announced that it would look into Sun's actions. "Sun's strategy is another brick from a wall that is coming down," said Jim Bidzos, president and CEO of RSA Data Security. "And it highlights that something is wrong with the U.S. policy." Sun has approximately a 10 percent equity stake in Elvis+, whose product is based on Sun's publicly available protocol, Simple Key Management for IP (SKIP). The 10 percent interest is thought to be key to keeping other companies from licensing and reselling the same technology. The government's resolve, however, may be breaking down. Just last week, Sybase Inc. won approval to export database and server products with 56-bit DES encryption, even though the Emeryville, Calif., company has no model for key recovery. ---------- SKIP, which stands for Simple Key management for Internet Protocols, was submitted by Sun to the Internet Engineering Task Force as an Internet standard. Included in SKIP E+ are algorithms for 56-bit DES, two- and three-key triple DES, and 64- and 128-bit ciphers for encrypting network traffic and keys. The security software was developed by Elvis+, a company of former Soviet space scientists with offices near Moscow. Sun bought a 10 percent interest in the company in 1993, but does not take an active role, said Steven Hunziker, chief operating officer of Russia Communications Research Inc., Los Gatos, Calif. RCR represents Elvis+'s products in the U.S. "RCR is really small - me and an accountant and two lawyers - and they watch the law like hawks," Hunziker said. "Elvis+ has kept a very careful distance from Sun, and those guys don't need anything from Sun to create the technology they're creating. The FBI and the CIA are just lazy, which is why they object." "We've developed key recovery technology and gotten government approval, so we can export without having to resort to what they did," said Ken Mendelson, corporate counsel for Trusted Information Systems Inc., Glenwood, Md. ---------- VeriFone today announced that its Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) -based product suite has received export approval from the US Department of Commerce, marking the first announcement of a SET-based, end-to-end Internet commerce solution containing full strength encryption technology to be approved for international export. VeriFone's vGATE, vPOS and vWALLET software employ the SET encryption protocol for transactions over the Internet, utilizing 1024 bit key size for public key encryption and digital signatures, and 64 bit DES for bulk encryption. This approval enables VeriFone to offer a higher level of end-to-end encryption than was previously available from U.S. corporations to international customers without special permission from the U.S. government. ---------- IBM last week took the first steps to help software vendors comply with federal encryption export rules, with the release into beta of a new security tool kit. ----------

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PGPlib-0.2 available
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text To: pgplib-announce(a)petium.rhein.de Subject: PGPlib-0.2 available Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 15:06:42 +0200 From: Tage Stabell-Kulo <tage(a)acm.org> Reply-To: tage(a)acm.org Sender: pgplib-announce-owner(a)petium.rhein.de Precedence: list -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Announcing PGPlib-0.2 ===================== We are pleased to announce a new verison of PGPlib. You can obtain the newest version (that is 0.2 as of today) from ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz In short, you will find a library that enables your software to read and write "packages" which can be decrypted and/or verified by means of PGP. In other words, you can incorporate PGP compatibility in your software without having to run PGP. When you uncompress and un-tar the file, you will obtain four files in the CURRENT directory. These files are README Describing how to preceed PGPlib-0.2.tar The library, manual pages and so on PGPlib-0.2.tar.asc A detached signature for verification pubkey.asc My public key (again, for verification) It is described in README how to verify the release you have obtained, how to unpack, what you will actually get when you unpack, and so on. What is there for you ===================== PGPlib is a library that lets you generate (and manipulate) PGP packets without having to run PGP. In particular there is code to generate and understand the following types of PGP packets: - Literal with filename, mode, etc. You can create literate packages from files, or from buffers, and create files from literate packets; - Convential encrypted (IDEA with Zimmermann's context sensitive feedback). The library can both read (decrypt) and write (encrypt) convential packets (in PGP format); - Armor. You can (de)armor a buffer or a file into a buffer or a file; - UserID packets are read and written in a variety of formats; - Keys can be obtained from a database (which is provided) or by parsing keyrings. Keys can be kept in buffers or on files; - You can maintain a PGP public-key database (I use this library to maintain a database with ~40.000 keys). There is code to use DBM as supplied from Berkeley or, if you prefer, GDBM from GNU; - You can verify RSA signatures on public keys and on buffers (files); - You can encrypt data (file or buffer) with public keys. The DEK is naturally written as a separate packet; - With a secret key you can sign other keys and buffers. Keys can be read from databases or files; they are decrypted on the fly. We have made a small