- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

re: Joy of Java
by dp＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Scott Brickner <sjb(a)universe.digex.net> wrote: > >And later: > > The Java bytecode is where the security properties must ultimately > be verified . . . . Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to verify > the bytecode. . . . The present type verifier cannot be proven > correct, because there is not a formal description of the type > system. Object-oriented type systems are a current research topic; > it seems unwise for the system's security to rely on such a > mechanism without a strong theoretical foundation. It is not > certain that an informally specified system as large and complicated > as Java bytecode is consistent. > >And in the conclusions: > > We conclude that the Java system in its current form cannot easily > be made secure. Significant redesign of the language, the bytecode > format, and the runtime system appear to be necessary steps toward > building a higher-assurance system. . . . Execution of remotely- > loaded code is a relatively new phenomenon, and more work is > required to make it safe. > >I do think that the ideas embodied in Java are very important, and will >significantly shape the future of computing, but Java itself may be just >a stepping stone on the way. Given the crowd here, this is likely stating the obvious, but it has never failed to provoke spluttering from the Sun employees I have tried it on. The thing not mentioned in this excerpt is that at best, the verification will have been done for the Sun implementation of the byte code engine. There have been announcements of competing implementations of the the engine, and any assumptions of safety are out the window in that case. Sun doesn't have any control over Java the byte code engine, anyone who wants can build one. (and at 40kb total size, it is a tractable thing for an undergrad that didn't manage to find a summer job). Sun does control Java the logo, and can deny a license to use it. That is likely to become a meaningless distinction -- If somone will install a disk recieved unsolicited in the mail, or handed to them at a trade show (how hard can it be to re-seal AOL packaging, such that a casual recipient won't notice), they aren't bright enough to insist on genuine Sun brand Java. If it becomes an expected thing, that all browsers/os's/toaster-ovens have a java byte code engine in them, there will be a sizable number sold without "benifit" of trademark (at the low end if nothing else, Sun does expect to be paid to use the steaming cup). Not all of them will have sufficient rigor applied to their development. Once common, then things get interesting. The press will (for lack of anything else to do, as all the engines are supposed to act identically) start to benchmark the competing implementations. At that point, under pressure to "get good numbers", some of the more "expensive" operations will be "tuned". Other restrictions might be sacrificed in order to have something ready for Comdex... Can't happen you say? I still remember when some of the PC video makers got caught special casing the strings in one of the big magazines benchmarks. Unfortunately, Sun has designed a fine example of a "Square Peg". As OAK, it was a moderately good fit for the intended use. With zillions of set top boxes, and a limited number of sources of product (national/regional controlled entry broadcaster model), you had to have remote execution, nobody could build a big enough set of servers. Since it was coming from a broadcaster, you could get away with trusting signed code -- not just any bozo can get video broadcast nationally (unless it is violent, and even then they time base correct it), the same would be true of set top code. Since it meant selling hardware (engine in rom), there would be a limited number of sources of system code -- the above mentioned undergrad would find it difficult to find enough capital to get a mass market hardware product to market. And when you get down to it, with only a few meg of ram, and no disk, there really wasn't a huge amount of data to compromise. Now lets examine what they are trying to do with it. It is a software only item currently, thus it has very low entry barriers. Code can be put up by any bozo with $10/month to pay a local web provider -- even if the code is signed, you may not be able to get at the author of an applet, either because of national boundries, or anonymity. And you get to run the stuff on a machine with a lot of state (all the dells and gateways sold today had at least a gig of state spinning there to browse), and a live net connection (back to the source if nothing else) to transmit interesting things back with. Looks like a bad fit to me. But the PR department does have a big hammer, and they are beating on it, and the hole is starting to give a bit -- they have it forced about halfway now... To get a round peg, they have to build a system at the A2 trust level. That means a verified design, and an implementation checked against that design. Sun hasn't done the design side of the game, if the comments made about the design by the Princeton group are accurate. Lacking a verifiable design, even Sun's implementation must be doubted. But it doesn't end there, the browser that surrounds the byte code engine can compromise even a good implementation (as netscape has demonstrated), and last, Sun has no way to ensure that everything that executes the byte codes is a "good" implementation. We don't even have to assume malicious intent on the engine builder, accidents have already supplied us with enough examples of how it can go wrong. (tho it is easier if you put the hole there -- you don't have to be skilled enough to find a hole to exploit, just good enough to add a hole to an existing implementation) <dp>

