July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

None
by Cari Machet 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

>Law mother fucking suit ... i will contact my lawyer friends - see if anyo= ne thinks you have standing =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Don't bother. =C2=A0It was somewhat of a joke for me to menti= on the "story royalty" line. =C2=A0 Since having spent thousands of hours i= n Federal prison law libraries, I studied many different areas of law, far = beyond criminal law and appeals, including copyright law. =C2=A0I am not aw= are that copyright law would protect such an idea. =C2=A0If I had written a= play or a script for a movie, THAT would be my own under copyright law. = =C2=A0But not merely the underlying idea. =C2=A0Now, nothing would prevent = one of these studios from giving me some sort of credit on a line at the en= d of the show, but they wouldn't owe me money legally. =C2=A0I am much more= upset that they took TWENTY FUCKING YEARS to steal the idea, than the fact= they 'stole' it. =C2=A0 =C2=A0 I should also take the opportunity to point out that I wrote = my AP essay independently from, and completely unaware of, the previous dis= cussions by Tim May and Robin Hanson. =C2=A0(I didn't even have Internet ac= cess, except as a portal, until mid-1995, and was entirely unaware of the C= ypherpunks list; =C2=A0AP part one was actually published here by somebody = else.). =C2=A0 =C2=A0 The major differences included: =C2=A0Tim May and Robin Hanso= n both referred to the idea, the one that would one day be seen as "assassi= nation markets", as being "abhorrent markets". =C2=A0See Cyphernomicon 16.1= 6.4. That they were repelled by the idea, presumably, is one reason they di= dn't rhetorically follow the concept out to its ultimate, logical outcome. = =C2=A0I, on the other hand, and totally unaware of their work, thought that= assassination markets would actually be a truly wonderful idea, precisely = because of their capability to destroy governments, make militaries unneces= sary and indeed impossible to maintain (critically, including nuclear weapo= ns), and completely replace the current 'criminal justice system' with a fa= r-fairer alternative. =C2=A0THEY merely stuck their big toes into the cold = pool, whereas I did a belly-flop. =C2=A0(With the accompanying pain, <sigh>= ). =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 They probably started out by thinking something like, "If per= son A can anonymously hire person B to kill person C, that could lead to mi= schief." =C2=A0Sure it could. =C2=A0But I approached the problem differentl= y: =C2=A0I saw that very few people would want to pay, say, $10,000 to buy = someone else's death. =C2=A0But I immediately also saw that 10,000 people m= ight want to pay $1 each for that outcome. =C2=A0That amounts to a crowdsou= rced decision, with its accompanying advantages and benefits. =C2=A0And I a= lso saw that such a functioning system would deter virtually everything whi= ch we call wrong in today's society. =C2=A0Anybody who is trying to argue a= gainst an AP-type system is inherently attempting to defend the hugely flaw= ed status quo, even if they don't realize that. =C2=A0 =C2=A0 I also solved David Friedman's "Hard problem", see his book, = "The Machinery of Freedom", =C2=A0the previously-assumed difficulty or impo= ssibility of providing for the defense of a fully libertarian or anarchisti= c society. =C2=A0Perhaps my big advantage was that I didn't know Friedman's= "Hard Problem" even existed, at least under that label, until long after I= 'd already solved it.=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Jim Bell ------=_Part_259692_252577611.1446314995160 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <html><head></head><body><div style=3D"color:#000; background-color:#fff; f= ont-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, = sans-serif;font-size:13px"><div></div><div style=3D"font-family: HelveticaN= eue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif; font-size= : 13px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56527"><div style=3D"font-family:= HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif= ; font-size: 16px;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56526"><div dir=3D"ltr= " id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56525"><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial" i= d=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56524"><b><span style=3D"font-weight:bold;"= >From:</span></b> Cari Machet <carimachet(a)gmail.com><br> <b><span sty= le=3D"font-weight: bold;">To:</span></b> coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com&gt= ; <br><b><span style=3D"font-weight: bold;">Cc:</span></b> cpunks <cyphe= rpunks(a)cpunks.org>; jim bell <jdb10987(a)yahoo.com> <br> <b id=3D"yu= i_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56921"><span style=3D"font-weight: bold;" id=3D"yu= i_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56920">Sent:</span></b> Friday, October 30, 2015 8= :03 PM<br> <b id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56923"><span style=3D"font-w= eight: bold;" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56922">Subject:</span></b> R= e: The Black List<br> </font> </div> <div class=3D"y_msg_container" id=3D"y= ui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56548"><br><div id=3D"yiv2095771975"><div id=3D"y= ui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56547"><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_144622= 9456410_56549">>Law mother fucking suit ... i will contact my lawyer fri= ends - see if anyone thinks you have standing</div><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"y= ui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56549"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_3_16_= 0_1_1446229456410_56549">    Don't bother.  It was somewhat = of a joke for me to mention the "story royalty" line.   Since having s= pent thousands of hours in Federal prison law libraries, I studied many dif= ferent areas of law, far beyond criminal law and appeals, including copyrig= ht law.  