July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [p2p-hackers] what would you like to see most in a p2p social network?
by Pierre St Juste 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Here's some explanation about distributed NAT traversal. We currently run a structured P2P overlay on Planetlab, when you run SocialVPN you join that structured overlay, we usually have about 500 - 600 nodes running. If node A wants to connect to node B, the following happens: 1 - node A sends a ConnectToMe (CTM) message to node B by using node B's P2P address (160-bit randomly chosen address). 2 - The CTM message contains node A's public IP and UDP port. 3 - Node B replies through the overlay with his public IP and UDP port and simultaneous sends a UDP packet to node A's public IP and port. 4. When node A receives the reply with node B's IP and UDP port, node A sends a UDP packet to node B's public IP and UDP port. 5. If you have a friendly NAT (not symmetric), then node A's packet will make it to node B's machine since node B has already sent a packet to that IP and port. We call it a distributed STUN server because the Brunet P2P library allows for discovery of one's public IP address and port and it also provides an all-to-all messaging layer needed to signal the start of UDP hole punching. As we all know, direct P2P communication is not always possible, in this case, a node that is reachable by both parties is chosen as the relay nodes and peers communicate through that. Finally our NAT traversal is a bit slower than regular STUN because the initial message is routed through a structured overlay that takes log(N) hops on average, but you may have dropped UDP packets and retries, so it may take milliseconds or a few seconds to set up direct P2P connection. These papers explain in more detail http://byron.acis.ufl.edu/papers/ipdps06ipop.pdf http://byron.acis.ufl.edu/papers/hpdc145-ganguly.pdf http://byron.acis.ufl.edu/papers/cops08.pdf Hope this helps. I encourage anyone interesting to download SocialVPN and try it out, there is windows installer and debian package. It currently works with GoogleChat or by emailing each other your P2P address. On Tue, Jan 18, 2011 at 12:49 AM, David Barrett <dbarrett(a)quinthar.com>wrote: > Wow, this looks really fantastic. I hadn't followed its progress but it > sounds like it's come a long way really fast. I'd love to hear more > about its distributed STUN service and NAT traversal. Do you have any > data on its effectiveness, perhaps expressed as the likelihood that two > arbitrary nodes will be able to connect directly via the internet? Is > there a TURN or other relay service available as a fallback? Thanks! > > -david > > On 01/17/2011 08:13 PM, Pierre St Juste wrote: > > I would like to point out the SocialVPN project > > > > http://socialvpn.org > > > > It is basically a P2P VPN which creates direct encrypted tunnels to > > friends. It currently uses the XMPP protocol for friend discovery and > > public key exchange. This VPN thus creates a social graph where edges > > are IP links. This infrastructure can be used as an enabler for many > > other social services. Here are a few examples > > > > 1 - Instead of using Skype, you can use Ekiga with Avahi, Avahi > > extension for Ekiga will discover online friends through multicast over > > the social virtual private network, you can then place SIP call directly > > over IP link. > > > > 2. For instant messaging, you can use Empathy or Pidgin with > > Bonjour/Avahi support, as concept as above. > > > > 3. For video stream, you can stream a video over HTTP or RTP using VLC > > and your friends can connect directly. > > > > 4. For social networking, you can run a wordpress blog locally and have > > your friends connect to that, or you can write an social networking > > application that communicates with friends over SocialVPN using Berkeley > > sockets API instead of having to deal with building P2P library that > > deals with NAT traversal, peer search and so on. > > > > 5. All data sent between peers is encrypted and authenticated, basically > > the same idea behind IPSec if you support PKI certificate exchanges. > > > > One of the hardest thing about building social P2P systems is having > > with a user-friendly way to bootstrap these social links (or Darknets). > > SocialVPN makes that step trivial so that developers can focus more on > > making cool apps versus figuring out how to traverse NATs. > > > > I hope this helps. > > > > On Mon, 2011-01-17 at 18:57 -0800, David Barrett wrote: > >> I'd suggest first figuring out why someone would pick a P2P social > >> network over Facebook, from a perspective of legitimate functionality > >> rather than just privacy (which as Facebook has demonstrated, isn't a > >> killer feature). I'd suggest really emphasizing the fact that with > >> P2P-Book, there is no "uploading" photos or videos: you can share entire > >> folders of files, videos, documents, or whatever