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Re: real life problems with ITAR (was Spam the Sign!)
by aba＠atlas.ex.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attila <attila(a)primenet.com> writes: > On Thu, 23 Nov 1995, jim bell wrote: > > > [US companies hiring non-US programmers to avoid ITAR] > > <attila sez> I think they have that one covered --not only is it > violation of ITAR's intent to send a programmer out of the U.S., but is > illegal to hire a foreign national to program for your non-U.S. products. Having your company legally based outside the US, with just a US office (on paper) would seem to get around this. If all your code is shipped from Sun Corp, Russia (and actually you get CDs in the mail from Russia literally if you order software from them), then it would seem to avoid the problem. They'd probably have to make sure that no programming at all occured in the US otherwise they'd be susceptible to the claim that they were violating ITAR by their US development team exporting software with a hole for crypto to their main development team in Russia. Multinationals could juggle that much easily. The other problem is that multi-nationals don't like stepping on the govts toes, because the govt might retaliate by not buying Sun, or Sun mysteriously losing contracts. Sound right? > the test is going to be with someone like Sun who "bought" a group of > Russian crypto programmers and left them in Russia. Now, the problem > with ITAR is that if you import that code, you can not then export the > code since it is now covered by ITAR. However this is the real problem, the don't want crypto no matter what. They'll do their damnest to stop it by whatever means: legal or illegal, monetary pressure, threats, FUD, overbroad ITAR, selective enforcement, etc. > secondly, it appears there is a move afoot to make it an ITAR > violation to hire the foreign nationals to circumvent ITAR --basically, > the Feds want to stop cryptography _everywhere_, including telling > Russians they can not work for U.S. companies! Just where do they think > they are getting off? > > then, when ALL hitech moves out of the U.S. and the DoD needs us, we > will not be here, will we? Something that is puzzling me is how DigiCash is doing. Their software I think is ITAR regulated (or would be if it were shipped from a US ftp site). OK, so they get around it by shipping their software from Digicash, Bv, Netherlands. But, somewhere on their pages it mentions that: "Digicash, Bv is a wholly owned subsidiary of Digicash" (which *is* based in the US). Does that make them a counter example who is currently getting away with it? Just to complicate things further David Chaum is a US citizen, right? Maybe he himself is ok because he doesn't write the code himself, the digicash development team does. Is Digicash (US) hiring (collectively) Digicash, Bv if it is a wholly owned subsidiary, in US legal terms? Reckon the long term message is for companies to just pull out of the US. Moving to a suitable jurisdiction would be possible for Netscape, and would be a coool blow against ITAR. Adam

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crypto for porno users
by gjeffers＠socketis.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

crypto for porno users Crypto porno is a wonderful topic for Cypherpunks. Child porno people are a group that definitely needs the very best in computer security. If their computer security problems are solved, then everybodys' computer security problems are solved. COMPUTER SITE DISK SECURITY The SecureDrive 1.4 disk encryptor system solves their computer site disk storage problem. It also gives them the solution to the "rubber hose" problem. With a "damaged" key file and the use of a password, they have an effective defense against court orders demanding keys. (see the docs for SecureDrive 1.4). Also disk encryptors not only encrypt files but also solve the problem of temporary work files that are used by many software packages (They can be reconstructed). TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MIT's PGP 2.6.2 solves their problem of secure telecommunications. This assumes that the people involved can really trust each other. STATE INFILTRATOR PROBLEM Of course, one of the really big problems for non-STATE approved groups is the problem of state agents infiltrating the group. This gets worse as the group gets bigger. This is also one more thing I have against states - one of their jobs is having their agents make friends with cit- izens and then betray their friends. Has anyone else noticed? - THE STATE HAS NO HONOR! The state prides itself on its cleverness here. Also, of course, once the state has entrapped an individual, they tend to get other members of the group by having their victims get and give evidence against other members. - sort of a domino effect and the group unravels - especially with the conspiracy laws. Drug distribution gangs are famous for falling to these techniques. A possibly unbreakable defense against the above assault would be the use of a Dining Cryptographers protocol. According to Applied Crypto- graphy, PGP may be used to send messages in these protocols. Pretend that a small group of Cypherpunks are child porn enthusiasts and decide to use the Cypherpunk mailing list to exchange pictures and child porn info.. I know little of the theory of Dining Cryptographers but I would think that a good implementation of it would make infiltrators useless. I will leave it for other Cypherpunks to discuss the mechanics (specific and general) for actually doing this. A possible risk would be that this would put the general membership of Cypherpunks at risk - or would it just put the list itself to risk? Does this imply that we need FORTRESS mailing lists or what others would des- cribe as COERCION-FREE mailing lists? Would remailers that allow two way secure communication be a help here? Would they be forced to be FORTRESS or COERCION-FREE to be effective? Should they use expendable lists?:-) Generally, if you wanted to start a discussion group on a forbidden topic on the Internet, and wanted to keep it secure - how would you do it? Today this is an academic question - but tomorrow? :-) Aside from workable anonymous Internet money, the two most needed computer privacy technologies are fortress mailing lists and remailers and workable Dining Cryptographers protocols. THE UNITED STATES "FEDERAL" GOVERNMENT HAS NO LEGITIMACY. The United States "Federal" Government - We'll be even more American without it. PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYYY BBBAAACCCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE! Gary Jeffers

