July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

New Cato study on the Biological Weapons Convention
by Patricia Mohr 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Cato Institute News Release September 28, 2000 Enforcement Of Biological Weapons Convention Would Be Unconstitutional Protocol would violate Fourth, Fifth Amendments and appointments clause WASHINGTON -- One unfinished piece of business on President Clinton's agenda is the development of a new "enforcement protocol" for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the 1972 treaty that bars signatories from producing or using lethal biological agents. But whether the president submits the protocol to the Senate for ratification or leaves the task to his successor, enforcing the BWC is so fraught with constitutional problems as to render the effort futile, according to a new Cato Institute study released today. In "Constitutional Problems with Enforcing the Biological Weapons Convention," Ronald D. Rotunda, visiting senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, notes that while the United States should continue to renounce the use of biological weapons, "the protocol will undermine the privacy rights that U.S. citizens expect and that the Fourth Amendment guards, will interfere with the safeguards that the appointments clause was designed to guarantee, and will compromise the intellectual property rights that the Fifth Amendment protects." Instead of allowing foreign inspectors access only to public property, the enforcement protocol would expand access to allow searches of private individuals and companies "without the strict protections of the Fourth Amendment and its requirement that a search warrant be issued by a neutral magistrate only after a finding of probable cause," says Rotunda. "The protocol's search of private property must be unusually thorough to have any chance of working effectively, but such invasive searches create a greater risk of a violation." The Constitution invests the executive branch of government with the power to appoint all "officers of the United States." International inspectors under the BWC protocol "would have police power over private parties but . . . would not be subject to appointment and removal by any U.S. official in the normal manner," Rotunda says. "The Supreme Court has made clear that the framers created and limited the appointment power to 'ensure that those who wielded it were accountable to political force and the will of the people.'" BWC inspectors would have no such accountability. Finally, because the BWC protocol would give international inspectors access to private companies on the cutting edge of technology, "intrusive inspections create a serious risk of industrial espionage by foreign inspectors -- many of whom come from nations that often do not respect intellectual property rights," says Rotunda. Companies that have their trade secrets stolen would face difficulty in getting compensation guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, as inspectors may be outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts by the time the theft is discovered or may have diplomatic immunity. Foreign Policy Briefing no. 61 (http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-061es.html) Contact: Ronald D. Rotunda, visiting senior fellow in constitutional studies, 202-218-4600 Randy Clerihue, director of public affairs, 202-789-5266 The Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation dedicated to broadening policy debate consistent with the traditional American principles of individual liberty, limited government, free markets, and peace. ----- End forwarded message -----

1 0

Greek officials were tapped using law enforcement back door
by Perry E. Metzger 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

A while ago, you may recall that members of the Greek government were wiretapped, and at the time, I speculated that the bad guys may have abused the built in CALEA software in the switch to do it. Well, it now appears that that was precisely what happened. Unfortunately, the article below is short on detail -- anyone have access to primary sources? (I know there are at least a couple of Greek cryptographers on this list...) http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/mar162006/update71652006316.asp Perry --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0

[thingiverse] 3D printing & intellectual property rights - So why
by Michael＠Oz 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