and their instantly > >> available to your friends -- without first uploading them somewhere > else. > >> > >> Furthermore, emphasize that you're not sharing *copies* of the videos, > >> songs, and photos -- you're sharing the originals: change the original > >> (crop, reorient, touch up, tag with metadata, etc) and its automatically > >> updated. > >> > >> -david > >> > >> On 01/17/2011 12:51 PM, Jan DomaEski wrote: > >>> Hey Michael, > >>> > >>> Thanks for the comments, they're helpful. > >>> > >>> A lot of this boils down to having two (or more) 'sides' of self. One > >>> for general public, others for the rest; this is doable. > >>> > >>> Grudge-friendly and jackboot resistant, in ideal world, comes with the > >>> 'distributed' and 'secure+encrypted'. But sure, seems to have been lost > >>> in the implementation of at least one social network i can think of. > >>> > >>> As to the grandmother compatibility, at least to me, this is not > >>> absolutely essential at first. > >>> > >>> Cherio, Jan > >>> > >>> 2011/1/16 Michael Rogers<m--(a)gmx.com<mailto:m--@gmx.com>> > >>> > >>> Hi Jan, > >>> > >>> Here's a quick list of features I'd like to see in any social > network > >>> (not just P2P ones): > >>> > >>> * Grandmother-compatible. It should be possible to be friends with > my > >>> grandmother without her seeing the photo of the time I did that > thing > >>> with the grapes. > >>> > >>> * Alcohol-compatible. There should be something as easy to > remember as > >>> an email address that I can give to random people I befriend while > >>> drunk. And if they look me up the next day, there should be a > polite way > >>> of not responding. > >>> > >>> * Schoolproof. People should not be able to find my profile just > because > >>> we went to school together 20 years ago. Similarly, people should > not be > >>> able to find my profile just because I applied for a job at their > >>> company (or at least, they shouldn't be able to see the photo of > the > >>> thing with the grapes). > >>> > >>> * Grudge-friendly. It should be possible to move my data from one > >>> provider to another when the current provider accuses me of > lacking > >>> integrity because I don't want my grandmother to see the photo etc > etc. > >>> > >>> * Jackboot-resistant. The Tunisian government should not be able > to > >>> steal my password by setting up a fake login page. > >>> > >>> Cheers, > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> On 15/01/11 20:35, Jan DomaEski wrote: > >>> > Hello everybody out there interested in p2p social networking, > >>> > > >>> > I'm doing a (free) p2p social network (just a hobby, wonbt be > big and > >>> > professional like diaspora). It has been in the works since > >>> summer, and > >>> > begins to get some shape. I'd like any feedback on things > people > >>> > like/dislike in the idea of a p2p social network and how this > is > >>> solved > >>> > by the little toy. > >>> > > >>> > I've currently written it in java, netty handles the > networking, > >>> Qt is > >>> > used for GUI. Some yml for configs and db4o for storage. > Non-blocking > >>> > xml (XMPP) parser is a missing puzzle. The app has been run > only on a > >>> > single machine, but it's already practical and I'd like to > know what > >>> > features most people would want. Any suggestions are welcome, > but I > >>> > wonbt promise Ibll implement them :] > >>> > > >>> > Two demos (the top one is new) below, gitorious and blog links > inside > >>> > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0rAwCsYt16w > >>> > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K1dujrhGvBQ > >>> > > >>> > Jan (jan.domanski(a)new.ox.ac.uk<mailto: > jan.domanski(a)new.ox.ac.uk> > >>> <mailto:jan.domanski@new.ox.ac.uk<mailto: > jan.domanski(a)new.ox.ac.uk>>) > >>> > > >>> > PS. Yes - it's all my own work and done as a scientist not a > >>> programmer, > >>> > which has terrible implications for code ;) > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > _______________________________________________ > >>> > p2p-hackers mailing list > >>> > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com<mailto: > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com> > >>> > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> p2p-hackers mailing list > >>> p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > >>> http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > >> _______________________________________________ > >> p2p-hackers mailing list > >> p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > >> http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > p2p-hackers mailing list > > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > _______________________________________________ > p2p-hackers mailing list > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > -- Pierre St Juste _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [p2p-hackers] what would you like to see most in a p2p social network?
