- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Fwd: trigger locks on public weapons
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1998 17:23:38 -0800 To: rah(a)shipwright.com From: Vinnie Moscaritolo <vinnie(a)vmeng.com> Subject: Fwd: trigger locks on public weapons > Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1998 17:22:51 -0800 > To: staff(a)goal.org > From: Vinnie Moscaritolo <vinnie(a)vmeng.com> > Subject: trigger locks on public weapons > Cc: > Bcc: > X-Attachments: > > congratulations on your move to force the MA legislators to eat their > dogfood by placing trigger locks on the Besses in the state house.. I am > an ex resident of the People's Democratik Socialist Commonwealth of > Massachusetts and was recently visiting the Rude bridge in Concord, > showing my wife the very place where America started. I happened to > visit the museum at the bridge and noticed that that there were three > functional Brown Besses in display, and non of them were properly locked. > I was appalled to see this, after all this is a place where many visitors > come to see where freedom started, where the Colonists stood against the > king who only wished to protect them by confiscating their guns.. and to > find that the weapons displayed there were did not comply with the law of > the day quite dismayed me.. but I thought that if I informed the folks at > GOAL you might be able to contact the propler authorities and set things > straight.. > > good luck my brothers.. Vinnie Moscaritolo http://www.vmeng.com/vinnie/ Fingerprint: 3F903472C3AF622D5D918D9BD8B100090B3EF042 ------------------------------------------------------- Those who hammer their swords into plows, will plow for those who don't." --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Triple DES "standard"?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 29 Dec 1998 19:11:37 -0500 To: jehill(a)nexis.org From: Vin McLellan <vin(a)shore.net> Subject: Re: Triple DES "standard"? Cc: Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)tillerman.nu>, Cryptography(a)C2.net Sender: owner-coderpunks(a)toad.com Rodney Thayer reported: >> Curiously enough, there seem to be no references to a standard before >> the X9.52 effort, which appears to be only a year or two old. NIST calls >> Triple DES a "private" standard. Josh Hill <jehill(a)nexis.org> responded variously: >? >Before things become standards, they are just good ideas. Triple DES is >widely used, despite the fact that there is no absolute standard. The >draft standard, itself, is actually quite straight forward... Nothing >really interesting about it, aside from ANSI's blessing. >NIST does the "we'll just refer to another standard and call it ours" >thing a fair bit... Look at FIPS 186-1: The RSA signature scheme accepted >is the one specified in ANSI X9.31. Actually, as I recall the tale, the Amercian Bankers Association-sponsored ANSI-accredited X.9 Committee's blessing of DES3 was itself pretty interesting. I understood that the NSA lobbied bitterly against the X9 effort to standardize 3DES as an ANSI standard, insisting that DES would surfice until its successor was chosen. A couple years ago, when the X9 committee -- or maybe one of the X9 crypto subcommittees -- rejected that advice and initially recommended that 3DES be made a standard, I was told that the NSA rep angrily declared that 3DES would _never_ get an export license and would never be shipped overseas. (Which may have put a damper on the 3DES standardization effort;-) Unfortunately, these standards development efforts usually escape the media's attention. Anyone on the list active in X9 and can give us the real story? Since the birth of X9 in the late 70s, the US National Security Agency has its own representative on the X9 Committee. As one might expect, the NSA has traditionally had significant influence over the ANSI "F" (crypto) subcommittees and cryptographic standards in financial services. There was a time when Ft. Meade effectively dictated those standards. Now, that is not necessarily so.... (After the NSA blundered so badly in trying to force the Banking industry to switch from DES to CCEP/Clipper in the late 80s, the Agency's mesmerizing control broken. The initial intro of CCEP/Clipper -- at an ABA meeting -- proposed that only US owned institutions could have access to Clipper. At the time, as I recall, maybe 10-15 percent of the US banks were foreign owned;-) The bankers couldn't believe that these idiots -- obviously so ignorant about the workings of the industry they were trying to defacto regulate -- were from the NSA of Legend and Lore.) I always felt that the NSA's alienation of the Bankers was probably the single most important factor in the collapse of the government's Cipper campaign. Suerte, _Vin ----- Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin(a)shore.net> 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548 -- <@><@> -- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: PWL files
by Chris Rowley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > I've been trying to figure out the method of encryption for OSR2 Win95 and > > Win98 *.pwl files and I was hoping someone had some details about the > > method used. [...] Does anyone have it figured out? > > I think Peter Gutmann and someone else figured it out sometime ago. Peter Gutmann figured out the old system. In reaction the system was changed by the OSR2 patch and in all further releases of Windows. What exactly it was changed to is the question. Chris.

