July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[p2p-hackers] darknet ~= (blacknet, f2f net)
by zooko＠zooko.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

It's a shame that the distinct concepts of "friend-to-friend net" [1] and "blacknet" [2, 3, 4, 5] are being munged together in the media under the rubric "darknet". The word "darknet" was coined, as far as I know, by Biddle, England, Peinado, Willman [6]. Last time I read their paper, it appeared to me to describe a system like Tim May's Blacknet -- an anonymous, secure, decentralized network which is used to transfer information illegally. It didn't mention anything about using friend-to-friend techniques to build such a network. However, the media seems to have started using the word "Darknet" to mean a friend-to-friend net and/or a blacknet [7, 8], thus simultaneously making it harder for people to think about blacknets which are based on other than friend-to-friend architectures and making it harder for people to think about friend-to-friend networks which are used for other than illegal information sharing. I place some of the blame for this development on the Freenet folks, who may be the first to promulgate this munging, and if they aren't the first they're certainly the most effective. Of course, courting controversy in the mass media is part of the Freenet strategy, and I'm not saying it's a bad strategy. But oh well. It is too late to change media usage, and it isn't a good idea to maintain technical jargon which is related to but subtly different from media terminology, so how about us technical folks, when we wish to denote a network-used-for-illegal-information-trading, use the original term "blacknet", and when we wish to denote a network-built-on-friend-to-friend, use "friend-to-friend net" or "f2f", and when we wish to refer to both of them together or to confuse visiting reporters, we use "darknet". Regards, Zooko [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friend-to-friend [2] http://www.privacyexchange.org/iss/confpro/cfpuntraceable.html [3] http://www.ussrback.com/crypto/misc/blacknet.html [4] http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ludlow/worries.txt [5] http://cypherpunks.venona.com/date/1993/08/msg00538.html [6] http://www.bearcave.com/misl/misl_tech/msdrm/darknet.htm [7] http://www.darknet.com/ [8] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darknet _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)zgp.org http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers _______________________________________________ Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[Politech] More revelations about Bush and NSA domestic surveillance: a roundup [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Tangentially-related article about judge approving cell phone monitoring without requiring prosecutors to show evidence of probable cause: http://news.com.com/Police+blotter+Judge+lets+Feds+track+cell+phones/2100-1… 8_3-6006453.html How extensive is NSA's spy program: http://news.com.com/Just+how+extensive+is+NSAs+spy+program/2100-1028_3-6006… 6.html An earlier roundup of blog posts: http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/12/nsa_surveillanc.html Articles asking whether President Bush commited an impeachable offense: http://www.cnsnews.com/news/viewstory.asp?Page=%5CPolitics%5Carchive%5C2005… %5CPOL20051220a.html http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/12/24/MNGBOGD4FF1.DTL http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,179323,00.html Previous Politech message: http://www.politechbot.com/2005/12/20/transcript-of-briefing/ http://www.politechbot.com/2005/12/20/two-submissions-on/ http://www.politechbot.com/2005/12/21/democrats-scramble-to/ -Declan -------- Original Message -------- Subject: HAVE YOU SEEN THIS? NY Times on NSA data mining Date: Sat, 24 Dec 2005 00:27:35 -0800 From: Philip Merrill <veyr(a)earthlink.net> To: Fred von Lohmann EFF <fred(a)eff.org>, Cory Doctorow <cory(a)eff.org>, Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Fred, Cory, Declan, http://nytimes.com/2005/12/24/politics/24spy.html Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report By ERIC LICHTBLAU and JAMES RISEN Published: December 24, 2005 ... A former technology manager at a major telecommunications company said that since the Sept. 11 attacks, the leading companies in the industry have been storing information on calling patterns and giving it to the federal government to aid in tracking possible terrorists. "All that data is mined with the cooperation of the government and shared with them, and since 9/11, there's been much more active involvement in that area," said the former manager, a telecommunications expert who did not want his name or that of his former company used because of concern about revealing trade secrets. Such information often proves just as valuable to the government as eavesdropping on the calls themselves, the former manager said. "If they get content, that's useful to them too, but the real plum is going to be the transaction data and the traffic analysis," he said. "Massive amounts of traffic analysis information - who is calling whom, who is in Osama Bin Laden's circle of family and friends - is used to identify lines of communication that are then given closer scrutiny." ... Phil Karn, a computer engineer and technology expert at a major West Coast telecommunications company, said access to such switches would be significant. "If the government is gaining access to the switches like this, what you're really talking about is the capability of an enormous