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Re: crypto for porno users
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"moroni(a)scranton.com" "Moroni" 24-NOV-1995 14:52:11.13 >I wish we could get off the subject of the kiddie porn , it makes >me wonder what people on this list are doing when they are not >mailing out letters. Not to flame ,BUT it is such a serious issue >and we all as adults and approaching adults should not treat it as >an academic issue . It is the most victimizing of all crimes and >I think of speak for some of us when I say that it would be better >if we all found a way to get back to discussing the problems of >cryptography as related to we not pornographers. I can see one argument that one should not discuss such unpopular topics. That argument is that the person who brought them up may act as a (hopefully inadvertent) _agent provocateur_ for those who would condemn cryptography for protecting child pornography and similarly unaccepted practices. However, I regard self-censorship in reaction to fears of government as as evil as governmental censorship. Consequently, I would like to give two counterarguments to the idea that child pornography is not something that should be cryptographically protected. The first is that one may legitimately disagree with the government on what is child pornography. For instance, one may disagree on what minimum age should be used. Governments are known for being quite incoherent on rules on sexuality and the age of consent. For instance, Britain's age for consent depends on the type of sexuality involved; heterosexual sex receives a more lenient age (18) than homosexual (21). (There are also, of course, difficulties caused by such legal inconsistencies as simultaneously deeming someone not to be of consenting age for sex yet to be considered an adult when charged with murder; I refer to the infamous Bobbit (sp?) trials). The second is that given new image modification technologies, it is possible to produce what will seem child pornography, but with no actual harm done to children. In some ways, this product may reduce harm to children in some respects by providing a "competing product" to actual child pornography, and thus discourage its manufacture. Some will argue that such simulated child pornography is useful by pedophiles in persuading children; this argument appears similar to the one against cryptography that it can be used for purposes generally agreed to be illegitimate. I trust that the list does not find such an argument to be valid. I will mention in this regard that I have no personal want to see child pornography. However, I support the right of those who do to do so, if no harm to others is committed. Sincerely Yours, -Allen

