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by nokia＠mail.kmsp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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"wisecrackers" by Levy in March Wired
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I sent this to <steven(a)echoync.com> but the address bounced. in any case I thougt I would cc: the list. this is a fun article to read, and I encourage everyone here to check it out. ------- Forwarded Message To: steven(a)echoync.com Subject: wisecrackers feedback Date: Tue, 27 Feb 96 18:12:02 -0800 From: "Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri(a)netcom.com> hello, I'm a cypherpunk subscriber. I liked your wired article on the cpunks ("wisecrackers") a lot. I thought I would mention some things: 1. you didn't seem to address the issue that factoring has not been proven to be difficult. a fast factoring algorithm is not ruled out by any existing mathematical theories, although no one expects that one exists. in other words, it is purely mathematician consensus that insists that factoring is a hard problem. hence RSA has not actually been proven to be a secure way of encoding information. its only secure because no one knows how to factor numbers quickly, and everyone is pretty confident that such a capability does not exist, although no one has proven it (yet). RSA rests on the difficulty of undoing a "trapdoor function" and as far as I know, there is no proof that any operation used for cryptography is intrinsically difficult to undo. (there are proofs that some functions are "intrinsically difficult" but they can't be used for crypto, because what you need in crypto is some operation that "is difficult when you don't have secret information, but is easy when you do."-- that is, not "always difficult". that's a trapdoor function, such as that used in RSA-- the secret knowledge makes the operation possible, whereas without it, it is "computationally impossible", i.e. possible in theory but not practice.) in fact there have been very incremental improvements in factoring algorithms. but no one can say, "factoring number [x] takes exactly [y] years" because no one knows what is the optimal factoring algorithm-- they only know the best one that has been *found* to date. (which is the quadratic sieve you mention). the question of whether factoring really is difficult is interesting to study. there is a whole class of computer problems called "NP" that can be shown to be "difficult" in an equivalent way. whether they are truly "difficult" is an open question. surprisingly, factoring has not yet been proven to be in this "NP" class, despite that many other problems have been. also, some mathematicians say that people have been trying to factor numbers since the dawn of time (well, at least since the greeks) so that if there was a good algorithm, we would probably have found it by now. I would argue against this position, saying that computers are a very recent invention on the horizon of human knowledge. the study of algorithmic complexity did not really begin in earnest until the 70's or so, again an extremely recent blip of time in regards to the history of human mathematical thought. 2. I think you were overplaying what Morris said to Zimmermann at the end. it made for good drama but I suspect the truth is more mundane. the fact that he asked "how much would the NSA spend for [x]" (where here [x] is "break PGP keys"). does not imply that they can actually do [x]. rather, what it implies is that their first inclination is to assume that something is theoretically possible, and then determine how much it would cost to do [x]. then, they determine whether the stategic results of obtaining [x] are worth its cost. in other words, the NSA has to approach all cryptoanalysis from this basic point: can we justify the cost based on the stategic value of the intelligence. they have to make this choice all the time as to where they invest their resources based on the payoff. their first question is, "what is the strategic value of cracking [x] code". I believe that they are run internally such that projects that are feasible and that they have the money are not actually carried out just because they are possible-- the strategic value has to be determined. what Morris was asking Zimmerman was, "how much would it be worth to an attacker to be able to read PGP messages". the NSA might well come to the conclusion that nobody important is using PGP and therefore trying to break it to read their messages is a waste of time. my opinion is that what was implied by Morris's position. frankly, I think the threat of prosecution against Zimmermann suggests the NSA may not be able to break the RSA cypher at certain key lengths no matter how much of our tax money they burn trying. 3. a group broke a 384 bit PGP key a little while ago. I was surprised how little coverage this got. perhaps it was due to the choice of keys. some are more "respectable" than others. <g> Paul Leyland and Jim Gillogly (Derek Atkins maybe?) were involved as well as some cpunks. anyway, keep up the good work. (heh. loved the description of the media outlets as "bottom feeders"). bye ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: PGP backdoor? (No, I'm not paranoid.)