vacuum operation to sweep up data," he said. [BY THE WAY guys, here is an e-mail I just sent about this: "This is truly interesting and not surprising from a technical point of view. As someone who looks at how ISPs are treated, it explains things I already knew. In terms of any positive potential for the future, it just shows what a different world we are now living in that this is even possible. My MUSIC bias is to try to figure out how musicians can get paid based on today's technology. Puts the attached-below news article in a different light."] -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Reliability of information from telephone wiretaps Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 10:09:48 -0800 From: Alan Barclay <barclay(a)rtda.com> Organization: Runtime Design Automation To: declan(a)well.com CC: bankston(a)eff.org Hello Declan:- I came across a very interesting paper on wiretap evasion by Matt Blaze (UPenn) at the following URL. http://www.doxpara.com/?q=node&from=0 I particularly think that the legal implications on the reliability of information obtained by phone wiretaps may be far-reaching, and of interest to Politech readers. Especially given the current administration's demonstrated record of vindictiveness, I agree with Dan's conjecture about Matt's cojones. News article (incorrectly attributed to NY Times in above): http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/30/business/taps.php Summary of paper: http://www.crypto.com/papers/wiretapping/ Full paper http://www.crypto.com/papers/wiretap.pdf Best wishes for the holiday season and for the New Year. Thanks again for running Politech. Regards, Alan Barclay -- --Alan Barclay-- barclay(a)rtda.com (408) 492-0942 direct www.rtda.com (408) 492-0940 main -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [Politech] Democrats scramble to say they didn't tacitly approve Bush's NSA surveillance [priv] Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 12:21:27 -0800 From: Benjamin SMITH <b3smith(a)mac.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> References: <43A99CEB.4010509(a)well.com> Uh, Declan, the handful of Congresspeople who were even able to see the Administration's plans with the NSA were barred from discussing it even with their staffs, and others (like Senator Graham of FL) said that the briefings were much less informative than what was revealed in Friday's article in the NYT. Cherry-picked information, limited access... wait a minute, that sounds familiar... -b3n -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [Politech] Democrats scramble to say they didn't tacitly approve Bush's NSA surveillance [priv] Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 14:33:06 -0500 From: Eric Gasior <eric(a)tastysnackcracker.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> References: <43A99CEB.4010509(a)well.com> Declan, In fairness it should be pointed out that the briefings were classified therefore the ability of Rockefeller and Pelosi to inform others was limited. >From Sen. Rockefeller's statement on 12/19: "The limited members who were told of the program were prohibited by the Administration from sharing any information about it with our colleagues, including other members of the Intelligence Committees." http://rockefeller.senate.gov/news/2005/pr121905a.html Eric Gasior "First of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself - nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance." -- Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1933 -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [Politech] One more submission on Bush authorizing secret surveillance Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 16:02:18 EST From: MarkKernes(a)aol.com To: declan(a)well.com http://www.avn.com/index.php?Primary_Navigation=Articles&Action=View_Articl… Content_ID=251800 News Analysis: Why You Should Be Worried About Bush's Illegal Wiretaps By Mark Kernes 12-19-2005 WASHINGTON, D.C. ? In his annual end-of-the-year speech delivered on Saturday, President Bush admitted to having committed at least 30 federal crimes by having issued an executive order authorizing the National Security Agency to intercept the international communications of people, including U.S. citizens (known in the law as "United States persons"), with known links to Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, and renewing that order, according to one report, more than 36 times. Each renewal could be considered by a court to constitute a separate crime. [snip] Mark Kernes, AVN "Those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to have them repeated for them." ? Me -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [Politech] Two submissions on Bush authorizing secret surveillance by National Security Agency [priv] Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 23:38:20 -0500 (EST) From: Dean Anderson <dean(a)av8.