are we bothering with GPL,CC etc licenses? To: thingiverse(a)googlegroups.com I came across the following and thought a precis may be handy. It implies much of what is on the 'verse is not copyrightable (apart from the artistic stuff), just useful articles. It would even be questionable whether scad programs are copyright. So are the licensing aspects bogus? I started out thinking so, but read on... http://www.publicknowledge.org/Copyright-3DPrinting *"In a practical sense, copyrights and patents are mutually exclusive. If you have a useful article you cannot protect it with a copyright. Conversely, you will not be issued a patent on an artistic work.[9]<http://www.publicknowledge.org/Copyright-3DPrinting#_ftn9>That means that if something is eligible for patent protection b even if it does not have patent protection b it cannot be protected by copyright. This dichotomy is part of the reason why most of the physical world is not protected by any type of intellectual property. Most physical objects serve some utilitarian function, which means that they are not eligible for >copyright protection."* *"As 3D printing and modeling grow in popularity, it is likely that we will see more companies and individuals assuming they have a copyright for a design or object and demanding removal of unauthorized versions. While most modern songs, movies, and pictures are protected by copyright, the same cannot be said for physical objects. For that reason, when a site receives a takedown request it may be wise to at least consider if the object is protected by copyright in the first place."* "*For 3D printing, this digital form is often that of an .stl file.<http://www.publicknowledge.org/Copyright-3DPrinting#_ftn43>These files can be thought of as the object equivalent of a .pdf file b they are more or less universally printable by 3D printers and allow objects to be transferred digitally around the world.<http://www.publicknowledge.org/Copyright-3DPrinting#_ftn44>But are they protected by copyright? And if they are protected by copyright, what does that mean? * * .Stl files are certainly protect able by copyright. Copyright law specifically mentions "maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans" as included within the scope of works eligible for protection.<http://www.publicknowledge.org/Copyright-3DPrinting#_ftn45> However, that does not automatically mean that every design file for a physical object is actually protected by copyright. * * * * After all, if a given diagram is the only practical way to virtually represent a physical object, a copyright on that diagram would prevent anyone from making any virtual versions of the object.<http://www.publicknowledge.org/Copyright-3DPrinting#_ftn46>This would give the holder of that copyright a great deal of control over the distribution and manufacture of the object itself. * * In order to avoid this outcome, copyright law limits the copyrightability of these types of works" "Furthermore, even if the design file is protected by copyright, creating a physical version will not infringe on any copyright that exists in the file. No copyright on the design of a useful object extends copyright protection to the object itself." ..."**Furthermore, there is some indication that copying a file of a useful object protected by copyright for the purposes of creating the useful object is not copyright infringement." * *"One way to avoid some of these thorny copyright questions is by distributing objects and designs with permissive licenses such as those provided by Creative Commons.Unfortunately this solution can break down when applied to physical objects beyond the scope of copyright. To put it simply, you cannot license what you do not have."* *"All of that being said, licensing of noncopyrightable files can serve at least two useful purposes b one legal and one cultural.* * * *"The legal purpose is something of a hedge against future legal change. As detailed in this paper, there are many open questions surrounding just what types (and parts) of objects are and are not protectable by copyright. Granting a license today means that the usage conditions of the object are clear no matter how copyright law evolves in the future. As long as the creator does not believe that merely granting the license gives them the right to control non-copyrightable parts of the work, there is little downside to futureproofing the status of the object.* * * *The second, cultural, purpose is probably the more important one. Licensing can be an important signaling device even when it is not legally enforceable. Attaching a Creative Commons license is a signal that the creator wants to include her work in an ever-expanding and evolving network of creativity. It gives the rest of the community confidence that they can build on the object."* * * <http://www.publicknowledge.org/Copyright-3DPrinting#_ftn55> -- -- Go visit thingiverse at http://thingiverse.com and stay tuned to the blog at http://blog.thingiverse.com. You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "thingiverse" group. To post to this group, send email to thingiverse(a)googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to thingiverse+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/thingiverse?hl=en --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "thingiverse" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to thingiverse+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- - Bryan http://heybryan.org/ 1 512 203 0507 -- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups DIYbio group. To post to this group, send email to diybio(a)googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to diybio+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at https://groups.google.com/d/forum/diybio?hl=en Learn more at www.diybio.org --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "DIYbio" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to diybio+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to diybio(a)googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/diybio?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

