- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: remailer@soda
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

remailer@soda (formerly hh@soda) now uses pgp's implementatoin of idea for the encrypted response block function, making it much more secure (i hope). Good stuff. But could you do the limited-use destroy-the-key stuff before you release it please - I'm really dubious about this single key you're using. It destroys confidence in the system completely for me. G

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Fixing "Flooding" with Pretty Good Digital Postage
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney writes: > I wonder if this could be a concerted denial-of-service attack. Julf's > remailer has had the highest profile of any, and he certainly has his share > of enemies. Maybe somebody figured it was easy to shove a few thousand > messages a day his way. This makes the server slower and less convenient for > others to use, as well as putting an extra load on the trans-Atlantic links > just for anonymous messages. It also could cost someone some money which > could be blamed on Penet. This could be an attractive strategy for an enemy > of anonymity. (Hal knows this, but for those who are new....) Charging some small amount remailing effectively fixes this problem...if someone want to flood a site with thousands of letters a day, and each one costs them 10 or 20 cents, the remailer site makes a tidy profit, which can then be used to buy more machines, a T1 link or two, etc. This "digital postage" could be a simpler subset of digital money, e.g., collections of numbers which are bought it advance and which can be used once and only once. Anonymity comes in various ways, such as by trading with others (lots of issues here, but not unsolvable ones, I think). "Pretty Good Digital Postage" would solve a lot of these problems, as well as making the remailer economy more normal, more market-driven. (Ultimately, we want "Mom and Pop remailers," with incentives.) No central authority needs to force this to happen, nor to set postage rates. Let those who wish to remail "for free" continue to do so, let those who set their rates too high be taught a lesson in market economics, and let the invisible hand work its magic. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Public Hearings (Clip & DT!)
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> Subject: Clipper/DigTel Hearings Date: Tue, 19 Apr 1994 19:33:27 -0400 (EDT) To: eff-activists(a)eff.org (eff-activists mailing list) This will be in tomorrow's EFFector Online: Subject: Upcoming Congressional Hearings on Clipper and Digital Telephony ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Congressional hearings on the Administration's Clipper/Skipjack initiative, and the FBI's draft Digital Telephony surveillance bill, and their implications for privacy and First Amendment rights, are to be held April 27 and May 3, 1994. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), of the Senate Judiciary's Technology and the Law Subcommittee, has expressed skepticism of the Clipper encryption scheme, and has called for hearings to examine the problems of this proposal and its implementation. This effort is due in part to all of you who played a vital role by responding to EFF's grassroots campaign to raise fundamental questions about security and free speech issues in relation to the White House proposal. The Senate hearing will be held on April 27, 1994, 9:30am EDT, Hart Building Rm. 216, and should feature testimony from the Digital Security and Privacy Working Group (a broad coalition of industry and public interest organizations, including EFF), Trusted Information Systems' Steve Walker, Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, a representative of the Justice Dept. (possibly Atty. Gen. Janet Reno), NSA Director Adm. Mike McConnell, and Ray Kammer of NIST. For more information, contact Beryl Howell at the Senate Judiciary Committee: +1 202 224 3406 (voice), +1 202 224 9516 (fax) Note: this is the full Committee's fax, so address faxes to "Berly Howell, Technology and the Law Subcommittee" or delivery may be delayed. Following the Senate Hearings, the House Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Technology, Evironment and Aviation will be holding a hearing to address related civil liberties issues of both the Clipper scheme and the FBI "Digital Telephony" proposal, which so far remains unsponsored. The hearing will be chaired by Rep. Tim Valentine (D-NC), and is scheduled for May 3, 1994, 1pm EDT, Rayburn Building Rm. 2318. Witnesses will include Ray Kammer of NIST, NSA's Clint Brooks, representatives from industry in a panel that will include USTA and TIA, expert witnesses Dorothy Denning and David Farber, and EFF's Jerry Berman on behalf of DPSWG. FBI appears not to be making a showing. The House hearing is being held "to review the Administration's policies and legislative proposals dealing with electronic survellance, privacy and security, ...the adequacy of the Computer Security Act in protecting goverment computer systems", and "the Administration's proposed Digital Telephony legislation and decision to promulgate a voluntary federal encryption standard". Futher information can be provided by Tony Clark of the Subcommittee at +1 202 225 8115 (voice), +1 202 225 7815 (fax) -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994 -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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What the heck is this? Optical noise encryption?
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone know anything about this? How secure is this? If you have to have 2 "identical" lasers to pull this off, sounds like this would not be very secure, since there must be a pretty wide margin of error (I mean, how "identical" can 2 lasers be?) ____ from EduPage ____ OPEN SECRET Instead of using mathematical codes to scramble and unscramble messages, Georgia Tech physicists are devising a way of sending a message with electronic noise generated by a flickering laser. By connecting identical lasers over fiber optics, the same random pattern of noise is generated at both the sending and receiving end, and the receiving simply subtracts the noise to uncover the message. (Atlanta Journal-Constitution 4/7/94 E2) __ end _______________ -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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Tessera the PCMCIA Card
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Electronic Designs, April 4, 1994, by DAVE BURSKY New Products, Digital ICs (approximately 1/2 page) P. 148 CRYPTO ENGINE EASES PUBLIC-KEY SECURITY ... Developed by National Semiconductor, the iPower secure microcontroller holds the encryption algorithms, secret data, and the central processing unit that processes them. The chip was designed to remian secure from electrical probes through the signal pins, as well as from analytical probes that etch package and circuit layers. Any such penetration would cause the stored data to be "zeroed" before it could be read out. The iPower SPU consists of a 32-bit CPU core with on-chip ROM, a real-time clock, and a interfaceto off-chip nonvolatile (battery-backed_ RAM that holds scrambled data. The remaining blocks on the chip include the encryption engine, some battery-backed RAM to hold secured data (master keys, algorithms, or records) and a host-system bus interface. The SPU chip can be combined with off-chip low-power RAM, a battery, and a PCMCIA interface to squeeze the entire public-key token on a card that meets the PCMCIA's type-1 format. The cards, dubbed Tessera after the token ancient Romans used as a ticket or means of identification, can now be implemented at a relatively low cost (less than $100 dollars per user for large orders) compared with previous solutions. Nevertheless it provides the highest level of commercial security (FIPS 140-1 level 3). Encrypted data could provide positive identification of users, store private medical records, include authorization codes, or even perform secure transaction processing. ... ---------- Tessera was an identifier for slaves. FIPS 140-1 level 3 is not the highest commercial security level, (per FIPS 140-1, January 11, 1994): ... 1.4 Security Level 4 Security Level 4 provides the highest level of security. Although most existing products do not meet this level of security, some products are commercially available which meet many of the Level 4 requirements. For the Tessera we know utitilizing CAPSTONE, Escrowed Encryption is present. It would hardly qualify for performing secure transaction processing for say money transactions when the U.S. government and/or other law enforcement agencies have the ability to break open the monetary instrument, by obtaining a warrant or through "other authorized access". The degree of privacy afforded is not absolute, even to the extent of the strength of the cryptographic algorithm (assuming transmission of the Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF)). Likewise those able to obtain access have the ability to tamper with or spoof transactions. Were it used to control access to facilities, it would certainly enable "black bag jobs" both physical and virtual. (Its a type-1 PCMCIA card)