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> CC: politech(a)politechbot.com FYI, its my read of the news on this issue the Whitehouse is claiming that the authorization to 'use any and all means appropriate to fight terrorism' supercedes the FISA and all other laws governing wiretapping, and indeed, I think they interpret it to be authorization to supercede all other laws governing anything else as well. This interpretation, if actually the position of the Whitehouse, is far more disturbing than tapping Americans talking/emailing foriegners internationally. In the case of tapping international calls and emails, there is ambiguity as to whether FISA applies anyway. In 1978, tapping was done on wires. It had to be done on the caller or the called. That is, in the US or outside the US. Suppose we tapped Osama's phone, physically in Afghanistan, and an American contact was made, FISA wouldn't apply. However, if we tapped the American (or more likely, a foriegner) physically in the US, hopping a contact would be made, FISA would apply. But modern surveillance is done differently because telecom is also different, now. In the case of modern international call, the tapping is probably done from space, using a satellite, or an undersea cable. And modern tapping can essentially scan all calls/emails for keywords. FISA covers surveillance done in the US. If the surveillance is done outside the US then FISA doesn't apply. Arguably, these interceptions might occur outside the US. But---I don't think this argument has been raised in this case. Rather, the Whitehouse seems to be claiming that it has congressional authorization for carte blanch superceding all prior laws incluing FISA. --Dean _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [tor-talk] Postfix + Tor (Was: remailers)
by Maxim Kammerer 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I would imagine this sort of thing to be useful for, say, NGOs and people in the field to have > a secure decentralised email infrastructure. You don't need mail servers for such an infrastructure over networks like Tor and I2P, where nodes can have persistent addresses b see cables communication in LibertC) Linux, which sends messages directly between hidden services / eepsites: http://dee.su/cables. -- Maxim Kammerer LibertC) Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute) _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Chromebooks for Risky Situations?
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Brian Conley: > Micah, > > Perhaps you can tell us the secret to convince all family members and > colleagues to become Linux hackers able to be completely self-sufficient > managing their own upgrades and modifications indefinitely? Stop supporting the use of non-free software? We're all part of the problem when we help people to be less free and to use proprietary software or proprietary services. This is both an education and a problem with enabling. We all suffer from it, I think. When we encourage people to say, buy a Macbook or a Chromebook because we're happy to support it over say, Windows, we're making things worse. Largely because the choice is actually between Free Software and proprietary software or free software on devices where we're not actually able to exercise all of our freedoms. Thus, when we aren't helping people to get off of the non-free platforms or to reduce our dependency on non-free software, we're basically not doing a great job at educating people that we care about and otherwise wish to support. When we pass the buck, we're enabling them with harmful, sometimes seriously so, solutions. > > Otherwise what is your point? > This essay seems like a longer version of what Micah has expressed: http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.html I also suggest reading these two essays by RMS: http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/shouldbefree.html http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/when_free_software_isnt_practically_better.ht… He is also talking about how the threats to a user might include Google itself (eg: my legal cases!) or perhaps even the network you're using (hint: ChromeOS has no way to protect you against such an attacker, so no, it isn't safe to use everywhere or perhaps anywhere depending on your trust of the local network). > It seems like you are being needlessly confrontational or outright ignoring > the quite reasonable counter arguments to various linux OSes,Ubuntu/gentoo/ > etc etc being made here. Most of arguments I've heard here boil down to privileged wealthy people complaining that learning and mutual aid or solidarity is simply too hard. The worst is when people who train people in risky situations make those kinds of statements. It's frankly, really and seriously embarrassing. All the best, Jake > On Feb 6, 2013 7:09 PM, "micah anderson" <micah(a)riseup.net> wrote: > >> Andy Isaacson <adi(a)hexapodia.org> writes: >> >>> On Wed, Feb 06, 2013 at 10:52:23AM -0500, micah anderson wrote: >>>>> - ChromeOS's update mechanism is automatic, transparent, and basically >>>>> foolproof. Having bricked Ubuntu and Gentoo systems, the same is not >>>>> true of Linux. >>>> >>>> I would be surprised if you actually 'bricked' these systems, since >>>> neither operating system you mention involves a procedure that has the >>>> risk of bricking a device. I suspect this is hyperbole? >>> >>> I've had dist-upgrade (or the GUI equivalent) make an Ubuntu system >>> unbootable and unrecoverable without recourse to a rescue-image and deep >>> magic grub hacking, etc. That counts as "bricked" when the easiest >>> course of action is to simply reinstall the OS from scratch. It's not >>> "bricked" in the sense that an Android install gone awry can require >>> specialized hardware (JTAG dongle etc) and crypto keys to fix, but it's >>> equivalent from a user's point of view. >> >> I understand where you are going with this, but when it comes to >> terminology, I think it serves to confuse the issue to misuse the term >> 'brick'. You cannot, as you say, "simply reinstall the OS from scratch" >> on a device that has been bricked. >> >> I can't wait for the day when Google accidentally pushes an update out >> that actually bricks their devices, because when that happens, there is >> no way to "simply reinstall the OS from scratch". >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > > > > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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UK must balance surveillance and data collection with privacy