I am not aware that copyright law would protect such an idea.=  If I had written a play or a script for a movie, THAT would be my ow= n under copyright law.  But not merely the underlying idea.  Now,= nothing would prevent one of these studios from giving me some sort of cre= dit on a line at the end of the show, but they wouldn't owe me money legall= y.  I am much more upset that they took TWENTY FUCKING YEARS to steal = the idea, than the fact they 'stole' it.</div><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_3_= 16_0_1_1446229456410_56549"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1= 446229456410_56549">    I should also take the opportunity to poi= nt out that I wrote my AP essay independently from, and completely unaware = of, the previous discussions by Tim May and Robin Hanson.  (I didn't e= ven have Internet access, except as a portal, until mid-1995, and was entir= ely unaware of the Cypherpunks list;  AP part one was actually publish= ed here by somebody else.).</div><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_144622= 9456410_56549"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_= 56549">    The major differences included:  Tim May and Robi= n Hanson both referred to the idea, the one that would one day be seen as "= assassination markets", as being "abhorrent markets".  See Cyphernomic= on 16.16.4. That they were repelled by the idea, presumably, is one reason = they didn't rhetorically follow the concept out to its ultimate, logical ou= tcome.  I, on the other hand, and totally unaware of their work, thoug= ht that assassination markets would actually be a truly wonderful idea, pre= cisely because of their capability to destroy governments, make militaries = unnecessary and indeed impossible to maintain (critically, including nuclea= r weapons), and completely replace the current 'criminal justice system' wi= th a far-fairer alternative.  THEY merely stuck their big toes into th= e cold pool, whereas I did a belly-flop.  (With the accompanying pain,= <sigh>).  </div><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_14462294564= 10_56549"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56549= ">    They probably started out by thinking something like, "If p= erson A can anonymously hire person B to kill person C, that could lead to = mischief."  Sure it could.  But I approached the problem differen= tly:  I saw that very few people would want to pay, say, $10,000 to bu= y someone else's death.  But I immediately also saw that 10,000 people= might want to pay $1 each for that outcome.  That amounts to a crowds= ourced decision, with its accompanying advantages and benefits.  And I= also saw that such a functioning system would deter virtually everything w= hich we call wrong in today's society.  Anybody who is trying to argue= against an AP-type system is inherently attempting to defend the hugely fl= awed status quo, even if they don't realize that.</div><div dir=3D"ltr" id= =3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56549"><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_= 3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56549">    I also solved David Friedman's = "Hard problem", see his book, "The Machinery of Freedom",  the previou= sly-assumed difficulty or impossibility of providing for the defense of a f= ully libertarian or anarchistic society.  Perhaps my big advantage was= that I didn't know Friedman's "Hard Problem" even existed, at least under = that label, until long after I'd already solved it. </div><div dir=3D"= ltr" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56549">     <br></div>= <div dir=3D"ltr" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56549">    &nbs= p;            Jim Bell</div><div dir=3D"ltr" = id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56549"><br></div> <div class=3D"qtdSeparateBR"><br><br></div><div class=3D"yiv2095771975yqt31= 85438982" id=3D"yiv2095771975yqt43260"><div class=3D"yiv2095771975gmail_quo= te" id=3D"yui_3_16_0_1_1446229456410_56546"><br></div></div></div></div></d= iv> </div> </div> </div></body></html> ------=_Part_259692_252577611.1446314995160--

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[drone-list] Using UAVs in Humanitarian Crises to Restore Connectivity
by Joseph Pollack 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear List, I'm looking into how tough and expensive and illegal it would be to use DIY or low-cost UAVs to restore connectivity or "gather" messages (SOS or otherwise) from populations affected by humanitarian crises. Any thoughts or suggestions? Warm Regards, -Joseph. _______________________________________________ drone-list mailing list drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Politech] Customs-proofing your laptop: Staying safe at border searches [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Detecting whether the Feds or any government adversary has placed spyware on your computer when "examining" it at a border checkpoint is not entirely trivial. It is, however, important for your privacy and peace of mind -- especially because computer and PDA searches will likely become more popular in time. Here are some basic suggestions: http://www.politechbot.com/2005/04/21/update-on-alabama/ A more advanced one would be to perform a checksum of all the files on the hard drive before-and-after through something like this: % for i in `find / -print`; do md5 $i >> /tmp/new; done ; diff /tmp/new /tmp/old The problem is that even your "diff" utility could be modified so you'd need to use a known-good copy from archival media. Can anyone recommend a checksum'ing utility for Windows and OS X? It would be nicer than a command-line interface. Note, by the way, that Rep. Bono's "anti-spyware" bill exempts police: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.00029: -Declan --- Declan, In response to the Alabama activist who was hassled at the border returning from Canada, here is some insight. However, I ask that you PLEASE WITHHOLD MY NAME; I know some people who do computer forensics for FBI and I would not want them to know it was me writing this.... Thanks. Feel free to use any of the below in the blog or in the listserv. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Loretta's experience w/ US Customs is chilling. The fifteen minutes her notebook computer was out of view and in government custody is plenty of time for an agent to image the drive. Imaging, as you know, is the end-to-end bit-level copying of the drive. When properly done, imaging bypasses all OS controls, such as file permissions in Linux, BSD, and OS/X, and user ownership in Windows. A drive image affords an analyst plenty of time to examine the drive contents without the owner's awareness. The image can be mounted onto a device where other programs can reconstruct or reinterpret file systems structures of NTFS, ext, FAT, and so on. An analyst mounting an image as root or Administrator can see anything. Do not assume a BIOS password will protect you. The drive can be physically removed from a laptop in under a minute. If the file data is encrypted, a forensic analyst will need to use a password cracker to decode the data. This will slow them down, and in all but the most pressing cases, will prompt them to move on. However, a careless individual may leave their PGP (or similar) key on their drive in a text file or in slack or deleted space, giving the agent something to work with. Though encryption is a pain for the user to deal with, this is probably the best level of protection. Encryption raises your reasonable level of expectation of privacy. Legal issues raised by this incident potentially include illegal search and seizure. Even US Customs still needs a search warrant for your computer, and the warrant must state specifically what they are looking for. They cannot fish. If an image was taken of Loretta Nall's drive, there will be a chain of custody document for this supposed evidence. Her lawyer can advise as to how to file a motion for it. There might also be an incident report, which would describe the actions of the agents. None of the information stolen from Loretta's drive can be used directly in a court proceeding. Unfortunately, it probably could be used to confirm other intelligence. There is no device I know of that will allow you to determine if your drive has been scanned or imaged. Computer forensics is extremely careful not to taint evidence by writing to the drive. I'd like to see one of those warranty foil labels that fall apart when you tamper with them. There must be source for them. Place a label across the edges of the drive bay. That way, if the drive is removed, you can at least see that it was opened. The point about government installing bots is well-taken. You may be able to md5sum your drive before and after customs, but this capability is beyond 99%+ of users. If possible, do NOT carry a notebook across the border with you if you can avoid it. Junior G-Men maybe too tempted to prove their mettle with the boss when they see one. For data, pen drives and CD's can be comingled with other personal possessions, where they might attract less attention. Pen drives may be reformatted at will, removing the risk exposure that might come with a notebook's Internet cache, slack space, cookie list, website history, and so on. If you MUST take your computer, FLUSH ALL INTERNET CACHE, web site histories, search histories, cookies, temp files, recycyle bins, etc. Make your own disk image before you go. Always ask Customs what they are doing, and ask as politely as possible. Object if they remove something from your sight - again, as politely as possible. Do not get "legal" on them, but do say "I don't understand." At least that way they cannot claim you have tacitly waived your rights. -N. G. Zax _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [Clips] Engineer Outwits Fingerprint Recognition Devices with
by Travis H. 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Play-Doh A recent magazine article suggested a spoofing technique involving wrapping one's finger with a few layers of cellophane; the latent print on the reader apparently is visible enough to be reused in this manner, at least with some currently-available scanners. -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><- Knight of the Lambda Calculus "We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: Mastercard problems
by Michael Holstein 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> The tool makes HTTP/1.0 requests, most browsers make HTTP/1.1 requests. > Realistically, if the folks from Anonymous wanted to really cause trouble, they'd be doing (legitimate looking) SSL requests against the actual payment gateways. The force-multiplier there is the computational effort it takes to negotiate a DH key exchange. For bonus points, call the voice auth service simultaneously and just sit on hold. Cheers, Michael Holstein Cleveland State University ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Mastercard problems
by Michael Holstein 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> The tool makes HTTP/1.0 requests, most browsers make HTTP/1.1 requests. > Realistically, if the folks from Anonymous wanted to really cause trouble, they'd be doing (legitimate looking) SSL requests against the actual payment gateways. The force-multiplier there is the computational effort it takes to negotiate a DH key exchange. For bonus points, call the voice auth service simultaneously and just sit on hold. Cheers, Michael Holstein Cleveland State University ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Freedombox-discuss] Non-profit Group Releases Open Source Mesh WiFi Network Software