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Re: AP
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:28 PM 5/20/96 +0000, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: [quoting Jim Ray>>] >Interesting. Has AP ever popped-up in the conventional medias? Other than the article I quote in its entirety in Part 8 of AP, an article from the Asahi Evening News (an english-language daily newspaper in Japan), no. >Then, again, I know an awfull lot of people who would applaude Bell. >But most of them are not computer litterate. They are from another >generation, not brainwashed by "Don't ask what your country can >do for you; ask what you can do for your country"... Unfortunately, it generally takes knowledge of at least computer networking, with a little knowledge of encryption and a vaguely passing familiarity with digital cash, to understand AP with enough detail to be useful. But I'm constantly amazed at how many people really APPRECIATE the idea, and its ramifications. >> This kind of thinking might authorize a massive Cherokee >> massacre if it spread, IMO. > >Please, do point out the similarities and the differences... I think >that the context is very different. If anything, I think AP would have allowed Indians to defend themselves, had they had access to it. >> We must, as >> Libertarians, face the fact that taxation we object to is not seen >> by many people as coercive. I don't think this is necessary: They need not see that something is wrong to be deterred by the possibility of their agents getting killed doing something that they see as "non-coercive." >> Even then, I prefer the judicial process to the oligarchy >> this scheme would entail > >This scheme is *not* an oligarchy. Pay a visit to any good dictionary >near you. Words have precise meaning and it is *much* better to >stick to it... > >Actually, since it is ruled by money, it might be a "buckarchy", but >again, everybody can spare a few bucks, so it might be a democracy >too if you insist on twisting the meaning of words. Yes, I think it would be a good idea to name the resulting society... Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Spam the Sign!
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Jeff Simmons <jsimmons(a)goblin.punk.net> said... >> >> >Then suppose you hand software to MIT to put on its export-controlled ftp >> >site (which would seem to follow your requirements to take reasonable >> >precautions to observe the ITAR, etc.) and you don't do the nudge, nudge, >> >wink, wink - BUT you know that it's going to be available on major ftp >> >sites in Europe within a few hours anyway. The intent to export isn't >> >there, but the export occurs anyway. Is it the intent, or the knowledge >> >that's important? > >What's important to the government is that the crypto not be exported. Actually, that's not true. What's REALLY important to the government is that it not be AVAILABLE outside the country, or perhaps even more accurately, not available anywhere. Problem is, the government doesn't have unlimited authority in this area. >> >Or, to bring it down to a practical question, what's stopping Netscape? How >> >does Netscape setting up an 'export controlled' ftp site based on the MIT >> >version lead to one of their executives going to jail? > >Maybe their executives don't want to deal with the possibility of going to >jail and are staying far from the edge of the law. Maybe they are too busy >trying to find some way to make money. > >> I very much agree with the direction you appear to be headed in. It seems >> to me that Netscape should have no problem devising some sort of scenario in >> which such a program eventually gets onto the nets, but in a way that is >> squeaky clean, at least for THEM. > >But why would they want to risk this? As squeeky clean as it is, we now >all know that they know that making it available this way is exporting >it. NO! The government doesn't even pretend to have authority over non-exported encryption, and they readily admit this. And I'm sure they are also are aware that they can't press their luck with an overbroad interpretation of ITAR. Let's look at REALITY, okay? Export controls on products have been around for many decades. Computers are a classic example. If merely manufacturing a product that (if exported to the wrong place) becomes a violation of such laws/regulations, then practically every computer company that has ever existed violated ITAR. Here's the real "problem": Export regulations were intended to MINIMIZE the number of controlled products "leaking through" the border. There was never any illusion that this could be entirely eliminated. So far so good: They were happy to minimize the number of mainframe computers 1970 (for example) USSR got. Software, by its very nature, is infinitely copiable, which means that even a single export constitutes a complete failure of the system. Thus, a system of regulation that was useful for hardware becomes totally useless for software. >> In addition, why should they even need to write the encrytion part of their >> software IN the US? It occurs to me that one way to do this might be to >> send one of their programmers to a conveniently-located place, such as >> Vancouver BC , Montreal Canada, or a few other nearby places, with a great >> deal of fanfare, and tell him to "write some crypto." He does, and brings >> it back into the US with him, leaving a copy of it "outside" the country for >> international distribution. > >This is illegal as well. No, it isn't. >The programmer is exporting the cryptosystem, No, he isn't. Exporting a book on encryption, including algorithms, for example, is entirely LEGAL. And I think you're misusing the term, "cryptosystem." The government may be attempting to use ITAR to regulate exports of fully-functioning software, but it apparently cannot touch books containing source code for such programming. Thus, "exporting the cryptosystem" is NOT always a violation of ITAR if your definition of "cryptosystem" is so broad as to include source-on-paper, and thus your statement is legally irrelevant. If you tighten up the term "cryptosystem" to include only functioning software, your statement becomes false because said programmer does not need to export same. Note that I'm assuming that the programmer GENUINELY writes the software abroad, as opposed to faking it. Of course, even "faking it" might be legal: If source-on-paper exporting is LEGAL, then taking a copy of an encryption program outside the country on paper, then scanning it into a computer and recompiling there should also be legal. >and may even be guilty of treason (probably not). If you really want >strong crypto, just buy it fom one of the hundreds of legitimate >overseas suppliers. If you want to export strong crypto Netscape, >rewrite Netscape outside the US. It's not that complex a program. That's not a satisfactory solution. The goal, I suggest, is to allow Netscape (or any other manufacturer) to sell a SINGLE product around the world, without violating (even arguably) ITAR.