by Ali, Saqib 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Britain's House of Lords Constitution Committee released a report Friday saying that the country's use of widespread video surveillance and personal data collection pose a threat to citizens' privacy and freedom. The committee said that while such surveillance and data collection could serve legitimate law-enforcement purposes, those interests should be balanced against privacy concerns, including Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The committee also issued specific recommendations that DNA data on individuals be consolidated to the National DNA Database, and that closed-circuit television surveillance only be used under strict oversight and where it has been shown to be effective. More info: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/02/uk-must-balance-surveillance-… http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/18.pdf saqib http://www.capital-punishment.net --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [declan@well.com: [Politech] E.U. Parliament votes to force "data
by Jeffrey F. Bloss 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

retention" on telecom, Net firms [priv]] User-Agent: KMail/1.7 Reply-To: or-talk(a)freehaven.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Thursday 15 December 2005 02:49 am, David Benfell wrote: > On Thu, 15 Dec 2005 01:20:19 -0500, Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote: > > > With this new logging in place XYZ might be able to force law enforcement > > to perform a simple query of the data to discover exactly who is posting > > the information. It's a simple (?) matter of searching for connection > > times to the blog, and comparing them to times that "Joe" makes > > connections to a Tor node. If Joe builds a new circuit at 2PM and the > > blog is updated at 2:00:01 PM, and this relationship can be demonstrated > > for some period of time, it's pretty clear that it won't take 6 months of > > data to prove beyond any reasonable doubt Joe is the blog owner. > > Suppose the blog is hosted outside Europe, and the blog software > introduces a random delay before actually posting Joe's entry? Sure, anything that removes influence or power from an "attacker" is a generally good thing, but... Jurisdictional borders aren't the panacea they use to be, if they ever really were. Treaties and agreements between nations can make collecting information from foreign sources a matter of an attorney filing the proper form in triplicate. In some number of places that depends completely on specific laws governing each jurisdiction, this is even an advantage for some attackers because getting around local laws and/or security is more difficult than simply asking a foreign official to collect the information for you. There's a depressingly increasing number of jurisdictions where some appointed official can walk through the door and confiscate, log, back door, etc any system on nothing more than a whim. It's theorized that this is why things like ECHELON were deployed outside US borders... to circumvent requirements like showing cause and obtaining warrants. This isn't to say that there's no jurisdictions that might make you safer, just that they're few, far between, and not near as safe as they once were. In fact, I don't believe mandatory logging is anything new even within EU Member Nations. I believe for some of them this is a step backwards if they're somehow restricted to the 6/12 month and "connection only" logging dictated by this new policy. The *real* threat is in the organization and broad scope of the thing. It will effectively transform all of Europe and then some, into one big surveillance tool. :( Anyway, the latency thing probably wouldn't make much difference at all either. It might fool a casual observer who is assessing the published content, but with these sweeping logging requirements there's no need to wait for the page to change when you hit the [refresh] button. ;-) The blog owner logging in to make the changes is what's being automagically logged, or what can be "force" logged from outside a jurisdiction. And half the puzzle is already relatively trivial to solve due to the forced connection logging. You have to assume that an attacker will absolutely know either the origin, or the destination of every packet, and have the ability to do what they will with that data. It's also important to note that blogging was just an out-of-thin-air example, and other types of communications can't be subject to any similar sort of latency. That's my semi-literate layperson's take on things. This EU logging policy is a problem of great concern as I see it. In theory at least, it could make Tor and any other similar distributed "anonymous" network completely and utterly useless for serious users in that jurisdiction, and far less secure for people who cross those jurisdictional lines in either direction. - -- Hand crafted on December 15, 2005 at 12:09:56 -0500 Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend. Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read. -Groucho Marx -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFDoa80RHqalLqKnCkRAmBfAJ40LDCQWPe7+Qn/BiTDXnPpTQBNGQCdHXvo o11JZbb9ft0AuBvclLnNW9I= =0Oh3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Why Should Feds Track College Students?