New Cato study on the Biological Weapons Convention
by Patricia Mohr 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Cato Institute News Release September 28, 2000 Enforcement Of Biological Weapons Convention Would Be Unconstitutional Protocol would violate Fourth, Fifth Amendments and appointments clause WASHINGTON -- One unfinished piece of business on President Clinton's agenda is the development of a new "enforcement protocol" for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the 1972 treaty that bars signatories from producing or using lethal biological agents. But whether the president submits the protocol to the Senate for ratification or leaves the task to his successor, enforcing the BWC is so fraught with constitutional problems as to render the effort futile, according to a new Cato Institute study released today. In "Constitutional Problems with Enforcing the Biological Weapons Convention," Ronald D. Rotunda, visiting senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, notes that while the United States should continue to renounce the use of biological weapons, "the protocol will undermine the privacy rights that U.S. citizens expect and that the Fourth Amendment guards, will interfere with the safeguards that the appointments clause was designed to guarantee, and will compromise the intellectual property rights that the Fifth Amendment protects." Instead of allowing foreign inspectors access only to public property, the enforcement protocol would expand access to allow searches of private individuals and companies "without the strict protections of the Fourth Amendment and its requirement that a search warrant be issued by a neutral magistrate only after a finding of probable cause," says Rotunda. "The protocol's search of private property must be unusually thorough to have any chance of working effectively, but such invasive searches create a greater risk of a violation." The Constitution invests the executive branch of government with the power to appoint all "officers of the United States." International inspectors under the BWC protocol "would have police power over private parties but . . . would not be subject to appointment and removal by any U.S. official in the normal manner," Rotunda says. "The Supreme Court has made clear that the framers created and limited the appointment power to 'ensure that those who wielded it were accountable to political force and the will of the people.'" BWC inspectors would have no such accountability. Finally, because the BWC protocol would give international inspectors access to private companies on the cutting edge of technology, "intrusive inspections create a serious risk of industrial espionage by foreign inspectors -- many of whom come from nations that often do not respect intellectual property rights," says Rotunda. Companies that have their trade secrets stolen would face difficulty in getting compensation guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, as inspectors may be outside the jurisdiction of U.S. courts by the time the theft is discovered or may have diplomatic immunity. Foreign Policy Briefing no. 61 (http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-061es.html) Contact: Ronald D. Rotunda, visiting senior fellow in constitutional studies, 202-218-4600 Randy Clerihue, director of public affairs, 202-789-5266 The Cato Institute is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation dedicated to broadening policy debate consistent with the traditional American principles of individual liberty, limited government, free markets, and peace. ----- End forwarded message -----

1 0

Re: Privacy/anonymity charities
by Ragnar 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Liberty Impact ( http://www.libertyimpact.com )is a knowledge-based organization and newsletter that promotes privacy and liberty. Donations to Liberty Impact can be made via a 501(c)(3) organization called United Support for Humanity ( http://www.unsh.org ). USH gives to organizations that support teaching, scholarship, etc. > To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com > Subject: Privacy/anonymity charities > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)lne.com > > The company I work for has a charitable donation matching > program. Do you > have any suggestions for organizations with 501(c)3 status who > would be > worthy recipients of a donation? I have EFF and EPIC on my > list. Are there > others doing things to protect anonymity and privacy rights? > > I am more interested in actively working on developing ways of > securing > people's anonymity, rather than lobbying or litigation > organizations. I > think that the two I have above cover the latter nicely. > > TIA. > > --- end forwarded text > > > -- > ----------------- > R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation > <http://www.ibuc.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and > antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable > to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman > Empire' > ===== Regards, Ragnar CFO - http://www.gold-age.net Liberty Impact! Check out this free, hard-hitting weekly newsletter about privacy, liberty, offshore banking, tax avoidance & digital currencies. http://www.libertyimpact.com Yahoo! Finance - Get real-time stock quotes http://finance.yahoo.com --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

Greek officials were tapped using law enforcement back door
by Perry E. Metzger 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

A while ago, you may recall that members of the Greek government were wiretapped, and at the time, I speculated that the bad guys may have abused the built in CALEA software in the switch to do it. Well, it now appears that that was precisely what happened. Unfortunately, the article below is short on detail -- anyone have access to primary sources? (I know there are at least a couple of Greek cryptographers on this list...) http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/mar162006/update71652006316.asp Perry --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0

Re: [liberationtech] Social Media Combatants
by Gregory Foster 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

YouTube (Dec 20) - "Israel: Unlawful Attacks on Palestinian Media" by Human Rights Watch: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dz4gcp78Ix4 Documents HRW's on-the-ground research into Israeli targeting of journalists during the November 2012 war. The 3.5 minute video excerpts an Al Jazeera interview in which Israeli government spokesman Mark Regev advocates interpreting the broadcast of "command and control" information as criteria for distinguishing "legitimate" journalists protected by international law from non-legitimate journalists who can be regarded as combatants and targeted as such. gf > Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog "The Strategist" (Dec 13) - > "Are social media users now legitimate targets?" by Chloe Diggins: > http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/are-social-media-users-now-legitimate-targ… > > Diggins is a Research and Analysis Officer in the Australian Army's > Directorate of Army Research and Analysis (DARA) Land Warfare Studies > Centre (LWSC): > http://www.army.gov.au/our-future/DARA/LWSC > > In the blog post, which is qualified as Diggins' personal opinion > rather than the established policy of her institution, Diggins reflects > on what is characterized as "Israel and Hamas' recent social media war": > >> Whether social media is making an effective contribution or not >> remains to be seen. However, by creating and perpetuating a narrative >> that influences public opinion, social media is contributing to a >> defined military operation and has become integral to the information >> and communication space. As a legitimate part of the conflict, social >> media (and its users) becomes a valid military objective. > > > HT @MartinHume via @cencio4: > http://twitter.com/cencio4/status/280420701599571970 > > gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