program that will (de)armor anything, a parser to parse PGP files (including decryption and so on), a shell to manipulate a keydatabase, a keyserver to run on top of such a database, a program to verify signatures on keys and/or files, a program to split keyrings in smaller parts and a program that will sign files for you. You will find all these (and more) in the applications/ directory. None of these uses PGP, the library provides all the functionality you need. What you need ============= - You must have the SSLeay library as I have not implemented any cryptographic functionality; I hope SSLeay is a good choice. I did not major in mathematics and can thus not judge the quality of their work, although it looks solid (to me). I link with their version 0.6.6. I rely on SSLeay for great many things, in particular their BIGNUMs, RSA encryption and IDEA. I use "fprintf(stderr" when problems occur, but integration into the SSLeay "error-system" might happen. You can obtain SSLeay from: * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSL/ - SSLeay source * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSLapps/ - SSL applications * http://www.psy.uq.oz.au/~ftp/Crypto/ssl.html - SSLeay Programmer Reference SSLeay is quite large and I only use a fraction of it. On the other hand, SSLeay seems to be well maintained and their crypto-library might very well shrink or become more modular as time passes. Your Feedback ============= Your feedback is solicited. Peter Simons <Peter.Simons(a)gmd.de> has created a mailinglist for PGPlib. To subscribe, send an e-mail to the address pgplib-dev-request(a)petium.rhein.de and write the command SUBSCRIBE into the BODY. If you want to be subscribed under a different address than the one you're mailing from, you can also use SUBSCRIBE yourname(a)somewhere.else to do the trick. To post to the list, send an e-mail to pgplib-dev(a)petium.rhein.de as usual. There is also an pgplib-announce(a)petium.rhein.de. Subscribe by sending an e-mail to pgplib-announce-request(a)petium.rhein.de with SUBSCRIBE in the body. The latter list will be very low-volume. If you write a nice application based on this library (the ultimate feedback :-), please feel free to send it to me and I will include it in the next release; Where to get PGPlib =================== ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz COPYRIGHT (yum, yum) ========= The library and included applications are all available under "Berkely style" copyright terms. Basically, this means that it is FREE for commercial and non-comercial use, and that you can do almost anything with the code. The only thing you can not do is to say that you wrote it. See the file COPYING for details. Let's go to work ================ I hope you like it, that you find is useful, that you will find no bugs, and that you will provide valuable feedback by means of the mailing list. Tage Stabell-Kul¯ Castelmaggiore, Italy 30. May 1997 //// Tage Stabell-Kuloe | e-mail: tage(a)ACM.org //// /// Department of Computer Science/IMR | Phone : +47-776-44032 /// // 9037 University of Tromsoe, Norway | Fax : +47-776-44580 // / "'oe' is '\o' in TeX" | URL:http://www.cs.uit.no/~tage/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: latin1 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.2, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBM47QfAMzZ6tx+9RpAQFHJQQAmsrh3sqgeRdOFscXWAb7/bV5ivdgnB4+ IpgGpGPMhNYfAzDJvz2rdvt1Z38NhLjOHOTEl+RhKGUGmc7cDXiaAE38Vh3OJIPu FijHtMgr++GdxZS5/WvcUxlvvMQjyjDaX84eG0clG1djYizMzR+7HwsIaaJeLtOb wlBORx01NRo= =Q5Ed -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PGP Library Announcements --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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INFO: Encryption battle heats up in House; experts weigh in (5/30/97)
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| PRO-ENCRYPTION BILL CLEARS SECOND CONGRESSIONAL HURDLE; FACES TOUGHER TEST IN COMING WEEKS. CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOVERNMENT KEY RECOVERY PLANS Date: May 29, 1997 Expires July 1, 1997 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com Redistribution of crypto-news is allowed in its entirety. _____________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents Encryption battle heats up in the House Experts assail government key recovery plans What YOU CAN DO NOW! Background What's at stake How to start or stop receiving crypto-news Press contacts _____________________________________________________________________________ ENCRYPTION BATTLE HEATS UP IN THE HOUSE On May 14th, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill designed to dramatically enhance the ability of Internet users to protect their privacy and security online. The bill now moves to the House International Relations Committee, where it is expected to face tougher opposition from the FBI, NSA, and the Clinton Administration. The International Relations Committee is expected to consider the bill soon. The Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE - HR 695) will prohibit the government from imposing mandatory law enforcement access to private online communications inside the US, affirm the right of American Citizens to use whatever from of encryption they choose, and relax current export restrictions which prevent the development of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies. The Clinton Administration, led by the FBI and the National Security agency, opposes SAFE and is pushing for a policy of domestic restrictions on the use of encryption, guaranteed law enforcement access to private