by Pierre St Juste 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Here's some explanation about distributed NAT traversal. We currently run a structured P2P overlay on Planetlab, when you run SocialVPN you join that structured overlay, we usually have about 500 - 600 nodes running. If node A wants to connect to node B, the following happens: 1 - node A sends a ConnectToMe (CTM) message to node B by using node B's P2P address (160-bit randomly chosen address). 2 - The CTM message contains node A's public IP and UDP port. 3 - Node B replies through the overlay with his public IP and UDP port and simultaneous sends a UDP packet to node A's public IP and port. 4. When node A receives the reply with node B's IP and UDP port, node A sends a UDP packet to node B's public IP and UDP port. 5. If you have a friendly NAT (not symmetric), then node A's packet will make it to node B's machine since node B has already sent a packet to that IP and port. We call it a distributed STUN server because the Brunet P2P library allows for discovery of one's public IP address and port and it also provides an all-to-all messaging layer needed to signal the start of UDP hole punching. As we all know, direct P2P communication is not always possible, in this case, a node that is reachable by both parties is chosen as the relay nodes and peers communicate through that. Finally our NAT traversal is a bit slower than regular STUN because the initial message is routed through a structured overlay that takes log(N) hops on average, but you may have dropped UDP packets and retries, so it may take milliseconds or a few seconds to set up direct P2P connection. These papers explain in more detail http://byron.acis.ufl.edu/papers/ipdps06ipop.pdf http://byron.acis.ufl.edu/papers/hpdc145-ganguly.pdf http://byron.acis.ufl.edu/papers/cops08.pdf Hope this helps. I encourage anyone interesting to download SocialVPN and try it out, there is windows installer and debian package. It currently works with GoogleChat or by emailing each other your P2P address. On Tue, Jan 18, 2011 at 12:49 AM, David Barrett <dbarrett(a)quinthar.com>wrote: > Wow, this looks really fantastic. I hadn't followed its progress but it > sounds like it's come a long way really fast. I'd love to hear more > about its distributed STUN service and NAT traversal. Do you have any > data on its effectiveness, perhaps expressed as the likelihood that two > arbitrary nodes will be able to connect directly via the internet? Is > there a TURN or other relay service available as a fallback? Thanks! > > -david > > On 01/17/2011 08:13 PM, Pierre St Juste wrote: > > I would like to point out the SocialVPN project > > > > http://socialvpn.org > > > > It is basically a P2P VPN which creates direct encrypted tunnels to > > friends. It currently uses the XMPP protocol for friend discovery and > > public key exchange. This VPN thus creates a social graph where edges > > are IP links. This infrastructure can be used as an enabler for many > > other social services. Here are a few examples > > > > 1 - Instead of using Skype, you can use Ekiga with Avahi, Avahi > > extension for Ekiga will discover online friends through multicast over > > the social virtual private network, you can then place SIP call directly > > over IP link. > > > > 2. For instant messaging, you can use Empathy or Pidgin with > > Bonjour/Avahi support, as concept as above. > > > > 3. For video stream, you can stream a video over HTTP or RTP using VLC > > and your friends can connect directly. > > > > 4. For social networking, you can run a wordpress blog locally and have > > your friends connect to that, or you can write an social networking > > application that communicates with friends over SocialVPN using Berkeley > > sockets API instead of having to deal with building P2P library that > > deals with NAT traversal, peer search and so on. > > > > 5. All data sent between peers is encrypted and authenticated, basically > > the same idea behind IPSec if you support PKI certificate exchanges. > > > > One of the hardest thing about building social P2P systems is having > > with a user-friendly way to bootstrap these social links (or Darknets). > > SocialVPN makes that step trivial so that developers can focus more on > > making cool apps versus figuring out how to traverse NATs. > > > > I hope this helps. > > > > On Mon, 2011-01-17 at 18:57 -0800, David Barrett wrote: > >> I'd suggest first figuring out why someone would pick a P2P social > >> network over Facebook, from a perspective of legitimate functionality > >> rather than just privacy (which as Facebook has demonstrated, isn't a > >> killer feature). I'd suggest really emphasizing the fact that with > >> P2P-Book, there is no "uploading" photos or videos: you can share entire > >> folders of files, videos, documents, or whatever and their instantly > >> available to your friends -- without first uploading them somewhere > else. > >> > >> Furthermore, emphasize that you're not sharing *copies* of the videos, > >> songs, and photos -- you're sharing the originals: change the original > >> (crop, reorient, touch up, tag with metadata, etc) and its automatically > >> updated. > >> > >> -david > >> > >> On 01/17/2011 12:51 PM, Jan DomaEski wrote: > >>> Hey Michael, > >>> > >>> Thanks for the