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distribution scheme
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

forget my earlier mail saying I had uploaded to funet.fi - seems I get "permission denied" from both there and csua.berkeley.edu even in the incoming dirs. am I missing something here? please tell me where I can upload. Falcon

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FINAL REMINDER: New PGP and Mixmaster keys at squirrel.owl.de
by Johannes Kroeger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New keys at squirrel already in use; old ones expire on January 1, 1999. Key for user ID: Squirrel Remailer <mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> (EXPIRE:1999-07-01) 2048-bit key, key ID 912CA289, created 1998/11/25 -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3in mQENAzZcErkA2gEIAMQpXNh1i9puYy/XwQIA8UrK+3BIPyCd92GBCqubdsJeEhAV cOCwfk3g0XGBDYiJBSkCqHG06IZMnXU6BVyukcLEUrmJXeyum7Nc6287ZBT92Ebm XCivROmMiOi2ZpdLUf2Na3QbFyUbZDu/vFTL64wJh3pqjP6BokpVoJi6IIGj7AS3 /Hi2iX9+jP80KUYfMZO0lAW3lTwXYtyduRuT8EoV71/+GTu/DNSBylXdR1zZVueH 531jDOysZbK+kqdlBc3U6GZYe405WVY8xbOprojI4nguPLKC19biLu2hJfFIYElX 7wvBBOMrIlUisvvsO1xm7XKdo/69fYC945EsookABRG0O1NxdWlycmVsIFJlbWFp bGVyIDxtaXhAc3F1aXJyZWwub3dsLmRlPiAoRVhQSVJFOjE5OTktMDctMDEpiQEV AgUTNlwUCLwPSJ4oQv5pAQE+iQgAzYGKS1rNcqQLzeKPAIfX0NrPfuHPWww+b9ZF y9d/dTPeR6dmdX4DbVguuYsRAO6rttklsYJRXpRN1CPO4pFGdSZhbfD2aaKQmADX Y3x0Jjf83jZhHo4sgWF6KxzZXNnZgao1Kkk4BNS8uRBy1jc6e/rTMhRrVABu5nt2 /NZEW8RrrRP3gOb1OSypieBKAfShxskLTiV5yi9rm2IRNhrRnadAygFiKjKBWIGy gKQgWuFNltXrMWriMffg5TVe+PjlTVIynkM9gjdQgE/cg56rqHkv/H5I6UsY0fol dYuNuATT+a1fbflqTfdjZYryEJZR3xndrCQk6wJbu8IMq8U1aokBFQMFEzZcE3oe XusFsYA8HQEBMYMIAJW3NETaKOaj3HA+mzHtmKf5GybI5yBBQ++NchMYOVBcJlHU 3euZx0kjgkjdm2SFZIZnjaLqYS7Nk4IJYMcvsGBrEtk7TFtyEZ8uHOQgUN1nbmOv tYr8gO7OyS/XULjz8uCuEvDza2dIBBiWstgxUOoKjMSXrjlMT4MRYPUphZS7Wf5n aNE2Y2cD0ANZIFbB3afc96TNtnO+VKnH2hIPWDogoSVGCO4Y1wqsH+VwiRwoLPcY R5qiWITbK6Ax3JCHv/a27VMiv4uHNDLU+FGq/8ksk9/EclWN2+Ni3qMD1aI/pTtt 3XhHBc8tLgWpW8J7Yy9DNxZmaAArqut4FqjPudKJARUDBRA2XBMRfYC945EsookB AQyuB/9hDivQELGw37CwDIgqmqdF31SpJeuHxhm4/BQg3Gc0Ezn3WaetkheX9p9+ lsEEq36oknIyg8GYgTr3nsRTgJXuwssB0SkiB+x3CkYegsuCgh30xAaxVB3RlIfU ny75Ltxl52p387bJ2sDc3STUQBEAy0HfjlgD98p7IO38D/rw/WWrXTko6rCcnuEx AzJ2Lx9klS0GLq/PxS9wK3V/5VM4rxMEhcnog+lHF1/GpvGnXAtNJztqqgdijjW8 C8qEJRKKh9c5PTCxBfwqLOHxsGCeBaEDzjO/LyCEohYlwZhBlVqN56zS6z0y7yBL AAF5qt39x2jsrKSH9p9fpZO06WuB =Yqyh -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de 3de441b2b721e4853259ae6952a0cfca 2.0.4b43 CNm -----Begin Mix Key----- 3de441b2b721e4853259ae6952a0cfca 258 AATdqb9WxExPliCxZIZ9GZyXCGZZiDa4bwZPSP4S lz7UORYAZu+rjGDinf4lfmPxfZIcF0X1oefLetF4 TxN4dZxmJWqz65NufN7pu4BngA1yGcV5Mn7LqbJh 8kqlGEdUFeb4LJTxhYW1flD1HEfmfE4nuYMQniSb oXLX1rypyH9OiwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key----- -- Johannes Kroeger <hanne(a)squirrel.owl.de> Send mail with subject "send pgp-key" to get my PGP key

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Happy New Year 1999 - Export Trade
by anali 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

30-12-1998. DEAR SIR, WE ARE ONE OF LEADING EXPORT ORGANIZATION IN SRI LANKA.WE WISH FORWARD OUR EXPORT MARKETS INFORMATINS FOR YOUR REFERENCES.OUR EXPORT COMMDITIES DETAIL GIVEN BELOW: EXPORT COMMODITIES- ******************* 1.FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. 2.CEYLON BLACK TEA IN BAGS,PACKETS OR BULK. 3.CEYLON HERBAL TEA IN BAGES,PACKETS OR BULK.DETAILS AS FOLLOWS: i.Bevila Tea (Sida Racemosa)Recommended for Reumatic pains/Cooling. ii.Ginger Tea (Zingiber Officinale)Recommended for Stimulant/Carminative. iii.Beli Tea (Aegle Marmelos)Recommended for Chronic Fever/Piles. iv.Ranawara Tea (Cassia Auriculata)Improve complexion in Woman. v.Gotukola Tea (Centella Asiatica)Improve the Memory. vi.Cinnamon Tea (Cinnamomum Zeylanicum)Recommended for Reumatism/Cold. vii.Clove Tea (Eugenia Caryophyllata)Recommended for Cold/Stomachie. viii.Polpala Tea (Aerva Lanata)Recommended for Kidney flushing. ix.Lantana Tea (Phyla Nodiflora)Recommended as Diuretic/Carminative. 4.CEYLON HERBAL PORRIDGE IN CONSUMER PACKETS.(HATHAWARIYA,- GOTUKOLA,WEL-PENELA,MUKUNUWENNA & IRAMUSU). 5.CEYLON HERBAL TEA (BLOOD PURIFYING TEA)- TEPHROSIA PURPUREA,TINOSPORA CORDIFOLIA,PHYLLANTHUS EMBLICA,- EVOLVULUS ALSINOIDES & CASSIA AURICULATA. 6.CEYOLN HERBAL TEA (SLIMMING TEA)-GYRINOPS WALLA,- BAUHINIA VARIEGATE,ATALANTIA MISSIONIS,MINOSA PUDICA- & CALOTROPIS GIGANTEA. 