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

perry(a)piermont.com wrote: > >Mark Bainter writes: <snip> >> However, this guy tells me >> that he met Phil at defcon and phil told him that he co-operated with >> the government and gave them information that would enable them to crack >> key's for versions later than 2.3. I don't know whether to believe him >> or not, >Your informant is taking extremely good drugs. You should find out who >his connection is should you want to get any. > >Perry Dear Perry, many peoples hear many things. The difficult part is to figure out what is the validity of what ones hears. I personnally heard a things or two, even if I am not involved in any way in the trade of crypto. I heard them through outside channels, completely independently from any crypto-activist, wether pro or con (CPunks et al or Govt). Theses sources are of utmost qualifications. Wether or not there is a "vast conspiracy" either to make us believe that, for an example, PGP *is* or *is not* crackable we *do not* know. Every side have vested interests. Many opinions that PGP is secure rest on *actual* evaluation of our computing capabilities, actual or forecasted. And experts are *very often* wrong. Have a look at history of sciences... You'll realize that most accomplishments were held as impossible even shortly before they were discovered/created. Such is the history of intra-abdominal surgery, of space flight and of many other knowledge and/or technology. In most instances of life, it is much wiser to realize that *we do not know* and accepting ignorance as such rather than adopting the first tempting rationalization that comes to mind. Because in the former case, you still have the possibility to enhance life by learning, while in the second, you can only hope that you did not adopt a wrong belief that will eventually cost you dearly. Remember, when an ostrich puts it's head in the sand, which part of it's anatomy it is showing to the world... So, why waste bandwith with a post that apparently mainly seems to be aimed at dismissing somebody but brings *absolutely no* new knowledge to the discussion? Please, next time, post privately. Funny jokes are, IMHO, welcome because they have some life-enhancing value. So please, at least be funny... Your post makes me wonder for what terribly conspiring organisation are you working for... JFA The collectivists be DAMNED! **** OLD KEY: DO NOT USE ANYMORE UNLESS FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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Re: ViaCryptPGP 4.0?! (was Re: PGP integrated into Z-Mail)
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Derek Atkins <warlord(a)MIT.EDU> writes: > > And, what does this have to do with ViaCrypt PGP 4.0? Would it be 3.0 > > compatible or is it something entirely different? > > I dont know. I dont work for ViaCrypt, and they have been fairly > secretive in their work. For all I know, they've made ViaCrypt PGP > 4.0 completely incompatible with PGP 2.6.2 and PGP3. I would have thought you and Colin would have some communication with Phil regarding PGP3, since PGP is his trademark. The web page referred to it as being in beta, so maybe they are working with the old specs... could also be that they completely rewrote and improved on the old version. (Of course if I have questions I should address them to ViaCrypt...) Rob. --- Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key.