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SEL_ane
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As previously noted here: SciAm, December, 1995: "Confidential Communication on the Internet." By Thomas Beth, director of the European Institute for System Security and professor of computer science at the university of Karlsruhe. Chain of certification in the author's scheme, SELANE, extends from local authorities who vouch for an individual's identity and probity up through regional, national and supranational authorities, each vouching for those below it. Digital signatures prevent tampering; anyone who recognizes one signature in the chain can be assured that a signed document is valid. SELANE is compatible with almost every commercial and academic network. It also provides a "smart" card that can carry out the necessary calculations securely for each user. And it addresses the conflicts of government and privacy interests when wire-tapping is needed. SEL_ane

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ANNOUNCE - Amnesia Remailer now public
by Scott Kenney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PGP message

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Re: real life problems with ITAR (was Spam the Sign!)
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Attila(a)primenet.com said: > On Thu, 23 Nov 1995, jim bell wrote: > >> I very much agree with the direction you appear to be headed in. It seems >> to me that Netscape should have no problem devising some sort of scenario in >> which such a program eventually gets onto the nets, but in a way that is >> squeaky clean, at least for THEM. >> >> >> In addition, why should they even need to write the encrytion part of their >> software IN the US? It occurs to me that one way to do this might be to >> send one of their programmers to a conveniently-located place, such as >> Vancouver BC , Montreal Canada, or a few other nearby places, with a great >> deal of fanfare, and tell him to "write some crypto." He does, and brings >> it back into the US with him, leaving a copy of it "outside" the country for >> international distribution. >> > <attila sez> I think they have that one covered --not only is it >violation of ITAR's intent to send a programmer out of the U.S. Well, don't assume that because something's a "violation of ITAR's INTENT" it is actually a violation of ITAR. It can't be assumed that ITAR is _perfect_: That it actually prohibits every activity the government that wrote it didn't like. , but is >illegal to hire a foreign national to program for your non-U.S. products. Sure about this?!? > the test is going to be with someone like Sun who "bought" a group of >Russian crypto programmers and left them in Russia. Now, the problem >with ITAR is that if you import that code, you can not then export the >code since it is now covered by ITAR. I didn't say that the code would ever be "re-exported": A copy would be brought into the US for domestic use, and everyone else outside the border would get their own copy from an outside server. > secondly, it appears there is a move afoot to make it an ITAR >violation to hire the foreign nationals to circumvent ITAR --basically, >the Feds want to stop cryptography _everywhere_, including telling >Russians they can not work for U.S. companies! Just where do they think >they are getting off? It is for this kind of problem that I "invented" my concept of "Assassination Politics": If everybody pissed off at this situation was willing to donate $10 to a fund to reward the deaths of a few government officials responsible for ITAR, I can well imagine that this would shake them up a bit.

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Re: USPS
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:54 PM 8/26/96, Bruce M. wrote: >On Fri, 23 Aug 1996, William H. Geiger III wrote: > >> Once in place all the goverment needs to do is ban all e-mail not sent >> through their system. Add this to the outlawing of all non-keyescrowed >> encryption, and the ability to archive all messages sent through their >> system. Now the goverment would have total access to everything you >> wright. > > Why not? I believe it is already illegal to place anything in a >person's physical mail box that the post office hasn't processed. For >the sake of preserving the 'integrity and security' of the Internet I >can see the govt. taking such future actions. I'm skeptical of this analogy (that it could be used to take control of e-mail). The postal mailboxes that the Postal Service claims to control are those that are either marked "U.S. Mail" or fit the form and function typically associated with a "mailbox." A box standing on a post by the side of the road near one's house, for example. Often saying something about "Approved by the U.S. Postal Service," blah blah. The Postal Service has nominal ownership of these boxes, even when installed by customers (as is the norm, of course). (This comes up in one major way: non-Postal Service deliveries are not supposed to be made into such boxes. Secondly, there are limits on what customers can do to "defend" these boxes against vandals...this has come up in discussions of placing a small box inside a large box and filling the space between with cement, to break the arms of hooligans who play "mailbox baseball.") Anyone is free to place boxes on their property marked "For Federal Express Deliveries," "For Packages from Neighbors," etc. Or to rent "Mailboxes, Etc."-type boxes. These latter examples are analogous to e-mail accounts folks have at various ISPs. Or to Mailboxes, Etc.-type rental boxes. The Postal Service has limited jurisdiction over rental mailboxes, and even less authority over my placing of a "UPS leave stuff here" box on my porch. Thus, I don't seen the analogy as giving the Postal Service more sweeping powers over e-mail than they already have over physical deliveries. And given the already-anarchic and already-distributed nature of e-mail, it's hopeless. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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