comments, they're helpful. > >>> > >>> A lot of this boils down to having two (or more) 'sides' of self. One > >>> for general public, others for the rest; this is doable. > >>> > >>> Grudge-friendly and jackboot resistant, in ideal world, comes with the > >>> 'distributed' and 'secure+encrypted'. But sure, seems to have been lost > >>> in the implementation of at least one social network i can think of. > >>> > >>> As to the grandmother compatibility, at least to me, this is not > >>> absolutely essential at first. > >>> > >>> Cherio, Jan > >>> > >>> 2011/1/16 Michael Rogers<m--(a)gmx.com<mailto:m--@gmx.com>> > >>> > >>> Hi Jan, > >>> > >>> Here's a quick list of features I'd like to see in any social > network > >>> (not just P2P ones): > >>> > >>> * Grandmother-compatible. It should be possible to be friends with > my > >>> grandmother without her seeing the photo of the time I did that > thing > >>> with the grapes. > >>> > >>> * Alcohol-compatible. There should be something as easy to > remember as > >>> an email address that I can give to random people I befriend while > >>> drunk. And if they look me up the next day, there should be a > polite way > >>> of not responding. > >>> > >>> * Schoolproof. People should not be able to find my profile just > because > >>> we went to school together 20 years ago. Similarly, people should > not be > >>> able to find my profile just because I applied for a job at their > >>> company (or at least, they shouldn't be able to see the photo of > the > >>> thing with the grapes). > >>> > >>> * Grudge-friendly. It should be possible to move my data from one > >>> provider to another when the current provider accuses me of > lacking > >>> integrity because I don't want my grandmother to see the photo etc > etc. > >>> > >>> * Jackboot-resistant. The Tunisian government should not be able > to > >>> steal my password by setting up a fake login page. > >>> > >>> Cheers, > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> On 15/01/11 20:35, Jan DomaEski wrote: > >>> > Hello everybody out there interested in p2p social networking, > >>> > > >>> > I'm doing a (free) p2p social network (just a hobby, wonbt be > big and > >>> > professional like diaspora). It has been in the works since > >>> summer, and > >>> > begins to get some shape. I'd like any feedback on things > people > >>> > like/dislike in the idea of a p2p social network and how this > is > >>> solved > >>> > by the little toy. > >>> > > >>> > I've currently written it in java, netty handles the > networking, > >>> Qt is > >>> > used for GUI. Some yml for configs and db4o for storage. > Non-blocking > >>> > xml (XMPP) parser is a missing puzzle. The app has been run > only on a > >>> > single machine, but it's already practical and I'd like to > know what > >>> > features most people would want. Any suggestions are welcome, > but I > >>> > wonbt promise Ibll implement them :] > >>> > > >>> > Two demos (the top one is new) below, gitorious and blog links > inside > >>> > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0rAwCsYt16w > >>> > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K1dujrhGvBQ > >>> > > >>> > Jan (jan.domanski(a)new.ox.ac.uk<mailto: > jan.domanski(a)new.ox.ac.uk> > >>> <mailto:jan.domanski@new.ox.ac.uk<mailto: > jan.domanski(a)new.ox.ac.uk>>) > >>> > > >>> > PS. Yes - it's all my own work and done as a scientist not a > >>> programmer, > >>> > which has terrible implications for code ;) > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > _______________________________________________ > >>> > p2p-hackers mailing list > >>> > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com<mailto: > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com> > >>> > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> p2p-hackers mailing list > >>> p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > >>> http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > >> _______________________________________________ > >> p2p-hackers mailing list > >> p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > >> http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > p2p-hackers mailing list > > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > _______________________________________________ > p2p-hackers mailing list > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > -- Pierre St Juste _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] Bill Binney, Jacob Appelbaum and Laura Poitras on Democracy Now about NSA
by Samujjal (Shayan) Purkayastha 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.democracynow.org/2012/4/20/whistleblower_the_nsa_is_lying_us National Security Agency whistleblower William Binney reveals he believes domestic surveillance has become more expansive under President Obama than President George W. Bush. He estimates the NSA has assembled 20 trillion "transactions" b phone calls, emails and other forms of data b from Americans. This likely includes copies of almost all of the emails sent and received from most people living in the United States. Binney talks about Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and challenges NSA Director Keith Alexanderbs assertion that the NSA is not intercepting information about U.S. citizens _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...