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NEW MEGA FAST INTERFACE + 30 ULTRA HOT JPEGS AT LIGHTNING DOWNLOAD SPEED
by STUFFED NEWS DAILY 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Top Spy Hawks GAK
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Admiral William O. Studeman Accepts Position on Premenos Board of Directors Concord, Calif., 28 Feb 1996 -- Premenos Technology Corp., a leading provider of electronic data interchange (EDI) software solutions for electronic commerce applications, today announced the election of Admiral William O. Studeman, U.S. Navy-retired, to its Board of Directors effective immediately. Studeman will also act as consultant on special projects including security and encryption issues. Admiral Studeman, age 56, is the former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and served for five months in 1995 as the acting Director of Central Intelligence. He retired from the Navy in October 1995. Prior to his assignment at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Studeman was the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), and before that was the Director of Naval Intelligence. In these positions, Studeman was involved in attempting to develop public policies and technologies that addressed the complex and often conflicting issues of enhanced economic competitiveness, law enforcement's warranted requirement for information transparency in pursuit of criminal investigations, national security interest in combating potential information warfare threats, and the country's overall increased need for enhanced protection of its information-related systems and applications. In commenting on his election to the Board of Premenos, Studeman stated that "Premenos is not only a leader in facilitating the promising future of electronic commerce, it is the first company in the marketplace with a product line for enhanced protection, security and integrity for the Internet and other electronic communications-related business transactions." Studeman added, "In working with Lew Jenkins and others in the company, I have an opportunity to better frame the government-industry dialogue and define the infrastructure, standards, regulatory, technical and other directional factors which must be addressed for electronic commerce -- a rapidly evolving industry segment so fundamental to the future of the American lifestyle and national security." Lew Jenkins, chairman and founder of Premenos said, "The infrastructure for moving critical business data over the Internet is crucial to the success of electronic commerce. We welcome Admiral Studeman to our team and look forward to his help in developing a trusted model for the electronic commerce market and establishing a solid infrastructure similar to the stringent military requirements that have been in place for decades." About Premenos Corp. Premenos is setting the agenda for electronic commerce and EDI through open networks such as the Internet. Premenos EDI software is an enabling strategy for transforming how corporations conduct business in extended enterprises using electronic communications. Templar -- a suite of software and services that enable businesses to send and receive EDI documents securely and reliably over the Internet -- was awarded the EMA '95 Electronic Commerce Product Excellence Award recognizing the most innovative new product debuted at EMA's annual conference. Premenos products support the IBM AS/400, RISC System/6000, HP 9000, SunSparc, Windows 3.x, NT and Windows 95. Premenos has a worldwide presence with sales offices in California, London and Paris. Contact Premenos World Wide Web (WWW) home page at http://www.premenos.com to access over 3000 pages of information on electronic commerce, EDI, standards, as well as Premenos corporate information materials. --

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Re: Strassmann's Anonymous