7.SPICES (BLACK PEPPER,CARDAMONS,CLOVES,GINGER,MACE,NUTMEG TUMERIC AND CINNAMON). 8.FRESH COCONUTS AND DESICCATED COCONUT. 9.FIBER(COIR PRODUCTS)-FIBER MOSSTICK,HUSK CHIPS,COMPRESSED COCOHUSK,DUST,PEAT. 10.SEA FOODS.DETAILS FOLLOWS: i.Fish -Frozen/Chilled ii.Shrimp. iii.Black Tiger Farm Prawns. iv.Giant Tiger Prawns. v.Cattle fish. vi.Octopus. vii.Live Prawns. vii.Lobster (Live or Frozen) Processing and Packing can be arranged to suite your requirements.All shipments by Air and Carry Sri Lanka Government Health Certificate of Origin. 11.RICE AND DHAL (RED LENTILS ). 12.NARURAL RUBBER. 13.SUGER. 14.INTERNATIONAL BRAND NAME CIGARETTES. 15.INTERNATIONAL BRAND NAME BEER AND NON ALCOHOLIC BEER AND LIQUOR. 16.ALL INTERNATIONAL BRAND NAME PERFUMES. 17.CRUDE OIL,PETROLEUM BY - PRODUCTS. 18.MEAT PRODUCTS-CHICKEN/BEEF/PORK WE ARE THANKING YOU IN ADVANCE FOR YOUR EARLY ATTENTION IN THIS REGARD. BEST REGARDS, LIONES ENTERPRISES NO-30,SUNETHRADEVI ROAD,KOHUWALA, P.O.BOX-77 ,NUGEGODA, SRI LANKA. TEL :0094 1 823464 (5 Lines) FAX :0094 1 823464 E.MAIL:anali@slt.lk **************************** We are following brand name Cigarettese and Beer manufacturer's Agent. Details as follows: CIGARETTES - ALL PRICES IN F.O.B.COLOMBO/SRI LANKA (USD.) ********************************************************** ONE (01)CASE CONTAIN 10,000 STICKS ********************************** 1/MARLBORO - LIGHT/REGULER Origin:U.S.A. 2/MILD SEVEN -HARD PACK Origin:U.K. AND SWITZERLAND 3/DAVIDOFF -CLASSIC Origin:GERMANY 4/SUPER KING Origin:U.K. 5.REGAL KING SIZE Origin:U.K. 6.TEDLAPIDUS Origin:U.K. 7/ROTHMANS Origin:U.K. 8/DUNHILL Origin:U.K. 9/555 -REGULER/LIGHT Origin:U.K. 10/555 -INTERNATIONAL Origin:U.K. 11.Camel,Winston,Salem and More Brand Cigarettes we can supply at the rate of USD.315.00 QUANTITY: 1 MASTER CASE = 10.000 Cigs 1 x 20' Container = 430 Master cases 1 x 40' Container = 920 Master cases SHIPMENTS - 20' AND 40' FCL'S ONLY. ************************* BEERS ***** 1.BARON'S BEER (MADE IN HOLLAND) ******************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2277 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 2.MASTER BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) ****************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2277 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 3.HOLLANDIA BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) ********************************* Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2277 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 4.BAVARIA BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) ******************************* Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2261 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 5.ORANJEBOOM PREMIIM BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) ****************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 6.REMBRANDT MASTERPIECR LAGER BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) *************************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 7.MELCHERS PREMIUM EXPORT PILSENER(MADE IN HOLLAND) *************************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 8.VAN DELFT PREMIUM EXPORT PILSENER(MADE IN HOLLAND) **************************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 9.HEINEKEN (GREEN LABEL)MADE IN HOLLAND *************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITION *************************** SHIPMENTS - 20' or 40' FCL'S ONLY. DELIVERY TIME :Received your L/c to our Bank arrange the shipment Further informations ******************** ATLANTIC NAVIGATIONS LINES (PVT) LTD NO-30,SUNETHRADEVI ROAD , KOHUWALA , NUGEGODA.COLOMBO. SRI LANKA. TEL: 0094-1-823464 (5 LINES) FAX: 0094-1-823464 E.Mail: anali(a)slt.lk

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Happy New Year 1999 - Export Trade
by anali 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