by bertagaz＠ptitcanardnoir.org 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, Seen on LWN (https://lwn.net/Articles/455207/) a group is implementing the 802.11s WiFi standard. Project page is here: http://www.open80211s.org/trac. Maybe people already in the mesh networks here can tell if it is interesting. bert. _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Politech] Customs-proofing your laptop: Staying safe at border searches [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Detecting whether the Feds or any government adversary has placed spyware on your computer when "examining" it at a border checkpoint is not entirely trivial. It is, however, important for your privacy and peace of mind -- especially because computer and PDA searches will likely become more popular in time. Here are some basic suggestions: http://www.politechbot.com/2005/04/21/update-on-alabama/ A more advanced one would be to perform a checksum of all the files on the hard drive before-and-after through something like this: % for i in `find / -print`; do md5 $i >> /tmp/new; done ; diff /tmp/new /tmp/old The problem is that even your "diff" utility could be modified so you'd need to use a known-good copy from archival media. Can anyone recommend a checksum'ing utility for Windows and OS X? It would be nicer than a command-line interface. Note, by the way, that Rep. Bono's "anti-spyware" bill exempts police: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.00029: -Declan --- Declan, In response to the Alabama activist who was hassled at the border returning from Canada, here is some insight. However, I ask that you PLEASE WITHHOLD MY NAME; I know some people who do computer forensics for FBI and I would not want them to know it was me writing this.... Thanks. Feel free to use any of the below in the blog or in the listserv. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Loretta's experience w/ US Customs is chilling. The fifteen minutes her notebook computer was out of view and in government custody is plenty of time for an agent to image the drive. Imaging, as you know, is the end-to-end bit-level copying of the drive. When properly done, imaging bypasses all OS controls, such as file permissions in Linux, BSD, and OS/X, and user ownership in Windows. A drive image affords an analyst plenty of time to examine the drive contents without the owner's awareness. The image can be mounted onto a device where other programs can reconstruct or reinterpret file systems structures of NTFS, ext, FAT, and so on. An analyst mounting an image as root or Administrator can see anything. Do not assume a BIOS password will protect you. The drive can be physically removed from a laptop in under a minute. If the file data is encrypted, a forensic analyst will need to use a password cracker to decode the data. This will slow them down, and in all but the most pressing cases, will prompt them to move on. However, a careless individual may leave their PGP (or similar) key on their drive in a text file or in slack or deleted space, giving the agent something to work with. Though encryption is a pain for the user to deal with, this is probably the best level of protection. Encryption raises your reasonable level of expectation of privacy. Legal issues raised by this incident potentially include illegal search and seizure. Even US Customs still needs a search warrant for your computer, and the warrant must state specifically what they are looking for. They cannot fish. If an image was taken of Loretta Nall's drive, there will be a chain of custody document for this supposed evidence. Her lawyer can advise as to how to file a motion for it. There might also be an incident report, which would describe the actions of the agents. None of the information stolen from Loretta's drive can be used directly in a court proceeding. Unfortunately, it probably could be used to confirm other intelligence. There is no device I know of that will allow you to determine if your drive has been scanned or imaged. Computer forensics is extremely careful not to taint evidence by writing to the drive. I'd like to see one of those warranty foil labels that fall apart when you tamper with them. There must be source for them. Place a label across the edges of the drive bay. That way, if the drive is removed, you can at least see that it was opened. The point about government installing bots is well-taken. You may be able to md5sum your drive before and after customs, but this capability is beyond 99%+ of users. If possible, do NOT carry a notebook across the border with you if you can avoid it. Junior G-Men maybe too tempted to prove their mettle with the boss when they see one. For data, pen drives and CD's can be comingled with other personal possessions, where they might attract less attention. Pen drives may be reformatted at will, removing the risk exposure that might come with a notebook's Internet cache, slack space, cookie list, website history, and so on. If you MUST take your computer, FLUSH ALL INTERNET CACHE, web site histories, search histories, cookies, temp files, recycyle bins, etc. Make your own disk image before you go. Always ask Customs what they are doing, and ask as politely as possible. Object if they remove something from your sight - again, as politely as possible. Do not get "legal" on them, but do say "I don't understand." At least that way they cannot claim you have tacitly waived your rights. -N. G. Zax _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [Clips] Engineer Outwits Fingerprint Recognition Devices with
by Travis H. 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Play-Doh A recent magazine article suggested a spoofing technique involving wrapping one's finger with a few layers of cellophane; the latent print on the reader apparently is visible enough to be reused in this manner, at least with some currently-available scanners. -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><- Knight of the Lambda Calculus "We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[Freedombox-discuss] Non-profit Group Releases Open Source Mesh WiFi Network Software
by bertagaz＠ptitcanardnoir.org 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, Seen on LWN (https://lwn.net/Articles/455207/) a group is implementing the 802.11s WiFi standard. Project page is here: http://www.open80211s.org/trac. Maybe people already in the mesh networks here can tell if it is interesting. bert. _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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