by None 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Sat, 18 Nov 2000, Ben Laurie wrote: > Bram Cohen wrote: > > > > And if you build a protocol which is a pain to use, noone will use it. > > What, like SSL, for example? SSL is not a pain to use, and it isn't effective against man in the middle attacks, since an attacker could simply make the end user connection be done via unencrypted http and most end users wouldn't notice. It is, however, quite effective against passive attacks, which is all that's really important. -Bram Cohen

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Freedom reductions thru ID cards
by John Caswell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Might contain some new news and be of interest regarding the continued debate in UK ID cards...Dave keep up the excellent work...John .........................................<snip>......................... ......... Apologies if you've received this already, but as you'll agree it makes alarming reading. Something to write to your MP about. This was written originally by Francis Stonor Saunders. Frances Stonor Saunders is the former arts editor of The New Statesman, author of The Cultural Cold War, Diabolical Englishman and The Devil's Broker and was awarded the Royal Historical Society's William Gladstone Memorial Prize. She lives in London. "You may have heard that legislation creating compulsory ID Cards passed a crucial stage in the House of Commons. You may feel that ID cards are not something to worry about, since we already have Photo ID for our Passport and Driving License and an ID Card will be no different to that. What you have not been told is the full scope of this proposed ID Card, and what it will mean to you personally. The proposed ID Card will be different from any card you now hold. It will be connected to a database called the NIR, (National Identity Register), where all of your personal details will be stored. This will include the unique number that will be issued to you, your fingerprints, a scan of the back of your eye, and your photograph. Your name, address and date of birth will also obviously be stored there. There will be spaces on this database for your religion, residence status, and many other private and personal facts about you. There is unlimited space for every other details of your life on the NIR database, which can be expanded by the Government with or without further Acts of Parliament. By itself, you might think that this register is harmless, but you would be wrong to come to this conclusion. This new card will be used to check your identity against your entry in the register in real time, whenever you present it to 'prove who you are'. Every place that sells alcohol or cigarettes, every post office, every pharmacy, and every Bank will have an NIR Card Terminal, (very much like the Chip and Pin Readers that are everywhere now) into which your card can be 'swiped' to check your identity. Each time this happens, a record is made at the NIR of the time and place that the Card was presented. This means for example, that there will be a government record of every time you withdraw more than #99 at your branch of NatWest, who now demand ID for these transactions. Every time you have to prove that you are over 18, your card will be swiped, and a record made at the NIR. Restaurants and off licenses will demand that your card is swiped so that each receipt shows that they sold alcohol to someone over 18, and that this was proved by the access to the NIR, indemnifying them from prosecution. Private businesses are going to be given access to the NIR Database. If you want to apply for a job, you will have to present your card fora swipe. If you want to apply for a London Underground Oyster Card, or a supermarket loyalty card, or a driving license you will have to present your ID Card for a swipe. The same goes for getting a telephone line or a mobile phone or an internet account. Oyster, DVLA, BT and Nectar (for example) all run very detailed databases of their own. They will be allowed access to the NIR, just as every other business will be. This means that each of these entities will be able to store your unique number in their database, and place all your travel, phone records, driving activities and detailed shopping habits under your unique NIR number. These databases, which can easily fit on a storage device the size of your hand, will be