30-12-1998. DEAR SIR, WE ARE ONE OF LEADING EXPORT ORGANIZATION IN SRI LANKA.WE WISH FORWARD OUR EXPORT MARKETS INFORMATINS FOR YOUR REFERENCES.OUR EXPORT COMMDITIES DETAIL GIVEN BELOW: EXPORT COMMODITIES- ******************* 1.FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. 2.CEYLON BLACK TEA IN BAGS,PACKETS OR BULK. 3.CEYLON HERBAL TEA IN BAGES,PACKETS OR BULK.DETAILS AS FOLLOWS: i.Bevila Tea (Sida Racemosa)Recommended for Reumatic pains/Cooling. ii.Ginger Tea (Zingiber Officinale)Recommended for Stimulant/Carminative. iii.Beli Tea (Aegle Marmelos)Recommended for Chronic Fever/Piles. iv.Ranawara Tea (Cassia Auriculata)Improve complexion in Woman. v.Gotukola Tea (Centella Asiatica)Improve the Memory. vi.Cinnamon Tea (Cinnamomum Zeylanicum)Recommended for Reumatism/Cold. vii.Clove Tea (Eugenia Caryophyllata)Recommended for Cold/Stomachie. viii.Polpala Tea (Aerva Lanata)Recommended for Kidney flushing. ix.Lantana Tea (Phyla Nodiflora)Recommended as Diuretic/Carminative. 4.CEYLON HERBAL PORRIDGE IN CONSUMER PACKETS.(HATHAWARIYA,- GOTUKOLA,WEL-PENELA,MUKUNUWENNA & IRAMUSU). 5.CEYLON HERBAL TEA (BLOOD PURIFYING TEA)- TEPHROSIA PURPUREA,TINOSPORA CORDIFOLIA,PHYLLANTHUS EMBLICA,- EVOLVULUS ALSINOIDES & CASSIA AURICULATA. 6.CEYOLN HERBAL TEA (SLIMMING TEA)-GYRINOPS WALLA,- BAUHINIA VARIEGATE,ATALANTIA MISSIONIS,MINOSA PUDICA- & CALOTROPIS GIGANTEA. 7.SPICES (BLACK PEPPER,CARDAMONS,CLOVES,GINGER,MACE,NUTMEG TUMERIC AND CINNAMON). 8.FRESH COCONUTS AND DESICCATED COCONUT. 9.FIBER(COIR PRODUCTS)-FIBER MOSSTICK,HUSK CHIPS,COMPRESSED COCOHUSK,DUST,PEAT. 10.SEA FOODS.DETAILS FOLLOWS: i.Fish -Frozen/Chilled ii.Shrimp. iii.Black Tiger Farm Prawns. iv.Giant Tiger Prawns. v.Cattle fish. vi.Octopus. vii.Live Prawns. vii.Lobster (Live or Frozen) Processing and Packing can be arranged to suite your requirements.All shipments by Air and Carry Sri Lanka Government Health Certificate of Origin. 11.RICE AND DHAL (RED LENTILS ). 12.NARURAL RUBBER. 13.SUGER. 14.INTERNATIONAL BRAND NAME CIGARETTES. 15.INTERNATIONAL BRAND NAME BEER AND NON ALCOHOLIC BEER AND LIQUOR. 16.ALL INTERNATIONAL BRAND NAME PERFUMES. 17.CRUDE OIL,PETROLEUM BY - PRODUCTS. 18.MEAT PRODUCTS-CHICKEN/BEEF/PORK WE ARE THANKING YOU IN ADVANCE FOR YOUR EARLY ATTENTION IN THIS REGARD. BEST REGARDS, LIONES ENTERPRISES NO-30,SUNETHRADEVI ROAD,KOHUWALA, P.O.BOX-77 ,NUGEGODA, SRI LANKA. TEL :0094 1 823464 (5 Lines) FAX :0094 1 823464 E.MAIL:anali@slt.lk **************************** We are following brand name Cigarettese and Beer manufacturer's Agent. Details as follows: CIGARETTES - ALL PRICES IN F.O.B.COLOMBO/SRI LANKA (USD.) ********************************************************** ONE (01)CASE CONTAIN 10,000 STICKS ********************************** 1/MARLBORO - LIGHT/REGULER Origin:U.S.A. 2/MILD SEVEN -HARD PACK Origin:U.K. AND SWITZERLAND 3/DAVIDOFF -CLASSIC Origin:GERMANY 4/SUPER KING Origin:U.K. 5.REGAL KING SIZE Origin:U.K. 6.TEDLAPIDUS Origin:U.K. 7/ROTHMANS Origin:U.K. 8/DUNHILL Origin:U.K. 9/555 -REGULER/LIGHT Origin:U.K. 10/555 -INTERNATIONAL Origin:U.K. 11.Camel,Winston,Salem and More Brand Cigarettes we can supply at the rate of USD.315.00 QUANTITY: 1 MASTER CASE = 10.000 Cigs 1 x 20' Container = 430 Master cases 1 x 40' Container = 920 Master cases SHIPMENTS - 20' AND 40' FCL'S ONLY. ************************* BEERS ***** 1.BARON'S BEER (MADE IN HOLLAND) ******************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2277 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 2.MASTER BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) ****************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2277 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 3.HOLLANDIA BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) ********************************* Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2277 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 4.BAVARIA BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) ******************************* Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2261 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 5.ORANJEBOOM PREMIIM BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) ****************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 6.REMBRANDT MASTERPIECR LAGER BEER(MADE IN HOLLAND) *************************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 7.MELCHERS PREMIUM EXPORT PILSENER(MADE IN HOLLAND) *************************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 8.VAN DELFT PREMIUM EXPORT PILSENER(MADE IN HOLLAND) **************************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. 9.HEINEKEN (GREEN LABEL)MADE IN HOLLAND *************************************** Packing :24 cans per shrink-wrapped tray 2300 trays 24 x 330ml per 20'FCL Quality :5% Vol.Alc. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITION *************************** SHIPMENTS - 20' or 40' FCL'S ONLY. DELIVERY TIME :Received your L/c to our Bank arrange the shipment Further informations ******************** ATLANTIC NAVIGATIONS LINES (PVT) LTD NO-30,SUNETHRADEVI ROAD , KOHUWALA , NUGEGODA.COLOMBO. SRI LANKA. TEL: 0094-1-823464 (5 LINES) FAX: 0094-1-823464 E.Mail: anali(a)slt.lk