Re: [cryptography] "Meet the groundbreaking new encryption app set to revolutionize privacy..."
by ianG 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 7/02/13 02:35 AM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 7:17 AM, Moti <m(a)cyberia.org.il> wrote: >> Interesting read. >> Mostly because the people behind this project. >> http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/02/silent_circle… > > No offense to folks like Mr. Zimmermann, but I'm very suspect of his > claims. I still remember the antithesis of the claims reported at > http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/. When we [0] were building the original Hushmail applet, we knew the flaw - the company could switch the applet on the customer. The response to that was to publish the applet, and then the customer could check the applet wasn't switched. Now, you can look at this two ways: one is that it isn't perfect as nobody would bother to check their applet. Another is that it isn't perfect but it was a whole lot better than futzing around with OpenPGP keys and manual decrypting. And it was the latter 'risk' view that won, Hushmail filled that niche between the hard core pgp community, and the people who did business and needed an easy tool. This is also the same thing that is the achilles heel of Skype. It turns out (rumour has it) that the attack kit for Skype that circulated in the late 00s amongst the TLAs was simply a PC breach kit that captured the Skype externals - keystrokes, voice, screen etc. Once the TLAs had that, they were happy and they shut up. It was easier for them to breach the PC, slip in the wrapper tacker, and listen in than seriously hack the skype model. And, then, media perception that Skype was unhackable worked again, everyone was happy. Same will be true of Silent Circle, and they will already know this (note that I have nothing to do with them, I just read the model like anyone else). The security requirement here is that they don't need it to be completely unbreakable, they just have to push 99% of the attacks onto the next easy thing -- the phone itself. Security is lowest common denominator, not highest uncommon numerator. See below. FWIW, their security model looks pretty damn good, in that it is nicely balanced to their business model (the only metric that matters) and they trialled this through several iterations (ZRTP, I think). They are the right team. Even their business customer looks fantastic (hints abound). If you're looking for an investment tip, this wouldn't be so far off ;) > I'm also suspect of "... the sender of the file can set it [the > program?] on a timer so that it will automatically b burnb - deleting > it [encrypted file] from both devices after a set period of, say, > seven minutes." Apple does not allow arbitrary background processing - > its usually limited to about 20 minutes. So the process probably won't > run on schedule or it will likely be prematurely terminated. In > addition, Flash Drives and SSDs are notoriously difficult to wipe an > unencrypted secret. Don't be suspicious, be curious -- this is where security is at. Remember: The threat is always on the node, it is never on the wire. Looking back at that Hushmail app, another anecdote. When I was doing business with a guy who was security paranoid, he used an unpublished nym, encrypted his messages with PGP, and then sent them via Hushmail to me. Life then turned aggressive, and we ended up in court. His side demanded discovery. I took all his untraceable, pgp-encrypted and Hushmail-protected mails and filed them in as cleartext discovery, as I was severely told to do by the court. Oops. From there they entered into the transcript as evidence, and from there, others were able to acquire the roadmap via subpoena. The threat is always on the node. Never the wire. Your node, your partners node, your partner's friend's node .... It is this that the Mission Impossible deletion feature is aimed at, and it is this real world node threat that it viably addresses. This is what people want. The fact that it is theoretically imperfect doesn't make it unreasonable. > Perhaps a properly scoped PenTest with published results would ally my > suspicions. It would be really bad if people died: "... a handful of > human rights reporters in Afghanistan, Jordan, and South Sudan have > tried Silent Textbs data transfer capability out, using it to send > photos, voice recordings, videos, and PDFs securely." Nah, this again is the wrong approach. Instead think of it this way: of 100 human rights reporters, if 99 are protected by this tool, and one dies, that is probably a positive. If 100 human rights reporters are scared away by media geeks that say it is unlikely to be perfect, and instead they use gmail, and 99 are caught (remember Petreus) then this is probably a negative. Human rights reporters already put their life on the line. Your mission is not to protect their life absolutely, as if we are analysing the need for a neighbour's swimming pool fence, but to make their reporting more efficient. Which coincidentally also means raising the chances that they live to report the next one. Risks, not absolutes. iang [0] I saw we - my company had a hand in the original crypto back when Hushmail was Cliff+1. FWIW. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