sold to third parties either legally or illegally. It will then be possible for a non-governmental entity to create a detailed dossier of all your activities. Certainly, the government will have clandestine access to all of them, meaning that they will have a complete record of all your movements, from how much and when you withdraw from your bank account to what medications you are taking, down to the level of what sort of bread you eat - all accessible via a single unique number in a central database. This is quite a significant leap from a simple ID Card that shows your name and face. Most people do not know that this is the true character and scope of the proposed ID Card. Whenever the details of how it will work are explained to them, they quickly change from being ambivalent towards it. The Government is going to COMPEL you to enter your details into the NIR and to carry this card. If you and your children want to obtain or renew your passports, you will be forced to have your fingerprints taken and your eyes scanned for the NIR, and an ID Card will be issued to you whether you want one or not. If you refuse to be fingerprinted and eye scanned, you will not be able to get a passport. Your ID Card will, just like your passport, not be your property. The Home Secretary will have the right to revoke or suspend your ID at any time, meaning that you will not be able to withdraw money from your Bank Account, for example, or do anything that requires you to present your government issued ID Card. The arguments that have been put forwarded in favour of ID Cards can be easily disproved. ID Cards WILL NOT stop terrorists; every Spaniard has a compulsory ID Card as did the Madrid Bombers. ID Cards will not 'eliminate benefit fraud', which in comparison, is small compared to the astronomical cost of this proposal, which will be measured in billions according to the LSE (London School of Economics). This scheme exists solely to exert total surveillance and control over the ordinary free British Citizen, and it will line the pockets of the companies that will create the computer systems at the expense of your freedom, privacy and money. If you did not know the full scope of the proposed ID Card Scheme before and you are as unsettled as I am at what it really means to you, to this country and its way of life, I urge you to email or photocopy this and give it to your friends and colleagues and everyone else you think should know and who cares. The Bill has proceeded to this stage due to the lack of accurate and complete information on this proposal being made public. Together & hand in hand, we can inform the entire nation if everyone who receives this passes it on." John Caswell G R O U P P A R T N E R S ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ THE JC BLOG http://contextualframeworking.blogspot.com/ PA Amanda Bravo +44 (0) 787 964 8080 amanda(a)grouppartners.net Mobile: +44 (0) 778 571 6770 Group Partners Europe 32 St James's Street, London, SW1A 1HD. +44 (0) 20 7925 2111 Group Partners America 15455 North Dallas Parkway, Suite 600, Addison Texas 75001 +1 972-764-3131 fax +1 972-764-5101. Fast Guide: http://www.grouppartners.net/downloads/documents/ publicdocs/GP_THINK_booklet.pdf Web Site: http://www.grouppartners.net "Helping our clients avoid solving the wrong problem really well" ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Freedom reductions thru ID cards
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[liberationtech] Bill Binney, Jacob Appelbaum and Laura Poitras on Democracy Now about NSA
by Samujjal (Shayan) Purkayastha 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.democracynow.org/2012/4/20/whistleblower_the_nsa_is_lying_us National Security Agency whistleblower William Binney reveals he believes domestic surveillance has become more expansive under President Obama than President George W. Bush. He estimates the NSA has assembled 20 trillion "transactions" b phone calls, emails and other forms of data b from Americans. This likely includes copies of almost all of the emails sent and received from most people living in the United States. Binney talks about Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and challenges NSA Director Keith Alexanderbs assertion that the NSA is not intercepting information about U.S. citizens _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Snowhite and the Seven Dwarfs - The REAL story!