by William Marlow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To all, I feel compelled to add some comments to this lively discussion: The point was that we all need to be aware of the use of remailers as possible parts of evil schemes. The recent revelations by some that cyberspace reflects real life is the case here. Remailers provide a means for the "dark side" to communicate, but they also provide the means for "the good side" as well. Mr. Byfield's assertions are most likely correct that remailers are used most of the time for "non-evil" purposes. Awareness of a problem is the first step in everyone addressing the best ways that we as a society (both Cyber and otherwise) deal with it. I have been targeted by those who wish to do harm using remailers. It is not a fun thing to deal with, but it is a fact of Cyberspace. I personally like remailers, ones which have no governments, good guys, bad guys or anyone else monitoring them, but we as a society must deal with all of these elements. Bill Marlow ------------------------------ Date: 2/28/96 5:02 PM To: Marlow, William From: t byfield A few observations on Paul Strassman's response to John R. Levine; I've rearranged it a bit for clarity, edited out a handful of lines, and whittled down the CCs. At 4:01 PM 2/28/96, Paul A. Strassmann wrote: John R. Levine: > >It's been possible for at least a century to mail letters with no > >return address. It's equally possible to use post office boxes and > >mail drops, or even a chain of mail drops, to have two-way exchanges > >of messages between people who don't know each other's identities. > > > >As far as I can tell, the existence of anonymous postal mail hasn't > >caused any great trouble over the past century. Can you explain why > >the appearance of similar facilities for on-line mail presents a > >greater problem? Paul Strassmann: >Since the idea that Internet remailers are not much different than >anonymous letters sent by mail is an often repeated theme, it warrants a >comment: > >1. Your statement that anonymous post mail hasn't caused any "great >trouble" over the past century does not stand up well. I have not done a >statistical sampling of incidents, but I wish to note that all my exposures >(personal and otherwise) to anonymous post have been associated with >extortion, spreading of unwarranted rumors and unsubstantiated accusations. >Most ransom notes in kidnapping cases have been conveyed by this means. Obviously, kidnapping and extortion demands sent anonymously through the post would attract far more attention than innocuous uses would--as did the recent incident in which someone donated (by anonymous mail) a million-dollar McDonald's sweepstakes ticket to a children's hospital. I daresay that for every such criminal instance you could cite, there are hundreds or even thousands of instances of completely benign "secret santas" and anonymous valentines from teenage "secret admirers," for example--which would hardly bear out your claim that >In civilized society the receipt of anonymous post has been always >associated with unacceptable social behavior. That reputation persists. Valentines and gifts sent anonymously will no doubt strike some people as trivial in the face of "information warfare" and other such gothic notions, and perhaps they are; but I can only wonder what exactly these valiant strategists think they're protecting and from whom they're protecting it. >2. Your assertion that one can be equally anonymous by post as with e-mail >does not stand up. > >First, anonymous mail is likely to carry stamp cancellation marks, which >provides an important clue as to the origin of the message. > >Second, criminal forensic techniques have been used very successfully in >tracing identifying marks, such as typewriter characteristics, Xerox copy >drum defects and other tricks such as genetic identifications of saliva >remnants left from licking a stamp or sealing the envelope. There are many >others. Anonymous e-mail does not convey such clues. > >Third, anonymous mail operates on a totally different scale and with a >different technology than post. The fact that automobiles were originally >called "horseless carriages" does not make them possess the attributes of >horse-carriages. When technology scales up from thousands to hundred >millions, the