by EEkid＠aol.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.courant.com/news/opinion/op_ed/hc- khwill0731.artjul31,0,984479.story?coll=hc-headlines-oped Why Should Feds Track College Students? July 31, 2006 Does the federal government need to know whether you aced Aristotelian ethics but had to repeat introductory biology? Does it need to know your family's financial profile, how much aid you received and whether you took off a semester to help out at home? The Secretary of Education's Commission on the Future of Higher Education thinks so. In its first draft report, released in late June, the commission called for creation of a tracking system to collect sensitive information about our nation's college students. Its second draft, made public last week, softens the name of the plan, but the essence of the proposal remains unchanged. Whether you call it a "national unit records database" (the first name) or a "consumer-friendly information database" (the second), it is in fact a mandatory federal registry of all American students throughout their collegiate careers - every course, every step, every misstep. Once established, it could easily be linked to existing K-12 and workforce databases to create unprecedented cradle-to-grave tracking of American citizens. All under the watchful eye of the federal government. The commission calls our nation's colleges and universities unaccountable, inefficient and inaccessible. In response it seeks to institute collection of personal information designed to quantify our students' performance in college and in the workforce. But many of us are concerned about invading our students' privacy by feeding confidential educational and personal data, linked to Social Security numbers, into a mandatory national database. Such a database would wrest control over educational records from students and hand it to the government. I'd like the commission to tell me how our students would benefit from our reporting confidential family financial information. Those of us in higher education aren't the only ones with concerns about this. Earlier this month, the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities released results of a survey that showed the majority of Americans oppose creation of a national system to track students' academic, enrollment and financial aid information. More than 60 percent of those polled opposed the creation of such a system, and 45 percent of those surveyed were "strongly opposed" to the proposal. Privacy groups from both ends of the political spectrum - including the Eagle Forum and the American Civil Liberties Union - criticized an early form of the proposal that Education Department officials were exploring in 2004. We already have efficient systems in place to collect educational statistics. I question why the commission, which shares our concerns about the increased cost of education, would want to create a database that not only violates privacy but also would be very expensive. Our existing systems meet the government's need to inform public policy without intruding on student privacy because they report the data in aggregate form. Colleges and universities report on virtually every aspect of our students' experience - retention and graduation rates, financial aid rates and degrees conferred by major institutions - to the federal and state governments as well as to organizations such as the NCAA and to many publications. The commission seems bent on its Orwellian scheme of collecting extensively detailed, very personal student data. Supporters say it would make higher education more accountable and more affordable for students. Admirable goals, but a strange and forbidding solution. This proposal is a violation of the right to privacy that Americans hold dear. It is against the law. Moreover, there is a mountain of data already out there that can help us understand higher education and its efficacy. And, finally, implementation of such a database, which at its inception would hold "unit" record data on 17 million students, would be an unfunded mandate on institutions and add greatly to the expense of education. At a time when the world acknowledges the strength of the American system of higher education - that it is decentralized, diverse, competitive and independent - why would a commission on the future of higher education want to impose federal regulations and federal bureaucratic monitoring of individual students in the name of "improving" higher education? Katherine Haley Will is president of Gettysburg College and chairwoman-elect of the Annapolis Group, an organization of leading independent liberal arts colleges. This first appeared in The Washington Post. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Why Should Feds Track College Students?