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Re: Triple DES "standard"?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Reply-To: <rankney(a)erols.com> From: "Rich Ankney" <rankney(a)erols.com> To: <dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu>, "Digital Bearer Settlement List" <dbs(a)philodox.com>, "Robert Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Re: Triple DES "standard"? Date: Wed, 30 Dec 1998 09:40:38 -0500 Sender: <dbs(a)philodox.com> List-Subscribe: <mailto:requests@philodox.com?subject=subscribe%20dbs> <snip> > Actually, as I recall the tale, the Amercian Bankers > Association-sponsored ANSI-accredited X.9 Committee's blessing of DES3 was > itself pretty interesting. > > I understood that the NSA lobbied bitterly against the X9 effort to > standardize 3DES as an ANSI standard, insisting that DES would surfice > until its successor was chosen. > > A couple years ago, when the X9 committee -- or maybe one of the X9 > crypto subcommittees -- rejected that advice and initially recommended that > 3DES be made a standard, I was told that the NSA rep angrily declared that > 3DES would _never_ get an export license and would never be shipped > overseas. (Which may have put a damper on the 3DES standardization > effort;-) > > Unfortunately, these standards development efforts usually escape > the media's attention. Anyone on the list active in X9 and can give us the > real story? > I was at the meeting. This was a meeting of (I think) X9F3, which is a working group in X9F, which has several working groups doing security. 3DES was being pushed really hard by the Fed. The vote was to get a sense of how much interest there was in a 3DES standard. (There is no requirement to have such a vote to work on something; the X9 rules require a new work item ballot sent to all X9 members.) The NO votes were, IIRC, from NSA (with the above quote, more or less), IRS, and IRE (a commercial outfit located in Baltimore). NIST abstained. I don't recall the official X9 vote, but it was along the same lines. The work was done in a different working group, X9F1, chaired by the legendary Blake Greenlee. The standard was published a few months ago. Again, the Fed pushed really hard on this; kudos to them. I'm sure Cindy Fuller of the X9 Secretariat (cfuller(a)aba.com) would have the official X9 ballot results if anyone is interested... > Since the birth of X9 in the late 70s, the US National Security > Agency has its own representative on the X9 Committee. As one might > expect, the NSA has traditionally had significant influence over the ANSI > "F" (crypto) subcommittees and cryptographic standards in financial > services. There was a time when Ft. Meade effectively dictated those > standards. Now, that is not necessarily so.... > > (After the NSA blundered so badly in trying to force the Banking > industry to switch from DES to CCEP/Clipper in the late 80s, the Agency's > mesmerizing control broken. The initial intro of CCEP/Clipper -- at an ABA > meeting -- proposed that only US owned institutions could have access to > Clipper. At the time, as I recall, maybe 10-15 percent of the US banks > were foreign owned;-) The bankers couldn't believe that these idiots -- > obviously so ignorant about the workings of the industry they were trying > to defacto regulate -- were from the NSA of Legend and Lore.) > I didn't start attending meetings till the early '90's, but I can certainly testify that Clipper/Fortezza were pushed really hard. In fact, X9F1 may still have open work items on some of this stuff (no work going on, but it needs a formal vote to remove it from the list). My major objection was the attempt to standardize on a particular *product*, which used classified algorithms, vs. standardizing on a public algorithm which could be implemented in H/W or S/W. So X9 ended up with: 3DES instead of Skipjack; DSA and RSA (and ECDSA real soon now) for signatures; and DH, RSA, and EC (real soon now) for key management. It's interesting that our DH standard seems to have reinvented much of the interesting stuff in KEA. Regards, Rich --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Crackers Set Sights on Iraq