by Hahaha 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The original message is kept in: ssl.gcinet.net:/storage3/var/spool/qmailscan/quarantine where the System Anti-Virus Administrator can further diagnose it. The Email scanner reported the following when it scanned that message: --- ---sweep results --- >>> Virus 'W32/Hybris-B' found in file /storage3/var/spool/qmailscan/ssl.gcinet.net9823410827615/sexy_virgin.scr ---

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Re: Two convicted in U.K. for refusal to decrypt data
by Steven W. Orr 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 08/13/09 09:41, quoth the dragon: > If you're in control of the computer the files reside on, and were in > control of it when the files were created and last accessed, the > chances > that you *don't* know the key for the encryption is so slim as to be > nonexistant. Scuze me? I thought this was the gnupg list! I'm sorta new at this stuff but I'm expecting just a bit more expertise from the people contributing to this conversation. First of all, I am running Thunderbird + Enigmail and I have gone out of my way to set "Add my own key to the recipients" to be OFF. I very much want email that I encrypt to others to not be readable by me at all. I am not a child pornographer or a terrorist and I do not have anything to hide except my own personal privacy. My personal choice is that if I send a message to someone and it is encrypted then I do *not*, by default, want to be able to see what I sent in my own sent-mail folder. If I want that option then I can simply Bcc myself when I send it. Second, I happen to be a Defendant in a case in US Federal Court. (Ever heard the phrase "Don't make a Federal case out of it?") They did. And they're right now in the process of losing big time against us. My only regret is that when we were served and I had nothing to hide, I wish that some of my email that I was required to turn over as part of the Discovery process had been encrypted. I would dearly have wanted them to come to me and say "Hey! This is encrypted so you have to decrypt it." and my response would have been "Sorry Your Honor, but I have no ability to decrypt that message. It can only be decrypted by the recipient. And yes, when I first started learning about this stuff, I did initially add my key when encrypting and between Enigmail and gnupg.conf and gpg- agent.conf it actually took a bit to figure out how to shut it off. So, when we talk about "chances that you *don't* know the key for the encryption is so slim as to be nonexistant", I think it's time for a few of us to take a step backwards and remember what the issue is here. As it sits right now, I do *not* know if the people who were in trouble in the UK are the encryptors or the decryptors and I also don't know if the encryptors even added their own keys to the message. - -- Time flies like the wind. Fruit flies like a banana. Stranger things have .0. happened but none stranger than this. Does your driver's license say Organ ..0 Donor?Black holes are where God divided by zero. Listen to me! We are all- 000 individuals! What if this weren't a hypothetical question? steveo at syslang.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iEYEARECAAYFAkqESM4ACgkQRIVy4fC+NyQ5xACfSeTYbNZAX7pqIVd5G2WQaS33 uvMAn2gYIW8xaOIUpKtz+qk23IXM2rsK =pXGO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users(a)gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

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Re: Two convicted in U.K. for refusal to decrypt data
by Steven W. Orr 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 08/13/09 09:41, quoth the dragon: > If you're in control of the computer the files reside on, and were in > control of it when the files were created and last accessed, the > chances > that you *don't* know the key for the encryption is so slim as to be > nonexistant. Scuze me? I thought this was the gnupg list! I'm sorta new at this stuff but I'm expecting just a bit more expertise from the people contributing to this conversation. First of all, I am running Thunderbird + Enigmail and I have gone out of my way to set "Add my own key to the recipients" to be OFF. I very much want email that I encrypt to others to not be readable by me at all. I am not a child pornographer or a terrorist and I do not have anything to hide except my own personal privacy. My personal choice is that if I send a message to someone and it is encrypted then I do *not*, by default, want to be able to see what I sent in my own sent-mail folder. If I want that option then I can simply Bcc myself when I send it. Second, I happen to be a Defendant in a case in US Federal Court. (Ever heard the phrase "Don't make a Federal case out of it?") They did. And they're right now in the process of losing big time against us. My only regret is that when we were served and I had nothing to hide, I wish that some of my email that I was required to turn over as part of the Discovery process had been encrypted. I would dearly have wanted them to come to me and say "Hey! This is encrypted so you have to decrypt it." and my response would have been "Sorry Your Honor, but I have no ability to decrypt that message. It can only be decrypted by the recipient. And yes, when I first started learning about this stuff, I did initially add my key when encrypting and between Enigmail and gnupg.conf and gpg- agent.conf it actually took a bit to figure out how to shut it off. So, when we talk about "chances that you *don't* know the key for the encryption is so slim as to be nonexistant", I think it's time for a few of us to take a step backwards and remember what the issue is here. As it sits right now, I do *not* know if the people who were in trouble in the UK are the encryptors or the decryptors and I also don't know if the encryptors even added their own keys to the message. - -- Time flies like the wind. Fruit flies like a banana. Stranger things have .0. happened but none stranger than this. Does your driver's license say Organ ..0 Donor?Black holes are where God divided by zero. Listen to me! We are all- 000 individuals! What if this weren't a hypothetical question? steveo at syslang.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.10 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iEYEARECAAYFAkqESM4ACgkQRIVy4fC+NyQ5xACfSeTYbNZAX7pqIVd5G2WQaS33 uvMAn2gYIW8xaOIUpKtz+qk23IXM2rsK =pXGO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users(a)gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

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