potential consequences are not subject to simple >extrapolation. By the same token, the fact that law enforcement agencies have, over the last two centuries, developed the forms of forensic analysis you mention doesn't mean that these techniques are a god-given right whose shortcomings in the face of new technologies need to be compensated for. These techniques are, as you point out, contingent on the traits peculiar to the objects being examined. Postal mail consists of integral physical objects which can bear these kinds of traces; email does not. Nor does shouting--yet I've never heard anyone suggest that fans at a football game should preface what they yell with their name and their address, or that their failure to do so constitutes a threat to national security. >3. Anonymous remailers have been conduits for misconduct ranging from >"spamming" - e.g. launching thousands of messages to saturate server >capacity - to massive distribution of "sniffers" that make a number of >software-based fire-walls inoperative. This objection remailers is a red herring: giveaway ten-hour accounts on AOL and other services, hacked accounts, accounts obtained under false names, and accounts obtained under a True Name are much more notorious sources of spam than are remailers. If spam is your objection, you're barking up the wrong tree. As for the "massive deployment of 'sniffers'," anyone capable of doing this or of using information gained by this means hardly needs remailers. >4. The most likely scenarios of an information assault on the information >infrastructure that performs essential social functions such as message >switching, transportation dispatching, public security communications, etc. >always commences with a saturation dispatch of a wide variety of >intelligent agent via anonymous remailers. "Most likely scenarios" are speculative: something that hasn't happened yet doesn't "always commence with" anything. >There is a long list of anti-social and criminal behavior that is greatly >facilitated by a guarantee of untraceability. The repertoire of such >malfeasances is sufficiently long that it does not warrant further elaboration. This chicken-or-egg formulation suggests that a milieu in which total traceability is possible would greatly diminish criminal behaviors and activity. Perhaps, but as you yourself have pointed out, such a milieu is utterly antithetical to anything remotely resembling a free democracy. Since the alternative to untraceability isn't viable, there's no point in bringing it up. >Now, I would like to repeat that I believe that anonymous remailers are >here to stay - at least in democratic societies. However, that does not >mean that one should continue insisting that anonymous remailes are not a >different phenomenon than an envelope containing a message that does not >have a return address. If you were the final arbiter on the question, your repeated claim that "remailers are here to stay" would be much more comforting. Unfortunately, the force of almost all your arguments is, in a nutshell, that remailers are associated with and facilitate criminal and/or terrorist activities--and that suggests to me that if you had your druthers, they would be illegalized. I'm curious: Do you or do you not support the continued existence of nonregulated, nonlicensed, and publicly accessible remailers? (Please note that this is a different question than "Are remailers here to stay?") regards Ted Byfield ------------------ RFC822 Header Follows ------------------ Received: by cpqm.saic.com with SMTP;28 Feb 1996 17:00:13 +0100 Received: from panix.com by cpmx.saic.com; Wed, 28 Feb 96 16:55:25 -0800 Received: (from tbyfield@localhost) by panix.com (8.7/8.7/PanixU1.3) id TAA08093; Wed, 28 Feb 1996 19:55:05 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <v02120d0aad5a771d4753@DialupEudora> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-PGP-KF: 75 7C E9 84 00 E1 1B 7A AA 23 AE 59 BD 19 4B BE X-XXX: If you're under 18, DO NOT READ THIS MESSAGE X-Subliminal-Message: Date: Wed, 28 Feb 1996 20:01:52 -0500 To: paul(a)strassmann.com From: tbyfield(a)panix.com (t byfield) Subject: Re: Strassmann's Anonymous Remailers Paper Cc: William_Marlow(a)cpqm.saic.com, raph(a)CS.Berkeley.EDU, denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu, KAHIN(a)HULAW1.HARVARD.EDU, steve(a)method.com (Steve Strassmann), dolanvp(a)consultancy.com, RON_KNECHT(a)cpqm.saic.com, ALGERJ(a)NDU.EDU, GIESSLERF(a)NDU.EDU, cypherpunks(a)toad.com