by Mark 13 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Geniuses at work: http://www.wired.com/news/print_version/politics/story/17074.html?wnpg=all > "It's a crime in itself to build weapons of mass destruction when the > children of the country are starving," said a group member who goes by > the name "kInGbOnG." And do they hope to kill Saddam, or help in NOT starving the nation? No, they plan to attack the government information systems used to rationing and planning deliveries of the food! > Though the systems' geographic origin could not be positively confirmed, > login prompts contained phonetic spellings of Arabic words. And to top it off, they're not even sure which country they are attacking! They can't possibly hit any military targets with this attack! And they hope to further the human rights with this attack? God save us from this kind of stupidity. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.wired.com/news/print_version/politics/story/17074.html?wnpg=all Crackers Set Sights on Iraq by James Glave 3:00 a.m. 30.Dec.98.PST A global group of 24 hackers and crackers spent Monday night probing, mapping, and preparing to attack computer networks owned by the government of Iraq. Quoting at one point from the Declaration of Independence, Steve Stakton, a member of the seven-year-old Legions of the Underground group, called for a concerted one-week cracking campaign against Iraq. "Iraq has treated human rights issues as poorly as China has," said Stakton in a meeting of the group that was held Monday night on Internet Relay Chat. "We need to carry out what the government won't, and can't, do." Stakton, 24, quoted from the group's mission statement: "We are ready to commence, and take [part] in electronic warfare if requested." Iraq has no connection to the public Internet, though Iraq Net, an official government homepage, is based in New York. Group members claim to be targeting an older, nonpublic network inside Iraqi borders that they say runs on a vintage protocol called X.25. "We are targeting them via terminal dialup," said Stakton in an interview conducted with group members on Tuesday over IRC, a global text-based chat network where identities can easily be forged. Group members said they were probing sequential network numbers within an older network owned by MCI, which they believed were assigned to Iraq. They described the system as "a gateway that handles systems that have no local chain of numbers." "It would effectively isolate them from the world if we took out the X.25," added a 19-year-old member based in Minnesota who goes by the name "lothos." "If we wanted we'd be able to dial up and make a huge amount of connection to their systems and possibly bring it down to its knees," Stakton said. One member said that he was analyzing network scans from the Iraqi cities of Ar Rutbah and Al Kut. Scott Ellentuch, a network security specialist with Internet consultancy TTSG, said X.25 networks are commonly used to connect older equipment. Iraq hasn't received any computers or computer supplies since the United Nations embargo was put in place at the time of the Gulf War. "If they do have an X.25 connection into Iraq, and that is their only network capability, someone could hop off the Internet and hop on to the X.25 and ride into the X.25 network," said Ellentuch. The group said its efforts partly involved "wardialing," a process of automatically dialing one phone number after another looking for modems. Members said that many modems answered at 2400 bps -- a speed common in the late 1980s. "Many other countries don't have ... technology as [advanced as] the United States," said Ellentuch. "The exploits that are possible on these machines have been around for ages." A member of the group supplied Wired News with a log of attempted connections to various institutional computer systems and bulletin board systems. Though the systems' geographic origin could not be positively confirmed, login prompts contained phonetic spellings of Arabic words. Stakton said that Legions' scanning efforts would continue Monday night, but declined to say when the group hoped to launch its attack. The Legions said that the attack was a legitimate act of protest against a rogue dictator. "It's a crime in itself to build weapons of mass destruction when the children of the country are starving," said a group member who goes by the name "kInGbOnG." In recent months, Legions of the Underground, whose members are largely in their 20s, has launched numerous attacks against China to draw attention to that nation's human-rights record. Last July, in a demonstration of their technical abilities, members claimed to have remotely moved a satellite dish owned by Time Warner Cablevision. The company confirmed a security breach in that incident.