communications via government designed "key-recovery" systems, and continued reliance on out-dated, cold-war era export controls. For the first time in history, Congress is close to passing real encryption policy reform legislation which will protect privacy, promote electronic commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet. Pointers to additional information on the SAFE bill and other efforts to reform U.S. encryption policy are attached below. Congress needs to hear from you! If you value your privacy and care about the future of the Net, please take a few moments to join the Adopt Your Legislator campaign. Instructions are attached below. ________________________________________________________________________________ CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOV'T. KEY RECOVERY PLANS On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer scientists released a report which for the first time examines the risks and implications of government-designed key-recovery systems. The report cautions that "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user. Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current competency of the field." The report substantially changes the terms of the ongoing debate over US encryption policy. For more than four years, the Clinton Administration has pushed for a policy of continued export restrictions on strong encryption, and the development of global key escrow and key recovery systems to address the concerns of law enforcement. The study, the first comprehensive analysis of the risks of key recovery and key escrow systems, calls into question the viability of the Administration's approach. The Report's authors, recognized leaders in the cryptography and computer science field, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier The report is be available online at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/ ________________________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW 1. Adopt Your Legislator Now is the time to increase our ranks and prepare for the fight that lies a head of us in Congress. Please take a few minutes to learn more about this important issue, and join the Adopt Your Legislator Campaign at http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ This will produce a customized page, just for you with your own legislator's telephone number and address. In addition, you will receive the latest news and information on the issue, as well as targeted alerts informing you when your Representatives in Congress do something that could help or hinder the future of the Internet. Best of all, it's free. Do your part, Work the Network! Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ for details. 2. Spread the Word! Forward this Alert to your friends. Help educate the public about the importance of this issue. Please do not forward after July 1, 1997. _____________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND Complete background information, including: * A down-to-earth explanation of why this debate is important to Internet users * Analysis and background on the issue * Text of the Administration draft legislation * Text of Congressional proposals to reform US encryption policy * Audio transcripts and written testimony from recent Congressional Hearings on encryption policy reform * And more! Are all available at http://www.crypto.com/ ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT'S AT STAKE Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age -- enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals and businesses come online, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and viability of the Net. Current US encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption products US companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. US hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on the global market must either conform to US encryption export limits or produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and complicated alternative. The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of debate over US encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the net" here in the US. A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption policy. Because the designers needed to be able to export their products, the system's security was "dumbed down". Researchers subsequently discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and intrude on what should be private conversations. This incident underscores the larger policy problem: US companies are at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing against companies that do not have such hindrances. And now, for the first time in history, the Clinton Administration has DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online. All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting privacy. What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for commerce, education, and political discourse. ______________________________________________________________________________ HOW TO START OR STOP RECEIVING CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. Requests to unsubscribe that are sent to shabbir(a)vtw.org will be ignored. _____________________________________________________________________________ PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org _____________________________________________________________________________ End crypto-news =============================================================================

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