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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UK must balance surveillance and data collection with privacy
by Ali, Saqib 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Britain's House of Lords Constitution Committee released a report Friday saying that the country's use of widespread video surveillance and personal data collection pose a threat to citizens' privacy and freedom. The committee said that while such surveillance and data collection could serve legitimate law-enforcement purposes, those interests should be balanced against privacy concerns, including Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The committee also issued specific recommendations that DNA data on individuals be consolidated to the National DNA Database, and that closed-circuit television surveillance only be used under strict oversight and where it has been shown to be effective. More info: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/02/uk-must-balance-surveillance-… http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/18.pdf saqib http://www.capital-punishment.net --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [declan@well.com: [Politech] E.U. Parliament votes to force "data
by Jeffrey F. Bloss 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

retention" on telecom, Net firms [priv]] User-Agent: KMail/1.7 Reply-To: or-talk(a)freehaven.net -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Thursday 15 December 2005 02:49 am, David Benfell wrote: > On Thu, 15 Dec 2005 01:20:19 -0500, Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote: > > > With this new logging in place XYZ might be able to force law enforcement > > to perform a simple query of the data to discover exactly who is posting > > the information. It's a simple (?) matter of searching for connection > > times to the blog, and comparing them to times that "Joe" makes > > connections to a Tor node. If Joe builds a new circuit at 2PM and the > > blog is updated at 2:00:01 PM, and this relationship can be demonstrated > > for some period of time, it's pretty clear that it won't take 6 months of > > data to prove beyond any reasonable doubt Joe is the blog owner. > > Suppose the blog is hosted outside Europe, and the blog software > introduces a random delay before actually posting Joe's entry? Sure, anything that removes influence or power from an "attacker" is a generally good thing, but... Jurisdictional borders aren't the panacea they use to be, if they ever really were. Treaties and agreements between nations can make collecting information from foreign sources a matter of an attorney filing the proper form in triplicate. In some number of places that depends completely on specific laws governing each jurisdiction, this is even an advantage for some attackers because getting around local laws and/or security is more difficult than simply asking a foreign official to collect the information for you. There's a depressingly increasing number of jurisdictions where some appointed official can walk through the door and confiscate, log, back door, etc any system on nothing more than a whim. It's theorized that this is why things like ECHELON were deployed outside US borders... to circumvent requirements like showing cause and obtaining warrants. This isn't to say that there's no jurisdictions that might make you safer, just that they're few, far between, and not near as safe as they once were. In fact, I don't believe mandatory logging is anything new even within EU Member Nations. I believe for some of them this is a step backwards if they're somehow restricted to the 6/12 month and "connection only" logging dictated by this new policy. The *real* threat is in the organization and broad scope of the thing. It will effectively transform all of Europe and then some, into one big surveillance tool. :( Anyway, the latency thing probably wouldn't make much difference at all either. It might fool a casual observer who is assessing the published content, but with these sweeping logging requirements there's no need to wait for the page to change when you hit the [refresh] button. ;-) The blog owner logging in to make the changes is what's being automagically logged, or what can be "force" logged from outside a jurisdiction. And half the puzzle is already relatively trivial to solve due to the forced connection logging. You have to assume that an attacker will absolutely know either the origin, or the destination of every packet, and have the ability to do what they will with that data. It's also important to note that blogging was just an out-of-thin-air example, and other types of communications can't be subject to any similar sort of latency. That's my semi-literate layperson's take on things. This EU logging policy is a problem of great concern as I see it. In theory at least, it could make Tor and any other similar distributed "anonymous" network completely and utterly useless for serious users in that jurisdiction, and far less secure for people who cross those jurisdictional lines in either direction. - -- Hand crafted on December 15, 2005 at 12:09:56 -0500 Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend. Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read. -Groucho Marx -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFDoa80RHqalLqKnCkRAmBfAJ40LDCQWPe7+Qn/BiTDXnPpTQBNGQCdHXvo o11JZbb9ft0AuBvclLnNW9I= =0Oh3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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