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[ISN] Academic Attacks on SAFER+ (fwd)
by Max Inux 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Subject: [ISN] Academic Attacks on SAFER+ Forwarded From: "Jay D. Dyson" <jdyson(a)techreports.jpl.nasa.gov> Originally From: John Kelsey <kelsey(a)plnet.net> I believe I have found two attacks on the SAFER+ version with 256-bit keys. While these attacks aren't practical, they demonstrate a weakness in the SAFER+ key schedule design, and may lead to more practical attacks in the future. The first attack is a modified meet-in-the-middle attack, requiring 2 known plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts, 2^{37} bytes of memory, and work equivalent to about 2^{241} SAFER+ encryptions. I have discussed this attack with Massey, and am fairly confident it really works. The second attack is a related-key attack, requiring 256 chosen plaintexts and their corresponding plaintexts encrypted under two related keys, and work equivalent to about 2^{216} SAFER+ encryptions. This is a much newer attack (about two days old), and I am less certain of it, but I believe it works. I will be writing these attacks up for publication fairly soon, but I wanted to announce them here to get the word out, and to see if anyone can either improve on them or find problems with them. Both attacks exploit two useful properties of SAFER+. First, I will describe the two useful properties, then I will describe the two attacks very briefly. The rest of this note assumes familiarity with SAFER+. 1.0. The Two Useful Properties of SAFER+ Consider SAFER+ with a 256-bit key. The key schedule is quite simple: We extend the key by a parity byte, getting a 33 byte extended key. We then use the 33 byte extended key to generate the entire sequence of subkeys. Each subkey byte is determined by only one key byte. If you know a given key byte, you know all the subkey bytes it determines; if you know a subkey byte, you know the key byte from which it was derived. SAFER+ rounds use 32 bytes of subkey each, in two blocks of 16 bytes. If the key bytes are k[0..32], then we have First Round: k[0..15] k[1..16] Second Round: k[2..17] k[3..18] Third Round: k[4..19] k[5..20] etc. This means that it takes quite a while in the encryption process for the last couple key bytes to affect the encryption. SAFER+ with a 256 bit key has 16 rounds and an output transformation. The output transformation uses only sixteen key bytes. Now, consider how many key bytes have affected the encryption at all after each round: After the first round (round 0), 17 key bytes have been used. After the second round, 19 key bytes have been used. After the third, 21. Continuing, we can see that it takes 9 (out of 16) rounds before SAFER+ has used all 32 key bytes. This allows both of my attacks. 0 17 1 19 2 21 3 23 4 25 5 27 6 29 7 31 8 all The other useful property is that we don't have to know all the key bytes to be able to recognize an output from a round of SAFER+ as being correct. Consider the situation where we know all but the last byte of the key of some round, and we know its input block. Each SAFER+ round consists of the keyed byte substitution layer, and the mixing layer. If we know k[0..14], but not k[15..16], then we end up knowing all but two bytes of the input into the mixing layer. The result is that we end up knowing *none* of the bytes of the output. However, we still know relationships between the bytes of the output. The matrix that describes the mixing layer makes it easy to see how to combine the output bytes into values that are not dependent on the unknown bytes of input. Now, consider a situation where we know all but the last two key bytes for round 0, and all but the first two key bytes for round 1. We can go backward through the mixing layer of round 1 (it's unkeyed), and then go back through the keyed byte substitution layer, learning all but two bytes of the output from round 0. We then make use of the trick described above. We will know relationships between the remaining known bytes of output from round 0, regardless of the unknown key bytes. 