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Copyrighted code and executable ASCII
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since several have asked and it serves several points, I present the following (also am interested in coderpunks - does this constitute a qualification ?). Point the first. A couple of years ago questions arose concerning executable ASCII. I had played with the concept back around the time I was doing memory maps of Bendix 930s and Mil-Std-1750s but never went very far with it. The concept was ressurected c.a. 1988 with a concern about multi-platform viruses (not talking macros or portable source, but true multi-platform binaries - can to the conclusion that dual platform was doable, triple possible but very difficult, and four bl**dy unlikely. Around 1990 some people in Germany developed a program (sorry, I do not recall the citation but wanted to acknowlege the fact - believe the program is on SimTel mirrors). That program was buggy and not suitable for E-mail through certain gateways and recipients. In 1994, there was a flurry of concern about E-Mail vulnerability and the subject came up again. We have had "ASCIIrizers" for some time: TekHex was one of the first I was aware of, then UUencode, PGP "Ascii Armor", and others. All required an client side file for decoding or the even cruder DEBUG scripting mechanisms. Looking at an Intel CPU instruction map, it became apparent that there was an entire class of instructions contained wholly within the RFC-822 compliant area. The result was my 1994 "Christmas Card". Since then I improved the algorithm somewhat reducing the first 129 character line to 64 characters (not sure why that was a target other than the max & min terms said yes and that is what UUencode uses so is known to work). This brings up the second point. Rewriting Copyrighted algorithms as is being discussed in relation to Royal Crown Cola (tm). Was once told that one test was that at least 20% of the code must be different. Now when using a compiler this is difficult to demonstrate because the included libraries make up much of the code. Assembly programming is different. Sometimes things must be done in a particular order to work at all. The enclosed code is an example: the bulk of the program is trivial, compression is lousy but that was not the intent. The key is in the first lime of code that makes it all possible, operable on everything from an 8088 to a 486 (do not know about Pentium - do not have one, nor a power PC but no one who received last year's card complained). It may be possible to change some of the registers and possibly some of the order but the stack is the stack. So here is a question: can that first line be changed sufficiently to satisfy the "independantly developed" tests whatever they may be. No credit for lengthening the line. Kudos for shortening but would be surprised if more than a couple of bytes could be removed while maintaining the functionality (some things were done to maintain compatability with the different pipeline mechanisms used by Intel and at least one kludge was necessary to avoid a bug in the Intel microcode). For those who would like the source code: sorry, it does not exist, all programming of the first line was done using DEBUG. There is an .ASM of the whole file but it contains a long "DB" directive. I have signed the code for authenticity. The executable file must start with the first "X" as the first byte (could have put logo in front. Didn't.). All the "P"s were deliberate. Will only work with true .COM files up to about 30k. Does not need to be so limited, just is & has nothing to do with the first line, just is a PoP & I was lazy 8*). Coderpunks are also welcome to comment. Warmly, Padgett ps have launched .COM directly from ccMail attachment before. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- XP[@PPD]5`P(f#(f((f?5!QP^P_u!2$=po}l=!!rZF*$*$ =0%GF%!!%PP$P$Ps- $l%gmZ$rl6lW$rm6mWlVl6m=ldmAlv%fmvmB%Xm6lW%Xm6mWl6m6m=ld%ylVmqlJ mqlRmqlNmqlBlWl6m6l/m'l/m3mql8mrm4mql:mAm1mBlal6m0l1%f%r%r%rl&$W %z${$z%yl"%qm"l&$a%Vl&$j%b$`%_%`$X$X$|l&%z%v%v$xl1m0l&%q%[$[$W%` $Y$X%Yl&%bl&${%q%k%ll&$_%^$\%`l&$X%[l&%b$[l&%r%i%q%n%nl&%`$V%`%a %X$X%b$a$\%`l&%Y$X$Y%^$[%_l&l1m0l&%n$[$W%[%a%b$X%^%[$[$ul&%f%r%r %rl&$t$_%^$\%`$[%b%\%`$sl&l1m0l&%k$Y%^%_%^$[%b$\l&$_%^$\%`l&%W%^ $\$\l&$a%`l&$Y%`$[%b%\%`$`l&${%k$i%ol&l)l$m0l1l$l6l$l6l6l6l6l6l6 $rm6lWlvl6l#lql0lvm:l6%Xl0lYm5m6l\m2mPm&lZl6$lmPm&$omql+mem6$ym7 lqmJm5lGl#mrm+lql4$tl&%Xm4$ol7mRmAm<$ym@mqlK%jmql7l^${l=l_mqm;m` m$%c%c%t%q%k%Xm3l`l$%c$t%l$Xm#lYm7m6mAlX$o%^$\%`l&$`%[%`%Yl&$[%[ $Xl&$^%b$W%`l&${%q%k%ll&%`$V$X%`$[%Y%^%[$[l$%fmumBl4mql=mr$wmpl5 mWmPl4m!m:mr$smrl5%gm=ld%cl\$gmPm&%Y%YlY$ol5l^m5mB%Xm7%q%[%X$\$` l&$[%[$Xl&$Y%`$[%b%\%`l&${%q%k%ll&$_%^$\%`l&$X%[l&${%k$i%o${l$lY $Yl5l^l3mB%nm7%q%[%X$\$`l&$[%[$Xl&%[$Z%`$[l&$_%^$\%`${l$l6l6l6l6 l6l6l6l6l&%q%[$[$W%`$Y%Y%^%[$[l&$Z$Y%[%a%`%Y%Yl&%a%[%\%\%`$[%a%^ $[%_${${${l$lZl6$tmPm&$Yl]memql5mqmKlZl6%tmPm&$Ylcmemsl5lYmol5l\ m2mPm&mZ$ql6lYlLl4lBlsm6%ym@mZ%xl6lBlOl6mNmFlB$Wm6lZl6%smql'msl5 mZl6l5lYl*m4mPm&%Ym&lYm8l5l^m4mBlWl7l&$q%b$`l&$_%^$\%`l&$Y%`%b$` l&$Y%`$Z%[$Y$X%`$`l&l$mqlRmul:l6$Sm5mBmvl6mZl5l6lYlMl4lB$xm6mZ$q l6lY$xm5lBm!m6mA$qm0l1%c%c%c%c%f%r%r%r%c%a%[$Z%V$Y%^%_$^$X%cl"%q m"%c%z%v%v$x%c$a%V%c$j%b$`%_%`$X$X$|%c%b$\$\%c$Y%^%_$^$X%Y%c$Y%` %Y%`$Y$W%`$`%c%c%c%c%clBm+l6l\m2lYmum5l^l6mB$vl7${${${%a%[%\$Z$\ %`$X%`${l$l\$smql'msl5mPm&l\$smql'mql5mPm&mUlBm2l6mNmFlBm^l6mB$v m7mU%jlWl*m4mWl*m3%ylV%ymIl`lbm6$Xl5l7mUlvmQl$$tl^%Wl4$t$|%Tm5lv mQ$nl!mUl;lJlNlBlqmElslFma%pmum8l&$Tm2%ym@mf$xm5ma$f$r$jlEmQ%fmf mam6m5mVm5mV$Yl4memam6mUlBlkm7lZl6%rmql+mpl5mPm&%Ym)lYm0l4l^l2mB l_m8%i%^$U%`%{$p%`$\%`$X%`l&%`$Y$Y%[$Y${l$lZl6$gmql+mrl5mq$smpl5 mPm&lY%xl4l^m2mBlsm8%k$Y%^%_%^$[%b$\l&${%q%k%ll&$_%^$\%`l&$X%[%[ l&$a%^%_$|l&%`$V%^$X%^$[%_${l$lYl*m3lZl6$rmql'mql5mPm&$Ym6mUlY%Z l4l^m3mB$mm8%p$Y$Y%[$Yl&%W$Y%^$X%^$[%_l&$X%[l&${%q%k%ll&$_%^$\%` ${l$l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6 l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6l6 l6l6${%[$Y%_l6$Z$Z$f$j%e$r$j$j$p%d%x$b$jl"$_m%l"$_l"l"$_%s%xm&%j $j$c$j%c%Xm&$yl$%t$Z%[%T$\%tm&m&$Y$e$ol!l$l!l$l&%t$zm$%o$om$m&m& m$$j$jl$$jl$$j%Y%|m0l1$Z$Z$l%gmZ$rl6lW$rm6mWlVl6m=ldmAlv%fmvmB%X m6lW%Xm6mWl6m6m=ld%ylVmqlJmqlRmqlNmqlBlWl6m6l/m'l/m3mql8mrm4mql: mAm1l6l6l6pp ____YAAA_copyright_(C)_1994_by_Padgett,_all_rights_reserved_____ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7.1 iQCVAwUBMTXclIVuK+48ORdVAQHq4QP/TgAirDLN2dONcfdmfPK02mjTHF2jg4zY nFqWZ9CuirrD+THVszeDbHjwmyBAgZVnnesDwVIDaNc4kdySVrPVwtX5xgA1sjXE oKrJxP5+YRTL5M0dbQUmbWLsEK9g2IToAqWIODVLHOI8K5l99/CQz8J+71zWzu9e VaQP4Mppdy4= =C3xl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Site certificates?
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Can someone point me in the direction of who I need to talk to in order to get security certificates for a Web server I'm setting up? I sent email to MS and Netscape, and neither has deigned to respond in 4 days.... Thanks Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMTSCEcVrTvyYOzAZAQG2hwP+L0tquQzMQC8XC9azPJsuFGbFq0ijTftI sGQIA9ddphwL+bWdD0utDfMBrRxPFqM1kTZNZKzGTU4VUokoBUh/wPiqkim8+v61 cQFAIK8Xl3IbqnZfjMjW3rfmSYKaPXEVRHd0ssOFV535s3K3rSZN9ck0qxioyjK/ aEgCxcXRsXg= =kCqo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> For privacy tools: http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/1148

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"Louis Freeh is a Cocksucker"
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have seen this meme scrawled on the sides of payphones and on train doors along the Red Line of Chicago's "Ell." Is this some form of organized protest or the actions of one person? While not directly cypherpunks related I cannot think of too many other types of people who would produce this graffito. Any responsible cypherpunks care to raise their hands?

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