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Re: anti-clipper autobomber
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ouch! I'm sorry I asked. I won't bother finding out anything else about Serdar, thanks. :-) I don't have any time to waste on megalomaniacs. Can someone convince him to "share" his software? If not, we can write our own. :-)

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CMU's digicash
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: info(a)ivory.educom.edu (E-D-U-P-A-G-E) Subject: E-d-u-p-a-g-e 04/19/94 Date: Tue, 19 Apr 1994 21:12:53 -0400 ... SMALL CHANGE ON THE NET Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University are developing NetBill, a computerized system for tracking and billing users for small transactions, such as a ten-cent charge per document. The developers hope NetBill will evolve into a universal accounting system on the Internet. (Chronicle of Higher Education 4/20/93 A31)

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remailer@soda
by Erich von Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

remailer@soda (formerly hh@soda) now uses pgp's implementatoin of idea for the encrypted response block function, making it much more secure (i hope). the code will soon be released. e

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blacknet
by Tommy the Tourist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As someone who would know, for reasons which I cannot divulge, I can assure you that the second round of blacknet posting was pure bullshit. Perhaps the first round was actually a real thing, but the second round was merely something designed to cause annoyance, I believe. ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 7 lines: :: Response-Key: ideaclipper ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```%!S^P;+]AB?X9TW6\8WR:.P&2'N\0Q?\$?[H)LU*I'JZ5['LLG0QJ!` HF7+LDJLJ%R?^K*"80#@+H[-_HE-PS5;U5P)P0MJ[:LPSD&Y]'P?2/P`` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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Re: Remailer Musings
by trestrab＠GVSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

kitten writes: >On the other hand, part of the rules of being a common carrier are >that one is *required* to cooperate with appropriate >authorities to prevent this sort of abuse and to catch said >abusers if/when it happens. I suspect that Mr. Templeton's >lawyer could make a case that by setting up a remailer >where one cannot "trace calls," one is violating the >requirements of being a common carrier, and thus is >responsible for content. The PO delivers mail whether or not it has a return address, let alone whether it has a _correct_ return address, so I suspect that Mr. Templeton's lawyer would have to be very creative indeed to pass that analogy by anyone who isn't asleep at the wheel. I think his thinly veiled warnings re: remailer operator legal liability are an attempt to intimidate, as it can get expensive to defend yourself even from a very weak claim ....... just ask Phil Zimmerman. Jeff trestrab(a)gvsu.edu

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