2.0. The Meet-in-the-Middle Attack The real insight that makes the low-memory attack work is that we can do meet-in-the-middle with two rounds whose key material we don't know all of. That is, we guess the keys for rounds 1-7 (numbering from one), which gives us all but two of the bytes for round 8. That's 29 key bytes guessed. We then compute some expressions in the output bytes of round 8 that don't rely on knowing the two unknown bytes of key, and that don't rely on knowing the two bytes of round 8's output that will depend on the two unknown key bytes when doing the guess on the other side. We guess the keys for the output transformation (16 bytes), plus the keys for rounds 10-16. That means 30 bytes of key guessed, and it also gives us enough information to get knowledge of all but two bytes of the output of round 8. We then compute those same expressions in those bytes. The result is that we can do the meet-in-the-middle at the output from round 8, despite not knowing all the key bytes used in round 8 or 9. Round | Key Bytes Guessed 1 17 2 19 3 21 4 23 5 25 6 27 7 29 8 29 (two unknown key bytes) - - -------------- (this is where the meet-in-the-middle happens) 9 30 (two unknown key bytes) 10 30 11 28 12 26 13 24 14 22 15 20 16 18 OX 16 That is, we can compute a set of bytes that are dependent only on the 29 bytes of key guessed from the top, or the 30 guessed from the bottom. Now, this would seem to take up a lot of memory to do this meet-in-the-middle attack. Fortunately, however, most of the key bytes guessed from the top are also guessed from the bottom. We thus mount the attack by first guessing all key values in common from the top and the bottom. We then do the meet-in-the-middle by trying all possible 2^{24} values from one side, and all possible 2^{32} values from the other. We compute this intermediate value that doesn't need any other key material from both sides, store our results in a sorted list, and look for duplicates from the top and bottom. With two plaintexts, it's easy to get more than 32 bytes of intermediate values, meaning that we don't expect to see any matches from incorrect guesses. 3.0. The Related-Key Attack The related-key attack works on a similar principle. My current attack is very simple: We choose a pair of keys, K,K^*, such that the keys differ only in the first two bytes; in these two bytes, we have a difference of 0x80. Under K we encrypt 256 plaintexts, P[i], each identical except with a different leftmost byte. Under K^* we encrypt 256 plaintexts, P[i]^*, with some fixed difference D<>0x80 from P[i] in the leftmost byte, and with fixed difference 0x80 in the next byte over. With probability about 1/2, we get at least one pair of plaintexts P[i],P[i]^*, whose values after two rounds are identical under the different keys. When this happens, their values are also identical after nine rounds. Now, we do our trick from the meet-in-the-middle attack, again, and guess the last 26 bytes of relevant key material. This lets us peel off the output transformation and the last five rounds, leaving us with access to the output from the eleventh round. We can peel off the PHT layer, since we know it and its inverse. We can then learn all but two of the bytes input to the eleventh round. We now know all but two bytes of the output from the tenth round, and we know a pair of texts for which only the last two bytes of the input to the tenth tound had changed. We can check to see if the values we've computed as being the outputs from the tenth round are consistent with this situation, and thus are consistent with this being a right pair. We expect to have to check 256 different pairs of texts in this way, each with work equivalent to 2^{208} SAFER+ encryptions. This leaves us with work equivalent to about 2^{216} encryptions, total, to learn 208/256 of the SAFER+ key bits. The remaining 48 bits can be brute-forced after these are known. We thus break SAFER+ with a differential related-key attack, using 2 related keys, 512 plaintexts encrypted under each key, and 2^{216} work. Comments? - - --John Kelsey, kelsey(a)counterpane.com / kelsey(a)plnet.net NEW PGP print = 5D91 6F57 2646 83F9 6D7F 9C87 886D 88AF -o- Subscribe: mail majordomo(a)repsec.com with "subscribe isn". Today's ISN Sponsor: Internet Security Institute [www.isi-sec.com]

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