[DIYbio] Fwd: 3D printing & intellectual property rights - So why are we bothering with GPL,CC etc licenses?
by Bryan Bishop 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

1 0

[osint] Militants and the Latest Mobile Phone Technology
by MARQUEZ Thierry 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Militants and the Latest Mobile Phone Technology Dec 08, 2004 1843 GMT Norwegian police said Dec. 8 they want to stop the sale of cell phone cards that allow the caller to remain anonymous. Their fear is that criminals will exploit these cards to avoid detection. This concern, which has been raised by law enforcement agencies elsewhere, could -- and should -- be extended to terrorists. Cell phones used in the planning and execution of attacks pose a serious obstacle to the security and counterterrorism forces charged with disrupting militant activities. These phones allow militants to communicate with one another while in the field, in real time and over long distances using cheap and readily available technology. Couple those advantages with the latest technology -- camera phones -- and law enforcement faces a walking, talking terrorist workshop. On the other hand, a phone is another link in the militant chain, presenting the opportunity for law enforcement to detect -- and thwart -- an attack before it takes place. Technology does allows security and law enforcement agencies to determine who places a phone call or sends an SMS text message, and to track the call to its source. This kind of evidence has been presented in a number of criminal cases around the world, most recently in October in a U.S. case involving a fake kidnapping in Massachusetts. Then again, there are ways to avoid detection. Savvy criminals, including militants, can evade detection in a number of ways, especially if they are operating in a developing country where security agencies might lack the necessary tracking technology or where the mobile phone industry is much less regulated. However, even in developed countries, there are easy and relatively inexpensive ways to get around law enforcement. The cheapest and most effective method is through the use of multiple Subscriber Identity Modules (SIM) cards -- the digital fingerprint of a mobile phone. Authorities can track a cell phone user by tracking the SIM card -- even if the user has not made a call. In order to avoid detection, a savvy militant will use the SIM card only once -- to decrease the number of chances for detection and association -- and then toss it away. High-ranking Hamas officials allegedly use this tactic to avoid identification and targeting by Israeli authorities. Indian authorities warned earlier this year that militants in the Kashmir region were using pre-paid phones (presumably with different SIM cards) to coordinate and plan operations. This tactic is a relatively new development -- conceived by the always innovative criminal mind in response to law enforcement successes in tracking suspected militants through their phones. For example, a multinational mobile phone sting operation was integral in the capture of suspected Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Furthermore, mobile phones also have become almost standard equipment in the construction of remotely detonated bombs, as they make inexpensive and fairly reliable triggers. The March 11 Madrid train bombers used this method to trigger their bombs -- though Spanish authorities later successfully tracked the bombers via one of the cell phone-triggered bombs that failed to detonate. Cell phones used in preoperational surveillance also can present a serious challenge to law enforcement, largely because of their now-ubiquitous nature. In other words, a person -- criminal or not -- talking on a cell phone outside of a building or a landmark raises no alarm bells. A cell phone with instantaneous picture transmission can be an even better terrorist tool. Based on the creativity already demonstrated by some militants in the use of cell phones -- an SMS message instructed a jailed Abu Sayyaf member to escape from an Indonesian prison in 2003 -- new methods of evading detection using mobile technology are likely to emerge. The development of technology to allow users to use the same phone to call from around the world, while changing its SIM cards, possibly is the next step. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Make a clean sweep of pop-up ads. Yahoo! Companion Toolbar. Now with Pop-Up Blocker. Get it for free! http://us.click.yahoo.com/L5YrjA/eSIIAA/yQLSAA/TySplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, discuss-osint(a)yahoogroups.com. -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor bisoldi(a)intellnet.org http://www.intellnet.org Post message: osint(a)yahoogroups.com Subscribe: osint-subscribe(a)yahoogroups.com Unsubscribe: osint-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: osint-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0